


Published Quarterly

JOURNAL
of the
**Royal United Service
Institution.**



Vol. LX., No. 440.—NOVEMBER, 1915.



PUBLISHED AT THE

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
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CONTENTS FOR NOVEMBER, 1915.

- FRONTISPIECES. (a) THE FOOT OF TOO-TOO AND THE RANGE OF THE SUFED KOH FROM THE HILL WHERE THE LAST STAND WAS MADE BY THE REMNANT OF THE CABUL FORCE. (see page 450).
(b) SKETCH OF THE HILL WHERE THE LAST STAND WAS MADE BY THE REMNANT OF THE CABUL FORCE, FROM THE ENTRANCE TO THE GUNDAMUCK PASS. (see page 450).
- SECRETARY'S NOTES v—vi
- NAVAL WAR PAST AND PRESENT. By ADMIRAL THE HON. SIR E. R. FREMANTLE, G.C.B., C.M.G.... .. 285
- TURKISH ARABIA AS A LINK OF EMPIRE. By COLONEL A. C. YATE ... 307
- CONCERNING FIGURE-HEADS. By COLONEL CYRIL FIELD, R.M.Lt.INF. (Rtd.) 315
- WITH GENERAL BOTHA IN SOUTH AFRICA. I.—THE REBELLION: WITH ENSLIN'S HORSE. II.—IN GERMAN SOUTH-WEST. By G.D.H. ... 323
- THE BRITISH CAPTURE OF GENOA, 1814. By C. T. ATKINSON; CAPTAIN, OXFORD UNIVERSITY O.T.C. 331
- CASUAL RAMBLES IN THE MUSEUM OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION. By COMMANDER W. F. CABORNE, C.B., R.N.R. ... 345
- THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE CONTINENT. TRANSLATED FROM *Le Temps* ... 361
- THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCIENCE OF MINE-SWEEPING. TRANSLATED FROM *Nauticus* FOR 1914 383

Continued on Page 3.

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
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CONTENTS—continued from page 1.

11. LETTERS CONCERNING THE 44TH REGIMENT DURING THE RETREAT FROM CABUL IN THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR. FROM A MANUSCRIPT LENT BY MRS. DE WEND	404
12. DIARY OF LIEUTENANT C. F. TROWER, 3RD BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY, DURING THE AFGHAN WAR OF 1842. FROM A MS. IN THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION	442
13. THE WAR AND GERMAN UNIVERSITIES. By FRANCIS H. SKRINE, F.R.HIST.S.	469
14. THE WAR: ITS NAVAL SIDE	474
15. THE WAR: ITS MILITARY SIDE	500
16. APPENDICES V., VI., VII., VIII. AND IX. DESPATCHES FROM THE FIELD-MARSHAL COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF THE BRITISH FORCES; AND FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING THE MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE	502
17. CORRESPONDENCE	564
18. PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY	565
19. NOTICES OF BOOKS	566

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
THE FOOT OF TOO TOO AND THE RANGE OF THE SUFED KOH, FROM THE HILL WHERE THE LAST STAND WAS MADE BY THE REMNANT OF THE CABUL FORCE: ABOUT FOUR MILES FROM GUNDAMUCK. SEPTEMBER 18TH, 1842.

[See page 450.]



SKETCH OF THE HILL WHERE THE LAST STAND WAS MADE BY THE REMNANT OF THE CABUL FORCE, FROM THE ENTRANCE TO THE GUNDAMUCK PASS. SEPTEMBER 20TH, 1842.

[See page 450.]



SECRETARY'S NOTES.

I.—Council.

The Council regret to announce the death of Major-General F. D. V. Wing, C.B., R.A., who was killed in France a few weeks ago. General Wing joined the Institution in 1904, and became a Member of the Council in 1910, and while he was at the War Office he rendered much valuable assistance to the Institution.

II.—Officers Joined.

The following officers joined the Institution during the months of August, September and October :—

Lieutenant V. A. Ewart, R.N.

Second-Lieutenant T. D. Kenrick, Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

Captain V. O. Robinson, 6th Battalion The Sherwood Foresters (T.F.).

Commander W. Hawkes-Strugnell, R.N.

Captain E. H. Heathcote, 6th Bn. Sherwood Foresters (T.F.).

The Council regret to report that since the commencement of the war 302 Members of the Institution have either been killed or have died of wounds. This, of course, makes a large decrease in the membership of the Institution, and the Council hope, therefore, that Members will use every endeavour to induce officers to join.

III.—Journal.

As it is not possible to hold any lectures in the Theatre, the question of the regular issue of the JOURNAL will largely depend on contributions received from Members and others.

IV.—Payment for Contributions to the Journal.

It is notified that the Council of the Institution have with much pleasure decided to offer some remuneration to Members (and to non-members) for accepted contributions to the JOURNAL. A sum, not exceeding £30 per quarter, has been for this purpose placed at the disposal of the Library and Journal Committee.

V.—Distribution of the Journal—Members' Addresses.

Owing to the war, Members' addresses have become so uncertain, and are so constantly changing, that punctual distribution of the JOURNAL is quite impracticable, and many Members must fail to receive their copies. As a matter of fact, a great many copies of the last number have been returned to the Institution through the Post Office, "Addressee not found." It is notified, therefore, that any Member who does not receive a copy of the present issue can be supplied by applying to the Secretary, and giving an address.

VI.—War Relics.

The Council would be greatly obliged if any Member possessing relics from the seat of war would kindly present or deposit same on loan for exhibition in the Museum. As the space in the Museum is very limited, they should not be of very large dimensions.

VII.—Additions to the Museum.

- (6766) Distinguished Service Cross given to Naval Officers, instituted in 1914.
- (6767) Lance which was used at the Siege of Bhurtpoor in 1826. It is the first English lance which was used with effect in action in India, and was issued to the 16th Light Dragoons (Lancers).—Bequeathed by the late Captain A. J. Armstrong, late 16th Lancers.
- (6768) The Badge of the Distinguished Service Order.—Presented by His Majesty the King.
- (6769) Two pieces of a German Zeppelin picked up with others in England. They are supposed to be portions of a petrol tank.—Given by the Army Council.
- (6770) Badge of the Military Cross instituted in 1914.—Given by the Army Council.
- (6771) Shako Plate of the 88th Foot worn during the Crimean War.—Given by Major A. Moss.
- (6772) Base of 17-inch German Shell. This shell was fired into Ypres on August 9th, 1915, during the attack of the 6th Division on Hooge. It fell on the road running round the town ramparts within 20 yards of the Headquarters of the 1st N. Midland Brigade, R.F.A. (T.F.), making a crater 47 feet in diameter and 16 feet deep.—Given by the officers, N.C.O.'s and men of the 1st N. Midland Brigade, R.F.A. (T.F.).
- (6773) Base of 15-inch German Shell. This fragment was picked up near Zillebeke, East of Ypres, on July 9th, 1915, by the donor.—Given by Major-General J. A. L. Haldane, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the 3rd Division.
- (6774) Portions of German Shells and Fuses.—Given by Major-General J. A. L. Haldane, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the 3rd Division.
- (6775) Two Chinese Mortars of ancient date, brought from Peking by the donor in 1900. They were mounted on the walls of that city.—Given by General Sir A. Gaselee, G.C.B., G.C.I.E.
- (6776) A German Sailor's Leave Pass for Boatswain's Mate Wolff, dated September 7th, 1915. It was dropped in England from a Zeppelin airship on the following day.—Given by the Army Council.

The attention of Members is drawn to the Museum Purchase Fund.

The amount taken at the Museum Public Entrance during August was £74 8s. 6d.; September, £57 14s. 6d.; October, £48 3s. od.

THE JOURNAL

OF THE

Royal United Service Institution.

VOL. LX.

NOVEMBER, 1915.

No. 440.

[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers. All communications (except those for perusal by the Editor only) should be addressed to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution.]

NAVAL WAR PAST AND PRESENT.

By ADMIRAL THE HON. SIR E. R. FREMANTLE, G.C.B., C.M.G.

THE facts of the successful mobilization of the navy in August last year are too well known to need repetition in detail, but it is certain that for once the British Navy was fully prepared for war when the storm burst, and it is well to note how it compares with our former experiences.

We must not, however, claim too much for our successful efforts at the expense of former periods of history, though the contrast is startling, as it is mainly the result of modern progress which has forced on all nations the necessity for preparing in peace for war, which our ancestors did not consider necessary or attempted in a perfunctory and desultory manner.

Times have changed in this as in many other respects; the advance of science and the consequent more comprehensive and intricate material at disposal urgently demanded preparation beforehand, so that Clausewitz, Bernhardi, and others were induced to consider peace as only an interlude between wars which could be used for quiet preparation for the clash of arms. Germany, as we know, has been preparing for war systematically for forty years, and the allied nations now in arms against her were forced to follow her example, though with far less consistency and regularity. In England this meant that our insular security, our ocean Empire, and our relations with the Dominions beyond the seas, rendered it necessary that our maritime supremacy should be maintained, and, though the army might be reduced, and to some extent neglected, it was left to

a few cranks to deny the necessity for a powerful navy—"Ready, aye, ready," in old sailor language, for all emergencies.

Fortunately, then, the navy was ready in August last year, and that it was fully complete at that time and prepared for all emergencies has been attributed to Mr. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, and to Prince Louis of Battenberg, the First Sea Lord. I must here refer to a somewhat barren controversy which has arisen in relation to the share taken by Mr. Churchill and Prince Louis respectively for the satisfactory result that the navy was not caught napping, but was, in fact, far more ready than were our adversaries, though they had counted on dealing blows to our fleet before it could be concentrated. I have called it a barren controversy, as it is quite evident that in this case, at all events, the civilian and naval head were of one mind.

The assembling of the entire fleet at Spithead for the inspection of the King, and the test mobilization of the reserves, was carried out on July 15th and two following days, and was successful, but shortly before the declaration of war the reserves had gone home, the First Fleet, then at Portland, had been ordered to disperse to its respective ports to give manœuvre leave, and the Second Fleet had dispersed to the home ports, the balance crews returning to barracks. This was the state of affairs on Sunday, July 26th, when matters appeared so threatening that Prince Louis thought it necessary to telegraph to Sir George Callaghan, who was then, and had been for three and a-half years, in command of the First Fleet, to "Stand fast" at Portland and await further orders. Mr. Churchill was then in the country, but he returned to town that evening and approved of Prince Louis' action. The First Fleet sailed from Portland on July 29th, and throughout the world our ships were ordered to their war stations.

War having been declared by Germany on Russia on August 1st, all naval reserves were called out on the following morning, and on the evening of August 3rd the Admiralty were able to report as follows:—

"The mobilization of the British Navy was completed in all respects at 4 o'clock this morning. This is due to the measures taken and to the voluntary response of the reserve men in advance of the Royal Proclamation which has now been issued. The entire navy is now on a war footing."

From a letter from Prince Louis we know that the possibility of action being taken to keep the fleet fully manned had been contemplated by Mr. Churchill, and that he felt sure of the First Lord's approval. At the same time, the first decisive step was taken by the First Sea Lord, and, in view of his well-known appreciation of international politics, we may fairly credit him with it. On the other hand, Mr. Churchill had the duty of defending the first warlike action taken on this side of the Channel, and possibly he preferred this to asking for authority to do so at the Cabinet Meeting.

This is important, as I know that when peace and war hung in the balance during the Fashoda crisis, our Government insisted on there being no preparation or movement of ships which might be interpreted as readiness for hostile action. There is, indeed, often a danger in this country that, in our determination not to provoke a war, we may fail to take necessary preparatory steps, but it was less dangerous in the instance quoted as it was known that the French were unprepared, and though the ships were scattered the manning arrangements were satisfactory, so that any loss of time could be made up.

Before leaving the question of mobilization it is well to point out that the satisfactory result is due to constant attention and organization for many years past both at the Admiralty and by the local Manning Committees at the naval ports.

What I have mentioned above refers to what is generally understood by mobilization of the fleet, but modern warfare demands more and more auxiliaries of various sorts, without which a navy, however powerful, is as helpless as a motor car without provision for replenishment of petrol. It has long been a shipping truism that freights are high in war time on account of the demands on our mercantile marine for colliers, store ships, provision ships and other auxiliaries.

As long ago as the Armada anxiety was felt by our ships at Plymouth from the non-arrival of overdue store ships, and in Hawke's time the delay of expected victuallers after the glorious action of Quiberon Bay gave rise to the amusing sailor's distich:—

“ Ere Hawk did bang McConflans,
You sent us beef and beer;
Now Monsieur's beat we've nought to eat,
Since you have nought to fear,”

the seamen believing that they were forgotten after the action. But this is a digression. If auxiliaries were necessary in sailing days, how much more are they required in modern times! Nor can they all be improvised after the declaration of war; and the Admiralty had taken steps to fit ships as mine-layers, trawlers as mine-sweepers, repair ships, mother ships for destroyers, submarines and aeroplanes, etc., but, besides ships already provided, the demands for colliers, store ships, and hospital ships were numerous, and they wisely commissioned fast liners, yachts and smaller vessels as auxiliary cruisers or patrol vessels.

The number of vessels so employed is shown by a list occupying forty-eight pages in the January “Navy List,” and a Royal Naval Motor Boat Reserve was established for inshore work. By these means not only was the North Sea and seas adjacent to the British Isles soon swarming with cruisers, but no step was omitted to make sure that the ocean should be occupied by British cruisers. It is to Mr. Churchill's credit that this action was taken, rendered so specially necessary in home waters by the enemy's submarines, but the Admiralty are to be congratulated on the prompt steps taken for trade protection

which some theorists held could wait until after the enemy's main fleet had been destroyed!

In Lord Sydenham's words to the Navy League in March last, "One of the most startling features of this war was the employment of the general maritime resources of the country, and the seafaring population drawn upon for dangerous duties had shown great heroism."

Officers from the retired lists of the navy, and Royal Naval Reserve, have been called upon and have zealously come forward to command and officer all these auxiliaries, so that we have retired flag officers and captains in charge of yachts and patrol vessels and performing executive functions at the various ports round our coasts. An instance of the extent to which this has been carried is shown by the name of Lieut.-Commander H. Gartside-Tipping appearing recently in the Roll of Honour as having been killed in action. This officer, though sixty-seven years of age, was no doubt active and competent and had devoted much of his life to the benefit of men of the mercantile marine.

These details show that Mr. Churchill was justified in claiming that our premier service was quite as well prepared for war afloat as was the German Army on land. The exploits of the German submarines have given rise to a notion, especially in America, that our enemy had forestalled us in submarine development; but, as a matter of fact, we had 90 submarines completed to Germany's 48, so that Mr. Balfour's reminder that they were not a German invention was much to the point. In aeroplanes and seaplanes, again, much was due to Mr. Churchill's enthusiasm for aerial development, though we were late in appreciating the value of these necessary adjuncts to war by land or sea in this country. A question arises whether we were right in neglecting the airship which may yet prove to be of greater value than we are inclined to admit. It is a technical question on which I am not competent to give an opinion, but it seems to me that we have too easily discarded the idea of the airship, and that we may yet find that some form of dirigible, not necessarily a monster Zeppelin, may have important functions, one of which would be the detection and possible destruction of submarines. However, I am glad to see that Mr. Frederick A. Talbot in his recent work, "Aeroplanes and Dirigibles in War," sums up the question as follows:—

"So far the stern test of war as applied to the science of aeronautics has emphasized the fact that as a naval unit the dirigible is a complete failure. Whether experience will bring about a modification of these views time alone will show, but it is certain that existing principles of design will have to undergo a radical revision to achieve any notable results. The aeroplane alone has proved successful in this domain, and it is upon this type of aerial craft that dependence will have to be placed."

I have endeavoured in the above summary to show something of the preparations made by the Admiralty, but it would be incomplete

if I omitted to refer to Mr. Churchill's prompt action in purchasing the vessels building or completing in British yards, when war broke out, for foreign Governments. These were as follows:—

"Osman I.," battleship; building by Armstrong for Turkey, 27,500 tons; renamed "Agincourt"; main armament, fourteen 12-in. guns.

"Reshadich," battleship; building by Vickers for Turkey; 23,000 tons; renamed "Erin"; main armament, ten 13.5-in. guns.

"Almiraute Laterre"; building for Chile; 28,000 tons; renamed "Canada"; main armament, ten 14-in. guns.

Four destroyer leaders, building for Chile, of 1,850 tons each, which have been named "Broke," "Faulkner," "Botha," and "Tipperary."

Three armoured river gunboats, building for Brazil, of 1,260 tons each.

All these ships, except the "Canada," were commissioned before the end of last year, the river gunboats, or monitors, have already done good service on the Belgian coast.

These additions to our fleet were all valuable vessels, the "Agincourt" and "Canada" being two of the most powerful Dreadnoughts in the world.

Our enemy has always disbelieved in our being able to man our ships, but there has been no shortage of men, and no difficulty has been found in providing the necessary crews for these vessels, though three of them are heavy battleships. I do not propose to deal generally with the actions which have taken place or the losses sustained, though submarine warfare and its bearing on trade must be considered in view of the protective measures taken, but the resiliency of our naval resources in personnel is aptly shown by the non-existence of any manning difficulties which loomed so largely in former naval wars, in spite of the losses which we have unfortunately suffered by the sinking of many of our ships. An official statement published in November last gives our losses of officers and men through the sinking of the three "Cressys," "Hawke," "Hermes," "Niger," "Formidable" and "Boyano," as 2,854 officers and men, and to these must now be added an almost similar number from the destruction of the "Bulwark," the loss of the "Irresistible," "Ocean," "Goliath," "Majestic" and "Triumph," in the Dardanelles operations, the "Good Hope," "Monmouth" and "Pegasus" in action with the enemy, so that the total naval losses by the enemy or explosion must be taken as between 5,000 and 6,000. The losses of officers and men in the Dardanelles were stated to be small. I am not including the losses of the naval divisions at Antwerp, as though nominally naval, they are a hybrid corps with doubtful seamanlike qualifications, and not, I believe, intended to serve afloat.

It is interesting to compare these losses in little more than a year, when there has been no general engagement, with the losses we sustained at Trafalgar, Copenhagen and the Nile. Thus in Trafalgar

the killed and wounded in the battle were 1,690; at Copenhagen, 1,200; and at the Nile, 896; or 3,786 killed and wounded in the three actions, 922 of whom were killed.

It is well to remember that, including all auxiliaries under the pendant, we have now some 300,000 men serving in the navy; in 1805 the number was 124,000, including officers.

Having now given the modern arrangements necessary on the outbreak of war, let us see how our ancestors prepared. The question of material was, of course, always important, and Hawke, when First Lord of the Admiralty, laid down two ships to each ship building in France. In peace time most of the ships were laid up "in ordinary," that is, as sheer hulks, only a small number of ships being kept in commission. The position in 1793, when war broke out with France, was as follows, according to "James' Naval History": At the close of 1792, he tells us that upwards of 60 out of the 87 line of battle ships in his abstract were in good condition, this being partially due to an expected rupture with Spain in 1790 and with Russia in 1792, but more probably to the prescience and system of Sir Charles Middleton, afterwards Lord Barham, who was controller of the navy. James is so immersed in material that he scarcely touches on the question of manning, but men could not be got in a day, and only 45,000 were voted for 1793. That we were not ready, from the difficulty of manning the ships, is shown by a French fleet of from 14 to 17 sail of the line, subsequently increased to 21, having sailed from Quiberon for the West Indies early in June, and it was not till July 14th that Lord Howe, with 15 sail of the line, sailed from St. Helens. In the following year, however, before the "glorious first of June," Howe had a fleet of 26 sail, which, according to Captain Brenton, was "remarkably well manned," though the officers in many cases lacked fleet experience.

It is unnecessary in a service journal to give in detail the present system in force before war broke out. It is well known that all available ships have for some years past been kept in commission complete with coal, ammunition and stores, the battleships being divided into three fleets, of which the First was to be kept with full crews as a home fleet, the Second had "full nucleus crews" and did its share of gunnery exercises and drills, the "balance crew" being active service ratings in the barracks and training establishments; the Third Fleet had "reduced nucleus crews" and could not be completed without the reserves, so that the question of manning the whole fleet was simply a matter of calling out the reserves and touching a button, the men being all trained, or at least partially trained, in the reserves.

In former periods very few ships were kept in commission in peace time, while the available ships "in ordinary" had to be fitted out, and, beyond a very few marines, the crews had to be got from the mercantile marine. The difficulties of such a system, if system it can be called, are manifest, but our ancestors could only endeavour to solve them by bounties and the press gang.

I am indebted to Commander Robinson's book, "The British Fleet," for much information about manning in former days and the

press gang. He shows the abrupt fluctuations which took place, and the number of "missing" seamen through desertion and sickness; thus, in 1784, at the close of the War of Independence, the navy was suddenly reduced by 80,000 men, or to 26,000, and though in 1892 it stood at 16,000, yet in 1910 we had 150,000. In 1763, after the Seven Years' War, out of a total of 183,893 who had served in the navy, no less than 133,708 were returned as "missing." Seamen were entered for the commission, nominally for three years, but it might be six or seven. The "Shannon's" crew, when the "Chesapeake" was captured in 1813, had been nearly seven years in the ship under Captain Broke, and the nominal three years' commission was so often exceeded in comparatively recent times that a popular parody in the midshipman's berth in my early days began: "It may be four years but it can't be for ever." But to return to older days. I have mentioned sickness, and though the food, the treatment of the sick, and the navy of the time of Vernon is described by Smollett in "Roderick Random" with the licence of the novelist, and is much exaggerated, there is enough truth in it to account to a great extent for the 133,708 missing above referred to.

There has been some confusion between the "prest" men and those "pressed" by force through the press gangs, but the difference was only one of degree of willingness or unwillingness. Every mariner was liable to serve when called out; if he came out at once he received the prest money of a shilling, and in many cases a bounty, if not he could be arrested and forced on board ship. Captain Cook is said to have joined the navy, to his own advantage and that of the world, to escape "a hot press on the river." The press-gang had an evil name. It was dreaded in the seaports, and perhaps even more in the homeward-bound merchant ships, and occasionally met with resistance. Commander Robinson tells us of a case in which a press gang from a tender were fired upon from a British merchant ship, three of the crew of the merchantman being killed in the subsequent scrimmage. They were acting under Rodney's orders, the circumstances being referred to Sir Edward Hawke, who directed the ship to be taken to her moorings in the Thames and the bodies to be thrown overboard!

No doubt it was a very rough way of taking seamen for the King's service, for which there was more defence than appears at first sight. I conclude these references to the press gang with one more extract from Commander Robinson's work. Douglas Jerrold, in his story of "Jack Runnymede," most graphically explains how his hero, from having a holy horror of the system, experiences its hardships in his own person, and thus in the service gets a better insight into the causes which had called it into existence. Returning home, "Pray, Sir," said he to a Parliamentary candidate who solicited his support, "what are your views on impressment?" "I am opposed, most assuredly, to the infamous and inhuman system of pressing," was the reply. "My service to you, Sir," replied Jack Runnymede, "you don't have my vote. What, sweep us from the world as a naval power, by doing away with impressment? No, Sir, not while I can lift my voice will I consent to this. By losing this I should cease to be grateful, as I

am, for my country—should no longer bless my stars that I am a Briton—no longer thank God that I am an Englishman." This may be quoted as a full-blooded defence of national service.

Fortunately we have found a better way in modern times, but there is no royal road to such success as we have attained, and it could only be done by keeping a large force in commission, involving unprecedented Naval Estimates to which I must refer later, and by organizing our reserves, Fleet Reserve, R.N. Reserve and R.N. Volunteer Reserve which were liable to be called out in case of war, all reserve men having retaining fees and performing short periods of drill and service on board the ships of the fleet.

Some illustrations of the manning difficulties with which our ancestors had to contend may now be given. I do not propose to say anything more about the press gang, but it was a very old institution, and we find Pepys, in 1675, observing that "it was what had been seldom done in time of peace; but press warrants were nevertheless offered to fifteen commanders"; and as late as 1859 a Royal Commission on manning the navy referred to the "press" as an undoubted prerogative of Her Majesty which could be again made use of in case of emergency. At the time of the Crimean War many old officers will remember the shifts to which we were reduced to man our ships, the bounties and the lack of seamen. Our Royal Naval Coast Volunteers who served on board coast defence vessels, and would not be employed more than 100 miles, or it may have been leagues, as I write from memory, of the coast! But these are somewhat wearisome details, so I propose to give a few instances of manning difficulties of historical interest.

Let me give as an instance Anson's memorable voyage round the world. It was in 1739, the nadir of British military efficiency, when Walpole, our peace Minister, had been forced into the "Jenkins ear war" with Spain by an indignant public, and had said with some forecast of his own neglect of warlike preparation:—

"They are ringing the bells now—

They will be wringing their hands soon."

That his prophecy did not come true can only be attributed to the extraordinary unreadiness of the Spaniards and to the determination of a few naval officers.

Anson, who commanded the "Centurion," of 60 guns, was recalled from the West Indies, and, as Commodore, placed in command of six ships, two of 50 guns, one of 40, one of 28 and a sloop, besides the "Centurion," to be fitted out to harass the Spanish ports and shipping on the west coast of America, but there were neither stores nor seamen available and inevitable delay occurred. He received his commission in January, 1740, but his instructions were not given him till June. He was to embark 500 soldiers, but the troops were not to be had, so 500 pensioners were supplied by the military authorities, in spite of Anson's remonstrances backed by the Admiralty. Naturally most of these pensioners were invalids, those who had legs ran away and none of them survived the terrible hardships of the voyage. There was lack of seamen, and when Anson asked for 300, 170 were sent him, of

whom 32 were discharged from hospital to make up the number. The squadron sailed on September 10th, but it was not till March, 1741, that they were off the Horn, and the ships separated in bad weather, one being wrecked, two failed to round the Horn and returned to England, and the "Centurion" reached Juan Fernandez in June, 1741, where she was joined some time later by the "Gloucester" and "Trial," two of the squadron. All three ships had suffered heavily from scurvy, deaths being numerous, which continued for some time after their arrival at the islands. In September, the disease having disappeared, the squadron sailed, having lost 626 men out of 926 who left England. After arriving off the Mexican coast it was found necessary to abandon the "Gloucester" and "Trial," and the "Centurion" crossed the Pacific and went to Macao, where she arrived on November 12th, 1742, remaining there till April, 1743. She had then only 227 men on board, many of whom were lascars and negroes. With this motley crew Anson waylaid and captured a galleon from Acapulco bound to Manila, after an action, and the vessel was sold at Macao for £300,000. In December, 1743, after refitting, the "Centurion" sailed from Macao and anchored at Spithead on June 15th, 1744, after an absence from England of nearly four years, during which he had circumnavigated the world.

Sir Albert Markham, from whose sketch of Anson¹ I take these details, sums up by saying that "in spite of the losses, both in ships and men, the expedition must be regarded as in great measure a successful one," an opinion that can scarcely be concurred in, though it may be admitted that it was a personal triumph of a good man under difficulties, for Commodore, afterwards Lord Anson. With the above exception it is, I fear, an object-lesson of the inefficiency of the navy at that period.

Some three years after Anson left England, Hawke commissioned the "Berwick," of 70 guns, for service in the Mediterranean; there was "a hot press" which filled up the ship with human beings, Hawke reporting that several of the pressed men were "very little, weakly, puny fellows that have never been to sea," and, after passing Gibraltar in October, 1743, he writes that 123 of his working men were sick! However, this distinguished officer landed his sick at Port Mahon, then in our hands, probably getting some good men from the merchant ships, and in the unsatisfactory action with the Franco-Spanish Fleet off Hyères in February, 1744, the "Berwick" was the only ship which gained any credit, as she captured the Spanish line of battleship "Poder," which was subsequently burnt by Admiral Mathews' order. As the "Poder" was totally dismasted it is evident that the "Berwick" was in good gunnery order, and afforded a proof of what could be accomplished by a leader of men in a few months, even with an indifferent crew. It also shows that when men were needed there was no mawkish sentiment about the quality or qualification of the men pressed. An illustration of the leisurely and inefficient war conduct of our Government a few years later is afforded by the loss of Minorca in 1756, which cost Admiral Byng his life from his failure

¹ "From Howard to Nelson"—"Anson," by Admiral Markham.

to relieve it. Recent letters published by the Naval Records Society show that for months previously the Government had been warned of the French preparations at Toulon which were obviously aimed at Minorca, yet they made no sign, being reluctant to spare ships from the Channel, and when at last Byng's squadron was ordered there was difficulty about men and the ships were ill-equipped. This, indeed, was Byng's defence, and he was not the man to make "poor puny fellows" into good sailors. With the controversy about Byng's execution I have no concern here. Macaulay considered it as "unjust and absurd," but Boscawen certainly approved it, as he signed the order for court-martial as a Lord of the Admiralty and the executive order for the execution as Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth. Posterity will, however, probably agree with Pitt in saddling the Government with much of the blame, for their hesitation in commissioning ships for the relief, and for entrusting an important duty to an officer whose antecedents were far from giving confidence.

It must, however, be admitted that strong party feeling obscured the issue, but Voltaire's satirical comment notwithstanding, it showed that however leniently military miscarriages might be regarded, the country will not condone any failure on the part of the national service which has always been, in the King's words, "our sure trust and shield."

I have endeavoured to show something of our manning difficulties in former times, and how they were overcome by the zeal of our officers and seamen. If we turn to our last great naval war, the mutinies at Spithead and the Nore showed that under our happy-go-lucky system the seamen had many grievances, and the stern discipline of a St. Vincent was necessary to preserve order. But much depended upon the captain, whose powers were autocratic, and, as the mutinies of the "Bounty" in 1789, and of the "Hermione" in 1798 showed, were sometimes used with brutal ferocity. I wish to touch lightly on questions of discipline, but in Nelson and others these powers, well used, produced splendid results, the seamen as a rule being intensely patriotic and responding readily to any demands made upon them. Towards the end of the war want of seamen was very severely felt, whilst after Trafalgar the over-confidence of the Admiralty and of the navy itself resulted in neglect of the necessary precautions or gunnery, and it appeared to be the rule to despatch ships to sea with crews picked up anyhow and anywhere, trusting that they could settle down after sailing.

Owing to the difficulties experienced by French ships in getting to sea at all, this answered fairly well, for if our ships were ill-manned the French ships were manned with landsmen, and their officers had little experience. When it came to fighting the United States ships we found out our mistake, but this is chiefly a question of gunnery to which I must return later. It is well here to refer to the case of the "Java," which was taken by the U.S. frigate "Constitution" off the coast of South America in December, 1812. The "Java," a first-class 38-gun frigate, was commissioned at Portsmouth by Captain Lambert, in August, 1812, and sailed for Bombay in November.

A detailed account of her crew is given in "James' Naval History" which is too long to repeat here. Brenton, who, as a naval officer ought to know, says:—"She had a bad mixture from the guard ships at the Nore and in Hamoaze such as at the close of the war were the generality of our crews." When Captain Lambert remonstrated he was told that "a voyage to the East Indies and back would make a good crew."

On December 29th she fell in with the American frigate "Constitution," of greatly superior force, and after a smart action, in which the "Java" was dismasted and Captain Lambert killed, she was captured, being subsequently burnt as "she could not float."

I am tempted to tell a story which was told me by a Mr. D—, who was born in the 18th Century. As a boy he was on board an Indiaman when the "Macedonian" was fitting out in 1812, and he met Captain Carden, who commanded the frigate, at dinner. On being asked by the Indiaman's captain: "I suppose, Captain, that you would not mind taking on two American ships?" he modestly replied that he would rather take on one first. The "Macedonian" was, of course, taken by the "United States" a few months later. The anecdote shows that our too easy naval victories over the French, for the reasons above given, had at that time so debauched the public mind and affected the naval service, that everyone was convinced that nothing was necessary but to get alongside the enemy and fight, so manœuvres and elaborate training were useless. Indeed, when I first joined the service, before the middle of the last century, this was still the general idea; the well-known paragraph in Nelson's famous battle order before Trafalgar that "no captain could go far wrong who placed his ship alongside one of the enemy" being quoted as the be-all and end-all of tactics, though it was really a reminder that no failure to understand a carefully drawn up battle order would excuse inaction. We are not, I trust, in any danger of underrating our enemy now, though I think that the Germans believed that their gunnery was superior to ours, and we may suppose that such actions as have taken place have probably caused them to reconsider this opinion.

I need say no more on the question of manning in former days. We adopted "continuous service" in 1853, boy-entry for ten years, and subsequently for twelve years from the age of 18, which gradually embraced the whole navy; and other improvements followed, especially increase of leave and more frequent payments, but it was long before the present system was in full working order. It was some years before the seamen, accustomed to choose their ships and their captains and to change at will from "the navy trade" to the merchant service, became reconciled to the change, but the extra pay, and new men, gradually conquered previous prejudices, and the present war is linking the two services together in a way that would not have been thought possible a few years ago, when the Royal Navy and the mercantile marine seemed to be drifting apart to the detriment of the maritime interests of the country.

Captains have, no doubt, lost much of their absolute power, but no good officer finds that his legitimate authority is weakened.

Let me now turn to principles of naval warfare past and present, and as an old officer I am keenly appreciative of the changes which have taken place in armaments, motive power and communications, all of which regulate tactics and, to some extent, strategy.

In Corbett's "Principles of Maritime Strategy" he tells us that "war is a continuation of policy, a form of political intercourse in which we fight battles instead of writing notes"; as I have before observed, our peace policy should contemplate possible war, and we have acted on this principle in occupying ports of vantage such as Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden, etc. Corbett then quotes with approval Clausewitz' statement that "the greatest and most critical decision upon which the statesman and the general have to exercise their judgment is to determine the nature of the war," from which he enlarges on what he calls "limited war." All this means, in plain English, that in war as well as in peace we must cut our coat according to our cloth, and not undertake military operations which are politically undesirable, still less engage in dangerous adventures from political motives.

In the present war, as in most wars in which this country is involved, there is no question but that the command of the sea is the first necessity for the life of the Empire and our insular security. Corbett's definition of command of the sea is as follows: "Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of communications and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory." If we accept this definition it is evident that it applies universally to naval war, whatever may be the material of which fleets are composed.

The control or command of the sea is, then, our strategical object, but when we come to the manner in which this control can be carried out, it clearly infringes on the domain of tactics and the perfection of the machinery at our disposal. Generally speaking, the more complete, efficient and powerful the ships, and appliances such as wireless, the more thorough will be the command. This has already been proved to be the case in the present war, notwithstanding the disturbing factor of the submarine menace.

Admiral Mahan, in his latest work on naval strategy, covers much the same ground as Corbett, to whom he refers with approval, so that it is unnecessary to quote his opinions. In his introduction to "Lectures on Naval Strategy," in 1909, he pays much attention to the rise of Germany as a naval power, and asks, with reference to the Monroe Doctrine, "Where ought Great Britain to stand in case we have trouble with Germany, and where ought we to stand in the reverse case?" and continues: "Corbett's remark is, that in the Seven Years' War the strength of the British nation lay in the fact that one great man, the first Pitt, controlled the naval, the military, and the diplomatic factors." Showing that this great naval authority was fully alive to the ambitions of Germany, and I quote his words as one "who, being dead, yet speaketh."

The main principles of strategy, then, being conceded, the question arose as to how they were to be carried out under modern conditions, and here the menace of the submarine came in. We endeavoured to occupy the seas with our cruisers as we had done in the French wars, as I have shown, though with different material; but the close blockade of enemy's ports as in the time of Hawke, St. Vincent and Cornwallis, was obviously impossible, so that we had to be content with what Bacon would have called "an abridgment of monarchy" in the North Sea. That the enemy could only make his appearance in blue water at great risk has been proved on several occasions; but we have found to our cost, as indeed was generally expected by naval officers, that a regular patrol by large vessels was dangerous owing to submarines and mines, so that we have had to trust to destroyers, patrol boats, and small craft to maintain a sort of "suzeraineté" in the waters near the enemy's coast. Fortunately, as Count von Reventlow has recently found out, though we made the discovery in the Dutch wars of the 17th Century, the British Islands "lie as a long mole" between German harbours and the Atlantic, so that it was sufficient to occupy the Channel and the northern entrances between Scotland and Norway to ensure an effective blockade.

Meanwhile, our big ships are not afraid to go to sea, when necessary, protected by destroyers, but they are kept in reserve "somewhere in the North Sea" ready to move at short notice in case the enemy's fleet should venture out from its protected anchorage. These arrangements have answered admirably, though the passive rôle left to our magnificent fleet must be even more wearisome than the constant cruising of those "storm-tossed ships" of Nelson and Cornwallis in the Napoleonic Wars, to which Mahan eloquently refers.

We may fairly congratulate Sir John Jellicoe on the success which has attended his dispositions so that no such attrition as has been aimed at by the Germans has taken place; but the submarine is a new order of naval being with rules of its own, so that no blockade appears to materially affect its operations, though we are learning how to deal with these insidious enemies. They are an unknown factor, but for all their offensive power they cannot convoy their own ships, or materially affect the effectiveness of the blockade.

A word may be said here about German submarine losses and the means we have adopted to destroy them. We know that the losses have been numerous, and that they include von Wettingen's "U 20," the commander who, in another submarine, sunk our three "Cressys" and the "Hawke," and that the submarine which sunk the "Arabic" has also been disposed of, but the number of losses stated in America is probably exaggerated. The methods used have been nets, bombs, ramming and guns, and American invention has been fertile in designing special vessels for the discovery and destruction of these piratical craft, so that we may feel sure that there will be various antidotes to their destructive agency as their powers and limitations are better understood. An account of a cruise in "U 29," taken from an American paper by a young sailor who had been taken out of a Norwegian ship, was given in the "United Service Magazine" last

month. I have, perhaps, dwelt too long on modern naval strategy, which has only changed in some details from the strategy of former periods, and let me now turn to tactics.

It is a truism that tactics depends on weapons, and in naval warfare the weapon was often the ship herself. Thus we had close quarters and ram tactics with the galleys in ancient times, and even as late as Lepanto, in 1571, though the gun was then coming into use. At the Armada, in 1588, the Spanish ships were high out of water with castles and poops, manned chiefly by soldiers with a few mariners to work the ship, though they had ordnance, and were propelled mostly by sails, and there were some galleasses and galleys. Our ships were lighter and handier, with better guns, on which Howard and Drake preferred to depend to the boarding which the Spaniards expected.

But I need not carry this further. From about the time of the Armada we had the sailing-ship tactics, the gun being the principal weapon, and, as the smooth-bore guns of the 17th and 18th Centuries were very erratic at even 300 or 400 yards, close action became the order of the day if decisive results were to be obtained, and, the guns being on the broadside, the fleets were formed in line of battle. Then we had the Fighting Instructions, a rigid adherence to which resulted in many indecisive actions and recriminations between admirals—complaints, on the one hand, of want of support, and, on the other, that it could not be rendered without breaking the formation ordered. The fetish of the line was much weakened when Rodney did not hesitate to break the French line with a portion of his fleet, and Howe ordered every ship in his line to cut through the French line on the First of June. I do not propose to deal with Nelson's tactics, but at St. Vincent he showed that even as a subordinate he was not to be hampered by strict rule, and his impetuous nature always made him ready to make any sacrifice for close action.

No doubt he was right, and though a deep student of tactics he made everything subordinate to the circumstances of the moment, feeling sure of victory if he could only bring the enemy's fleet to close action. But I doubt if the service ever entirely understood him, and after Trafalgar we had no general action. I have already spoken of the tradition which remained even at the time when I first went to sea.

Let me now turn to single-ship actions. Our ships and those of the French were of similar classes, and there was little difference in their respective armaments, so that seamanship consisted chiefly in closing with the enemy and raking her if possible; but a captain was quite happy if he could get alongside and engage "yard-arm to yard-arm," in Nelson's phrase, "to complete the business."

It is a common error to suppose that no attention was paid to gunnery in former days, as General Sir Howard Douglas' "Naval Gunnery," first published in 1819, can testify, and it is to his exertions that the establishment of the gunnery school in the "Excellent" in 1831 is mainly due. He shows that his father, Sir Charles Douglas, who was captain of the fleet in Rodney's action of "the saints" in 1782, had introduced flint-locks and other improvements. Sir Howard, in his introduction to the fifth edition of his work, published in 1860,

speaks of the gunnery of the battles between 1793 and 1815 as "giving abundant proof that the navies of Europe had in the latter epoch much deteriorated in the practice of gunnery," and in his account of the action between the "Macedonian" and "United States" he states that the "commanders of the American frigates would not permit us to join in close battle until they had gained some decided advantage from the superior facilities of their long guns in distant cannonade. . . ." And he refers to "the intrepid uncircumspect and often very exposed approach of their assailants."

In so doing the American captains were clearly in their right, and some hints of lack of courage in James are beside the question. That "close action" so permeated the service in 1812-13, that the fact that it is the duty of a commander to win with as little loss as possible was lost sight of is shown by the court-martial on Captain Carden of the "Macedonian," which, while exonerating him from blame, excuses him from failing to bring the enemy to close action sooner from a desire to keep the weather-gauge. Probably in this case "close action" was the best chance for the British frigate, whose 18-pounders could be no match for the American's 24-pounders at any distance, but the court-martial seems to have assumed that close action was the plain duty of any British ship irrespective of her armament.

That armament does govern tactics was clearly shown at a later period of the American War in the action between the British frigate "Phoebe" and the U.S. frigate "Essex," which is worth recalling. The "Phoebe," Captain Hillyar, was a 38-gun frigate with the usual armament of her class; the "Essex," Captain Porter, was entirely armed with 32-pounder carronades, except three long 12-pounders. The action took place off the coast of South America in February, 1814, and resulted in the capture of the American frigate, Captain Hillyar having taken care not to close till he had reaped all the advantage of his long 18-pounders. President Roosevelt, in his history of the naval actions of the war, agrees that Hillyar's action "was eminently proper," and he quotes Sir Howard Douglas' remarks that "Captain Porter's sneers at the respectful distance the 'Phoebe' kept are, in fact, acknowledgments of the ability with which Captain Hillyar availed himself of the superiority of his arms."

I have said enough about gunnery in the time of the French and American Wars and I must bring it up to date. It was demanding more attention, as I have shown, even in 1830, and at the commencement of the Crimean War, in 1854, our guns were very superior to those of the Russians, but the war stimulated the call for rifled guns and we had the Lancaster, Whitworth and Armstrong guns, which were more or less experimental, though the latter were partially adopted. The breech-loading of the Armstrong guns, however, proved unsatisfactory, especially in the higher calibres, and the muzzle velocity, due to the lead casing, was low, so muzzle-loaders, rotation being given by studs and grooves, was the principal method in use for some 30 years after the Russian war, the largest guns being the 80-ton guns mounted in the "Inflexible," which did some service at Alexandria; but these were not repeated, and, with this exception, the

largest gun in the service was the 38-ton gun mounted in the "Dreadnought" in '84. But breech-loading soon afterwards became universal, all difficulties having been overcome. Improvement has been continuous since the present century opened, and we have now guns of 13.5 in. and 15 in. in our newer dreadnoughts and battle cruisers, but the system adopted in the last ten years of the 19th Century of copper rings and grooves in the navy is still the one in use in our heavy modern ordnance. This is not a gunnery manual, but a comparison between the 38-ton gun above referred to and the 15-in. guns of the "Queen Elizabeth" may be admitted. The "Dreadnought's" 38-ton gun threw a shell of 818 lbs. with a muzzle velocity of 1,575 f.s., the "Queen Elizabeth's" 15-in. guns throw a shell of 1,950 lbs. with a velocity of 2,500 f.s., so that there is no comparison in their ballistics.

Given the guns, it remained to make a good use of them, and it may be admitted that gunnery was insufficiently encouraged though gun practice was rigidly enjoined; but in the latter part of the last century drills were in many cases carried out in a perfunctory manner, and excuses for the omission of the quarterly gun practice, or for having thrown away the whole of the quarter's allowance of ammunition in a single forenoon were too easily admitted. The gunnery experts were helpless in the face of the preference given to appearance and smartness, even aloft, though the masts and sails were leaving us, and gun firing spoilt the paint work and not infrequently caused minor defects through the concussion of heavy ordnance. Commanders-in-Chief and the Admiralty were no doubt to blame for this state of things, but the younger officers were studying naval warfare and naturally appreciated gunnery, so a change came with the new century, and prize-firing returns and newspaper comment all had their part in directing more attention to gunnery.

Prize-firing targets, battle practice, and gun-laying practices were adopted and fire-control positions established, the advance being to a great extent due to Lord Fisher, who had been Staff Officer and Captain of the "Excellent," when in command in the Mediterranean and at the Admiralty, but the great improvement in practice was undoubtedly due to Captain, now Admiral Sir Percy, Scott from his system of darters and other devices, which taught aiming by results, revolutionizing gunnery firing in the navy. The invention was scarcely understood at first, but the results in the "Sylla" in the Mediterranean, afterwards followed by the "Terrible" in China, were so startling that the Admiralty adopted them in the gunnery establishments, and Admiral Scott as the first Inspector of Target Practice has further improved the whole gunnery system of the fleet. Experts tell us that it is far from perfect yet, and in the American, German and French navies similar principles have been adopted, so that we cannot stand still; but our war experiences have already shown that our naval gunners have attained a perfection of gun-laying which would not have been dreamed of even a few years ago.

As I gave some details of former naval actions I propose to make some remarks on our recent engagements; the Coronel, Falklands Islands, Dogger Bank, and "Sydney"- "Emden" fights. I do not

propose to deal here with a question which ought not to be lost sight of, namely, as to who is responsible for the extraordinary mistake of the late gallant Sir Christopher Cradock having been allowed to go in chase of a squadron of greatly superior force. The excuse of "Where was the 'Canopus'?" I dismiss as having no bearing on the question, as she was not a cruiser, and my object is simply to show how actions are fought under modern conditions and armament.

In the Coronel action we have practically similar accounts from Captain Luce who commanded the "Glasgow," and from Admiral von Spee who was in command of the German squadron.

Mr. Pollen, in "Land and Water" of August 14th, has given us a well-argued, scientific account, with diagrams, of the actions above referred to, and he points out that in each case the stronger and faster squadron or ship fought the action at the range best suited to his armament; that his guns being more powerful he preferred long range which the great perfection of modern guns and gunnery made effective, and, as in the case of the "Phoebe" above referred to, he obtained his victory with small loss. This is "quite proper," as Mr. Roosevelt puts it. The days of chivalry have passed, and we do not give the enemy any chances just to make things fair.

In the Coronel action the fight began at some 11,000 yards, and till the very last the distance was not less than 7,000 yards. Von Spee shows that he had the advantage in speed and position, and Cradock could do little but fight under the conditions chosen by his adversary. According to von Spee the British ships seemed to make worse weather of it than the Germans, and the latter could wait till they had the advantage of the light after the sun had set. The fire control of the Germans was evidently better for this reason, so that the British ships were knocked out in the first few broadsides. In any case, in order to bring his 6-in. guns into action it should have been Cradock's tactics to close, and apparently he made some attempt to do so, but only after the action had continued for some time, in order, as von Spee assumed, to use his torpedoes; but with the improvement in gunnery, and the speed at which ships are moving, making boarding impossible, the attempt to close would be likely to have even less chance of success than it had in the action between the "Macedonian" and "United States."

In the Falklands Islands action we have the same lesson; the action was fought throughout at distances from 16,500 to 12,500 yards. It lasted three hours before the "Scharnhorst" was sunk and five hours before the "Gneisenau" sank. In this case, too, the Germans made several attempts to shorten the range, but Admiral Sturdee had everything in his favour, and he preferred to win with small loss.

Turning, now, to the Dogger Bank action, the really remarkable thing is the distance at which it was commenced, fire having been opened by the "Lion" at 18,000 yards. "We began to hit at 17,000 yards," says Admiral Beatty—about ten statute miles. Reports have certainly been made showing that this has been done in practice, both in our navy and in that of the United States, but it seemed almost impossible, and rather a yarn to be taken with the proverbial grain

of salt. But here we have the fact stated from our own Admiral's report but corroborated by an enemy, a survivor of the ill-fated *Blücher*, whose account was as follows:—

"About nine o'clock columns of smoke could be seen on the far horizon behind us. The enemy were after us, but as yet we could not see them. Suddenly from the blue sky above us a shell fell near us, with a moaning, groaning whine. We could see no ship. From somewhere below the horizon had come this shot. Nowhere visible were there any warships of the enemy which our gunners could find for a target. Still out of the skies above us more shells continued to fall, in front of us, beside us, and behind us.

"Finally the observers at the mast-head were able to make out through their telescopes the tops of the masts of a ship, but her hull was buried out of sight, and yet those British gunners in their turrets, who could not see even the tops of our masts, were rapidly getting the distance and range of the '*Blücher*' from the fire control officers far up in their own mast tops.

"We were the first under fire in the action and we were the last under fire. Practically every British ship poured projectiles into us. I have never seen such gunnery, and there has never been the like of it before in the history of the world."

In the *Naval Warrant Officers' Journal* for October, after quoting the above letter, there is an apt comparison made, between this latter day action of first-class ships, and a theoretical action depicted so vividly by the late Mr. Arnold Forster in his sketch, "In a Conning Tower." It was only twenty-five years ago that Mr. Arnold Forster wrote, and the guns supposed to be engaged were the heaviest in the service, of 110 tons. But the first shots were fired when the ships were only 2,000 yards apart, a bare nautical mile, and verily "the old order changeth." The change is not only or chiefly due to the guns, but to the accurate range finding, spotting and fire control, which appear to me, with my old navy knowledge of guns and gunnery, to be little less than miraculous.

Yet, as Mr. Pollen tells us, and it is confirmed by the "*Blücher*" narrator, though in the next hour after this wonderful opening of the action between 9.45 and 10.45, the range was probably reduced to 11,000 yards, no corresponding damage took place, and the two German battle cruisers which had been on fire an hour previously escaped. The reason probably is that as the Germans altered course our Admiral had to put his ships under helm to follow, and to avoid destroyer attacks. It is a nice question for experts, but there is no doubt that frequent changes of course seriously interferes with fire control. Still, most people would argue that if you can hit at ten miles, it should certainly be easier to do so at five and a-half.

Turning now to the "*Sydney*"-"*Emden*" fight. Again we find the stronger and faster ship capturing her enemy with little loss to herself, the "*Sydney*'s" 6-in. guns being more than a match for the 4.1-in. guns of her enemy, and again we find the "*Emden*," the weaker ship, trying to close to use her torpedoes, causing the British cruiser to sheer off so as to retain the advantage of her superior gun

fire. The "Emden" was well fought, but Captain Glossop of the "Sydney" took every advantage of his superior armament, saying in his report, "I kept my distance as much as possible."

How, then, are future battles to be fought? This is a question which I cannot answer, and if I knew our Admirals' intentions I would not divulge them, but though some modification of the old line of battle may remain in an action between powerful fleets, it seems imperative that there should be flexibility and some discrimination between the different divisions, varying as they must do in speed and power, so that large discretion will probably be left to junior Admirals. The tactics of single ships have been sufficiently shown by the experience of the war.

A few remarks may now be made on future naval power. For the present the Dreadnought battleship and battle cruiser carrying monster guns remain as the bed-rock of navies, though their sphere of activity is much reduced, and unless they can be made unsinkable it is hard to see how they can continue to exist in view of the future development of the submersible, for certainly submarines will largely increase in number as well as become more powerful. On the other hand the larger the submersible the more she will become a surface water cruiser. American papers are full of the submarine and its future, and anti-submarine motor boats of extraordinary speed intended to ram, and being capable of carrying a light which can show for a mile under water, are proposed as antidotes. Such is the "Tiddlywink," with a speed of 70 miles an hour—really a hydroplane. Then we are told of giant aeroplanes with a speed of 95 miles an hour, of which England has ordered a few hundreds! Of baby-submarines, and other developments which may or may not ever be realized. Nearly all these inventions are for the benefit of the British Government, and we know that Mr. Lansing has refused to stop the construction of fast motor boats to be used against submarines.

It is satisfactory to know that inventors are being encouraged on the other side of the water, and that we are making use of the inventive genius of our American friends. We know less of what is doing here, but we may feel sure that our contractors have not been idle, and I can only guess that, as we evidently have recently built monitors carrying heavy guns though of light draught, so other vessels may have been designed with special qualifications to meet modern requirements.

The enemy has been credited with many surprises for us, but we may rest content that the ingenuity of naval architects, public and private, in this country will prove equal to any shown by the enemy, and in this case I am quite willing to wait and see.

As to the submarine blockade, the pirates will no doubt continue to exact toll from our mercantile marine, and the loss of life from the inhumanity with which their attack on trade must almost necessarily be carried out is deplorable, but it is only a pin-prick of about one per cent. on our mercantile marine, shippers being more than remunerated by increased freights. At the present stage the losses of our ships are not increasing and the German submarines are being

destroyed quite as fast as they are built. The latest development of the submarine is, we are told, a vessel which can lay mines from below the water and be replenished with petrol from a submerged dépôt ship. These mines would, of course, be as dangerous to a neutral as to an enemy. No doubt the war will produce many changes in naval construction and warfare which we cannot foresee, and I trust that inventors will have every encouragement, though their name is sure to be legion, and patience will be required to wade through ingenious devices of fertile brains of many men ignorant of all sea experience.

In referring to that misused phrase, first made use of by Napoleon, of the "freedom of the seas," I feel that it is difficult to do justice to the importance of the question that it raises for this country and Empire. It is a sort of catchword in the United States from the war of 1812, and it was adroit to raise the cry now that neutral States are prevented by our navy from carrying on a lucrative trade with our enemy. It raised the questions of contraband, of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, of the Hague Conventions of 1907-8 and of the Declaration of London of 1909, which was fortunately never ratified through the action of the House of Lords in throwing out the Prize Bill which would have placed our prize courts under a hybrid arbitration court. Then there is the mischievous claim of what is erroneously called the freedom from capture of "private property at sea," which assumes possible that the "peaceful traffic on the roads of the sea" can continue "during war, whatever the flag might be that carried the traffic, even though it were that of a belligerent."¹

In comparing the navy of to-day with past periods it is of some interest to see how the navy has increased in expense, though it is waste of time to sigh over the vast sums which are now needed.

A friend of mine going over a ship which I commanded made the following remark, "Now I see why the navy costs so much," and those who follow Mr. Frederick Palmer's account of his visit to the Grand Fleet will appreciate the elaborate system now in force, and the scientific completeness of the control in the hands of the Admiral. The contrast with the simplicity of former periods is indeed great, and as invention succeeds invention the cost steadily rises.

It is amusing to read in an old book in the Royal United Service Institution called "Rise and Progress of the Royal Navy," published in 1805 and dedicated to Lord Barham by Charles Derrick, of the early days of a Royal Navy. Thus in Queen Mary's time, the navy having fallen into decay, a commission reported that £14,000 was necessary to put it into a satisfactory state, after which it could be maintained for £10,000 a year. It was, I think, two years ago that a deputation of little-navyites called upon Mr. Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, urging him to reduce the navy, which was then costing nearly forty-eight millions. The Chancellor, in a sympathetic reply, pointed out that if we could go back to our expenditure of twenty-five years previous, he could reduce the income tax to 2d. in the £. No doubt. The navy of 1888 cost about twelve

¹ Sir N. Barnaby's "Naval Development of the Century."

millions, but there were few ironclads, no destroyers, submarines or wireless. Our ships were even then rather obsolete and were armed with muzzle-loading guns. One Dreadnought could easily have sunk the whole of our fleet of 1888.

It may be a misfortune, but it is one that the navy shares with all modern improvements—expenses continue to increase. In the days of the sailing battleship it was considered that they cost £100 a gun, so that a first-rate cost £120,000. Now a super-Dreadnought costs two and a-quarter millions. In 1812, 145,000 seamen and marines were voted and the navy cost twenty millions. Just one hundred years later the cost had risen to nearly forty-eight millions for the same number.

To compare with former days is accordingly what Rudyard Kipling would call foolish talk. If we require a navy it is evident that it must be up to date and an expensive article, but it preserves the Englishman's home, which is of even greater value.

This last "reductio ad absurdum" is the ultimate goal of the restriction on legitimate maritime power, but it has received the support of Lord Loreburn, the late Lord Avebury and others.

The whole question of the value of maritime power is raised in the above conventions and declarations, the danger of which should not require any demonstration after our war experience, but for what a naval correspondent of the *Morning Post* calls "the hopeless misconception of the nature of war involved in the above proposals shown by Sir Edward Grey in his offer to discuss the 'freedom of the seas' with the United States after the war."

It must have been at once obvious to the Government after war was declared that, unless we were to admit that our sea power was of no importance, and that we were prepared to fight the war on shore, our naval rights, not only against German merchant ships and men of war but against neutrals carrying contraband, must be enforced, yet, though it was pretty generally admitted that the Declaration of London was "made in Germany" to protect neutrals, except in the case of their carrying food to England, when they could be sunk, it was fatuously declared that our conduct of the war would be guided by the unratified Declaration. That it has been since practically destroyed by numerous Orders in Council is well known, and at last it has been finally put on one side by the Order in Council of March 11th, cotton, copper and other articles being declared contraband. It is unnecessary to argue the matter more fully, but it seems clear that as everything in modern warfare is used by the State for the national army, the distinction between contraband and non-contraband is obliterated, and the doctrine of ultimate destination must be enforced if we are to prevent the enemy from being supplied through neutrals.

It is unfortunate that the Foreign Office seem to look upon the Declaration of London as personal, as it was to seal the Conventions of The Hague in which they had taken so strong a part, so it is necessary briefly to refer to the Conventions.

The brief given to Sir Edward Fry before the Convention of 1907 was to propose the abolition of contraband altogether, which was fortu-

nately not entertained; if it had been we should probably have reduced our Estimates and have been powerless at sea!

With the long lines now held by armies no neutral goods can pass into an enemy's country by land and all trade is stopped, yet it is contended that a strong maritime Power has no similar right except by blockade, the terms of which make it impracticable with modern weapons.

"Freedom of the seas" was first put forward in the Milan Decree of 1806, and it has always had the support of the strong military Power, but we rely on sea power and can say, with Byron, to the tyrant:—

"Man marks the earth with ruin—his control
Stops with the shore."

Mahan tells us that when Pitt was pressing Russia to join in an alliance against Napoleon, she demanded a relaxation of our right of search of neutrals, which our great Statesman, even in the hour of his greatest need, refused.



TURKISH ARABIA AS A LINK OF EMPIRE.

By COLONEL A. C. YATE.

THE issue of the present war means the recasting of the political form of four out of the five Continents of our globe. The old stock of atlases are at a discount. When the inevitable Congress—not of 1915, but later—has done its work, Stanford, Bartholomew, Johnston, Black, Justus Perthes and co-geographers of every nation will vie with each other in the production of the new atlas. Before the war "Stieler" bore away the palm. It is full time that Britain, unrivalled in exploration, excelled also in map-production. America alone promises to undergo no change; for, whether provocation comes from Central Europe or Central America, Washington sees profit in peace. In Asia, Turkey is specially marked out for drastic redistribution—a redistribution which may involve Persia, and certainly influence India. When the Caliphate is in the melting-pot, and the granary of Mesopotamia is crying out for restoration to its pristine prosperity, the Mussulman millions cannot be indifferent. Afghanistan, despite temptation, has firmly maintained its attitude of complete aloofness from the war which has dragged practically the whole world, directly or indirectly, into its vortex. Persia has not been able to stifle German intrigue. The Amir Habibullah seems, like his father, to hold his realm in the hollow of his hand. Persia is riven by faction; and, if we consider how Britain and Russia, and notably Russia, have treated Persia, not only since the Convention of 1907, but since the days of Malcolm and Harford Jones (1800-09) and the Treaty of Turcomanchai (1828), we need not feel surprise that some Persians welcome German devilment with open arms. The briefest recapitulation would be too long. When *The Times* reviewed Morgan Shuster's "Strangling of Persia," endeavouring to show some justice to a man whom it had condemned, if not damned, it admitted that the book "must be seriously regarded." Russia took Persian life mercilessly in her "sphere." Britain, in the "neutral sphere," sacrificed British life, to wit, Captain Eckford, and recently three others. Strictly speaking, Persia should treat the German Minister at Teheran as the U.S.A. have treated Dr. Dumba. But memory of Russian massacres in Azerbaijan some four years ago might almost reconcile Persians to welcoming either Turkish force or Teutonic intrigue in that province. Britain in Khuzistan has most important interests, political, commercial and strategical, to safeguard. They fully justify her in occupying Bushire. It is British troops which have expelled the Turks from the Karun Valley, not, I admit, so much to protect Persian territory as to vindicate British rights. The Anglo-Persian oil-fields are most valuable, and Shushter and Khoramabad open up profitable avenues of trade. It rests with Russia to set things right in Ispahan; and

indeed, if the Swedish gendarmerie do not suffice, the Cossack brigade at Teheran should intervene. If necessary, perhaps, Russian troops can be sent there. The mere raiding of Persian Baluchis into British Baluchistan is of little significance. From time immemorial that has gone on; and nowadays the Mekran Levy Corps is able to repel any such filibustering inroads. Baluchistan contains a mass of martial material which still appears to await the fiat of the Government of India, before it can be trained, equipped and organized for the defence of the Empire.

Egypt, which half a century ago, when the Suez Canal was under construction, promised to become a French preserve, is now a Protectorate of the British Crown. We have been talking for fifteen or twenty years of the Cape to Cairo Railway. Think of a "Wagons-lits" car leaving Calais via Constantinople, Konia and Cairo for the Cape. That is coming, despite the short sea run from Marseilles, Brindisi or Salonica to Alexandria. The Red Sea route, in the Middle Ages exploited by Venice, has passed into the hands of the British Empire, which, mistress of the Nile as well, commands the junction of great highways of sea and land, reaching north, south, east and west, to the Cape, East and Far East, Antipodes, Southern Europe, Pillars of Hercules, and across Syria and Arabia. Historians say that Alexander founded Alexandria as a rival to the Queen of the Bosphorus. Be that as it may, the glory of Alexandria is surely coming. The great trade routes of the world meet there. Its one weakness, compared with Constantinople, is its defencelessness. The strength of the Dardanelles, as proved by the past six months, should make Europe hesitate to entrust it to any single Great Power, and so place a strong *place d'armes* on the flank of the great shipping route between East and West. In succession to the Ptolemies, the Roman Empire and the Caliphate, Britain assumes sway over what may once more become the world's emporium. The 20th century reopens, expands and accelerates traffic on all the routes known to Ancient and Middle Ages, and, possibly, adds one or two to their number. But, there is nothing new under the sun. Mr. R. M. Stephenson in 1850, when he projected a railway from Calais *via* Constantinople, Baghdad and Baluchistan to Karachi, thought his idea was original. He was disillusionised by a caustic "traveller" who, in 1856, published, through Edward Stanford, of Charing Cross, "The Euphrates Valley Route to India," dedicating it to Mr. W. P. Andrew. With much humour he exposed the impracticability of Mr. Stephenson's selected route across Asia Minor, advocating in its place the one which the German Baghdad Railway has followed, and showing that at least four Englishmen before Stephenson had proposed a trans-Continental railway from West to East. To quote one passage:—"Not that there was any want of projectors at home. A Mr. William Pare, of the Seville Ironworks in Dublin, elaborated a scheme of a Calais, Constantinople and Calcutta railway in 1842, and this was afterwards, in 1845, prolonged to Peking, under the designation of 'The Atlas Railway.'" Mr. William Pare is even more forgotten than Mr. Waghorn, to whose initiative the P. & O. Company's shareholders

owe their fine dividends, and the Suez Canal its existence and prosperity. A statue of Waghorn¹ stands on the mole near Port Said, erected, let us hope, by the grateful directors and shareholders of the P. & O. Company. When Calais and Canton are linked by rail, let not the directors of "The Atlas Railway" forget William Pare.

In linking West to East, the railway and steamboat—I dare not trespass on the future of aviation—has replaced the caravan. In achieving this countless tentative projects have been still-born. Abortion, had Lord Palmerston had his way, would have been the fate of both Suez Canal and Euphrates Valley Railway. France and Germany finally took both cases in hand and nursed the bantlings through. The humour of it lurks in the fact that Britain after all hopes to reap the profit; but, Britain left the Balkans out of count. Disraeli bought Ismail Pasha's canal shares, occupied Cyprus, and meant to build the Alexandretta—Aleppo—Baghdad Railway. Mr. Gladstone came into power and cancelled all he could. Gladstone, it was said, would ruin his country and die in a madhouse. Not at all! There was an occult method in his madness, a vein of luck which thwarted his best-laid schemes, a philosopher's stone which turned his tin into gold—for England's sake. What wondrous luck put Egypt into our hands in 1882? Lord Alcester, Lord Charles Beresford and the gallant little "Condor" know more about that than the Gladstonian Cabinet. Where France toiled, Britain reaps; and when this war is over, Britain, unless her brain and will-power break down, hopes to reap where Germany has toiled. Beaconsfield's Alexandretta—Aleppo—Baghdad line must still be ours, and the presence of Sir John Nixon's victorious troops at Kut-el-Amara, ninety miles from Baghdad, reminds us that Mesopotamia awaits restoration to its ancient wealth and glory under the beneficent rule of the British Raj. Thirty-seven years ago, at the Berlin Conference, Bismarck stole a march on England and Russia, and, making a catspaw of Austria, seized Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first stepping-stone towards German dominion in the East; unless, indeed, the grant of the Muristan at Jerusalem by the Sultan to the Crown Prince Frederick ten years before be regarded in that light. The conception of a grand trunk line from Hamburg, through Constantinople and Baghdad to the Persian Gulf, restoring, as it were, the wealth of the East to the Hanseatic League, was a bold one. For the Turk

¹ The journalist, J. H. Stocqueler ("Memoirs, 1820-70," published in 1873, pp. 74-6), gives a humorous but interesting account of Waghorn. The Overland route scheme is said to have originated in Bombay mercantile circles. Under their auspices, and to promote the Overland route, Mr. James Taylor, brother of the British Resident at Baghdad, accompanied by Messrs. Aspinall and Baratri, started from Baghdad towards Constantinople by the Euphrates Valley. All three were murdered. This was in 1830. Up to that time, says Stocqueler, Waghorn had been a partisan of the Cape route. On hearing of Taylor's death, Waghorn took up the Overland route, went home without delay, won over the East India Directors, Lord Ellenborough and the Iron Duke, and finally gained his object. But, according to all accounts, he never touched a red cent of reward.

it clearly foreshadowed loss of independence; while, at the same time, it promised protection from Russia and Britain. Bismarck's "Memoirs" indicate that he contemplated the disappearance of the Turkish Empire. It would be interesting to have more in detail his ideas about the partition of it. Rather more than a century ago Alexander I. of Russia and Napoleon I. of France put their heads together to share the dominion of the world. The rock upon which they split was Constantinople, the Rome of the Eastern Church. If anyone dreams that Russia can make a separate peace, let him remember that Constantinople is the Mecca of Muscovy. Germany will not—nay, cannot—buy Russia off at the price of Constantinople and the two straits, and nothing short of that would satisfy Russia. To the Germanic Confederation access through the Balkan States and Turkey to the great agricultural and mineral resources of Turkey in Asia is of the highest importance. It is war, then, *à l'outrance* between Russia and Germany, and Britain's stake is not less than theirs.

Germany provoked the despatch of the Persian Gulf Expeditionary Force of 1914. Russia provoked that of 1856. In 1914 Britain was called upon to protect her rights in Southern Persia, on the Shat-el-Arab and in the Persian Gulf. In 1856 Herat was threatened by Persia at the instigation of Russia. We could not easily touch Herat, but we could and effectively did touch Bushire, Borasjun, Mohammerah and the Karun Valley. How often the tool suffers for its simian employer! Sir James Outram commanded the 1856 force, and two of the finest soldiers on the Upper Sind frontier, John Jacob and Henry Green, served with his cavalry brigade. Jacob was a man of marvellous versatility. Originally an artilleryman, the "Sind Irregular Horse" is the monument of his ability as a cavalry leader. At the same time his rifle, throwing an explosive bullet 2,000 yards, was, in 1850, ahead of any infantry fire-arm then in use. Jacob tried it at the Battle of Borasjun, and with it blew up the tons of powder captured from the Persians. It was at Borasjun that the Indian cavalry broke right into a formed Persian square. It was in the Karun Valley that a Persian division fled at the sight of a handful of Seaforth Highlanders. The Karun Valley, with its steam-boat navigation and the "Lynch" road from Ahwaz to Ispahan,¹ means much more for us to-day than in 1856. The country around it has been found to be a most valuable reservoir of mineral oil, and that alone called for armed protection. We are only now, for some inexplicable reason, being furnished with the information which enables us to realize what the Indian Expeditionary Force, commanded at first by Sir A. Barrett, and, when reinforced, by Sir John Nixon, has done, and to appreciate the services which it has rendered to the Empire. And to think that at the last Imperial Conference India was not represented! In this war France, Egypt, the Dardanelles, East Africa and Turkish Arabia, all bear witness to the efficiency of the Indian Army, as also did South Africa fifteen years ago. Peace has not attended the footsteps of Indian colonists at the Cape, but there is surely a very fine field for them in Mesopotamia and East Africa.

¹ Vide V. Chirol's "Middle Eastern Question," Chapter XIII.

The Persian Gulf Expeditions of 1856-7 and 1914-15 have one point in common, *vis.*, the use of an amphibious type of warfare, the land and sea forces co-operating in all or most of the attacks on the enemy. The attack on Mohammerah, as described in "Sir James Outram's Persian Campaign" (Smith, Elder, 1860), illustrates this; and, as we know, the advance of the troops under Sir A. Barrett and Sir John Nixon has been supported and facilitated by naval craft on the Shat-el-Arab and Tigris. Such combined operations are regulated by no official text-book, but are left to the genius of the naval and military commanders. "Sea power" is everything to us. "Mahanism v. Moltkeism," a pithy term applied by Germans to the present war, is a tribute to our navy and merchant service. What other Power in this war could have had troops operating at one and the same time in France, Egypt and East Africa, on the Tigris, and at Tsingtau and the Dardanelles? Our "sea power" has not decayed. It led us early in the 17th Century into the Persian Gulf, there to challenge Portuguese supremacy. It was not till 1668 that the Turk occupied Basra and so reached the Gulf. This fact must not engender confusion with the much earlier Arab occupation, which led to the maritime intercourse between the Gulf and China and to the valuable trade which for centuries plied between the Far East and the Levant *via* Turkish Arabia.

When we consider the past eventful and romantic—the "Thousand-and-one Nights"—are part of it—history of this region which the forces under Sir A. Barrett and Sir John Nixon are opening up to British occupation and enterprise, we may well share the indignation of *The Times* at the veil which the British Press Bureau has thrown over the Tigris Valley operations. The pity is that Russia, operating from the Caucasus and in the Black Sea, has achieved little. Haloes gather round names after a fashion that, in a way, defies analysis: John Nicholson, Herbert Edwardes, John Jacob, James Outram—men of very varying characteristics and of imperishable fame. The expedition of 1914-15 penetrates to the fabled Garden of Eden and the marvellous realms of Harun-er-Rashid. If a halo can be won, surely it can be won there! And yet Outram and Jacob are men hard to beat! Complex characters! Both fought and doubtless hated, with a holy hate, Sir Charles Napier. If it be true that Napier announced his conquest of "Sind" in the one word, "Peccavi," we can conceive Outram and Jacob waxing waggish over that *mot.* In the eyes of both, Napier *had* "sinned." In this spirit our paladins of last century fought each other and fought for King and John Company. Do like men still live to-day? Sometimes I think we are duller. I lectured last March to the Royal Society of Arts on the Indian Army, and endeavoured to lay before my audience its chivalry and romance as well as its solid and solemn fact. An ex-lieutenant-governor remarked that I had said nothing about "drill." I willingly admit that "drill" may, in able hands, be made a most entertaining topic. I appeal to *Punch* and the "Junior Sub" in *Blackwood* to endorse this statement; but as I am neither *Punch* nor the "Junior Sub," I must beg Sir Stuart Bayley to take me as I am. Those two paladins, Outram and Jacob,

were quite ready to fight each other! I know—on “the worst possible authority,” as *Punch* prefers it—that Jacob was only saved, by his second and better thoughts, from writing to Outram a truly insubordinate letter during the Persian Campaign. Happily, only the waste-paper basket saw its contents. A Viceroy of India—I forget which—spoke of Jacob as “the most conceited man I ever met.” Twice,¹ it is recorded, Lord Dalhousie severely reprimanded him, concluding his reports on the occurrence with the words, “It is a pity, for he is a fine fellow.” Outram came under the Dalhousian displeasure, as “Goldsmid’s Life” (Vol. II., Chapter III.) shows, and ran some risk of being “shelved,” or, as we say to-day, “Stellenbosched.” Such were the vicissitudes in the careers of men, though heroes still very human, who have won immortal fame, and such some of their characteristics. Biographies ignore these things. Outram went to crown his career in the Mutiny, and Jacob, at first appointed to command a division destined to serve under Sir Hugh Rose, was finally directed to resume his post as Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier. Meanwhile, early in 1857, Sir Harry Lumsden, with Dr. Bellew, was sent *via* Ghazni on a mission to Kandahar. Bellew, an expert Pashtu and Persian scholar, accompanied Pollock and Goldsmid to Sistan in 1870, and thence went on across Southern Persia to the Tigris, arriving at Kasr-i-Shirin on the Turco-Persian frontier in June, 1872. There is a future before Kasr-i-Shirin as the centre of an oil-region, and the frontier station on the prospective line from Baghdad to Teheran. Of this Dr. Bellew foresaw nothing. He felt the heat our gallant troops under Barrett and Nixon have felt, and thus records it:—“The heat! Its bare recollection is enough to provoke a moisture of the skin!” And this from a man who lived, not in tents and trudging and fighting over waterless wastes, but under a roof, or at least the awning of a steamer on the Tigris, or in the Gulf!

As far as I can judge from my study of the progress of German aspirations after Asiatic dominion, the birth thereof may, perhaps, be traced to von Moltke’s days of service under the Turkish Government. I fear Disraeli, blinded by his Russian antipathies, did not see through Bismarck at the Berlin Conference of 1878.² In 1889 and 1898 William II. visited the Holy Land. British Knights of St. John attended the footsteps of the Sovereign Head of the Johanniter

¹ *Vide* Lord Dalhousie’s “Private Letters,” edited by Baird, 1910, p. 302, and Lee Warner’s “Life of Lord Dalhousie,” Vol. II., p. 293.

² The late Commander-in-Chief in India claims, in a letter published in *The Times* of October 12th, a premonition of German designs in India not vouchsafed, as he affirms, to “*les avocats et philosophes*.” Sir Valentine Chirol sheds light upon the scene when, in *The Times* of October 13th he points out that he had found, when at Simla in 1911, “many of the ablest members of the Army Department over which the Commander-in-Chief himself presided” opposed reduction of the army from “fear of Russian, not German, aggression.” *Verbum sap.* Despite the *dictum* of the great Napoleon, *les avocats et philosophes* are not the only “destroyers of nations.” The Russians term the fiend “vodka” and the Celt “whisky.” The Teuton thrives on all.

Orden at Jerusalem, once the *chef-lieu* of the Order—a purely gratuitous act of attention. William II., bent on projects subversive of British policy and interests, preferred a clear field. Since 1889 the “B.B.B.,” as the “Berlin—Byzantium—Baghdad” Railway was succinctly styled in German circles, had been on the tapis. Nineteen-hundred-and-fifteen sees that scheme, supplanting every project from Chesney in 1830 to Beaconsfield in 1880, approaching completion. I still, however, venture the belief that the “B.B.B.” of achievement will turn out to be the “Byzantium—Baghdad—Baluchistan” Railway of R. M. Stephenson. Britain, France and Russia all have great railway, commercial, and political interests in Turkey in Asia, and, unless this great war has a most disastrous ending for the Allies, I am confident that the “B.B.B.” will be an international and not a Teutonic railway. Baluchistan is not what it was when “A Traveller” laughed R. M. Stephenson to scorn. Sixty years ago the Persian, from sheer devilment, damaged the Indo-European telegraph route. The Baluch to-day is growing familiarized with railroads. Russia seeks access from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. Britain must connect Egypt with Mesopotamia and Southern Persia, and India with both. Railways must come. Even Afghanistan, bent on holding the Feringhee at arm’s length, will yield in time. A State cannot refuse to admit wealth. One of the foremost Mohammedan thinkers of the day deprecated the idea of “Sir-Henry-Lunn” hotels on the Hindu Kush and café chantants in the bazaars at Kabul. But they will come. I see in Afghanistan the Switzerland of Asia. The Afghan has, under the garb of the “friendly,” looted British frontier expeditions from time immemorial (*vide* S. S. Thorburn’s “Transgression”), and will equally loot the globe-trotters. Under the auspices of Thomas Cook and Henry Lunn, Briton, Muscovite and Teuton may yet fraternize on the slopes of the Hindu Kush, and the Pathan will plunder all three. As the Concert of Europe maintains the neutrality of Switzerland, so the European Concert of Asia will maintain the inviolability of the Amir’s throne.

Bulgaria has entered into the Great War, and verily the future of the Turkish Power, once so vast, extending from the Tigris to the Tagus and the Danube to the Nile, now reduced by two-thirds, lies upon the knees of the gods. When Italy joined in the war, M. Sazonoff uttered this caution:—“We feel confident that Italy will preserve her traditional respect for the principles of nationality, otherwise Dalmatia will be a wall instead of a bridge between Italy and the Balkans. Russia has no interests in the Adriatic, but she cannot allow Turkey to hold the keys of the Black Sea. In Russian hands the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles will be guarantees of order and of navigation, where all will enjoy equal commercial rights. Bulgaria and Roumania need have no fears on that score.” Bulgaria will not welcome a Russian Constantinople. Apparently she pins some faith upon a Teutonized Queen of the East, and who can say that she is wrong?

The British Empire has embarked upon this war with the firm determination to maintain its power the world over. The Protectorate

of Egypt is a mighty addition to its responsibilities. It would seem that it is the destiny of our Empire to restore Egypt to that pre-eminence which was hers up to the time of her conquest in the 6th Century, B.C., by Cambyzes the Persian. The opening up of communication by rail between Egypt and India *via* Arabia has for long engaged attention, and very recently the journey of Captain H. L. L. Shakespear, of the Political Service, from Koweit to Cairo added fresh proof of its practicability. His death early in this war is matter for the sincerest regret. India, more than ever in the future, will take its place, its due place, in the Councils of the Empire, side by side with the self-governing Colonies. Given loyalty, its wealth and vast population make it a power, and its position is such that that power, in naval or military shape, can be exercised far and wide, as this war has proved. Nor have its limits yet been reached. It is of vital importance to the British Empire that no European Power should impose an insuperable barrier to her communications between the Eastern Mediterranean, including Egypt, and the territories bordering upon the head of the Persian Gulf. We have Egypt and Baghdad at this moment practically in our hands. The British Empire must keep them there.



CONCERNING FIGURE-HEADS.

By COLONEL CYRIL FIELD, Royal Marine Light Infantry (Rtd.).

THE hull of a modern man-of-war is as bare of ornamentation as the khaki fighting jacket of "Thomas Atkins"; her bow is as plain as the edge of a chisel. Both are solely intended for use—not to be looked at. But it was not always so. There were times, not so very long ago, if we consider the age of this old world of ours, when the most elaborate decoration was the order of the day. The sterns of the battleships of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries were often masses of carving and gilding; along their bulwarks ran a series of gilded trophies of arms, flags, &c., generally on a red or blue ground, while certainly more important than all in the eyes of the seamen of those days, was the figure-head, the final and finishing touch to the bow decorations.

The figure-head was the characteristic emblem of the vessel—the personification of her identity.

"In some ships," wrote Captain Basil Hall, eighty years ago—when the iron-clad with her smoking funnels and naked masts had not been born or thought of—"the sailors pride themselves especially on the beauty of their figure-heads; and many a time I have seen the captain of the fore-castle employed for hours in painting the eyes, hair and drapery of his favourite idol. I suppose few commanding officers will allow of this liberty; for it must be owned that as Jack's taste in female beauty, and in the disposition and colours of dress, are borrowed from a very questionable source, where the naked truth, as it is called, predominates sadly over the beau-ideal, his labours in adorning the figure-head are apt to produce strange monsters. I once heard of a captain who indulged his boatswain in this whim of representing his absent love as far as the king's allowance of paint could carry the art; and it must be owned, that as the original Dulcinea owed her roses to the same source, the representation 'came very close aboard of the original,' as the delighted boatswain expressed it. This very proximity in colouring, scantiness of drapery, and so forth, which formed the boatswain's pride, perplexed the worthy captain, who had given his sanction to the work, for he could never cross the bows of his own ship with a party of friends, without raising a laugh at the expense of his taste in figures. The whole crew, however, soon fell as much in love with the damsel as the boatswain had done before them; and it would have been cruel to have sent the painter to daub her ladyship all over with one uniform colour, according to the general fashion. The considerate commander took a different line.

" 'You seem proud of your head, Mr. Clearpipe, I shall gild her for you!' In a few days the sparkling eyes and blushing cheeks of Mrs. Boatswain, like Danaë, had yielded up their charms to the golden shower. The glittering figure-head soon became the delight of the ship's company, and on one occasion furnished the captain with rather an odd means of calling out their energies. The ship was sailing in company with several others of the same class, and when they all came to reef top-sails together, she was beat on the first occasion. As they were setting about a second trial of activity, the captain called out to the people aloft, 'Now, I tell you what it is, my lads, unless you are off the yards and the sails are hoisted up again before any other ship in the squadron, by the Lord Harry, I'll paint your figure-head black!' From that time forward she beat every ship in the fleet." Who can deny that on this occasion, at least, ornament proved of practical use? It is only those unsentimental dry-as-dust reformers whose acquaintance with our sailors and soldiers is generally confined to official returns and reports, who would like to deprive them of all the little distinctive badges and decorations that they prize so highly and reduce them to one dead-level of paper "efficiency"!

As we travel further back along the avenue of years we find that the seaman not only prized the figure-head of his floating home, but may almost be said to have venerated it as well. In a letter written in 1779, it is stated:—"The French and Spanish Fleets came before Plymouth and might have destroyed it; for there was nobody to hinder them. *The British Fleet fled before the enemy*, and the seamen hung their hammocks before the 'Victory's' head that she might not see such days!"

Much the same thing happened in 1797, when, in obedience to orders from the Admiralty, Sir Charles Hardy was reluctantly obliged to decline an engagement with the French. When the British Fleet crowding on all sail bore away from their opponents, a boatswain's mate on board the "Royal George" was seen busily lashing a double hammock round the head of the king. "What are you doing there?" says a lieutenant on the forecastle. "Only securing his peepers," says Jack. "Peepers! what do you mean?" exclaims the officer. "Why," replied the man, "we ar'nt ordered to break the old boy's heart, are we? I'm sure if the king once gets a sight of this here day's work, and knows that we have run away like cowardly lubbers, it will be the death of him, poor soul!"

A mishap to the figure-head was naturally regarded as an ill-omen. On one occasion, at any rate, the seamen's gloomy forebodings proved justified in the event. At the beginning of 1782, the "Atlas," of 90 guns, was launched at Chatham; when they came to ship her bowsprit the figure stood so high, that it was necessary to cut away part of the globe upon his shoulders; and that part happened to be North America. Some mishaps, however, might be repaired. Thus, for instance, during the battle of "The Glorious First of June" (1794) the fine laced cocked hat which adorned the bust of the duke, which formed the "Brunswick's" figure-head, was carried away by a cannon

ball. The crew of the "Brunswick," thinking it would be a degradation for a prince of the reigning house to remain uncovered in the face of the enemy, sent a deputation to the quarter-deck to request that the captain would be pleased to order his servant to give them his laced cocked hat to repair the loss. The captain good-humouredly complied. The carpenter nailed it on, and there it remained till the close of the engagement.

It is not easy to trace the origin of figure-heads. They were certainly in use in the ships of the ancient Egyptians and Phœnicians, though whether regarded in the same way as by the seamen of more modern times it is impossible to say. With the Phœnicians they seem at one time to have distinguished special classes of ships. From the fact that a figure-head representing a horse was found on a wreck on the East African coast about 112 B.C., it has been deduced that the Phœnicians had succeeded in doubling the Cape, since this type of head belonged particularly to a numerous class of their ships known as "Hippi." As for Egyptian figure-heads, the visitor to the British Museum may see them carved in dozens on the big sarcophagus on his left-hand as he enters the Egyptian Gallery. But most of these have two heads, one at the bow the other at the stern, and are probably in some way connected with funeral ceremonies.

Roman and Grecian ships appear to have had figure-heads, but they are rather overshadowed by other ornaments of a somewhat similar kind. At the bow rose the head and neck of a swan, or similar high curving decoration, at the stern was a feather or fan-shaped ornament called the "aplustre," and on the poop a figure of the tutelary deity of the ship. Neither of these was the "parsemon" or figure-head proper, which was placed between the ram and the bow ornament—sometimes on the stem of the ship, sometimes duplicated on either bow, as in modern days. The "parsemon" had a *general* reference to the ship's name, but not a *particular* one as had the figure-heads of modern history. If the ship was named after a river, there was a crocodile—after a mountain, a Phrygian lion, and so on. The figure at the poop more nearly represented the particular ship. Occasionally a human head was carved at the top of the bow ornament or "chemiscus." This may or may not have been emblematical of the ship's name.

The navies of the Greek and Roman empires passed away with the empires to which they belonged. Their scheme of bow and stern ornamentation went with them. But the Vikings, the "Men of the firds"—the fierce sea-rovers of the North—inaugurated a new system of ship decoration, in which the figure-head was pre-eminent. Their "Dreadnoughts" were termed "drakkers" or "dragon-ships," their "cruisers" "esnekkers" or "long serpents." Like the "snake-boats" of the modern Burmese, the whole vessel was contrived to bear the semblance of a dragon or snake when afloat. The bows were formed in the similitude of the monster's head, the stern was fashioned like his tail, while the rest of the boat played the part of his body.

Sooner or later these were augmented or replaced by a special figure-head, and when King Sweyn descended on the Norfolk coast in 1004, it is stated that though the king's own ship was like those we have described "in the form of a dragon"—a very ancient emblem of sovereignty it may be observed—the prows of the other ships with him were ornamented with figures of lions, bulls, dolphins or men, made of gilded copper. It is, however, to be noted, that old historians were apparently sometimes rather confused between the words "stem" and "stern," and it is at least as likely that these figures were at the stern as represented in William the Conqueror's ships in the Bayeux tapestry. Most of these have two "heads," one at the bow and the other at the stern, but both looking ahead, and not in opposite directions, as in the pictures of double "headed" Egyptian vessels previously referred to. It may be noted, however, that according to a very old chronicle, the golden boy blowing an ivory horn and pointing towards England, which appears on the "Mora," the Conqueror's own ship, was placed at the *prow* and not astern, as it appears in the tapestry. The double head is very much in evidence in certain very ancient carvings in Sweden representing ships of this period. All these have double dragon or snake heads facing forward, possibly on the principle of a double-barrelled gun, for the figure-head in the Viking days had a real and formidable significance. This was due to an extraordinary superstition.

The head of a victim offered in sacrifice was lifted up to a god with an invocation to bring evil upon all enemies of the person making the sacrifice, in return for the pleasure the spectacle was supposed to afford the deity. The head, so exalted, was known as a "nith-stang." Its effect or range of action surpassed that of our very latest big guns, since it is said an Icelandic chief put a curse upon the King and Queen of Norway by placing a "nith-stang," made of a horse's head on a pole, on his own mountain-side. Its fixed regard was supposed to put all the guardian spirits of the land to flight. The figure-head proper was at this time probably evolved from "nith-stangs" of some kind or another set up above the dragon or snake bow of a vessel. In an old Saxon MS. a human head is shown set upon a pole in this position. Anyway, figure-heads became regarded as possessing the baleful potentialities of these gruesome emblems, and by an old Icelandic law vessels were forbidden to come within sight of the island without first removing their figure-heads, lest they should scare away its guardian spirits. It is evident therefore that they were removable and not a part and portion of the ship, as the dragon bow is sometimes considered to have been. To announce that they had "unshipped" the dreaded bogie, the crew ran up a shield to the masthead.

After the Norman Conquest the progress of naval architecture practically abolished the figure-head for some centuries. The tubby sailing ship—the round ship—replaced the long serpents and their kind, except for the galleys of the Mediterranean. The "round ships," when equipped for fighting, as they nearly always had to be

at a time when every man's hand was against every other—at sea—had fighting stages built right out over the bow and stern. There was no room or place for a figure-head, though later on, in the 15th century, there were sometimes coats of arms at the bow below the forecastle, or perhaps a little rudimentary worm trying to look like a dragon. There were probably exceptions. For instance, the "Good Pace of the Tower" had a large golden eagle with a crown in its mouth on the bowsprit. This was in 1400, at which time the figures of their patron saints were made for several ships, though where they were placed is not known. Eighty-nine years later, what seems to be an actual figure-head appears in the picture of the wreck of a Hanseatic ship given by some survivor to the Marienkirche at Lubeck. It is an upright figure of a knight in armour, with spear, pennon, and shield. In the really formidable navy of Henry VIII., the figure-head made a tardy reappearance. The famous "Henri-Grace-a-Dieu" had a mild-looking squatting lion at her bow, while an inoffensive and diminutive unicorn and salamander perched themselves on the protruding "beaks" of the ships bearing the names of these mythical animals. These two, by the way, were French-built ships, given to the King of Scotland and captured off Leith in 1544. The French, however, seem to have gone in for more imposing bow ornaments at this period, since their "Grande Françoise," launched in 1527—the biggest ship that had ever been built in France—had a figure-head consisting of the image of St. Francis, her patron saint, placed over the "Salamander," the royal badge of Francis I. It is very interesting to note that this saintly figure-head is still to be seen in the church of St. Francis at Havre. Although we have the figure-heads of the "Shannon" and "Chesapeake," and dozens of less famous ones preserved in this country, we have nothing to compare with this French specimen as regards antiquity. The figure-head did not attain any very remarkable prominence, beauty or proportions, during the Tudor period, but with the advent of the Stuarts appeared the equestrian type. The figure on horseback, which our principal men-of-war then bore at their bows, was often brought into combination with several other figures. Thus the figure-head of the magnificent "Sovereign of the Seas" represented King Edgar riding over seven less powerful kings. When the Commonwealth Government built the "Naseby," they followed suit by giving her an equestrian figure of the Protector trampling upon the representatives of six nations. This was plagiarism with a vengeance! Strange to say it was in this very ship that Charles II. returned to England upon his Restoration, in honour whereof she was re-named the "Royal Charles." Of course, "Old Noll" was not allowed to remain, and his wooden effigies were therefore removed and burnt, as Pepys says, "with so much insulting folly as I never heard of," the head being cut off and hung on a specially constructed gibbet, with "the trayned bands of Rochester to witness the solemnity." But what annoyed Pepys about it more than anything else was the waste of money, as it was going to cost the king £100 to have a new figure-head made in the form of "a Neptune." As it turned out Oliver might just as well have been

left where he was, since four years later the "Royal Charles" was captured by the Dutch in the Medway and taken over to Holland.

The disappearance of the "beak-head" rendered the big equestrian figure-heads impossible, and at the beginning of the 18th century, possibly with a view to economy, an order was issued that all new ships were to have a lion as figure-head. This order was probably as much honoured in the breach as in the observance, for in 1770 fanciful patterns were as numerous as ever, and a naval officer, writing to the *St. James' Chronicle* in that year, expresses his surprise in seeing at the head of the new 90-gun ship "Queen" not, as he expected, "an elegant personification of Charlotte of Mecklenburg, but a ferocious looking lion, whose extended jaws seemed to hunger for blood and slaughter." Another objection to the "lion" head was its very constant use by both the French and Dutch Navies. Admiral Winter's flagship, the "Vrykeid," at Camperdown, wore one of these. Another attempt was made by Admiralty bureaucrats to deprive men-of-war of their individuality by the introduction of a uniform bow ornament. They proposed to abolish the figure-head altogether and replace it by a "scroll"—very appropriate from an office desk point of view. This was towards the end of 1796, but barely a year passed before they abandoned the ill-advised attempt altogether and ordered that "ships of war shall be ornamented with carved work at their heads and sterns, as formerly."

From this time forth our men-of-war revelled in busts and full-length figures of "Jupiter," "Agamemnon," "Bellerophon," and other Greek and Roman demi-gods and heroes interspersed with those of members of the Royal Family, and successful naval and military commanders. There were, of course, exceptions. Nelson's "Victory," for instance, had as figure-head the Royal Arms with a blue-jacket and marine as supporters, who were afterwards transmogrified into a pair of cherubs dressed in the "altogether."¹

Many of the single figures were of colossal size, 15, 17, and even 21 feet in height. A great number—over 150 in all—are still to be seen at the Royal Dockyards at Chatham, Sheerness, Portsmouth and Plymouth, to say nothing of many others scattered about the country. One of the old lion heads is said to be doing duty as a public-house sign at Martlesham, near Ipswich, and has become so scarlet—probably with shame at the base use to which he has declined—that, "As red as Martlesham Lion" is a common saying over that countryside. Some small comfort may be taken from the fact that he

¹ The figure-head with the seaman and marine supporters was the one she wore at Trafalgar. But in earlier days she had a most pompous and elaborate one. The bust of George III. stood on an arch over the Royal Cypher on a shield. Two figures of Britannia formed supporters, one crowned by an allegorical representation of "Victory" and the other by a similar representation of "Fame." The Royal Arms also formed part of the design together with figures representing Asia and Africa. This would seem to be enough for any figure-head, but in this case there was an additional figure of a boy with a globe and compasses, symbolical of the dominion of the seas.

is said to be a Dutch lion from a ship of that nation once wrecked on the Suffolk coast.

For the first half of the 19th century the figure-head well held its own, but in the latter half it received its *coup-de-grace* in the advent of the ironclad. Although the first seagoing armourclad, the French "La Gloire," had no bow ornament at all, the "Warrior" and the "Black Prince," with which we replied to her, and which had "swan" bows, carried two of the finest and handsomest figure-heads ever turned out. But as the ram bow became more and more universal it was found difficult, if not impossible, to put a regular figure-head in position. Some attempts were made even so late as 1887, when the "Howe" and the "Rodney" were given threequarter length heads representing the famous Admirals whose names they bore, but they had to be removed, as they got in the way when the torpedo-net defence was rigged out. The usual type of bow ornament worn by our earlier battleships was an escutcheon sometimes bearing the Royal Arms, and in other cases devices appropriate to the ship's name, with a more or less elaborate scroll-work design on either side of it. One of the most remarkable of these decorations was that of the "Warspite" (1886). The "gingerbread-work" on either bow represented a lady brandishing a sword and torch—possibly a prototype of a suffragette asking for votes—with a background of flags, arms and conventional foliage, while the escutcheon which bore the Royal Arms, opened like a pair of folding doors to allow a Hotchkiss Q.F.-gun to be fired dead ahead. The French Navy was the first to drop the bow ornament altogether, though a few of her armourclads, notably the "Brennus" (1891)—which with her huge fighting masts looked like one of Gustave Doré's romantic castles gone afloat—had really fine figure-heads. Our own Navy gave them up rather more reluctantly, while strange to say, the Germans, whose Navy is but a child in years compared to those of France and England, clung to them longer than either. The "Wittelsbach" (1900) and the "Deutschland" (1904), for instance—both first-class armourclads—had very fine figure-heads, while most of the smaller ships and cruisers of that period had an elaborate and handsome bow decoration.

But though now coming into line with other nations in this respect, the latest German battleships having nothing but a diminutive shield or badge on either bow, the Germans are a sentimental nation and still hanker after the figure-head, so much so, that their magnificent new Atlantic liner "Imperator," has at her bow a large carved Imperial eagle standing on the Globe, with the motto "Mein Feld ist die Welt." We might characterize this device as being "a little bit previous." The figure-head in our own liners has been dead these many decades. There are indications that the ram bow in warships which brought about the downfall of the figure-head, may have had its day. The newest Japanese men-of-war are already built with an overhanging bow. Should this type of bow become more universal, shall we see the figure-head "come to its own again"? It is much to be feared that our modern ideas would not sanction an

expenditure on what would be called "useless frippery." It is, however, quite possible that these "modern ideas" may be erroneous and short-sighted ones. In the United States Navy some years ago the place of the figure-head was taken, in a few ships, by a bronze figure or group emblematical of the vessel's name, which was placed between the guns on the fore-turret. It seems a pity that this idea has not spread and developed. Such a fine and enduring mark of individuality is open to none of the objections made to the figure-head and would become an heirloom in ships of the same name. Uniformity is doubtless a fine thing in many ways, but individuality is worth accentuating in ships and regiments, for in them it spells *esprit-de-corps*, and *esprit-de-corps*, not infrequently, spells—"Victory!"





Bow Ornament. Circa. 1500 (Arms of Brittany).
From a Book of Hours, belonging to Anne of
Brittany.—Bib. Nat.



Human and Crocodile Heads on Roman Galley.
From Coin of Marcus Antonius.



Dragon Figure-Head. From MS. of about 1000 A.D.





Figure-head of a Hanseatic Ship of 1489.
From "ex-voto" picture of its wreck in the
Marienkirche, Lubeck.



Head of H.M.S. "Unicorn" 1844.



Head of H.M.S. "Salamander," 1844.



Head of the "Victoria," the Ship in which Magellan sailed round the World. From Hulsius



H.M.S. "Enterprise."



H.M.S. "Orion."



H.M.S. "Edinboro."



H.M.S. "Queen" (1794).



H.M.S. "Duke of Wellington."



"La Bretagne," 1855.



H.M.S. "Calcutta."



"Star of India."
Bow Ornament in the old Indian Troopships.



H.M.S. "Gibraltar"
(Key of the Mediterranean).



Bow of German Liner "Imperator."



Bow Ornamentation "Kaiser Wilhelm II."



Figure-Head of the "Te-Avawa," one of the two big War Canoes in which the Maoris are said to have first arrived in New Zealand—(600-700 years ago.)



Figure-Head of South Sea Island War Canoe.
The author has seen such a head with eyes made from the glasses of a missionary who had been eaten.

WITH GENERAL BOTHA IN SOUTH AFRICA.

I.—THE REBELLION: WITH ENSLIN'S HORSE.

II.—IN GERMAN SOUTH-WEST.

By G. D. H.

I.—WITH ENSLIN'S HORSE.

ENSLIN'S HORSE was Pretoria's crack regiment. "A" and "B" Squadrons were composed solely of young South Africans, the majority of them having been in Government employ. Our squadron, "C," was made up entirely of overseas men. So you can imagine the rivalry there was between our lot and the others. But it was all good, healthy rivalry, not jealousy, and we got on well together. I had been with two irregular corps during the Boer War and had thought them a tough crowd: Enslin's could have given them points and then some more besides.

We had one little fight about 30 miles outside Pretoria at Haaman's Kraal: it happened in this way: We had been hurriedly sent for to reinforce the S.A.M.R. at that place. The rebels were in force there under Jack Pienaar—quite a "knot" he proved later. When the engagement was over it was a case of honours even. A first-rate man was lost here, Captain Allan King, Native Commissioner; he had been bowled over by a rebel when helping a wounded man.

Towards the end of November, we were hurriedly sent to Kronstadt. We should have got there in good time, only towards sundown one of the mightiest storms ever seen, even out here, started, and our train was forced to hold up all night at a siding. In the morning the whole country was under water, and our train could barely crawl along. At noon we reached Kronstadt and were bundled out. The town was full of troops and we heard all sorts of rumours. Next day we packed our kits, and that was the last we saw of them for a month. In the afternoon we entrained, also two other mounted regiments, and with two engines in front and one behind, off we started. We travelled about 40 miles and detrained at Honingspruit. Here we received orders to move off at 11 p.m. There were more troops here, and they had been in touch the previous day with the rebels. All our bunch must have totalled nearly 3,000 men. Everything was kept quiet so as to avoid leakage, but we learnt that Botha had assembled 30,000 men, that we were taking part in a combined drive, and that Botha had declared he was not returning to the Transvaal until the rebellion was squashed. This was all very cheering, and livened us up in spite of the damp. We had only an overcoat each, and they were real good ones, but blankets we never saw till we returned to Kronstadt. In the next few weeks I learnt

how the Boers had ridden rings round us in '99. I did not think flesh and blood could stand it; as for the horses, they were marvels.

We moved out one night at 11 p.m., pitch dark, and with lots of rain falling. About five miles out, I heard an old train whistling, and remarked to my half-section that it seemed to be strange, out to kill your fellow-man in sight and hearing of the railway. He evidently thought my moralizing feeble as he gave no answer, so I subsided. About 1 a.m. there was a little excitement. We rounded up a camp of the rebels, but they managed to break through, and it was "gallop" then till dawn. The only difference I found in the Orange Free State, after fifteen years, was that there were more wire fences than before. These were cut mostly, but now and then fellows galloped into one in the dark all standing, and there were some frightful falls. Dawn brought a little rest, and we learnt that our rebels, about 300 in number, had gone to earth in a plantation about a mile to our left. So we breakfasted and watched things. An hour's rest, and we were ordered to saddle up. Suddenly out came the rebels from the plantation, and charged down in our direction, but seeing us they broke and scattered. After an hour's chase we had 60 prisoners to our bag; we went on, and 10 a.m. brought us to a place called Edenville, consisting of two houses and a store, where there were more troops. We handed over our prisoners and went down to the dam to camp; the rain had now cleared and the sun was turned full on. Rations were issued here, mealie meal and sheep. We had a big lunch and slept till 4 p.m. At 5 p.m. we were off again, and at sundown, down came the rain. We travelled till 1 a.m., and then camped between some kopjes. Although I was dead beat, I was put on grazing guard, all the horses having been let loose and knee-haltered. I did not dare sit down for fear of sleeping. I went over to the other two guards, but they were feeling just as I was. At last came our relief, and I just lay down and slept where I was. We rested all the forenoon, and then travelling on again we reached Lindley at midnight.

This seems all very uninteresting, but we were just part of a big move, and the rebels were being most successfully shepherded. We had an hour's lie down in the streets of Lindley, and then on again. Our never-resting scouts had brought in news of a big bunch of rebels just ahead, so it was more canter and gallop. We raised our rebels at daylight, when they put a few shots into us, and bolted. We reached our farm, and had a rest till midday, and some more mealie porridge and sheep.

The strain of all this day and night work was telling on everyone, and we were all looking and feeling played out. Just as we were saddling up, a despatch came in, and we received orders to stand fast till the next morning. That saved us. A wash and clean up and a night's sleep made a new man of me. Next morning we moved on, and at sundown reached a rather important farm, "Bridge Rule," kept by a German-American. He was inclined to be "offish," but our adjutant soon fixed him up. He had a store here as well, and apparently went strong as a trader.

More meal and sheep, but this time we had commandeered pots and pans from the store to cook in—it's not much good to try and boil a leg of mutton in a cavalry patrol-tin. Our mess's share of the store had been some packets of patent oats and three packets of table jelly. So we boiled the flaky stuff, and put in the jelly to flavour it; our porridge came out a nice pink, and attracted a lot of attention, but it was all right. But our big iron pot with half a sheep in, and good thick broth, was the real thing.

Boer methods of trekking are simple. Travel light, and carry no rations, that's their motto. When you arrive anywhere, what food there is is commandeered for you and issued. The issuing is very simple. A pound of mealie meal or more, and a wave of the hand to a flock of sheep, and you caught any animal you fancied and slaughtered it. That evening we started again, and during the night ran into a gang of rebels; we kept after them till 9 a.m., when we chased them right into Reitz, into the arms of another crowd of ours. An hour's rest here and rations. My share was a tin of Huntley and Palmer's biscuits and a packet of tea. Botha was in Reitz, and the place was just swarming with troops. Here we learnt more news and were told what troops would be on our right and left, and how we should know them. Botha held a bit of an inspection of all the troops and was well cheered. We then moved off in a good old downpour.

The next few days practically finished the rebellion, and our little lot had the time of its life. We left Reitz midday and moved off with the main column. Four p.m. found us camped at a farm with a most excellent orchard; also a big dam, and in the middle of it geese and ducks innumerable. That did not deter Enslin's, and in no time everyone was stripped and in after his dinner. I was mess orderly and was busy getting firewood and fruit. Our mess did all right, two geese, two ducks, and a hen that I met. Some fellows had turkeys. We soon had the feathers off, and were busy cooking. Orders were to move off at 10 p.m. At sundown the rain redoubled, and in no time fires were out, and the place a foot in water. I put a half-cooked hen in my nosebag, and a ditto duck in my overcoat pocket. Ten o'clock saw us away in a bumping storm, 2 a.m. halted; one couldn't lie down, the veldt was a running river. An hour's rest and on again; black as pitch, and raining literally blocks of rain. Dawn saw us in front of the rebel position and everywhere you could see mounted men. At one place our little lot did a frontal attack, but we got bunkered badly at a donga running full to the brim. Some horses went in and were fished out about a mile down. This gave the rebels a start, and by the time we had found the ford they had cleared. The ford didn't help much, the water coming over one's knees, and running strong; I felt my hair rise as my pony lost his footing, but we made the bank all right. Midday the rain cleared and saw us all in a valley, dismounted but ready to move on. Here we chewed damp duck and discussed things. On again, and evening brought us to a small farm. More mealie meal and sheep, and the warm feed cheered us. Eight p.m. saw us on the move and we kept on all night. Daylight brought us to a big camp, and here were all the rations

in the world for us. Midday saw us on the go until daylight. We now learnt we were doing a turning movement, and were returning to Reitz, and that the drive had been a terrific success, prisoners and guns galore. We passed one man, the picture of happiness. He was Commandant Klopper. Early in the drive, he and about 20 men had been captured by the rebels, and carted along with them. When the tide turned the whole commando, 400 of them, surrendered to old Klopper, and he brought them in.

Four p.m. on December 6th brought us into Reitz, and here we had two days' good rest. On Monday we were an escort to about 1,400 prisoners, and marched them down to the station. There the lot were rounded up in our particular section. We heard that the total bag had been nearly 5,000, and that these were being brought in at the various centres of troops. This left about 1,000 to be accounted for. Didn't the troops cheer. We were full up with rations here, everything that the Government could get for us. December 8th saw us out from Reitz, and the same old career around. My diary at this period has few entries beyond "pickets," "mutton," and "fed up." December 10th saw us at a Scotchman's farm, called Korte. Here the lady of the house set to, and baked griddle cakes for us, and they were good. Going on from here my half-section ran two rebels to earth beneath a bed, and I found one behind a door.

Our Major, the antithesis of a soldier to look at, was a cool hand. He'd gallop up to a farm without drawing his revolver, and nine times out of ten there were rebels. He was a great little chap, and his English was a delight to us; it was usually in times of stress that it gave way. We were hurriedly saddling one day, and when ready for the order to mount, out it came, "Take your seats, please." We nearly cheered. Our skipper, Johnstone, was A1. He had been an Army man, and looked after us well. December 13th found us at Lovat, waiting orders. Suddenly in comes a Cape-cart and three girls. Within five minutes "saddle up," and we heard they had brought in news of a commandant and a gang of rebels. An hour's hard ride and we rounded up the lot, Commandant Stead and 100 men. Next day we were out again and found another bunch of 40. We learnt now that the rebels were disheartened and split up in small batches. Between now and the 19th, my diary shows 280 prisoners to our credit. The 19th saw us in Kronstadt, and it was good to roll between blankets again. On the 20th we entrained for Pretoria, reaching there the same night. We'd been a little over a month away, and had done a good share in squashing the rebellion. Pretoria turned out and let us know what it thought of its pet corps. We were paid off on the 22nd, and the next day saw us on our way to our various homes.

Young South Africa is decidedly hot stuff, and it did one good to see a former spruce civil servant engaged in a tussle with a reluctant and exceedingly woolly sheep; the former young bloods of Pretoria took to the veldt life naturally, and it was their conduct that helped so much to gain Enslin's Horse the reputation it enjoyed.

II.—IN GERMAN SOUTH-WEST.

Infantry training is at all times a pretty strenuous task, but when a man is through with it, and is turned out as the real article, he is a different being to what he was when he enlisted.

I do not suppose our training at Durban differed from any other, bar that the sun broiled us, that the infernally steep hills around Durban had become steeper to us, and that everything we did was at the double. We always had the satisfaction of being able to lie down at intervals, and sometimes were actually allowed a whole night's sleep. It was with a joy you can imagine that we at last received our marching orders, and in January said good-bye to Durban and entrained for Capetown. Our gaudy troop train took five solid days to reach Capetown, and instead of being let loose to enjoy ourselves on arrival there, we were detrained alongside the transport and promptly marched on board.

We left Capetown at 4 p.m. on January 26th, and reached Walvis Bay at noon on the 29th. We landed in the evening, were marched off to our camp, and the next morning we could size up Walvis properly. Civilization had added a few disreputable wood and iron buildings, and had then passed on and forgotten it. The bay itself was all right, and there was lots of it. It was the turn of our section for duty, and we found ourselves on outpost, and had our first real sight of the desert. It was not interesting in any way. Sand as far as you could see, and then to make sure that you should know it was sand, a whirlwind would get up and almost choke you. Where we were posted there was not an atom of shelter, and we were not sorry when the sun went down.

Walvis did not seem to bring us any nearer to realizing our dreams of bayoneting Germans. A railway was being built to Swakopmund, and as no natives were available, the light task of shifting railway material was turned over to us. Teak and ironwood sleepers are most excellent articles when in their proper place, but when it comes to manhandling them and humping them on your shoulder, and trudging hundreds of yards through sand, they become less interesting. The rails, though, were the worst of the lot, and they were not kept in ice either; they could not have been hotter if they had been fried. But everything comes to an end, and after about a fortnight's toiling at all this stuff, a transport came in with about fifteen hundred natives for the railway.

About the end of February the heat suddenly became intense, and on many days registered 120° in the shade. And, on top of this, came an invasion of every kind of insect imaginable, all of them with a most businesslike bite; no one could get any sleep, and one would hear yells from everywhere when a beetle would get in an extra strong nip. Those nights were not pleasant. Some of us had been sent off to a small post, five miles inland. The heat here was appalling, no sea breeze to temper it. The dust storms here were tremendous and it was no good trying to do any guard when they were on; the only thing was to lie down and try and keep the sand from burying one.

Here were some natives, and we saw the first instances of German cruelty. None of our natives could understand a word of their language, and I do not know to this day why it had been done. There were eight niggers, all men of vigour, and all had been castrated. These things I saw with my own eyes, but the worst cases of cruelty to natives were met with by the Central Force working east from Lüderitz-bucht. Men told me they had found bodies of natives tied round and round with barbed wire and apparently buried alive. Others told me of cases of natives hanged and filled with bullets. Owing to this terrible system of terrorising the natives we did not receive the slightest help from any of the black men of German South-West Africa—the Germans had cowed them so thoroughly—and you know how useful natives can be.

At last we received fresh orders, and during March embarked for Swakopmund. This place was quite an eyeopener, jolly big three-storeyed buildings, and the town well laid out. The streets were sandy, but most of them had a wood pavement either one side or the other. On our arrival we entrained, and were later offlanded about eight miles out; we then marched three miles and encamped till dusk, when we started off again. We were escort to some heavy artillery and did not travel fast, but it was very tiring. We were on the go, without a stop for more than a minute, till 11 p.m., then rested till 4 a.m., and on again till 9. Then we left the battery at noon and pushed on four miles to the water. When we reached it we were dead beat. The journey had been hardly 30 miles, but it had been slow, heavy going with hardly a stop, through that unholy sand, and carrying a 50lb. kit. It is a good job it had been mostly night travelling. It would have been heartbreaking to see the ghastly desert we were passing through; nothing but miles and miles of sand, and a few dried bones here and there. The well had been cleaned out and there were tons of water being pumped up. I was chatting to the engineer man at the pumping engine; he had been with the first lot of our men that reached here, and had found things in a terrible mess, and the well poisoned; the Germans had dumped literally sacks full of "Cooper's sheep dip" down the well; mines, too, had been strewn all round, but bar four mules being blown up, there had been no damage done.

From here we marched right on to Reitz, where Botha had his first fight with the Germans. It was a marvellously strong place. Their camp had been in a hollow, and all round were rocky hills about 700 ft. high. The entrance was a small gorge about 100 yards wide, and yet our chaps went straight in and the Germans fled out the other side. We were now 70 miles inland, and still desert, sand and rocks for miles. The more we saw of the country the less we liked it, and to hear us grouse! A pro-German to hear us would have thought we were ripe for treason, and that not one of us would ever soldier again. And yet only a few days before the three regiments had been paraded, and asked if there were any men willing to serve in Europe. Out of 1,800 men, 1,500 odd stepped forward, and I know

the other 300 only wanted a week's "bust," and then they would be along too. So when you hear T.A. grouching and declaiming his woes, just let him slide; he's all right and it is his only safety valve. At this place I cracked right up, the sand had played me right out, and I had to give in, and was sent down country.

On the hospital ship with me were four fellows who had escaped from the enemy, and had had a 200-mile march across the desert. Luckily it had rained when they started, and here and there they were able to scoop up water in rocky pools and refill their water-bottles. Their food, such as it was, gave out before a week, but they still struggled on. From their last camp they could see the ocean, but no sign of Swakopmund. Ten miles from the coast they were one man short, but determined to push on and come back for him. The point they came out at was Cape Cross; here the enemy had blown up everything; but they came upon half a tank of rain-water. Shell-fish in plenty were found and boiled in an old pot. Next day they went back and brought in their pal. And two days later all made their way along the coast, and reached safety. They had indeed a miraculous escape from the desert.

Arriving at Capetown, hospital treatment soon put me on my feet, and foolishly I thought I was all right, and returned to duty. This time I saw German West, from its southern end. Our railway corps had worked like demons, and had laid the rails across 300 miles of desert. In laying the railway across the desert, all the way from Prieska to the German railhead at Kalkfontein, the engineering corps had done wonders. To the southern column had fallen terrible work in the way of clearing out the wells. Only where they had been hurried had the Germans been cleanly and only dropped bags of poison down. At the southern end they had time to be deliberate. When our fellows arrived, they invariably found the wells full to the brim with rotting corpses of mules and horses that the Germans had shot and thrown in. And all these had to be taken out piece by piece. It was indescribable and unforgettable. And yet our fellows faced it. In spite of all this, the old railway was put down at the rate of one-and-a-half to two miles a day over the whole of the 350 odd miles between Prieska and the German terminus.

On the map, Upington on the Orange River looks a beautiful spot. It is a place where it is always blowing a gale; everything is hidden in black clouds of dust, and yet people live there of their own accord. On a sunny day, if you take off your shirt you feel you are being flayed alive; the fine dust in the air whips and stings. From here I was passed up to the German railhead, Kalkfontein, a small settlement. But, oh! that illimitable desert! I suppose the men who have been with Botha right up north have actually seen trees and grass. But there have been 30,000 others who saw neither tree or shrub from the time they left the Transvaal. As for your poor old rifle, you carried him swathed around like a mummy, though that did not help. But the last dust storm I was out in put the tin lid on, and for days I was gasping for breath. That was two months

ago, and I am still coughing up sand. So I had to retire to hospital, and reluctantly took my discharge. To all these clouds there was one little bit of silver lining, and the irony of it all appealed to everyone.

In January, Botha had commandeered men right and left. There were about 1,200 stalwart non-starters. "No; we're not going to fight, and we jolly well won't go!" Fatherly advice reduced the laggards (cowards the others called them) and "strikers" to 600. These were duly tried, and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment with hard labour. They did the hard labour all right. They were carted to rail-head, put in a nice barbed-wire camp, and forced to carry railway material. I admit their movements were not smart, neither did they look happy. But they were doing useful work and I left them at it.



THE BRITISH CAPTURE OF GENOA, 1814.

By C. T. ATKINSON; Captain, Oxford University O.T.C.

TAKE a map of the world, mark on it the places commemorated on the regimental Colours of the British Army, and what a wonderful epitome presents itself of the military history of this country since the Restoration; what a striking illustration of the world-wide character of our Imperial responsibilities and the complicated nature of the problems with which British military administrators have to deal. "*Quæ caret ora cruore nostro?*" No better answer could be given than the "Ubique," which sums up the battle-honours of the regiment¹ which is entitled to more honours than any other but, ironically enough, has none at all. The most cursory examination of the battle-honours map will show how amply "Ubique" is justified. Every continent contributes to the list, for even Australasia is represented by the "New Zealand," so well earned in the costly and difficult operations against the Maoris in the "Forties" and "Sixties" of the last century, yet it is the blank spaces on the map which most arrest attention. It is but natural, thanks to our strength at sea, that only one honour has been awarded for an action within the British Isles. And this, the distinction of "Fishguard," borne by the Pembrokeshire Yeomanry to commemorate their share in bringing about the surrender of the extraordinary collection of convicts, bad characters, captured Chouans and Vendéans, whom the French threw ashore at that remote spot in February, 1797, deserves to be remembered more for its peculiarities than for its importance.² But if one expects to look outside the British Isles for the places where the British Army has earned its honours, it is remarkable, seeing how large a part Great Britain has played in the Mediterranean in the last two centuries and a half, and that Northern Italy has almost as good a title to be called the cockpit of Europe as have the Low Countries themselves, that there should be but one Italian name among all our battle-honours. Portugal and Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, France and Russia have all contributed freely to the actions for which honours have been granted, the one Italian name is Maida, the brilliant little victory of 1806 in Calabria, in which some

¹ The Royal Regiment of Artillery.

² The Jersey Militia have an honour which the inaccurate might include in the same category as "Fishguard," for they commemorate the repulse of de Rullecourt's descent on St. Helier during the American Rebellion by having "Jersey, 1781," on their colours, but to call this an honour "earned within the British Isles" raises a formidable question, which lies outside the present argument, that of the exact constitutional position of the portions of the Duchy of Normandy still ruled by the successors of William the Conqueror.

seven British battalions gave a foretaste of the results of the conflicts between British and French infantry so soon to open in the Peninsula.

But is Maida the only battle on Italian soil which deserves commemoration on our Colours? A country with Italy's length of coast-line and Italy's possible landing places seems the natural theatre for those "amphibious" operations which a power strong at sea but relatively weak on land finds a weapon limited, it is true, in scope and only occasionally applicable, but peculiarly effective where circumstances favour its use. Indirectly England has influenced, and been influenced, by many a battle on Italian soil; Eugene's great victory at Turin in the Spanish Succession War was the work of an army most of which was in British pay; at Rivoli and Marengo Napoleon triumphed over England no less than over Austria, but the troops whom England's subsidies have enabled to fight in Lombardy and Liguria have never had with them any British regiments. Marlborough, it is true, was most anxious in 1706 to transfer himself and all the British cavalry from the Netherlands to Italy to help Eugene relieve Turin, but so daring a stroke was altogether unacceptable to his cautious colleagues, and so with two exceptions, one¹ most trifling, Italy has been to the British Army *terra incognita*.

The more important exception was the British occupation of Sicily from 1806 to 1816, an episode punctuated by descents on the mainland, which accomplished just enough to show how much more might and should have been achieved. One only of them has escaped oblivion, and Maida is remembered, not for the results it achieved, but as having been in its tactics the prelude to the conflict in the Peninsula between the tactical systems of France and England, which Professor Oman and Mr. Fortescue have described so clearly. As the precursor of Wellington's long list of triumphs, Maida has won its place in history, yet had Maida been made the Roliça of an earlier Peninsular War in another peninsula, its tactical importance would have been overshadowed. But Sir John Stuart failed to enter by the door his brigadiers and his men had opened to him. Had he re-embarked promptly, sailed north to Policastro or Salerno, and, landing again, planted himself across the path of the retreating French, Reynier must have been trapped. The flickering insurrection of the Calabrian peasantry might have been fanned into a great flame. Gaeta, where a gallant resistance was still being maintained, might have been relieved, and the whole position of the French in Southern Italy shaken to its foundations at a moment when Napoleon had a breach with Prussia impending and few men to spare for Naples. But, like Admiral Hotham, when he so excited Nelson's indignation

¹ After the British evacuated Corsica in 1796, the garrison occupied Elba, and, while holding that island, found it necessary to land on the coast of Tuscany and expel the French from Piombino and some of the coast villages, their object being to establish a communication with the mainland and obtain the supplies which Elba did not produce. In this task the 18th Royal Irish were employed, and came into conflict with the French at Campiglia. Cf. Gretton's "Campaigns of the Royal Irish Regiment."

by letting slip a chance of decisive action with the Toulon fleet,¹ Stuart was easily contented, he had "done very well," and Maida remained unutilized, typical in its relative barrenness of the whole British occupation of Sicily, prominent in the long list of opportunities which were presented to Great Britain from time to time in the course of the Great War, in no theatre of war so conspicuously as in Italy, only to be neglected.

The peculiar vulnerability of the Italian peninsula to "amphibious operations" explains why so many of these unutilized opportunities occurred in Italy. Admiral Mahan has shown how closely connected were Nelson's operations along the Riviera in 1795 and 1796 with the fluctuations of the struggle on shore, but the more the naval operations in the Mediterranean are studied in their bearing on the land warfare, the more clearly apparent become the limitations of mere naval supremacy. Command of the sea, in Mr. Corbett's words,² "means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes," and consequently naval victories fail to be decisive unless followed up and supplemented on land. Not till three years after Nelson's victory at the Nile was the French occupation of Egypt brought to an end—by the little army which disembarked with Abercromby at Alexandria. Heretical though the assertions may sound to "the idolators of Neptune," Trafalgar was only decisive in so far as it forced Napoleon to adopt that "Continental System" which in the end opened a door to the intervention of the British Army continuously and on a considerable scale. The most instructive chapter of "The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire" is the one which remains unwritten, and which ought to tell the sequel to Trafalgar and to expound in detail the contribution of the Navy to the successes of Moore and Wellington. The complete absence³ of any reasoned and authoritative account of the work of the Navy after Trafalgar is the most serious gap in the literature of the Napoleonic War.

The truth is that it is not by studying only what the Army did or only what the Navy did, as if they were in watertight compartments, that the Napoleonic War is to be understood, but by considering what might have been done by Army and Navy in co-operation. The real reason why the British Fleet had to evacuate the Mediterranean at the end of 1796 was not that Spain had thrown in her lot against us, but

¹ "Had we taken ten sail and allowed the eleventh to escape when it had been possible to have got at her, I could never have called it well done."—Nelson to the Duke of Clarence, March 15th, 1705.

² "Some Principles of Maritime Strategy," p. 90.

³ James is a mere mass of disconnected detail, Laird Clowes' "History of the Royal Navy," which follows James in adopting the misleading division of events into "Major" and "Minor Operations," is little more than a James up to date; and the only book from which one can learn anything is General Callwell's "Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance," and it only deals with this period incidentally, and does not give it special or separate treatment.

because the British Army was perishing in the West Indies when it might have been operating to far better purpose along the shores of Italy. Instead of three thousand we ought to have had twenty thousand men in Corsica, which, as Lord William Bentinck wrote to Lord Bathurst in January, 1814, was the "most valuable position in the Mediterranean," since a force having Corsica as its base might, by acting in "constant union" with a Mediterranean fleet, create "an extraordinary diversion" in Italy. Had the statesmen of 1795 possessed the same grip of the possibilities of amphibious warfare as Bentinck's letter shows, the Italian campaigns of 1795 and 1796 might have had a very different ending.

When Bentinck wrote he was contemplating the transfer to Corsica of the whole available British force then under his orders in Sicily, but this project was never realized, for almost immediately after he sent off this letter the whole situation in Italy was altered by the conclusion of the treaty of January 11th, 1814, between Murat, then King of Naples, and the Austrians, who up to that time had made but little progress in wresting Italy from Napoleon's Viceroy, Eugene Beauharnais. This treaty Castlereagh, much to Bentinck's annoyance, found it necessary to accept as a basis for future action, with the immediate result that the English intervention took the shape, not of the occupation of Corsica as a preliminary to operations in North Italy, but of a landing at Leghorn, and an advance along the Riviera to Genoa, the capture of which city from the French was the last hostile action of the British Army in the long contest which had opened in May, 1803.

This expedition of Bentinck's to Genoa is an episode in comparison with which Maida is a household word. No battle-honour of "Genoa, 1814," was granted to the units engaged to excite even the curiosity which is aroused by the appearance on regimental Colours to-day of such an unfamiliar name as "Mandora," borne by the Scottish Rifles and Gordon Highlanders. Yet in scope and in execution it was as worthy of commemoration as, not a few actions so recorded. Even taking the not wholly satisfactory standard of casualties incurred, honours have often been earned by losses lighter than those of the regiments actually engaged in this enterprise. Yet its obscurity is natural enough. In the closing stages of Europe's great struggle against the Corsican tyrant such a side-issue as Bentinck's capture of Genoa is easily overlooked. Absorbed in Napoleon's great contest in Eastern France or in Wellington's victorious progress from the Pyrenees to Toulouse, historians have little space or time to give to Eugene's defence of Italy, to Bernadotte's operations against the Danes, or gallant old Lynedoch's efforts to clear the French out of the Netherlands. Yet the forces engaged in these quarters were in the aggregate quite considerable, and the French troops employed in Holland or Italy would have been of no small assistance to Napoleon at such critical moments in his contest with Blücher and Schwarzenberg as the morning after Montereau or the day of Arcis-sur-Aube.

Between Maida and Bentinck's landing at Leghorn several promising chances for British intervention in Italy had occurred. Before the end of 1806 substantial reinforcements had brought the British in Sicily up to nearly 20,000 of all ranks, and in the spring of 1807, with Moore to command them, Napoleon held in check in Poland after his Pyrrhic victory at Eylau and at his wits' end for troops, a stroke might have been dealt in Italy comparable to that which Moore was to strike in Spain in 1808. But the "Ministry of All the Talents," not content with having already despatched 10,000 men to South America on an errand which would have done next to nothing to hurt Napoleon had it been as successful as it proved disastrous, proceeded to render impotent its striking force in Sicily by sending a third of it to Egypt on a venture as futile and as unsuccessful as even Whitelocke's famous fiasco at Buenos Ayres. Thus, though Italy was at the time described by a very acute observer, Sir Richard Church, as ripe for insurrection and needing one thing only to produce an outbreak against the French, the appearance of a British army under Moore, and though the change of government at home which brought Castlereagh to the War Office was accompanied by far "more judicious views with regard to military operations,"¹ by the time the troops in Egypt had been extricated, "the advantage of time and place," which "in all martial actions is half a victory,"² had passed away; the Franco-Russian alliance at Tilsit had revolutionized the situation, and Sicily was more likely to suffer than to serve as the base of an offensive.

During the Wagram campaign the Austrians were longing to see a British diversion in Italy, but unfortunately Sir John Stuart was again in command in Sicily, and to his hesitation and indecision it must be attributed that not till June, when Napoleon had already entered Vienna and thereby caused the hasty evacuation of Italy by the Austrian Army which had inflicted defeats on Eugene Beauharnais at Sacilio and Caldiero, were the British embarked for a voyage along the Neapolitan coast which, for all it accomplished, might never have been attempted. No further opportunities were offered for years. The transfer of Murat to Naples increased the military efficiency of the Neapolitan kingdom, while his reforms and vigorous government diminished alike the inclinations of the population to rise and the chances of a successful insurrection. Moreover, once England was committed to the Peninsular War no reinforcements could be spared for Sicily; indeed, when in the summer of 1812 Murat went off to Russia, it was to the east coast of Spain that the available troops from Sicily were dispatched.

By this time Stuart had given place to a man of a far higher stamp, Lord William Bentinck. The inspirer of that most interesting experiment, the Sicilian constitution of 1812, which provided the Sicilian insurgents of 1848 with one of their watchwords, the advocate of Italian liberation, Bentinck's connection with Sicily is important

¹ Bunbury. "Passages in the Great War with France," p. 314.

² Drake to Elizabeth, April 13th, 1588.

on its diplomatic and political side rather than in military matters. As a soldier Bentinck attained no particular distinction: he had served on the staff in the Netherlands in 1794, and as British military attaché to Suvoroff's army in 1799; in Moore's campaign in Spain he commanded—creditably enough—the brigade which bore the brunt at Corunna; but when in command on the east coast of Spain in 1813, he achieved very little. It is not perhaps unjust to surmise that during his operations in Catalonia the situation in Italy was to some extent distracting his thoughts. As long ago as October, 1811, he had received instructions from Marquess Wellesley, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, about the prospects of rousing Italy against Napoleon. It was partly to provide a nucleus for an army of liberation that in 1812 the prison hulks and barracks of England were ransacked for Italians who would join an "Anglo-Italian Levy" and go out to Sicily, where Bentinck, full of zeal for this not very promising corps, raised additional battalions. But from the first Bentinck had been warned to walk warily: Wellesley had cautioned him¹ against exciting the people of Italy to premature or partial projects. Liverpool wrote² that it was only if more disposition to welcome British assistance were shown than had hitherto been manifested that the garrison of Sicily might be utilized in Italy: while Italy continued as it was, the east coast of Spain afforded a more promising opening. In October, 1812, Bathurst,³ who earlier in the year had received information that anti-French feeling was increasing in Italy, had to report less favourable accounts from Italy, and though early in 1813 Italian discontent was again increasing, it was not sufficient to afford any solid basis for action, especially as anti-French feelings were held in check by the distaste of the Italians for any return to their ancient connections.

That even in 1813 it was best to concentrate our efforts in the Spanish theatre of war is obvious. Even if the whole garrison of Sicily could have been concentrated for a descent on Italy, Bentinck could have achieved little of a solid character until Austria had definitely come down on the Allies' side of the fence on which Metternich was sitting, or until anti-French feelings in Italy had advanced beyond mere "discontent." Moreover, even though Napoleon was stripping Italy of troops for his campaign on the Elbe, Bentinck's own force, none too large, included a Sicilian contingent not very satisfactory either as regards military efficiency or loyalty, as well as several foreign regiments in the British service of doubtful value. A landing in Tuscany or Naples might have had disastrous results had the campaign in Germany gone against the Allies. Bentinck could hardly call on Italian patriots to rise against Napoleon when his operations might well end in an ignominious return to Sicily.

¹ Wellesley to Bentinck, October 21st, 1811. Papers relating to Italy presented to the House of Commons. "Commons' Journals," 1814-1815.

² Liverpool to Bentinck. March 4th, 1812. *Ibid.*

³ Bathurst to Bentinck, August 11th, 1812; October 13th, 1812; April 20th, 1813. *Ibid.*

By the autumn of 1813 the situation had so far improved, that Bathurst wrote¹ to authorize the employment of British troops to assist the Austrians under General Nugent operating against the French in the Illyrian provinces, as well as to supply any insurgents in Italy with arms and ammunition. Yet in this letter there is a hint that the authorities at home felt scruples about giving Bentinck too free a hand, for he was warned against taking Italian troops wholesale into our pay, since the strain on Great Britain's resources, already enormous, was being augmented by our promise of subsidies to Austria and our other allies. Acting on these instructions Bentinck proceeded to reinforce Nugent from the Ionian Islands. The British troops there had already been carrying on "amphibious" operations in the Adriatic with considerable success in conjunction with the squadron under Admiral Fremantle. They had driven the French out of Dalmatian islands like Augusta and Curzola, had done considerable damage by raiding Fiume, and now, co-operating with the Austrians, they reduced Trieste in October, and finally completed the overthrow of the French by the capture of Cattaro and Ragusa in January. Before Ragusa fell the Austrian force under Nugent had been landed at the mouth of the Po by a British squadron, and with it went a little British detachment, some 500 strong, drawn from the 35th Foot,² de Roll's Swiss regiment, about the senior foreign regiment in the British service, and the Calabrese Free Corps, a unit raised in Sicily out of refugees from the mainland. As Nugent pushed on into Italy, this little handful accompanied him, and, after sharing the fortunes of his corps, ultimately joined Bentinck at Genoa after the fall of that city. One would give a good deal for a diary of one of the officers of the 35th who went through this, one of the most remarkable adventures in which British troops have ever shared.

Nor was this reinforcing of Nugent the only enterprise in which Bentinck indulged. A battalion of the Anglo-Italian Levy under Colonel Catanelli, a very enterprising officer, was embarked on a squadron under Commodore Rowley, and having landed along with a strong party of marines on the Italian coast at Via Reggio, not far from Lucca, destroyed several coast batteries and beat off an attack by a strong detachment of the Leghorn garrison, inflicting many casualties on them and capturing three guns. The troops and marines were then hastily re-embarked in the hopes that by a prompt move to Leghorn that town might be seized, its inhabitants being reported to be favourable to such an effort and the garrison weakened by its losses. On December 13th a landing was effected and a position taken up in the suburbs. However, the expected rising of the inhabitants did not take place, without heavy guns the town could not be taken, and the threatening condition of the weather made communication with the ships precarious. While Colonel Catanelli and the senior naval officer on shore, Captain Dundas, were reconnoitring the town and discovering that they were confronted with a task beyond their powers, sudden

¹ Bathurst to Bentinck, September 27th, 1813. Papers relating to Italy presented to the House of Commons. "Commons' Journals," 1814-1815.

² Now the 1st Royal Sussex.

firing on the Pisa road announced an attack by a strong force of cavalry and infantry from Pisa. The marines had been posted on this side, and, behaving with conspicuous coolness, they not only beat off the cavalry, but actually attacked and routed the infantry. The Italian Levy co-operated, covering themselves with credit, but there was nothing to be done but to re-embark, which was accomplished without any mishap.¹

But more solid work was at hand. Napoleon's overthrow at Leipzig, anticipated as it had been by Wellington's passage of the Bidassoa and invasion of France, enabled Bathurst to write to Bentinck in December authorizing him explicitly to attempt the capture of Genoa. Information had been received that the population would welcome the appearance of the British, and that the town was so weakly garrisoned as to be at the mercy of a *coup de main*. In the probable event of a rising Bentinck was "to lose no time in giving every possible assistance," the main object to which his efforts were to be directed being "the occupation of Genoa, or at least of the two forts which command the entrance to the harbour." Provided it were "with the entire concurrence of the inhabitants," he was to take possession of Genoa on behalf of his Sardinian Majesty.² Even before Bathurst's letter reached him Bentinck had been eagerly grasping at an opportunity of activity and was preparing to take possession of Corsica, having been invited to help an Italian regiment in that island which was anxious to declare against Napoleon. However, the situation was altered by the conclusion of the treaty between Austria and Murat, communicated to Bentinck by Neipperg's letter of January 8th. Unpalatable as this treaty was to Castlereagh on political grounds, the minister was too shrewd and statesmanlike to sacrifice the whole to a part. He was not going to let his disapproval of a compromise with "the person now exercising the government of Naples," as he described Murat in his letter³ of January 22nd, 1814, to Bentinck, betray him into a quarrel with Austria. As he wrote to Bentinck on February 4th,⁴ "It would have afforded the Prince Regent the truest satisfaction to have seen his Sicilian Majesty replaced on the throne of Naples by the exertions of the Allies, but there has been throughout the obvious danger that, in aiming at too much, his Sicilian Majesty might lose all, and that the Allies, in endeavouring to assert too tenaciously the interest of the Sicilian family, might sacrifice the common cause." It was necessary to secure Murat's support as, were he to stick to Napoleon, it would be impossible for Bellegarde and the Austrian army in Italy to make head against Eugene, who was already holding them in check on the Adige. Bentinck, too, though very much annoyed at the Austro-Neapolitan treaty, realized clearly the necessity of accepting the

¹ Cf. despatches of Sir Josias Rowley and Captain Dundas, December 15th, 1813, to Sir E. Pellew, *London Gazette*.

² Bathurst to Bentinck, December 23rd, 1813.

³ "Castlereagh Correspondence," Vol. IX., p. 184.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

fait accompli, and in consequence arranged a suspension of hostilities between England and Murat, which, without prejudice to England's engagements to the Neapolitan Bourbons or to her future relations with Murat, allowed for the immediate future co-operation between the British, the Austrians and Murat.

The armistice with Murat once signed (February 3rd) the share of the British in the combined operations was soon decided upon, for Bentinck cordially approved the project drawn up by Count Neipperg.¹ This allotted the left bank of the Po to Bellegarde's corps, Murat with Nugent's Austrians was to take the southern bank and push forward by Modena and Piacenza on Stradella, outflanking Eugene and the force opposing Bellegarde and threatening their communications. To the British was assigned what Bentinck wanted,² "a line of our own, distant and separate from our allies but leading to the same object." This line was the Genoese Riviera. Two alternatives were considered: a descent on Spezzia, or a landing in Tuscany, much further from Genoa. The second had to be adopted as there was not enough tonnage available to transport the whole force to the mainland at one and the same time. The troops therefore had to be moved in two divisions, the first, 8,500 strong, setting sail from Palermo on February 28th, under a strong naval escort. Ten days later it landed at Leghorn, which was found undefended. The transports returned promptly to Palermo, embarked the second division, some 6,100 of all ranks, and were back at Leghorn by April 2nd.

Bentinck's force was a motley collection, typical of the cosmopolitan character of the British Army, which in the course of the great struggle against Napoleon had been driven to many strange expedients for obtaining recruits. About a third of the force belonged to the Sicilian forces, mainly supported out of British subsidies and more or less under Bentinck's supervision. They were not calculated to inspire confidence. Sir John Moore had been uncomplimentary about them when he had served in Sicily, and Bentinck seems partly to have taken them with him because they could not safely be left in that island, which they hated, being nearly all natives of the mainland. Of the remainder over 5,000 were foreigners actually in the British service, Germans of the King's German Legion, Italians of the Calabrian Free Corps and Anglo-Italian Levy, Greeks of that truly remarkable unit, the Duke of York's Greek Light Infantry. The King's German Legion, which was represented by three battalions, the 3rd, 6th, and 8th, were admirable troops, the 3rd and 8th Battalions being destined to emerge with flying colours, before eighteen months were out, from a test far severer than any they were to encounter in Italy. The Calabrians had done good service in Catalonia and the Ionian Islands, but the Anglo-Italian Levy was an uncertain quantity. Catanelli's battalion had acquitted itself well

¹ Bentinck to Bathurst, February 6th, 1814. War Office papers printed in "Commons' Journals," 1814-1815.

² Bentinck to Bathurst, January 14th. *Ibid.*

enough at Leghorn, but the 2nd Battalion, when sent to Spain in 1813, proved quite untrustworthy, deserting freely, and actually plotting to betray its position to the French, so that General Campbell had to disarm them and ship them back to Sicily.¹ The British element was composed, in addition to artillery and engineers, of four battalions, the 14th (2nd battalion), 21st, 31st, and 62nd Foot,² three of them over 1,000 strong, while in his second-in-command, Macfarlane, in Hohnstedt, an officer of the German Legion, and in Montresor, who had commanded the 18th Royal Irish in Tuscany eighteen years before, Bentinck had some very capable subordinates. The contribution of the Navy to the expedition consisted of a squadron comprising three 74's, the "Aboukir," "America," and "Edinburgh," two frigates, the "Furieuse" and "Iphigenia," and several smaller craft, including a detachment of the flotilla of gunboats which had figured so prominently in the arrangements for the defence of Sicily. While waiting for Macfarlane's division Bentinck himself went off to Verona to consult with Bellegarde, visiting Murat at Reggio on the way. Much friction had arisen over Murat's pretensions to administer Tuscany, most of which was occupied by his troops, and this, added to the language of the proclamation published by Bentinck shortly after landing, strained relations between the British and Murat almost to breaking point. Bentinck's proclamation³ was hardly calculated to promote cordial co-operation with his allies. Always an ardent advocate of Italian aspirations, he had summoned the Italians to arm that they might "vindicate their own rights and be free." "Great Britain," he declared, "offers you her assistance in order to rescue you from the iron yoke of Buonaparte." The example of Spain was commended to the Italians, whom he urged to "hesitate no longer, but let Italy in arms be convinced that the great cause of their country is in their hands."

Such language was hardly likely to please Metternich, and Castlereagh, though his views on the Italian question were more liberal than is usually supposed, was somewhat embarrassed by Bentinck's excess of zeal. He wrote⁴ angrily to Liverpool of Bentinck's "impracticability and Whiggism," and found it necessary to caution Bentinck to afford "no plausible occasion or pretext for umbrage to those with whom we are acting," pointing out that in

¹ Campbell to Bathurst. Alicante, February 22nd, 1813. War Office, Secretary of State's "Original Correspondence," Vol. 183; and Wellington's Despatches, X., 142.

² Now the West Yorkshires, Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1st East Surrey and 1st Wiltshires respectively. It is to be regretted that only one of these units, the 62nd, has a regimental history which throws any light on this expedition, of which Herr Schwertfeger's excellent history of the King's German Legion (Hanover, 1907) contains a short but useful account.

³ Cf. Papers relating to Genoa. "Commons' Journals," 1814-1815. Appendix VI.

⁴ April 27th, 1814. "Castlereagh Correspondence," IX., p. 510.

using phrases which might seem to suggest that he had more in view than the expulsion of the French, he was departing from the principle laid down for him, of conforming his actions to the views of Bellegarde, to whose force he was to regard his own as auxiliary.¹ Of Bellegarde Bentinck formed a very low opinion, describing him² as quite lacking in energy and *totalement démonté* by the sharp repulse his attack on Eugene's position on the Mincio had received. With the Austrian Army thus held at bay, and Murat playing a double game, Bentinck had little to hope for from his allies, but if they did nothing to help him he had a clear field before him, and by the time the second division landed he was back at Leghorn, ready for a move on Genoa.

In his absence Montresor had accomplished much. He had pushed an advance-guard forward by way of Pisa, which he reached on March 23rd, and Lucca to Spezzia, the "Edinburgh" and "Swallow," 18, under Captain Dundas, R.N., accompanying the movements of the troops. For the first fifty miles Montresor was hardly opposed, but on reaching the little river Magra, some six miles east of Spezzia, he found the French strongly posted on the western bank. A reconnaissance on March 25th showed that a direct attack would be costly, but while Montresor made demonstrations of crossing at Sarzana, covered by his artillery, Colonel Travers, with the Greek Light Infantry, the Calabrian Free Corps, and the light company of the 8th King's German Legion, made a turning movement to the right, wading through a smaller stream, the Varra, and crossing the Magra higher up at St. Stefano. In this three German sharpshooters distinguished themselves, swimming across the river under heavy fire and bringing back a boat in which troops could be ferried across. Meanwhile Dundas had landed his marines at the mouth of the river and captured the castle of Lerici. The defenders, already shaken by the fire of Captain Pym's guns, retired in confusion on Spezzia on finding their flank turned. Nor did they stand there, for next morning the town was found evacuated, though Fort Sta. Maria, a detached work at the mouth of the harbour, was prepared to offer a stubborn resistance. As the harbour could not be utilized while it held out, Montresor set about its reduction, sending a detachment in pursuit of the fugitives to cover siege operations. The field-pieces of the Royal Artillery produced no effect, but the Navy came to the rescue, and six 18-pounders were landed from the "Edinburgh" and with great difficulty hauled up the heights, where batteries were constructed to receive them. Some of the guns in the neighbouring coast batteries which the French had dismantled were also brought to bear. By the evening of March 29th the batteries opened fire, with such good effect that by eleven o'clock next morning preparations were being made to storm when the enemy hoisted the white flag. They had been altogether unable to reply to the besiegers, for the well-aimed fire of the

¹ Castlereagh to Bentinck. Dijon, March 30th and April 3rd. "Castlereagh Correspondence," IX., pp. 410 and 427.

² Bentinck to Castlereagh. Verona, March 27th. *Ibid.*, IX., p. 400.

German sharpshooters had made it impossible for the defenders to stand to their guns. Thus, with quite trifling losses, the important harbour of Spezzia passed into the hands of the Anglo-Sicilians.

On the disembarkation on April 5th of the second division, which included the 14th and 31st Foot, with the headquarters of the 8th King's German Legion and over 3,000 Sicilians, the advance on Genoa was resumed, but about midway there a strong force was found posted at Sestri, and Bentinck, realizing that the enemy had been reinforced, decided to wait till his whole force could be concentrated (April 8th). Defective transport and the terrible state of the roads along this rocky coast-line delayed the concentration, though once again the fleet proved most helpful, re-embarking Hohnstedt's brigade, the 3rd and 6th King's German Legion, at Spezzia on April 10th, and conveying it direct to Nervi, only a few miles from Genoa. Meanwhile the troops had already ousted the French from Sestri without much difficulty, April 10th; the boats from the ships and gunboats of the Sicilian flotilla lending useful help, though an attempt to disembark the 31st at Recco proved unsuccessful. On the 12th Montresor, with the 8th King's German Legion and the 31st, pushed forward against Nervi, encountering a stubborn resistance from the enemy, whom he found strongly posted on the slopes of Monte Fascia. There was sharp fighting in the vineyards, the brunt of it falling on the 31st, whose light company distinguished itself greatly by the gallantry with which it stormed a four-gun battery on the enemy's right,¹ but in the end the French were thrust back and Bentinck's advance-guard occupied the village of Sturla, where next evening the 8th King's German Legion repulsed a sortie of the garrison. On the 13th Hohnstedt landed at Nervi, and by the 14th all Bentinck's troops were concentrated at the gates of Genoa. The country between the Anglo-Sicilians and their objective was extremely difficult, "the most impassable I saw," Bentinck called it in his despatch of April 20th,² "thickly covered with country houses, only communicating with each other by narrow lanes between high walls." The French right, otherwise very strong, was exposed to the guns of the fleet, while on the left mountains covered the flank, which was additionally protected by two strong works, Forts Tecla and Richelieu. Realizing the strength of the position, Bentinck determined to turn its left by sending Hohnstedt's two battalions on a wide detour northwards into the mountains, ordering him to be in position to attack at daybreak next morning (April 17th). This flank movement was to be combined with a frontal attack, Montresor's division assailing the French right, Travers' light detachment, reinforced by the 3rd Anglo-Italians, being sent against Forts Tecla and Richelieu, Marfarlane with the rest of the troops forming the second

¹ The official despatch puts the 31st's casualties at 40, but the regimental history gives them as 14 men killed, 2 officers and 40 men wounded, a difference perhaps to be explained by the official return including only men who were disabled.

² Bentinck to Bathurst. War Office, Secretary of State's "Original Correspondence," Vol. 315.

line. To seaward, gunboats and mortar-vessels, supported by ship's boats armed with carronades, were to attack the batteries which lined the shore; the marines of the squadron were embarked in boats belonging to the transports, ready to "land if occasion required," while the "Aboukir" and four smaller vessels were to conduct a false attack further to the westward, which proved very efficacious as a diversion.¹

Unfortunately for Hohnstedt, a thick fog on the evening of the 16th and the failure of the peasantry to show him the right road resulted in his going astray, and when five o'clock next morning came his column had the mortification of hearing the guns open fire but being nowhere near the spot they should have reached. However, undeterred by the non-appearance of the Legionaries, Travers and Ceravignac, of the 3rd Anglo-Italians, made a most dashing attack. The Anglo-Italians made for Fort Tecla and carried a ridge in front of it, where they captured three guns. Their right half-battalion pushing on against Fort Richelieu joined in with Travers, whose Greeks and Calabrians obtained possession of high ground overlooking and commanding the fort. This was too much for the garrison, who, fearing to be taken by escalade, surrendered, upon which the defenders of Fort Tecla began to evacuate their post but were nearly all captured. This completely exposed the enemy's left wing, which promptly retired. On the other flank the fighting had been more severe: the French position was strong, and the character of the country made it extremely hard for the artillery to co-operate. There was a fierce struggle round the churchyard of St. Francisco de Alvaro and both the 21st and 8th King's German Legion were hotly engaged, though the cover everywhere afforded to both attackers and defenders kept down the losses on both sides. Finally Montresor called upon Macfarlane's division for assistance, and the 62nd were pushed forward, whereupon the French defence collapsed. By this time, too, thanks to the tremendous fire kept up by the flotilla, which drove the defenders of the shore batteries from their guns, the seamen and marines had landed with but trifling loss, seized all the batteries outside the walls and turned their guns against the town. By noon Bentinck's artillery and engineer officers were selecting sites for breaching batteries within 600 yards of the walls, at "their most assailable front" where "the very bottom of the wall was discovered and the defences could be easily destroyed." This success had been achieved at a slight cost, troops and squadron having between them under 300 casualties between April 12th and 17th. But there was no fight left in the defenders. Count Fresias, the Commandant, had at his disposal but raw and hastily-collected levies stiffened with a few better troops from Eugene's army,² and with a strong force preparing

¹ Cf. Rowley's despatch of April 18th. *London Gazette*, 1814.

² I am indebted to Professor Oman for some particulars as to the French garrison of Genoa. It included battalions of five French regiments of the line, besides the First Regiment of Toulon, a corps formed out of seamen. The casualties among the officers amounted to 27, from which the total loss of the garrison may be calculated as between 500 and 600.

for an assault, a powerful squadron off the harbour—for Pellew had arrived with five more ships of the line just in time to witness the capture of the shore batteries—and the inhabitants openly displaying their hostility, he had no inclination to die in the last ditch. A flag of truce was sent out, and Bentinck, anxious to spare a city towards which his sentiments were of the friendliest, willingly concluded an armistice, followed next day by a definite convention. This handed Genoa over to the British, the garrison, some 4,000 all told, marching out with the honours of war and a safe conduct to France. With Genoa some half-a-dozen warships fell into the victors' hands, one of which, a newly built ship of the line, was added to the British Navy as the "Genoa," 74, and survived many years to commemorate its capture, figuring prominently at Navarino. The joy of the Genoese at their deliverance from the French was expressed by the illumination of the city and the warmest of welcomes to Bentinck, in whom they believed they saw a rescuer alike from Napoleon and from the scarcely less detested Sardinians. Nor was Bentinck loath to accept the position. His work as a soldier accomplished, creditably enough, the politician in him could no longer be repressed, and he proceeded to actions which considerably exceeded his instructions, and aroused in Genoa hopes doomed to bitter disappointment. Immediately after the surrender he issued a proclamation¹ declaring the re-establishment of "the old constitution of the Genoese States, such as it existed in 1797, with those modifications which the general wish, the public good and the spirit of the original constitution of 1576 seem to require." In this proclamation he stated that "the general desire of the Genoese to return to their ancient government seemed conformable to the principles recognized by the High Allies, of restoring to all their ancient rights and privileges," but, unfortunately for the Genoese, their "particular aversion" to annexation to Piedmont clashed with the desire of the Allies to increase the mainland dominions of the King of Sardinia, so as to provide a strong barrier to French intervention in Italy, and Castlereagh's reception of Bentinck's letter of April 27th was most chilling. He warned him² against taking steps to encourage "the fermentation which at present seems to prevail in Italy on questions of government," and declared that Bentinck's arrangements for the provisional government of Genoa were "not to be considered as prejudging the system which it may be expedient to apply to that part of Europe." Thus, though British troops occupied Genoa till 1815 was well advanced, they were there as caretakers for the King of Sardinia, and Bentinck's expedition to the Italian mainland takes but a humble place in history, very different from the fame which would have been its had it resulted in the restoration of the ancient Republic of the Dorias.

¹ Cf. "Commons' Journals," 1814-1815, Appendix VI.

² Cf. Castlereagh to Bentinck, Paris, May 6th, 1814. "Commons' Journals," 1814-1815.

CASUAL RAMBLES IN THE MUSEUM OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

By COMMANDER W. F. CABORNE, C.B., R.N.R.

THE Museum of the Royal United Service Institution is not so well known to the general public as it should be, nor, indeed, to many members of the Institution itself, notwithstanding that its marvellous collection of exhibits, largely illustrative of the naval and military history of the nation during the last three and a-half centuries, at once forms a most interesting and valuable medium of education and an incentive to patriotism.

Relics of great and famous naval and military leaders, men who performed remarkable and heroic deeds in order to found and maintain the British Empire, abound there.

These and other relics and exhibits form gems of priceless historic worth; while their setting is the noble old Banqueting House, practically the last remaining portion of the Palace of Whitehall—so closely identified with the House of Stuart, alike in its prosperity and in its misfortunes—which happily was spared by the great fire which destroyed nearly all the other buildings in its vicinity in 1698.

The present edifice was built in 1619 by James I., upon the site of a former banqueting house, from the design of Inigo Jones, and the pictures forming the ceiling, representing the apotheosis of his father, and other subjects, were painted for Charles I. by Peter Paul Rubens.

The fact that the latter unfortunate monarch passed through the Banqueting Hall on his way to the scaffold on the memorable January 30th, 1649, has completely overshadowed in the public mind all the other events that have taken place within its walls; but the circumstances of that tragic day have been so fully described by the Rev. Canon Edgar Sheppard and various other writers that one need not do more than allude to them now.

During the reign of James I. masques and other scenes of revelry took place in the Banqueting Hall, as also was the case in the happiest days of Charles I.; but then came the Civil War and the Commonwealth, and with the latter a period of unutterable dullness and gloom out of deference to the views of the then dominant extreme Puritans, thus so graphically described by Lord Macaulay:—

“They baptized their children by the names, not of Christian saints, but of Hebrew patriarchs and warriors. In defiance of the express and reiterated declarations of Luther and Calvin, they turned the weekly festival by which the Church had, from primitive times, commemorated the resurrection of her Lord into a Jewish Sabbath. They sought for principles of jurisprudence in the Mosaic law, and

for precedents to guide their ordinary conduct in the books of Judges and Kings. Their thoughts and discourse ran much on acts which were assuredly not recorded as examples for our imitation. The prophet who hewed in pieces a captive king, the rebel general who gave the blood of a queen to the dogs, the matron who, in defiance of plighted faith, and of the laws of Eastern hospitality, drove the nail into the brain of the fugitive ally who had just fed at her board, and who was sleeping under the shadow of her tent, were proposed as models to Christians suffering under the tyranny of princes and prelates. Morals and manners were subjected to a code resembling that of the synagogue when the synagogue was in its worst state. The dress, the deportment, the language, the studies, the amusements of the rigid sect were regulated upon principles not unlike those of the Pharisees, who, proud of their washed hands and broad phylacteries, taunted the Redeemer as a Sabbath-breaker and a wine-bibber. It was a sin to hang garlands on a maypole, to drink a friend's health, to fly a hawk, to hunt a stag, to play at chess, to wear love-locks, to put starch into a ruff, to touch the virginals, to read the 'Fairy Queen. Rules threw over all life a more than monastic gloom. Some precisians had scruples about teaching the Latin grammar, because the names of Mars, Bacchus, and Apollo occurred in it. The fine arts were all but proscribed. The solemn peal of the organ was superstitious. The light music of Ben Jonson's masques was dissolute. Half the fine paintings in England were idolatrous and the other half indecent. The extreme Puritan was at once known from other men by his gait, his garb, his lank hair, the sour solemnity of his face, the upturned white of his eyes, the nasal twang with which he spoke, and above all, by his peculiar dialect. He employed upon every occasion the imagery and style of Scripture. Hebraisms violently introduced into the English language, and metaphors borrowed from the boldest lyric poetry of a remote age and country, and applied to the common concerns of English life, were the most striking peculiarities of this cant, which moved, not without cause, the derision both of Prelatists and libertines."

In 1653, among the fanatics of the then House of Commons, which was summoned by Oliver Cromwell and only lasted a few months, was an active member, much noted for his long prayers, sermons, and harangues, named Praise-God Barebone. He was by trade a leather-seller, and from this ridiculous and frequent speaker the profane of the times christened the whole assembly with the name of Barebone's Parliament.

In a foot-note to Hume's "History of England" it is stated that: "It was usual for the pretended saints at that time to change their names, from Henry, Edward, Anthony, William, which they regarded as heathenish, into others more sanctified and godly; even the New Testament names, James, Andrew, John, Peter, were not held in such regard as those which were borrowed from the Old Testament, Hezekiah, Habakkuk, Joshua, Zerobabel. Sometimes a whole godly sentence was adopted as a name. 'Cromwel,' says Cleveland, 'hath beat up his drums clean through the Old Testament. You may

learn the genealogy of our Saviour by the names of his regiment. The muster-master has no other list than the first chapter of St. Matthew.' The brother of this Praise-God Barebone had for name, *If Christ had not died for you, you had been damned*, Barebone. But the people, tired of this long name, only retained the last word, and commonly gave him the appellation of 'Damn'd Barebone.'

With such an impossible crew practically in possession of the ship of State, the Banqueting Hall, as such, had indeed fallen upon very evil days.

Carlyle tells us that in July, 1665, when a Swedish Ambassador Extraordinary came to this country to try to negotiate a general league, or basis for a league, of Protestants against the Power of Rome, and Anti-Christian Babylon at large—an object that Cromwell never ceased endeavouring after, with only partial success—he was given audience of the Lord Protector in the Banqueting House, which was hung with arras. The Lord Protector, according to Bulstrode, "stood on a foot-pace and carpet, with a chair of state behind him," and the Ambassador saluted thrice as he advanced, thrice lifting his noble hat and feathers, as the Lord Protector thrice lifted his; and then:—"After a little pause, the Ambassador put off his hat, and began to speak, and then put it on again: and whensoever, in his speech, he named the King his master, or Sweden, or the Protector, or England, he moved his hat: especially if he mentioned anything of God, or the good of Christendom, he put off his hat very low; and the Protector still answered him in the like postures of civility. The Ambassador spake in the Swedish language; and after he had done, being but short, his Secretary Berkman did interpret it in Latin." And now, "after his Interpreter had done, the Protector stood still a pretty while; and putting off his hat to the Ambassador, with a carriage full of gravity and state, he answered him in English."

Early in 1657 came the attempt of Miles Sindercomb, a cashiered quartermaster, to burn Whitehall, with the object of trying to kill the Protector during the confusion that would ensue. This plot failed, and on Friday, January 23rd, the Parliament with the Speaker, Sir Thomas Widdrington, at its head, went to the Banqueting House to congratulate His Highness upon his escape. Carlyle mentions "that in passing from the Court up to the Banqueting-house, 'part of an ancient wooden staircase,' or balustrade of a staircase, 'long exposed to the weather, gave way in the crowding'; and some honourable gentlemen had falls, though happily nobody was seriously hurt."

In 1657 the Parliament, by a majority, decided to offer the Crown to Oliver Cromwell, the Lord Protector, and, accordingly, on Tuesday, March 31st,¹ Speaker Widdrington, attended by the whole House, repaired to Whitehall, and there, in the Banqueting Hall, presented to his Highness "The Humble Petition and Advice of the Parliament of

¹There is a little discrepancy with regard to this date. Thomas Cromwell gives it as April 4th; on the other hand, one of Oliver Cromwell's own speeches indicates March 31st, which is the date given by Carlyle. The same difference exists with regard to the date of the refusal of the Crown.—W.F.C.

England, Scotland, and Ireland " that he should accept the title of King; and subsequent negotiations were carried on in the same place.

Again, on May 8th of the same year, the Banqueting Hall was the scene of Oliver Cromwell's rejection of the Crown, owing to his dread of the effect upon the Army and others should he accept it.

As an illustration of the feeling that existed in some quarters upon this question, it may be mentioned that, on the 27th of the previous February, a deputation of a hundred officers, ex-Major-Generals, and considerable persons some of them, waited upon his Highness: "To signify that they have heard with real dismay of some project now on foot to make his Highness King; the evil effects of which, as 'a scandal to the people of God,' 'hazardous to his Highness's person, and making way for the return of Charles Stuart,' are terribly apparent to them!"

In the words of Thomas Cromwell, "the Protector, with well affected earnestness and much ostentation of his self-denial, refused the diadem upon which he had so long reckoned." The concluding portion of his speech upon that occasion was as follows:—"But truly this is my answer, That (although I think the Act of Government doth consist of very excellent parts, in all but that one thing, of the Title as to me) I should not be an honest man if I did not tell you that I cannot accept of the Government, nor undertake the trouble or charge of it—as to which I have a little more experimented than everybody what troubles and difficulties do befall men under such trusts, and in such undertakings. . . . I say I am persuaded to return this answer to you, That I cannot undertake this Government with the Title of King. And that is mine answer to this great and weighty business."

Looking at Cromwell's association in life with the Banqueting Hall, it is only fitting that his sword should be preserved among the exhibits in the museum. This weapon, which bears the marks of two musket balls, was used by him when he personally led the final assault on Tredah (now known as Drogheda), in Ireland, on September 12th, 1649, upon which occasion he put the Governor, Sir Arthur Aston, and all the garrison to the sword, more than 3,000 persons, most of them English, perishing.

Four days later, Cromwell wrote to John Bradshaw, President of the Council of State, who had presided at the trial of Charles I. in Westminster Hall:—"It hath pleased God to bless our endeavours at Tredah. . . . I wish that all honest hearts may give the glory of this to God alone, to whom indeed the praise of this mercy belongs."

On the 3rd of September, 1658, the great regicide, worn out, and ever haunted by the memory of a terrible day for which there could be no expiation, passed to his account, and was succeeded in the Protectorate by his son, Richard.

But in 1660 came the Restoration, and Charles II., upon his arrival in London from exile on the 29th of May of that year, was received at Whitehall by both Houses of Parliament, who offered, in the name of the nation, their congratulations and allegiance—the Lords being in the Drawing Room and the Commons in the Banqueting Hall.

Thenceforth the Palace with its Banqueting Hall was once more the scene of mirth and revelry, much accentuated by the inevitable

reaction from the deadly dullness of the Protectorate; and also of State functions.

Charles II. received the Lords and Commons in the Banqueting Hall on March 1st, 1662, prior to the arrival of the Queen (Catherine of Braganza), part of whose dowry were Bombay and Tangier.

Curing the King's Evil, or scrofula, by touching of the Sovereign, is said to date back from the time of Edward the Confessor, although the public ceremony in connection therewith is only traced from the reign of Edward III., and the immortal diarist, Samuel Pepys, under the date of June 23rd, 1660, says:—"To my Lord's (the Earl of Sandwich) lodgings, where Tom Guy come to me, and there staid to see the King touch people for the King's Evil. But he did not come at all, it rayned so; and the poor people were forced to stand all the morning in the rain in the garden. Afterward he touched them in the banquetting-house."

There appears to be some little discrepancy as to the date when Charles II. first performed this ceremony, for John Evelyn says, on the 6th of July, 1660:—"His Majestie began *first to touch for the evil*, according to the costome, thus: his Majestie sitting under his State in the Banquetting House, the Chirurgeons cause the sick to be brought or led up to the throne, where they kneeling, the King strokes their faces or cheekes with both his hands at once, at which instant a Chaplaine in his formalities says: 'He put his hands upon them and he healed them.' This is sayd to every one in particular. When they have ben all touch'd they come up againe in the same order, and the other Chaplaine kneeling, and having an Angel gold strung on white ribbon on his arme, delivers them one by one to his Majestie, who puts them about the necks of the touched as they passe, whilst the first Chaplaine repeats: 'That is the true light who came into the world.' Then follows an Epistle (as at first a Gospell) with the Liturgy, prayers for the sick, with some alteration, lastly the blessing; and the Lo. Chamberlaine and Comptroller of the Household bring a basin, ewer and towell for his Majestie to wash."

Under the date of April 13th, 1661, Pepys records:—"Met my Lord with the Duke (of York); and after a little talk with him, I went to the Banquet-house, and there saw the King heale, the first time that I ever saw him do it; which he did with great gravity, and it seemed to me to be an ugly office and a simple one."

With respect to touching for the King's Evil, Macaulay says:—"This ceremony had come down almost unaltered from the darkest of the dark ages to the time of Newton and Locke. The Stuarts frequently dispensed the healing influences in the Banqueting House. The days on which this miracle was to be wrought were fixed at sittings of the Privy Council, and were solemnly notified by the clergy in all the parish churches of the realm." He then goes on to give the ceremony in rather fuller detail than that already recorded, and adds:—"The service may still be found in the prayer books of the reign of Anne. Indeed, it was not until some time after the accession of George the First that the University of Oxford ceased to reprint the

Office of Healing together with the Liturgy. Theologians of eminent learning, ability and virtue gave the sanction of their authority to this mummary; and, what is stranger still, medical men of high note believed, or affected to believe, in the balsamic virtues of the royal hand. We must suppose that every surgeon who attended Charles the Second was a man of high repute for skill; and more than one of the surgeons who attended Charles the Second has left us a solemn profession of faith in the King's miraculous power. One of them is not ashamed to tell us that the gift was communicated by the unction administered at the coronation; that the cures were so numerous and sometimes so rapid that they could not be attributed to any natural cause; that the failures were to be ascribed to want of faith on the part of the patients; that Charles once handled a scrofulous Quaker and made him a healthy man and a sound Churchman in a moment; that, if those who had been healed lost or sold the piece of gold which had been hung round their necks, the ulcers broke forth again, and could be removed only by a second touch and a second talisman. We cannot wonder that, when men of science gravely repeated such nonsense, the vulgar should have believed it. Still less can we wonder that wretches tortured by a disease over which natural remedies had no power should have eagerly drunk in tales of preternatural cures: for nothing is so credulous as misery. The crowds which repaired to the palace on the days of healing were immense. Charles the Second, in the course of his reign, touched near a hundred thousand persons. The number seems to have increased or diminished as the King's popularity rose or fell. During that Tory reaction which followed the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament, the press to get near him was terrific. In 1682 he performed the rite eight thousand five hundred times. In 1684 the throng was such that six or seven of the sick were trampled to death. James, in one of his progresses, touched eight hundred persons in the choir of the Cathedral of Chester. The expense of the ceremony was little less than ten thousand pounds a year, and would have been much greater but for the vigilance of the royal surgeons, whose business it was to examine the applicants, and to distinguish those who came for the cure from those who came for the gold. William had too much sense to be duped, and too much honesty to bear a part in what he knew to be an imposture. 'It is a silly superstition,' he exclaimed, when he heard that, at the close of Lent, his palace was besieged by a crowd of the sick: 'Give the poor creatures some money, and send them away.' On one single occasion he was importuned into laying his hand on a patient. 'God give you better health,' he said, 'and more sense.' The parents of scrofulous children cried out against his cruelty: bigots lifted up their hands and eyes in horror at his impiety: Jacobites sarcastically praised him for not presuming to arrogate to himself a power which belonged only to legitimate sovereigns; and even some Whigs thought that he acted unwisely in treating with such marked contempt a superstition which had a strong hold on the vulgar mind." The ceremony of touching appears to have taken place for the last time in the reign of Queen Anne.

On September 17th, 1660, Evelyn writes:—"I went to London to see the splendid entry of the Prince de Ligne, Ambassador Extraordinary from Spaine: he was Generall of the Spanish King's horse in Flanders, and was accompanied with divers greate persons from thence, and an innumerable retinue. His train consisted of seventeen coaches with six horses of his owne, beside a great number of English, etc. Greater bravery had I never seene. He was received in the Banquetting House in exceeding state, all the greate Officers of Court attending."

Another description of ceremony is mentioned by Pepys, as follows, on April 20th, 1661:—"And so went away to White Hall; and in the Banquetting-house saw the King create my Lord Chancellor and several others, Earles, and Mr. Crewe and several others, Barons: the first being led up by Heralds and five old Earles to the King, and there the patent is read, and the King puts on his vest, and sword, and coronett, and gives him the patent. And then he kisseth the King's hand, and rises and stands covered before the King. And the same for each Baron, only he is led up by three of the old Barons. And they are girt with swords before they go to the King."

On December 29th, 1662, Pepys writes:—"Thence to White Hall, and got up to the top gallerys in the Banquetting House, to see the audience of the Russian Ambassador; which took place after our long waiting and fear of the falling of the gallery (it being so full and part of it being parted from the rest, for nobody to come up merely from the weaknesse thereof:) and very handsome it was. After they had come in, I went down and got through the croude almost as high as the King and the Embassadors, where I saw all the presents, being rich furs, hawkes, carpets, cloths of tissue, and sea-horse teeth. The King took two or three hawkes upon his fist, having a glove on wrought with gold, given him for the purpose. The son of one of the Embassadors was in the richest suit for pearl and tissue, that ever I did see, or shall, I believe. After they and all the company had kissed the King's hand, then the three Embassadors and the son, and no more, did kiss the Queene's. One thing more I did observe, that the chief Embassador did carry up his master's letters in state before him on high; and as soon as he had delivered them, he did fall down to the ground and lay there a great while. After all was done, the company broke up; and I spent a little while walking up and down the gallery seeing the ladies, the two Queenes, and the Duke of Monmouth with his little mistress (Lady Anne Scot), which is very little, and like my brother-in-law's wife."

Again, he records on June 13th, 1663:—"Yesterday, upon conference with the King in the Banqueting House, the Parliament did agree with much ado, it being carried but by forty-two voices, that they would supply him with a sum of money; but what and how is not yet known, but expected to be done with great disputes the next week. But if done at all, it is well."

The Banqueting Hall was also closely identified with the Most Noble Order of the Garter—Charles I. at one time proposed to have its history illustrated on the walls—for Evelyn tells us on April 22nd,

1667 :—"Saw the sumptuous supper in the Banquetting-house at White-hall on the eve of St. George's Day, where were all the Companions of the Order of the Garter."

He continues that, on the following day :—"In the morning his Majestie went to Chapell with the Knights of the Garter all in their habits and robes, usher'd by the Heralds; after the first service they went in procession, the youngest first, the Sovereigne last, with the Prelate of the Order and Dean, who had about his neck the booke of the Statutes of the Order, and then the Chancellor of the Order (old Sir Hen. de Vic) who wore the purse about his neck; then the Heralds and Garter King at Arms, Clarendieux, Black Rod. But before the Prelate and Dean of Windsor went the Gentlemen of the Chapell, and Choristers singing as they marched; behind them two Doctors of Musick in damask robes; this procession was about the Courts of White-hall. Then returning to their stalls and seates in the Chapell, plac'd under each Knight's coat armour and titles, the second service began : then the King offer'd at the altar, an anthem was sung, then the rest of the Knights offer'd, and lastly proceeded to the Banquetting-house to a greate feast. The King sat on an elevated throne at the upper end at a table alone, the Knights at a table on the right hand, reaching all the length of the roome; over against them a cupboard of rich gilded plate; at the lower end the musick : on the balusters above, wind musick, trumpets and kettle-drums. The King was serv'd by the Lords and Pensioners, who brought up the dishes. About the middle of the dinner the Knights drank the King's health, then the King theirs, when the trumpets and musick plaied and sounded, the guns going off at the Tower. At the banquet came in the Queene and stood by the King's left hand, but did not sit. Then was the banquetting stuff flung about the roome profusely. In truth, the croud was so greate that tho' I staid all the supper the day before, I now staid no longer than the sport began for feare of disorder. The cheere was extraordinary, each Knight having forty dishes to his messe, piled up five or six high. The roome hung with the richest tapessry."

At the present time there are exhibited in the Museum the broad riband and the Garter worn by the great Duke of Wellington, but the valuable portion of the insignia of the Order is always returnable to the Sovereign upon the death of a Knight. However, in one of the cases, there is a "George," and it will be remembered that Charles I. on the scaffold handed the "George" that he was then wearing to Bishop Juxon.

On August 19th, 1668, Evelyn says :—"I saw the magnificent entrie of the French Ambassador Colbert, receiv'd in the Banquetting House. I had never seene a richer coach than that which he came in to White-hall. Standing by his Majestie at dinner in the Presence, there was of that rare fruit call'd the *King-pine*, growing in Barbados and the West Indies, the first of them I had ever seene. His Majesty having cut it up, was pleas'd to give me a piece off his owne plate to taste of, but in my opinion it falls short of those ravishing varieties of deliciousness describ'd in Capt. Ligon's History, and others; but possibly it might, or certainly was, much impair'd in coming so far. It

has yet a gratefull acidity, but tastes more like the quince and melon than of any other fruite he mentions."

Evelyn appears to have attended many of the functions of his day, for on November 24th, 1681, he writes:—"I was at the audience of the Russian Ambassador before both their Majesties in the Banquetting-house. The presents were carried before him, held up by his followers in two ranks before the King's State, and consisted of tapisry (one suite of which was doubtless brought from France as being of that fabrick, the Ambassador having pass'd thro' that Kingdom as he came out of Spain), a large Persian carpet, furs of sable and ermine, etc., but nothing was so splendid and exotic as the Ambassador who came soon after the King's Restauration. This present Ambassador was exceedingly offended that his coach was not permitted to come into the Court, till being told that no King's Ambassadors did, he was pacified, yet requiring an attestation of it under the hand of Sir Cha. Cotterell, the Master of the Ceremonies: being, it seems, afraid he should offend his Master if he omitted the least punctilio. 'Twas reported he condemned his sonn to loose his head for shaving off his beard, and putting himselfe in the French mode at Paris, and that he would have executed it had not the French King interceded."

The last of these receptions that I have come across is thus recorded by Evelyn on January 11th, 1682:—"I saw the audience of the Morocco Ambassador (named Hamet), his retinue not numerous. He was receiv'd in the Banquetting-house, both their Majesties being present. He came up to the Throne without making any sort of reverence, not bowing his head or body. He spake by a renegado Englishman, for whose safe return there was a promise. They were all clad in the Moorish habite, cassocks of colour'd cloth, or silk, with buttons and loopes, over this an alhaga, or white woollen mantle, so large as to wrap both head and body, a shash or small turban, naked legg'd and armed, but with leather socks like the Turks, a rich scymeter, and large calico sleeved shirts. The Ambassador had a string of pearls oddly woven in his turban. I fancy the old Roman habite was little different as to the mantle and naked limbs. The Ambassador was an handsome person, well featur'd, of a wise looke, subtile, and extremely civile. Their presents were lions and estridges (ostriches), etc.; their errand about a peace at Tangier. But the concourse and the tumult of the people was intolerable, so as the officers could keepe no order, which these strangers were astonish'd at first, there being nothing so regular, exact, and performed with such silence, as is on all these public occasions of their country, and indeede over all the Turkish dominions."

Charles II. died on February 6th, 1685, and speaking about his end, Evelyn says:—"I can never forget the inexpressible luxury and prophanesse, gaming, and all dissoluteness, and as it were total forgetfulness of God (it being Sunday evening) which this day se'n-night I was witnesse of, the King sitting and toying with his concubines, Portsmouth, Cleaveland, and Mazarine, etc., a French boy singing love songs, in that glorious gallery, whilst about twenty of the greate courtiers and other dissolute persons were at Basset round a

large table, a bank of at least 2,000 in gold before them, upon which two gentlemen who were with me made reflexions with astonishment. Six days after was all in the dust."

I have not happened across any account of functions that may have taken place in the Banqueting Hall during the short reign of James II.; but the weathercock placed by his orders on the building, so that he might observe from his own apartment whether or not the wind was favourable for the enterprise of his son-in-law, the Prince of Orange, still retains its place.

But now another great and momentous ceremony was to take place within the historic walls. Macaulay tells us that:—"On the morning of Wednesday, the 13th of February (1688), the Court of Whitehall and all the neighbouring streets were filled with gazers. The magnificent Banqueting House, the masterpiece of Inigo, embellished by masterpieces of Rubens, had been prepared for a great ceremony. The walls were lined by the Yeomen of the Guard. Near the northern door, on the right hand, a large number of Peers had assembled. On the left were the Commons with their Speaker, attended by the mace. The southern door opened: and the Prince and Princess of Orange, side by side, entered, and took their place under the canopy of state.

"Both Houses approached bowing low. William and Mary advanced a few steps. (Viscount) Halifax on the right, and Powle (the Speaker) on the left, stood forth; and Halifax spoke. The Convention, he said, had agreed to a resolution which he prayed Their Highnesses to hear. They signified their assent; and the clerk of the House of Lords read, in a loud voice, the Declaration of Right. When he had concluded, Halifax, in the name of all the Estates of the Realm, requested the Prince and Princess to accept the crown.

"William, in his own name and in that of his wife, answered that the crown was, in their estimation, the more valuable because it was presented to them as a token of the confidence of the nation. 'We thankfully accept,' he said, 'what you have offered us.' Then, for himself, he assured them that the laws of England, which he had once already vindicated, should be the rules of his conduct, that it should be his study to promote the welfare of the kingdom, and that, as to the means of doing so, he should constantly recur to the advice of the Houses, and should be disposed to trust their judgment rather than his own. These words were received with a shout of joy which was heard in the streets below, and was instantly answered by huzzas from many thousands of voices. The Lords and Commons then reverently retired from the Banqueting House and went in procession to the great gate of Whitehall, where the heralds and pursuivants were waiting in their gorgeous tabards. All the space as far as Charing Cross was one sea of heads. The kettledrums struck up: the trumpets pealed; and Garter King at Arms, in a loud voice, proclaimed the Prince and Princess of Orange King and Queen of England, charged all Englishmen to bear, from that moment, true allegiance to the new sovereigns, and besought God, who had already wrought so signal a deliverance for our Church and nation, to bless William and Mary with a long and happy reign. Thus was consummated the English Revolution."

The Coronation of William and Mary took place on the 11th of April, 1689, and the following day the House of Commons went to Whitehall and kissed Their Majesties' hands in the Banqueting Hall.

Although now Sovereigns of England, William and Mary were not yet Sovereigns of Scotland, and it was not until 1689, after much wrangling, that Commissioners were appointed by the Scottish Convention to offer to them the throne of Scotland.

Macaulay says:—"The ceremony of the inauguration was distinguished from ordinary pageants by some highly interesting circumstances. On the eleventh of May the three Commissioners came to the Council Chamber at Whitehall, and thence, attended by almost all the Scotchmen of note who were then in London, proceeded to the Banqueting House. There William and Mary appeared seated under a canopy. A splendid circle of English nobles and statesmen stood round the throne: but the sword of state was committed to a Scotch lord; and the oath of office was administered after the Scotch fashion. (The Earl of) Argyle recited the words slowly. The royal pair, holding up their hands towards heaven, repeated after him until they came to the last clause. There William paused. That clause contained a promise that he would root out all heretics and all enemies of the true worship of God; and it was notorious that, in the opinion of many Scotchmen, not only all Roman Catholics, but all Protestant Episcopalians, all Independents, Baptists, and Quakers, all Lutherans, nay, all British Presbyterians who did not hold themselves bound by the Solemn League and Covenant, were enemies of the true worship of God. The King had apprised the Commissioners that he could not take this part of the oath without a distinct and public explanation; and they had been authorized by the Convention to give such an explanation as would satisfy him. 'I will not,' he now said, 'lay myself under any obligation to be a persecutor.' 'Neither the words of this oath,' said one of the Commissioners, 'nor the laws of Scotland, lay any such obligation on Your Majesty.' 'In that sense, then, I swear,' said William, 'and I desire you all, my lords and gentlemen, to witness that I do so.' Even his detractors have generally admitted that on this great occasion he acted with uprightness, dignity, and wisdom."

In 1698, as before stated, the Palace of Whitehall was burnt down, the Banqueting Hall being spared, and in 1724 the latter was converted into a Chapel Royal (although it was never consecrated), the opening ceremony being attended by George I.

Between 1811 and 1816 captured French Eagles and Colours were deposited there with solemn religious observance and much military pomp.

"The Drama of the Eagles," by Mr. Edward Fraser, should be read by all those interested (and who is not?) in the fascinating and meteoric career of Napoleon I., giving as it does their history from their first presentation by the Emperor to representatives of the Imperial Army and Fleet, on the Champ de Mars, in 1804, upon the occasion of his coronation; following them through the vicissitudes of many a well-fought field and recording in detail the devotion and heroism with which they were defended by those to whom their care had been

entrusted. The great respect and love invariably displayed by Napoleon for his eagles was strikingly manifested on the day of the sad "Adieu of Fontainebleau," in 1814. The Emperor, we are told, took hold of the Eagle of the Old Guard, embraced and kissed it three times, with tears in his eyes, and displayed the deepest emotion. "Ah, chère Aigle," he exclaimed, "que les baisers que je te donne retentissent dans la postérité." One of the eagles, known as "The Eagle with the Golden Wreath," was stolen from the Chapel Royal, and the others were subsequently transferred to the Royal Hospital at Chelsea.

In 1895 the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution was removed from Whitehall Yard to the Chapel Royal, Whitehall, which once more resumed its name of Banqueting House.

I have given many of the foregoing incidents in detail—and, doubtless, have omitted some more of interest—because, although there may not be much new in them, so far as I am aware, they have never previously been brought together in anything like concrete form.

At the present time, when the Turks, under the pernicious influence of the Germans and led away by the Committee of Union and Progress (save the mark!), are fighting against Great Britain and her Allies, to whom they owe such a deep debt of gratitude for services rendered in the past, there is an exhibit of considerable interest in the Museum in the shape of the diamond badge of the Turkish Order of the Crescent, conferred upon Lieut.-General Sir John Moore in 1801. This Turkish Order was instituted by Sultan Selim III., in 1799. He had previously presented a similar crescent to Lord Nelson, after the Battle of the Nile, who wore it on his coat as if it were an order.

A few years ago I was asked by Lieut.-Colonel G. Mackinlay, who was about to read a paper, at the Victoria Institute, on "The Morning Star in the Gospels," if I could explain the origin of the device displayed on the Turkish ensign, namely, a crescent and a star. Having then consulted various works of reference, it would seem that the emblem in question was instituted in honour of Hecate, a Greek moon-goddess. At the siege of Byzantium by Philip of Macedon, in the fourth century B.C., it is stated that the Byzantines were saved from a night surprise by a flash of light which revealed their approaching enemies. According to one authority, this light was a new moon which suddenly appeared in the heavens. If a moon did appear, probably it was the crescent of an ordinary moon which showed itself unexpectedly between dark, heavy clouds on a dirty night—the sort of night that would be chosen for a surprise attack. It is singular, however, how from time to time the miraculous is introduced into the events of war. For further instance there is the Cross which appeared in the sky to Constantine the Great, with the words "In hoc signo vinces"; and the latter-day legend of the Angels at Mons. Anyhow, out of gratitude to Hecate for their escape, the Byzantines erected an altar in her honour and stamped a crescent on their coins. A star was added then or subsequently, but whether in recognition of the morning star or of Hecate's alleged female parent, Asteria, the starry sky of night, I have not been able to ascertain.

Thus the crescent became and remained the official emblem of Byzantium, and afterwards of its successor, Constantinople, when that city was founded by Constantine the Great, A.D. 324; and after Constantinople was taken by Mahomet II., in 1453, the Sultan assumed the badge by right of conquest.

It is noteworthy that the national flags of other Mohammedan States, such as Morocco, Muscat, Zanzibar, and one or two independent colonies of Arabs, although red like the Ottoman ensign, are innocent of any device; while the Persian emblem is the Lion and the Sun.

We have seen that the crescent, pagan in its origin, was the recognized mark of a great Christian city for upwards of eleven hundred years, and it is nonsense to say that when Constantinople fell into the hands of the Turks the cross was replaced by the crescent. What really happened was that the cross was removed and the crescent remained. In the same way, it is manifestly incorrect to talk about the Crusades having been conflicts between the Crescent and the Cross, because the former was probably not even known to the great majority of the Saracen hosts.

Charles I., King of Naples and Sicily, a son of Louis VIII. of France, in 1268 founded a Christian Order of Knighthood named the Crescent. This order died out, and was reconstituted at Algiers by René, Duke of Anjou, brother and heir of Louis III., King of Naples, in 1464. The badge was a crescent of gold, on which was the word "Loz," enamelled in red letters, the import being "Loz (laus) en Croissant"—Praise by Increasing. This semi-religious and semi-military Order had for its objects the honour of God, the defence of the Church, the encouragement of noble actions, and the glory of the founder; but it did not survive the death of its resuscitator.

According to the most recent edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica," Ala-ud-din, the Seljuk Sultan of Iconium (1245-1254), and Ertoghul, his lieutenant and the founder of the Ottoman branch of the Turkish race, assumed the crescent as a device, and it appeared on the standard of the janissaries of Sultan Orkhan (1326-1360). So it may be that the crescent belongs to the Turks both by descent and also by conquest.

But, however that is, we may claim that in the length of time since it was first used the crescent has been more of a Christian than a Mohammedan badge; and it may be added that the crescent, generally surmounted by the cross, is to be seen on some churches in Russia, this being considered a proof of the Byzantine origin of the national church of that empire.

It would be an extremely difficult task, even in several papers, to examine and describe in a very condensed form the history of the various interesting and valuable historic exhibits to be found in the Museum, and upon this occasion it is proposed to deal with only a few relics relating to our Great Indian Empire, a part of the world which many of us know, and many of us love.

The first to be mentioned is a sword which belonged to the famous Hyder Ali, Sovereign of Mysore, and father of the celebrated Tippoo Sahib.

Then comes a very handsome brass field gun of native workmanship, captured at Seringapatam in 1792, when that city was besieged by 22,000 British and native troops, with 86 guns, under Lord Cornwallis, and defended by a Mysori garrison under Tippoo Sahib. On February 6th of that year all the redoubts commanding the city were carried at a cost to the assailants of 530 officers and men, while the Mysoris lost 20,000. On the approach of reinforcements under General Abercromby, Tippoo consented to treat, and peace was signed in March.

Seven years later, in 1799, Seringapatam was again besieged, this time by troops under Major-General George Harris (afterwards Lord Harris of Seringapatam and Mysore), when the city was defended by Tippoo Sahib with a garrison of 20,000 men. On May 3rd it was stormed and taken by General Baird with 4,000 men. The British losses during the siege amounted to 1,464, and about 8,000 Mysoris fell in the assault, Tippoo Sahib himself being killed in the rout. Among the relics of this potentate are a bow and arrows, the bow, which is of steel, being damasceened with gold; a pair of heavy flint-lock pistols, taken from his belt after his death; and a sword.

There is also a gold medal for the capture of Seringapatam in 1799, awarded to Major Lang, Commanding II. Division, 2nd Regiment of European Infantry.

But overwhelming interest naturally attaches to objects which are closely connected with the dark days of the Indian Mutiny in 1857-58.

One is a bronze plate taken from the carriage of the puppet, Bahadur Shah, whom the mutineers had proclaimed Emperor, and who after the fall of Delhi was sent to Rangoon as a State prisoner.

Another is a coat of quilted armour taken in action from Koer Singh, the famous Rajpoot Chief of Jugdespore, on August 12th, 1857, by Major Vincent Eyre, commanding the Field Force which relieved Arrah, in Bengal, where a house was defended by Mr. Boyle, with sixteen Englishmen and sixty Sikh police, against the attack of three revolted native regiments led by a Zemindar, Kur Singh. This small and gallant garrison held out from July 25th until August 3rd, 1857, when they were rescued.

Curious, also, is an autograph letter from Major C. Macpherson, political agent, dated Agra, September 7th, 1857, to Brigadier-General Neill, at Cawnpore. This document shows the use made of Greek letters in despatches during those troublous times.

The ever memorable defence of the Residency at Lucknow is commemorated by the original despatch of Colonel (afterwards Sir) John Inglis, who succeeded to the command after the death of Sir H. Lawrence, consisting of four sheets of paper, written on both sides, addressed to the Military Secretary to the Government of India, and dated September 26th, 1857; by some silver smallplate, belonging to the 32nd Light Infantry, damaged by shell-fire; and by an inkstand, which was the property of Brigadier-General Sir Henry Montgomery Lawrence.

On July 1st, 1857, the mutineers opened fire on the Residency and its environs, the garrison of which consisted of 927 Europeans and 768 native troops, besides women and children, the whole being under the

command of Sir Henry Lawrence, one of the two very remarkable brothers of that name, both of whom attained to great fame. The defence made, the details of which are well known, will live in history and be looked back upon with pride as long as the British Empire shall endure.

On July 2nd Lawrence was mortally wounded by a shell, and died on the 4th, at the age of 51. As Nelson, when dying, said: "Thank God I have done my duty," so Lawrence desired that the only epitaph on his tomb should be: "Here lies Henry Lawrence who tried to do his duty." He was buried in the churchyard, a hurried prayer being said by the chaplain, who alone could be present.

Sir Henry's younger brother, John Laird Mair Lawrence, afterwards Lord Lawrence, known as the "Saviour of the Punjaub," during the Indian Mutiny, rose from the small post of writer in the Honourable East India Company's Service to the highest and most important position under the British Crown, that of Viceroy and Governor-General of India, an office which he filled from 1863 until 1869, when he was succeeded by Lord Mayo, who was subsequently assassinated at Port Blair, the convict settlement in the Andaman Islands.

Lord Canning wrote:—"Through him (Lawrence) Delhi fell, and the Punjaub, no longer a weakness, became a source of strength. But for him the hold of England over Upper India would have had to be recovered at a cost of English blood and treasure which defies calculation. It is difficult to exaggerate the value of such ability, vigilance, and energy at such a time." Personally, I well remember his coming on board, at Calcutta, the frigate-built East Indiaman 'Blenheim,' in which I was then serving as a youngster, to inspect the ship, after she had been totally dismasted, in the Bay of Bengal, during the great cyclone of October, 1867. He now rests from his labours in Westminster Abbey.

Two other items which may be mentioned are a Punjaub medal, with a clasp for Mooltan, which belonged to a Sepoy, named Kassi, of the Bengal Sappers and Miners, and was taken from his body when he was killed as a rebel during the Indian Mutiny; and a scimitar taken from the palace of the infamous Nana Sahib at Bithur.

On the west wall of the Banqueting Hall there is suspended a common looking, partially mutilated white flag, with a red St. Andrew's cross, which should not be passed over unnoticed, as it was carried in the assault on Delhi, on September 14th, 1857, to distinguish the Second Column, under Brigadier-General (afterwards Sir) William Jones (K.C.B.), who became senior officer when Brigadier-General John Nicholson, who commanded the main storming party, fell.

This flag should revive many memories of that great day; among them the blowing in of the Cashmere Gate, a feat ever to be associated with the names of Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, and Sergeants Carmichael, Burgess, and Smith; and the mortal wound received by John Nicholson, who has been described as one of the ablest men and most gallant soldiers that England numbered among her ranks. In recognition of his services in defeating a large body of the enemy on August 25th, Sir John Lawrence had telegraphed to him from Lahore:

"I wish I had the power of knighting you on the spot. It should be done." Very appropriately, his remains were deposited in the new burial-ground in front of the historic Cashmere Gate, and near Ludlow Castle.

And that particular flag would also serve to remind us, if any such object were necessary for the sake of remembrance, of a young lieutenant who took part in the capture of Delhi; who, many years afterwards encamped near the city as Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India; and who, one short year ago, passed away full of years and honours, accompanied to his grave in St. Paul's Cathedral by the respect and love of a sorrowing nation—the late Field-Marshal Lord Roberts. His had, of late years, been as the voice of one crying in the wilderness, alas! unheeded by the politicians of both parties, who, instead of pursuing their favourite occupation of vote-catching, should have grasped the great and eternal truth: "*Si vis pacem para bellum*." Had they done so, the probabilities are that peace would have reigned in the world to-day.

The most pathetic and one of the most tragic relics in the Museum is the hair, contained in a frame, of murdered women and children, gathered, from cacti and other prickly plants growing at the mouth of the Well of Cawnpore, by Lieutenant W. Gordon-Alexander, 93rd Highlanders, on November 3rd, 1857, when on the march to the relief of Lucknow with Sir Colin Campbell's force.

The story of the heroic defence of the entrenchment at Cawnpore for twenty-one days, from June 6th to June 27th, 1857, under Major-General Sir Hugh Massy Wheeler, K.C.B.; the surrender of the remains of the garrison, some four hundred and fifty in number, under Nana Sahib's promise of a safe conduct to Allahabad; the breach of faith on the part of the Nana, and the slaughter at the embarkation ghaut; the subsequent murder of the survivors, principally women and children, under the most atrociously revolting circumstances, in the House of Massacre, long since swept away; and the disposal of their bodies in an old well; is one that has often been told, and still will bear repetition.

Personally, of all the sights in India, the Well, with its inscription—"Sacred to the perpetual memory of a great company of Christian people, chiefly women and children, who near this spot were cruelly murdered by the followers of the rebel Nana Dhundu Pant of Bithur, and cast, the dying and the dead, into the well below, on the XVth day of July, MDCCCLVII."—probably impressed me most.

And there, within a little enclosure in the now lovely gardens, surmounted and symbolically guarded by a beautiful white marble angel, the work of Marochotti, they sleep in what to those of British race is the most sacred spot in all India. "Requiescant in pace!"

THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE CONTINENT.

Translated, by permission, from the articles contributed to *Le Temps*
by Monsieur RENE PUAUX.

IT required the violation of the neutrality of Belgium to decide the question of sending the British Expeditionary Corps to the Continent. On August 2nd Sir Edward Grey assured M. Cambon that the British Fleet would protect the French coast against any naval attack, but this constituted the limit of the undertaking made by the British Government. In London it was not believed that the Berlin Cabinet would tear up the treaty to which it had set its hand; evidence was wanted, such as the negative reply of Herr von Jagow—"Germany will therefore no longer consider Belgian neutrality"—and the entry of the Germans into Belgian territory at Gemmerich, to make it clear to the Ministry over which Mr. Asquith presided, that Europe was faced with the most decisive question in the whole of its history—the struggle of the powers of liberty with the powers of falsehood and grab; and that England could not observe an attitude of the prudent defensive and of partial assistance towards her fellow-signatory of the *Entente Cordiale*, but would be forced to apply her whole energies to a struggle, upon the issue of which depended her own existence and the future security of the world.

The military assistance immediately available was but meagre, but at the same time it was far from being negligible. Those who promoted the *Entente Cordiale* had studied well all its conditions; the belated aid of the British divisions to France had been foreseen, and the whole problem had been gone into on the spot by the specialists. Sir John French and other officers of the British Staff had, during past years, attended our manœuvres and conferred with our General Staff. On the other hand, Aldershot had on many occasions been visited by our senior officers, and particularly by General Foch; and in this way there had been established in peace time a connection between those who in war were to prove brave and loyal comrades.

But England had given such little attention to the needs of a great European war, which she had always done her best to avoid, that she had remained deaf to the gravest warnings uttered by her statesmen and by her leading soldiers.

In 1908, at Edinburgh, Lord Rosebery had clearly pointed out the danger, and said:—"In these days, when words follow rather than precede the blow, it is necessary to be ready at all points. Were the nation suddenly to awaken in the presence of an enemy, patriotism could produce neither trained troops, nor weapons, nor strategy; all these should be made ready beforehand." Lord Esher had laboured in vain

to make his fellow-men and his colleagues understand that forces insufficiently organized would be of no avail in the inevitable war which was about to burst upon Europe with a Power numerically stronger and better organized for war than had ever been the armies of Frederick or of Napoleon. The best-loved of soldiers, Lord Roberts, had despairingly pleaded the same cause throughout the United Kingdom—the attitude of the people and of the Government had remained equally passive. In England the eyes of all men were fixed on the Navy, and nobody took much interest in the Army. The Army Estimates were passed without anybody concerning himself overmuch with the details, and the people were satisfied if a certain number of soldiers were available to be paraded on Laffan's Plain whenever the heads of foreign States visited England.

The law of 1907 regarding the Territorial Army had suffered no modification. In the event of war, the United Kingdom would be able to put in the field an expeditionary force of six infantry divisions and four cavalry brigades, all composed of troops raised by voluntary methods; while she retained at home a territorial army composed equally of volunteers, but which by their contract of enlistment could not be called upon to serve outside the Kingdom without their consent. England, in fact, had not wanted war, but war surprised her unawares.

The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Infantry Divisions and a cavalry division were the first troops to be embarked; the 4th Division sailed on August 23rd, and, until the close of the Battle of the Marne, this was all that England could send to our assistance. Then to these corps were successively added the 6th Division, which embarked on September 7th and became available on the 16th; the 7th Division, which embarked at the end of September and was landed at Ostend; the 2nd Cavalry Division, which disembarked in Belgium with the 7th Division; the 8th Division and the Indian Corps, of which the first units were not available for employment until October 27th.

THE CONCENTRATION.

On August 14th Field-Marshal Sir John French disembarked at Boulogne, on the 15th he paid a visit to the President of the Republic at Paris, and, later, one to General Joffre; while, on the 17th, he reached his headquarters at Cateau. The First British Army established its headquarters at Wassigny, the Second at Nouvion, and the cavalry division at Maubeuge. The line of demarcation of the concentration zone of the British Army was drawn on the east through Hirson, Fourmies, Clairfayt and Erquelines, joining on to the Fifth French Army under General Lanrezac. The moment of the intervention of the British Army was not to be longer delayed; the chief command was expecting a German attack in force to the north of the Meuse, and the British Army was to co-operate in the work of the Fifth French Army by outflanking the enemy's force should this be possible.

On August 24th the reports and the aerial reconnaissances gave notice that a very large German force was concentrating to the north

of the Meuse between Brussels and Namur, and that it comprised six army corps and three cavalry divisions, while other enemy corps prolonged the right wing towards Brussels and to the west of the Belgian capital.

On the 22nd, the IIInd, IVth, IXth, Xth and VIIth German Corps had reached the line Forest, Tubize, Lillois-Witterzee, Genappe, Sombrefe and Tamines; cavalry patrols were reported between Ghent and Oudenarde, from Pacy-sur-Tournai to St. Guilhem, and on the line Mons—Charleroi.

From the 21st the British Army had begun to move forward, and on the morning of the 23rd it was deployed in front of Mons, the 1st Division and the 5th Cavalry Brigade at Haulchin, the 2nd Division at Lalongueville, the 3rd at Jemappes, the 5th at St. Ghislain, and the remainder of the cavalry at Quiévrain. The 19th Brigade was detraining at Valenciennes. At the disposal of the British Army was the group of three French reserve divisions about Merles-le-château; the left flank of the Fifth French Army occupied the front Thuin—Malines; fighting had already commenced on the Meuse.

THE BATTLE OF MONS (AUGUST 23RD).

The British Army was preparing to attack, when, on the morning of the 23rd, it had itself to sustain the shock of the German Army on the line Condé—Erquelines. The British regiments met heroically the furious attacks of the German masses. The British *sang-froid* did not fail. Captain Shott, of the Royal Berkshire, rallied his men under an avalanche of bullets, and, lighting his pipe, said, "Lads, we will smoke." The gun limbers were becoming empty, and the British *groggnards*, the veterans of colonial wars, found this kind of warfare a very different game to an Afridi raid, or a punitive expedition into the country of the Mahdi. But—"Good luck to the old regiment!" said, as he fell back dead, a man of the 1st Warwickshires. All the men depicted by Kipling seemed to live again.

Field-Marshal Sir John French's "contemptible little army" was for a time obliged to give way before overwhelming numbers, but it found itself again. On August 24th the Fifth French Army fell back on the line Givet—Maubeuge, while the British retired slowly on the line Maubeuge—Valenciennes, their left covered by a body of French cavalry.

During its retreat the British Army was attacked by the IIInd and IVth German Corps from Stettin and Magdeburg, and its left wing suffered heavy losses. On the 25th the retirement was continued on the line Cambrai—Le Cateau, parallel to, but in advance of the front of the Fifth French Army. The situation became difficult; the whole of the German efforts were concentrated on the British Corps, the left of which was threatened; and on the night of the 25th-26th, the 1st British Corps was attacked in its quarters between Landrécies and Le Cateau. The Coldstream Guards were brought up by motor car during the night to protect headquarters; the fighting was of extreme violence, but the *morale* of the British was not lowered; in a battery

which had lost all its officers and men, a non-commissioned officer and two gunners, the sole survivors, kept up the fire unconcernedly; the Manchester Regiment performed prodigies of valour, but the effort demanded was beyond what was possible. The 1st British Corps fell back on Origny—St. Benoite on the Oise, the IInd on St. Quentin. Sir John French explained to his troops the reasons for the retirement; he is very popular with his men, stops in their midst, asks them questions, and laughs with them; while the words in which he explains to them a retreating movement, than which nothing is more terrible and demoralizing, restores confidence to all. The retreat was carried on methodically under the direction of Sir Douglas Haig; the Highland Light Infantry, the men of the Oxford and Buckinghamshire, the Worcester Regiment, and the Connaught Rangers form the rearguard, which retires fighting, the men sleeping little or not at all, and singing as they march, such songs as "Annie Laurie" or "Hold out your Hand, Naughty Boy."

On the night of the 27th the 3rd, 4th and 5th British Divisions were to the south of the Somme, at Ham, where they were reconstituted and reorganized. The more tired of the men were carried in three trains to Compiègne, and the remainder of the three divisions reached Noyon on the evening of the 28th. The 1st and 2nd Divisions arrived on this day about Chauny, between Bichancourt and Audelin.

The 1st Corps maintains, by means of its rearguard, communication with the left of Lanrezac's army at La Fère; to the west, the 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions are halted within ten kilometres of the Oise. On September 1st the retreat of the British troops is continued to the line Fontaine-les-Corps, Nanteuil-le-Houdouin and Betz. Portions of the 1st and IInd British Corps repulse the 4th German Cavalry Division, capturing ten guns. These were the days immediately preceding the close of the general retreat and the beginning of the Battle of the Marne.

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE.

The British Army was to hold a position to the east of Paris and share in the offensive of the French forces. From the moment when General von Kluck's manœuvres should have determined the decisions of General Joffre, the British Marshal was to make all dispositions for co-operating in the new plan of action.

On September 3rd the reconnaissances carried out by British airmen reported that the southern movement of the enemy had come to an end, and that he was marching south-east, in order to pass the Marne between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Château-Thierry. On the same date the British Expeditionary Force had received its reinforcements and reorganized its units. On the evening of the 3rd the situation of the army was as follows:—The 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades at Mauroy to the south of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre; the 1st Corps to the south of Signy-Signet; the IInd Corps between Ville Mareuil and Couilly; the IIIrd Corps between St. Germain-les-Couilly and Chanteloup; the Cavalry Division at Villeneuve.

The troops rested during the 4th September.

The British Army now wheeled so as to bring up its left in support of the Sixth French Army, which held the line of the Ourcq to the north of Meaux. The objective of the offensive of the Sixth Army was to be Château-Thierry, that of the Fifth and of the British Army was to be Montmirail. In view of the offensive the British Army was thus disposed: Ist Corps, Courpeloy-Pézarches; IInd Corps, La Haussaye-Tigeaux; IIIrd Corps, Bailly; the British Cavalry was at Haute Maison, Coulommiers, Tory-le-Chatel, in touch with a French cavalry corps.

The following were the orders for the 6th: the general direction of attack was Rebais; the Sixth Army was to debouch on the Ourcq at 9 a.m. on September 6th. The British Army was to be ready to march at 8, starting so soon as the Sixth Army began to debouch on the Ourcq.

VON KLUCK FIGHTS A RETREATING ACTION.

On the evening of September 6th the advanced troops had reached the southern bank of the Grand-Morin; the Ist Corps occupied the line Vaudoy—Le Plessis-Pézarches; the IInd, Faremontiers—Courtry; the IIIrd, Crécy—Voulangis; while the cavalry was at Choisy, connecting with a French cavalry corps. The German forces fell back in a northerly direction. On this same day, the Sixth French Army had attacked on the front Chambry—Oissery, the battle being a very lively affair. In order to show front against General Maunoury's attack, von Kluck had brought from the south to the north-west two divisions, which reached the Marne about Varedes and Lizy.

On the 7th the whole of that part of the German Army which was in the front of the British and of the Fifth French Army was falling back fighting; and on the evening of this day the British cavalry was to the east of Choisy, the Ist Corps was to the west of that place, the IInd was at Coulommiers, and the IIIrd on the line Maisoncelle—Giremoutiers.

On the 8th, airmen reported that the road from Hondevilliers to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre was congested by troops and transport, which, moving south, were passing the Marne about here in order thereafter to turn north-east in the direction of Montreuil. In front of the Fifth Army the German rearguards were holding the line Montmirail—Viels—Maisons, and, in front of the British line, Sablonnières—Orly. By mid-day the Ist British Corps was at Rebais, the IInd at Doue, the IIIrd at Petit Courroy, connected with the 8th Division of Maunoury's army on the front Villemareuil—Pierre—Levé.

At 1 p.m. the IIIrd British Corps reached Signy—Signet—Jouarre, supported by an artillery brigade from the 8th Division; the IInd Corps reached Le Petit Morin between Jouarre and Arches; the Ist Corps held a line from Arches to La Trétoire. By evening, on the 8th, the enemy had re-crossed the Marne, and the British Army had reached that river; while on the 9th the British troops threw into disorder the hostile rearguards, taking from them eight machine-guns

and several hundreds of prisoners. That evening the army of Sir John French held the passages of the Marne; the outposts of the Ist Corps were about Château-Thierry and Thiolet, with the Corps' headquarters at Charly; those of the IIInd Corps were at Coupery, on the high ground south of Montreuil, at Montreuil-aux-Lions and at Chaumont, with headquarters at Saacy; the IIrd Corps held the *débouchés* of the Marne at Champigny and at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, with headquarters at Tarterel.

FROM THE MARNE TO THE AISNE (SEPTEMBER 10TH, 11TH, 12TH).

Action with the rearguards was continued on the 10th, the British capturing seven guns, many machine-guns, more than 1,000 prisoners and many wagons; and by the evening of the 10th the British Expeditionary Force had made a remarkable advance, almost reaching the line of the Ourcq.

The Ist Corps held the line Dammard—Monnes—Priez, facing north-east; the IIInd the line St. Quentin—Chézy—Gandelu, facing north-west; the IIIrd from Cocherel to Montigny, facing north; the 1st, 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades were at Sommelous; and the 3rd and 5th at Marizy and Passy-en-Valois.

On the 11th the British crossed the Ourcq, moving towards the Aisne; the cavalry reached Serrenay, Druisy and Trigny; the head of the Ist Corps was at Bruyères and Oulcy-le-Château, that of the IIInd at St. Rémy, and the IIIrd at Louatre. Sir John French's orders were that on the 12th they should debouch on the Aisne between Bucy-le-Long and Bourg-et-Conin. During the 12th the British engaged a rearguard in occupation of Vesle, while the Sixth French Army was in action with the German forces holding Soissons.

THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE.

On the morning of the 13th September the British Army occupied the three following positions: Ist Corps, Courcelles—Vauxceré, in front of the bridges at Bourg and Pont d'Arcy; IIInd Corps, Braine Serches, facing the bridges at Chavonne, Vailly, Condé and Missy; IIIrd Corps, Billy—Rozières, in front of the bridges at Venizel and Soissons.

By the evening of the 13th the Ist British Corps had seized the *points d'appui* of Pont d'Arcy, Bourg-et-Conin and Verneuil; the IIInd Corps those of Missy and Vailly; the IIIrd those of Belleu and of Villeneuve. The IIIrd Corps had met with very considerable resistance on the right bank of the Aisne. On the 14th September the Ist Corps crossed the Aisne at Bourge, moving thence on Courtecon; it was violently attacked by the enemy debouching from Troyes and Cerny, but repulsed him, capturing 12 guns; to the north of Vailly, the IIInd Corps, which had passed the Aisne at Vailly and Missy, succeeded in occupying Hills 185 and 169. The IIIrd Corps, crossing at Venizel, attacked Hill 151 (one kilometre to the east of Crouy) and Hill 146 (one kilometre to the west of Chivres).

On the left the right of the Sixth French Army held Crouy, Bauxroi, Pasly and Pommiers. To the right, the 18th Corps (Fifth Army) occupied the Chemin des Dames as far as the south of Cerny-en-Laonnois; but the high ground to east and west of the Oise canal and as far as the Aisne was held by very many heavy German guns.

The fighting on the Aisne was of a very violent character. The British Army had already forgotten the trying hours of the retreat; its offensive qualities were in no way impaired; its historical old regiments had struck hard. The regiments of the Guards, the Seaforth Highlanders, the Camerons, the Middlesex Regiment, the Black Watch, can now add the name of the Aisne to those others already embroidered on the silk of the Colours hanging on the walls of the great churches of Britain.

THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE NORTH OF THE AISNE.

On the 15th September, at 12.30 p.m., the 1st British Corps succeeded in prolonging the line of the XVIIIth French Corps as far as the plateau to the south of Ostel, and here repelled a German attack. The 3rd Division of the IInd Corps had moved forward on its right and occupied the southern edge of the plateau Folemprise—Rougemaison—Grandrieux. The IIIrd Corps held the southern edge of the plateau and the Hills 146 and 151 to the north of Bucy-le-Long. On the evening of the 15th, the 1st Corps, co-operating with the XVIIIth French Corps, had occupied the manufactory at Troyon; its left was south of Orsel; the 3rd Division held the ridge Folemprise—Grandrieux, the brow of the Hill 169 to the south of Torcy, and St. Pierre to the west of Vailly.

The enemy held the plateau, the fort at Condé and Condé-sur-Aisne.

The 5th Division was at Missy, the 4th was holding the ridge to the north of Bucy-le-Long, linking up at Crouy with the 45th French Division.

During these last two days the fighting had been particularly fierce. The British Army had been exposed to the enemy's desperate counter-attacks, all of which had been hurled back; it had taken a thousand prisoners and captured 12 guns from the Germans, but the victory had cost it 5,000 casualties. The British consolidated the position which it was holding, in view of once again taking the offensive; and on the 16th the 6th Division, which had sailed from England on the 7th, joined the Expeditionary Force and was placed in reserve to the south of Soissons.

From the 17th—20th there were counter-attacks by the Germans on the Ostel plateau, the 1st Corps flinging themselves on the enemy with the bayonet and inflicting on him heavy losses. The enemy bombarded the British positions with his heavy guns, renewed his attacks against the left of the 1st Corps, and then, on the 20th, realizing the ill-success of all his efforts, he evacuated Chivres. From the 23rd to the 28th September the British supported the French offensive; on the 23rd the British heavy guns bombarded the wood of Ailles

to support the advance of the XVIIIth French Corps; on the 26th the 2nd British Brigade inflicted huge losses on the enemy; on the 27th the IIIrd Corps effected an advance to the north of Bucy; and during the night of the 27th—28th the 1st Division drove back a violent attack.

It may be useful here somewhat to expand the recital of the record of this part of the campaign.

C'est l'époque héroïque, celle qui fut en fait décisive. Déjà elle est du domaine de l'histoire. Herbert Kaufman will sing of "the Hell-gate of Soissons," of the twelve British engineers who sacrificed themselves, the one after the other, in order to blow up the bridge. What were the last words of the colonel of the Manchesters?—"No surrender, lads. You have your rifles, your bayonets, the butts of your rifles, and, last of all, you have your fists." What of the five charges of the Scots Greys at Mons? What of the men of the Royal Highlanders who marched against the enemy, calling to one another in the language of the football field:—"On the ball, Highlanders, mark your men!" *Tous les soldats ont été sublime. Ils ont dépassé l'attente même de leur chef, qui à la fin de la retraite de Mons ne les croyait pas capables de reprendre l'offensive avant une longue période de repos. Ils étaient peu nombreux; l'Angleterre, de par son système de recrutement, ne pouvait momentanément compter que sur eux. Ils avaient rempli leur tâche; le premier et formidable effort de l'ennemi était brisé!*

THE TRANSFER OF THE BRITISH ARMY TO FLANDERS.

The Aisne front was now consolidated, and a period of sitting still was about to follow. Reinforcements were in course of arrival for the British Expeditionary Force—the 7th and 8th Divisions, two divisions of British and one of Indian cavalry. The moment seemed favourable to the Field-Marshal, now commanding an army largely composed of fresh troops, to resume the place he had originally occupied on the French left and thus shorten his communications with his bases of supply.

The movement, which had the approval of the French commander, was carried out in echelon. The British cavalry division was ready to move on October 1st; the relief of the IInd Corps in the centre was completed on the morning of the 3rd by prolonging the front of the 1st and IIIrd Corps on either side of it, and its transfer to the region of Hazebrouck was completed by October 9th. A French division reached the neighbourhood of Soissons on the 5th, replacing the IIIrd British Corps which was sent to the region of Pont-Ste-Maxence—Compiègne, and was thence transported into the St. Omer—Hazebrouck zone ready for action on the 13th. As regards the 1st Corps, it arrived about St. Omer on October 19th. The whole manœuvre was a particularly delicate one, for the transfer of the British suspended for ten days all northward movement of the French, at a moment when the reinforcement of the French left wing was in progress. By agreement between General Joffre and Field-Marshal

French the British divisions had to come into action at the moment they reached their several stations without waiting for any general concentration of the British Army.

THE ANTWERP PROBLEM.

During the closing days of September, the 7th Division of infantry and one of cavalry were put on shore at Ostend from England. At that moment the idea was entertained in London of sending these two divisions to the help of Antwerp; but since everything had then to be subordinated to the success of the main operation—that of check-mating the Germans seeking to outflank our left—this project was abandoned after consultation between Sir John French and General Joffre. The 7th Division covered the retreat of the Belgian Army which evacuated Antwerp and fell back on Ostend, Thourout and Dixmude, rejoining the main body of the British Army. The abandonment of Antwerp was a cruel sacrifice, for the place had a special significance from the English point of view, but it was recognized in London that this was required in the interests of the military situation, just as Petrograd understood the need for the evacuation of Moscow.

THE BATTLE OF FLANDERS.

The British army corps having successively arrived in Flanders, there found themselves with Belgian and French troops on either flank, and formed with them the forces opposing the enveloping movement of the German Army. Field-Marshal Sir John French's troops thus did not form a continuous line, but occupied different points of the front. Three theatres of operations may here be indicated, in which, by the numbers engaged or by the violence of the struggle, the British efforts took on a different character. 1.—Between Dixmude and Ypres a British corps, the IVth, fought from October 21st alongside French territorial divisions and the brigade of *fusiliers marins*. 2.—Between the Lys and Lens two British corps, the IIInd and IIIrd, acted in prolongation of the Tenth French Army which was operating about Arras and opposing the enemy's offensive aimed at Calais. 3.—Special mention must be made of the operations of the Ist British Corps which was employed before Ypres, and there, with the Eighth French Army, sustained the violent attack of the German main forces.

Without being able to relate in full detail the operations of these three groups it will still be useful to give some idea of the stout resistance offered by the British troops to the desperate attacks of the German masses.

The IVth Corps (7th Infantry and 8th Cavalry Divisions) which had been disembarked at Ostend, covered, as above mentioned, the Belgian retreat from Antwerp. On the evening of October 14th the 7th Division was to the east of Ypres near Zillebeke, the 3rd Cavalry Division at Voormescelle; on the 16th the 7th Division established itself on the line Zandvoorde—Gheluvelt—Zonnebeke, while the cavalry division was about Langemarcke. One French territorial

division was at Ypres and another at Poperinghe. A French cavalry corps, on the left of the British cavalry, had been brought up to the vicinity of the Forest of Houthulst, when it had struck against the head of a new German column and been obliged to slacken its rate of progress. On the 19th the occupation of Menin by the 7th Division was prevented by the arrival of enemy columns, estimated at about an army corps, debouching on the line Thielt—Courtrai.

The French cavalry, after several brilliant actions, retired before the German main body. On the 20th the 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division were at Poelcapelle—Zonnebeeke—Houthem, supported as to their left by the French Territorials. The 1st British Corps came up on their right, the mission of all these troops being to hold on pending the arrival of the army which General Joffre was forming for service in Belgium, and by the side of which they were to fight the great Battle of Ypres. The British were about to receive the support of the Lahore division of the Indian Army which, on the 20th, had completed its detrainment.

On the 21st the German attack developed. On the 22nd the British lost Bixchoote, but counter-attacked next day; the fight was very fierce, but the 7th Division lost and then retook their trenches. The division was by this time greatly exhausted by incessant fighting and continuous marching since the date of its disembarkation at Ostend, and on the 27th Sir John French decided to break up this army corps. The 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division was thenceforth attached to the 1st Corps of which they formed the left wing, the 7th Division occupying the sector of front from Zandvoorde to the Ypres—Menin road.

THE IIND AND IIIIRD BRITISH CORPS.

On October 9th the British cavalry had moved on the Aire—Bethune canal, its objective being the Forest of Nieppe; the enemy fell back from Estaires, Merville and Laventie before the British cavalry, holding Pradelles and Vieux Berquin and being concentrated in the Forest of Nieppe. On the evening of October 11th the 2nd Cavalry Division seized Mont des Cats after a lively action.

The IInd Corps, which had moved forward in rear of the cavalry, concentrated between Bethune and Furnes, connecting with the left of the Tenth French Army. A brigade of the IIIrd Corps, with its accompanying artillery, was already available at St. Omer on the 11th. The IIIrd Corps itself had come up on the 12th and concentrated about Hazebrouck.

While the IInd Corps made slow progress on the southern bank of the Lys, in face of a very large body of German cavalry supported by infantry and heavy guns, the IIIrd Corps moved forward on the northern bank. The cavalry corps operated on the left of the British Army, clearing the Forest of Nieppe and reaching Neuf Berquin and Straseele on the evening of the 12th: the objective of the IInd Corps was La Bassée, that of the IIIrd was Bailleul.

On the 13th the IInd Corps reached the line Noyelles—Pontheu, and though attacked violently on the 14th, it maintained its position.

It was operating in an industrial region, in a flat country covered with small gardens, little houses and factories, where artillery support could not be particularly efficacious. The IIIrd Corps, on the other hand, continued its march in a north-easterly direction; and on the night of the 14th it was on the line Neuve Eglise—Vieux Berquin, while the British cavalry was already at Messines and Wytschaete. The enemy had abandoned Bailleul, leaving some wounded behind them.

The Field-Marshal now ordered the IInd Corps to incline rather to the east, moving forward on both sides of the Lys, protected as to its left by the British cavalry, as to its right by the French cavalry corps which, masking Lille, was securing the connection between the two British corps. The English cavalry reached the Lys at Comines on the 15th, and on the following day pushed reconnaissances to the country south of Ypres. Two divisions were between Messines and Hollebecke and one at Rosbecke.

The IIIrd Corps installed itself on the 16th in the wood at Ploegsteert to the north of the Lys and occupied Fleurbaix to the south of the river; on the 17th it held the railway station at Armentières. In the meantime the IInd Corps was held up at Givenchy in front of La Bassée, to the south of which place the Germans occupied a commanding position. This the British attempted to turn; they made some slight progress to the north of La Bassée, and after some bitter fighting arrived on the evening of the 17th at Herlies and Illies. Supported by a brigade of the XXIst French Corps they attacked La Bassée on the 18th and 19th, but were repulsed by very heavy artillery fire.

The IIIrd Corps had continued its march, and on the 18th was to the east of Armentières on the line Verlinghem—Premesques—Radinghem.

The German front, already very strongly organized, was drawn in front of the IInd and IIIrd British Army Corps through the towns of La Bassée, Furnes, Escobecques, Pérenchy, Fort Carnot and Lynselles. In front of this line, but more to the north, the Germans also occupied the line of the Lys between Frelinghiem and Werwick.

On the 20th battle was engaged along the whole front, being especially lively at Radinghem and Frelinghiem; the IIIrd Corps succeeded in capturing the last-named village. The fighting continued during the 21st and 22nd, it being the moment when the Germans between Arras and Ypres were making their most violent effort to reach Calais. Under the hostile pressure the British had to yield ground at several points, losing the villages of Violaine, Herlies, Fromelles and Radinghem. On the 23rd the battle was no less desperate. To the north of the Lys the cavalry corps about Messines endured a violent pressure from the 20th to 25th, but was able to maintain its position on the line Messines—Hollebecke. The IIIrd Corps lost and then recovered its trenches; while the IInd Corps withdrew to its second line of defence—Fauquescourt—Neuve Chapelle—Givenchy.

On the 24th the infantry attack ceased, but the bombardment continued. The IInd Corps, being greatly weakened by these latter combats, was reinforced on the right by four battalions and an artillery

brigade from the Tenth French Army, and on the left by 2,000 carbines and the whole of the guns of the French cavalry corps. Thanks to this, it was able, on the 26th, to hurl back an infantry attack. To the IInd Corps the Field-Marshal also sent an Indian brigade; this attacked and captured Neuve Chapelle on the 28th, but fell back with heavy loss under machine-gun fire.

The 29th and 30th were marked by a new German offensive along the whole front: the cavalry corps was attacked at Hollebecke and Messines and held out during two days, at the end of which a French corps came up to occupy the front from Messines to Kleinvillebecke during the Battle of Ypres. At Ploegesteert Wood, in front of the IIIrd Corps, the Germans were repelled after some hot engagements; and finally the IInd Corps also repulsed the enemy, and found that Neuve Chapelle had been evacuated. On the 30th the IInd Corps, which had been particularly tried, was relieved by the Indian Corps.

The 2nd Cavalry Division was relieved by the French cavalry corps, which was again relieved on the 10th by General Allenby's cavalry. The two other divisions changed places in the trenches before Messines, their artillery sharing in the fighting of the French troops at Hollebecke, Wytschaete and Messines.

From the 30th October onwards the whole of the German effort was directed against Ypres; there is then nothing particular to chronicle on the fronts occupied by the IIIrd and Indian Corps. On the 2nd November the troops of this last lost some trenches, on the 3rd they repulsed an attack on Neuve Chapelle, while on the 4th they retook the positions from which they had been dislodged. The IIIrd Corps checked the enemy on the 5th, lost the edge of Ploegesteert Wood on the 7th, and attempted its recapture on the 10th, but in vain.

On the 7th the Indian Corps repulsed the Germans who had tried to possess themselves of Richebourg St. Vaast. The ardour of the enemy had now evaporated; from two different sources it was learnt that between October 31st and November 2nd 30,000 German wounded had been sent to Ghent and Brussels. The German effort had miscarried.

THE 1ST CORPS.

The 2nd Division of the 1st Corps had been brought up to the neighbourhood of Hazebrouck on October 16th, but the corps concentration was not completed until the 19th, and it was, on the 20th, directed via Poperinghe to the north of the Yser, into the region of Langemarck, where it established itself in prolongation of the IVth Corps. On the 21st it attacked to the north-east of Ypres, but was not able to make any progress, the neighbouring French territorial division having retired upon Bixchoote, of which the Germans took possession on the 22nd. The 1st Corps held the line Steenstraete—Langemarck—Zonnebeeke to the north of Ypres, but on the 23rd was relieved in the position it held to the north of the Ypres—Roulers railway by a division of the IXth French Corps, and prolonged the line from Zonnebeeke towards Becelaere. The 23rd was marked by a very hot action, the 1st Division had 1,500 German

dead in its front, and made prisoners of 600 starving men. On the 25th the 2nd Division, supported on its left by the IXth French Corps, attacked, took two guns, made several prisoners, and, despite considerable opposition, advanced towards Becelaere; while the 2nd Brigade repulsed a night attack, countered, and captured 270 Germans, seven of whom were officers. By the 26th the 1st Corps had gained 1,800 metres, 500 the day following, but was unable to reach Becelaere.

The enemy had now, however, received reinforcements, and on the 29th a formidable attack was made upon the 1st Corps, the Germans penetrating as far as Gheluvelt, and the British losing 400 men and five machine-guns. At the end of the day, however, they succeeded in retaking their positions.

On the 30th, under extreme pressure, the British lost the heights of Zandwoorde and withdrew to the line Zonnebeeke—Gheluvelt—Hollebeeke. General Foch, who had been in close communication with the British command from the 8th October, the date when Sir John French had visited him at Doullens to arrange the detrainment of the British troops, now sent the Field-Marshal three French battalions. He placed later at his disposal five more battalions, six batteries from the IXth and XVIth Corps, while so soon as they came up he sent forward to the British front all the units of the XXXIInd Corps at his disposal. After a battle lasting for four days, during which the *fraternité d'armes anglo-française est extrême*, the British front was re-established. The German offensive, which had been pressed with violence up to the 9th, relaxed on the 11th: the critical period was at an end.

The days following the 11th November passed quietly, but the artillery duel continued. The British Army was reorganized, certain units were retired from the front and the line was re-drawn; it was left to be held by the British alone, and it extended from Festubert, east of Bethune, to the point 75, south-west of Wytschaete.

During the four weeks that the Battle of Flanders endured, the British had lost 45,000 men, but the sacrifice had not been offered in vain. The German effort had broken on the Yser as it broke on the Maine.

Etroitement unis, Français, Anglais et Belges ont d'un cœur égal et d'une égale énergie barré la route de Dunkerque et de Calais en infligeant à l'ennemi des pertes énormes et irréparables.

VISIT AND DEATH OF LORD ROBERTS.

The two greatest battles of modern times, and, without doubt, in all history, had come to an end; the last days of the second week in November witnessed the agony of the German dream. Equality of numbers was now established on the western front. The help afforded by England had been of a weight impossible properly to measure in any scales; she had flung into battle all the resources she had immediately at hand; her losses had been made good by the reserves provided for in the Bill of 1909. But what might not have happened had she hearkened to the words of her far-seeing statesmen and

leading soldiers, and had had ready at the very commencement of the war an army proportional to her greatness and to her resources in men? One man more than any other had foreseen all this—Lord Roberts, the unheard apostle of compulsory military service. His age—he was eighty-three—had made him ineligible for a command, but the passionate interest which this warrior took in the operations drew him to the Continent; he longed to see again the Indian regiments, among which he had passed forty years of his life, the army of India which he had fashioned, these units of the Lahore Division—the 47th Sikhs, who three years before had defiled before the King-Emperor to the time of the “Manchester March,” the regiments of Gurkhas, who go by to the “Wellesley March,” and the regiments of the Meerut Division, among them the 2nd Battalion 39th Garhwal Rifles—*ces troupes d'élite qui représentaient l'armée des Indes au Durbar.*

Lord Roberts going, on November 13th, from St. Omer to Neuve Chapelle—Richebourg l'Avoué, then the centre of operations of the Indian Corps, made a detour to visit General Foch. They had known each other for a long time, for the French General had frequently visited England—“*J'étais commis-voyageur en danger allemand,*” he had once lately remarked, and Lord Roberts thoroughly approved the prophetic views of his guest. General Foch received the old Field-Marshal at the Municipal Offices, where he had spent so many anxious hours during the battle of the Yser, watching the old clock with the swinging pendulum and waiting for the ring of the telephone bell. The Field-Marshal was in uniform, enveloped in a big khaki overcoat. He was much interested in the explanations of the recent operations, and followed the sketches drawn by Captain R. “What a curious battle!” he said, on hearing how the British and French Divisions were all mixed together, engaged in the same task—that of damming the German torrent. To the staff officers who were introduced to him he remarked, “You have a great General.” He was all smiles; the joy of victory lit up his keen eyes; the British Army, of which he had been the Commander-in-Chief, had answered his expectations, and the battles of the Marne and the Yser, while saving the old world, had also saved England.

During the morning the Field-Marshal visited the Indian Corps. For some reason he took off his overcoat while reviewing the troops, and the days are cold in mid-November. Coming back to St. Omer he was shivering, and on the night of the 14th he was dead. *Il y a dans cette disparition soudaine, brutale, d'un vétéran au lendemain du jour où il a constaté la victoire, où il s'est retrouvé une dernière fois parmi ses soldats, une beauté antique. La mort de Lord Roberts, le jour même de la dernière vaine attaque allemande sur l'Yser, restera un des émouvants instants de cette guerre.*

THE WAR OF POSITIONS.

From November 15th the operations in Flanders took on the character of a war of positions, and up to to-day this character has

scarcely been in any way modified. Some actions more important than others have marked its various stages; there was on January 25th the great assault sustained by the 1st Corps at Givenchy and gloriously repelled; from March 10th—12th there was the important affair at Neuve Chapelle; on March 15th and 16th the offensive at St. Eloi; from April 17th—21st the attack on Hill 60. Beginning on April 22nd was the Battle of Ypres, where the Germans for the first time made use of asphyxiating gases, and where the Canadian troops performed prodigies of valour—a battle which continued almost without interruption till May 25th.

There was, further, the assistance given by the British Army to the French attack in the Arras sector between May 9th and 18th; the attack at Festubert, where the British Army gained more than half a kilometre on a front of six kilometres; and, finally, and more recently, there was the affair at Hooge.

These actions are all too fresh in the memory for it to be necessary to give details concerning them. This war of positions, if it fails to strike the imagination by reason of its apparent "marking time," does not mean any cessation of the combat. The war is one of attrition. By killing the adversary's troops, one obliges him to call upon new men of inferior quality to make up his losses, to bring forward other classes of recruits, thus his powers of resistance steadily diminish.

From this point of view, the situation of the British Army in regard to the enemy is especially favourable. While Germany has to call upon her oldest and youngest men, the United Kingdom recruits the contingents she sends to the Continent from amongst the pick of her population. She now sends forth to battle men from 21 to 30 years of age, who possess equally the physical quality of their time of life and the moral qualities of the volunteer. These men compose the new "Kitchener" divisions, which, since the end of the winter, have been continually arriving in the north of France. Last week (the writer's article is dated September 18th) I saw one of these divisions arrive, and the men made a remarkable impression upon me of vigour, efficiency and discipline.

By degrees, with the methodical spirit which characterizes the British temperament, the equipment has been improved; technical improvements have kept pace with the necessities of the day. At the time of the Battle of Flanders, the British Government, recognizing the gravity of the situation, called upon the Territorial Army, which could not, without its own consent, be employed outside the United Kingdom. Nobody should be led astray by the word "territorial," which in France evokes the idea of men who have become stiff in their joints, but who may recover elasticity of movement. In England the word implies merely a category of recruitment, not of age. The Territorial Army is formed, like the Regular Army, of volunteers. The consent above mentioned was easily obtained, and from the beginning of November their battalions and batteries began to arrive in the Pas de Calais. Further, Territorial battalions had in some cases been sent to India to set free troops of the Regular Army there

serving. Numbers cannot be stated, but the effort made can be appreciated by writing generally. At the start the Expeditionary Force numbered 80,000 to 100,000, but since then England has placed something like ten times these numbers in the field. The creative work goes on; these are the results of Lord Kitchener's methods.

(Here follows a brief account of Lord Kitchener's career and services which concludes with the following words): *Telle est la carrière de l'homme. Son caractère est comme celui de beaucoup d'hommes d'action; volontairement taciturne. Son regard, d'un bleu d'acier, est déconcertant. Il regarde les gens droit dans les yeux. Il n'admet pas qu'on diffère ni qu'on tergiverse. Ce qui est possible doit être fait et immédiatement. Il a fait les nouvelles armées anglaises.*

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW ARMIES.

I have had occasion to see these new divisions from very close at hand. Trained in England, they have been kept thoroughly up to the mark from the day of their arrival on the Continent. I have surprised them doing physical drill by whole battalions in their shirt-sleeves in camp; and this drill does not consist of vague movements lightly executed, the necessity of which our men do not grasp and look upon almost as a punishment, but of a rational gymnastics based upon the principles which for a year past have been studied at the College at Rheims, and of which our young men are now beginning to acknowledge the benefit.

These men, from the day of their disembarkation to that of their arrival at the front, have been able to see all that is being done for them by the *services d'arrière*, and to realize the solicitude for them of their country. Much has been said about these *services d'arrière* of the British Army, and they need special mention by reason of their abundance, and even luxury. To those who criticize this abundance the reply is made that, "Our army is a voluntary one in regard to which the State must religiously carry out all the terms of its contract, and, since we have not obligatory service, the British soldier remains something of a privileged person, better cared for than any other soldier and endowed with every possible comfort that a man can have in the field. England is a country where any change is but gradually accepted. Any idea of the country being in danger penetrates only by slow degrees the mind of the masses. Lord Kitchener gets without difficulty the recruits he requires, but our men preserve the tradition of the consideration the soldier has always received and are not to be 'done.' Thus a man who is well cared for, supplied with everything, and who knows that if he is wounded he will be admirably looked after, is a man of double value." And it is certainly the case that the British soldier, whom popular ignorance regards as a man newly shaved and devouring a slice of bread and marmalade, *se battent avec un admirable courage et un entrain magnifique.*

It is impossible to give numbers, to name places or mention dates in speaking of the working of the departmental corps of the British Army, but those who have seen and who write of them may be

believed. The British Army already in France is very numerous and every day its numbers are increasing; its "filling up" with munitions proceeds very satisfactorily; the heavy artillery is gradually being constituted; and it was only the other day that Sir John French stated that "our guns are better than the German guns, and our shells are equal to the German shells of a larger calibre."

The equipment of the British soldier is the most complete and practical of any army; there is nowhere any heavy leather, no stiff valises which chafe the shoulders, everything is waterproof and light. The rations surpass everything that can be imagined, and thousands of motor lorries are constantly bringing up from the railway, the tracks of which have been greatly added to, all the rations and forage that are needed.

To the German cavalry, which can only replace its losses at great cost by way of Sweden and Norway, England can oppose cavalry corps admirably mounted, and to which Australia supplies an abundance of splendid remounts. The British Government has established in Normandy a horse hospital and convalescent camp which are marvels of their kind; 2,000 horses are always there under treatment. At the time of my visit a horse was just coming to after chloroform, from the chest of which a piece of a shell had been extracted. Masseurs were still rubbing the animal lying extended on a big waterproof sheet. The veterinary officer assured me that in six weeks the horse would be returned sound to the army. The camp, where everything had been improvised, was arranged with great taste, a regard for order, hygiene and even comfort, which gave no sign of a temporary or hasty organization. The English lads, drawn from training schools in England, and even from Chantilly and Maison Lafitte, looked after the animals with a skill which cannot be over-emphasized. The artillery and cavalry need have no anxiety as to their remounts.

THE MEDICAL ORGANIZATION.

It is in the organization of its medical department that the British method arrives at the height of its capacities. The evacuation of the wounded by motor ambulances, by means of barges arranged for the more seriously wounded, for whom any shaking is dangerous or painful, meets the worst exigencies. The motor ambulances are in many ways similar to those in use by us, but as regards the barges which I have seen they are as practical as they are pleasant to look at. By means of a central staircase the stretcher is carried down into a large hall lighted by electricity and equipped with electric fans. Each bed has a mosquito curtain and is supplied with every possible accessory that the wounded man can want made in nickel. Flowers decorate the walls and a phonograph is ready to play "Happy Gipsy" or any other rag-time airs. The barge has its own kitchen, its dynamo, its stores of medicines and eatables, its cabins for the *personnel*, comprising nine sick orderlies, two nurses and a surgeon, for the thirty-four beds which the barge holds. A tug for each group of barges tows them along the canals to the base hospitals or ports of embarkation. Three hospital ships, with slung beds specially constructed to

prevent sea-sickness, make the voyage to the British ports under hygienic and comfortable conditions.

The hospitals are equally comfortable; there is the same care to give the patient the same smiling surroundings—grand hotels or casinos on the sea-shore, hutments installed in pleasant sites or on the shore of the Channel; the melancholy of the wounded man is always appreciative of the consolation afforded by flowers or beautiful views.

I have spoken to some of these unlucky ones. One of them had two fingers of his left hand torn off and his right arm riddled by shell fragments, while only one eye looked out from the bandages in which his head was swathed. The nurse, a pretty woman, in her light grey uniform with the scarlet cape, had just finished allowing him to bathe for himself the wounds on his right arm. Imperturbably, with the three remaining fingers of his left hand he was soaking the pad of wadding in the basin of solution of sublimate. He was interested in his wounds and liked to care for them himself. "They are going on well," he said. Another, who was in a high fever and who was being fanned incessantly by an orderly, began to sing the "Marseillaise" on seeing French uniforms passing by his bed.

A Highlander who had been crippled for life was asked if he did not regret having taken part in the war. "No," he replied, "I have got a good home, and a man who has that ought to defend it." The men never complain, they are always making jokes. One who had lost his left arm said, "How lucky for me that it was not the right; I shall have the first vacancy for opening the taxi-cab doors in the Strand." Some of the expressions used by the soldiers will not bear translating, as when they make jokes in regard to stenography—shorthand, literally translated, writing when short of a hand—speaking of it in fun as a job suitable for one who has lost his fingers and whose hand has thus been cut short! The stoics are of the same family as ours, their hearts have been dilated by the same thoughts.

The British medical administration has arranged convalescent camps for these men, and men leaving hospital spend some three weeks in them. Here they are "re-made from head to foot." The barber, the dentist, the chiropodist, all care for these men, who, grouped in tents, take to gardening, re-make their muscular education by means of outdoor games, and do not return to the front until they are again thoroughly fit. The United Kingdom has plenty of men available and has no need, as with Germany, to send men back to the firing line whose wounds have barely healed.

At the entrance of one of these convalescent depots a huge placard bears several verses entitled "Our Motto"; here are the first lines:—

"Smile, smile, smile,
It's well worth while,
For when you smile
Another smiles."

And certainly this good counsel, amounting almost to an order, is closely followed, and the men do smile. In their smart uniform of

blue linen with white collar and scarlet tie they devote themselves to the work of the camp, ornament the plots round their tents with designs in broken pieces of coloured glass, with moss, with flowers depicting their regimental badges, and among these designs I found a Gallic Cock staring at the British Lion, and with this amiable inscription in French—"Bonjour, France!"

L'AMITIE FRANCAISE.

La fraternité d'armes qui s'était manifestée pendant les batailles de la Marne et de l'Yser n'était pas un sentiment occasionnel né du danger commun. L'œuvre de l'Entente Cordiale, la pénétration croissante des deux peuples, a été efficace. Dans tout le nord de la France où l'armée anglaise est cantonnée, la population civile et le corps expéditionnaire font excellent ménage. Le soldat anglais est gentil; il a le cœur dans la main; il donne tout ce qu'il a; paye à des prix d'Anglais ce qu'il a besoin; s'intéresse à la vie nouvelle à laquelle il se trouve mêlé. On the Sunday of the Feast of the Assumption, in a little village on the Somme, I was not a little surprised to see the procession leaving the church under the guardianship and direction of two British military policemen, while two others on the pavement kept back the crowd (certainly not a large one) with all the gravity and regard for order of the London police. Habit was too strong for them, they must organize and maintain order. Wherever the British soldier is found, that is the prevailing feeling—to clean up, organize the traffic, impose methods of hygiene, and put everything to rights. A Frenchman said, laughing:—"Il faudrait que les Anglais restassent encore deux ans dans le nord. Ils lui feraient le plus grand bien."

From another point of view, and that one of real military importance, the presence of the British Army in a large northern zone of France and in Belgian territory makes certain services very much more easy to carry out, and particularly that of spy-detection. The British, once installed there, do not allow themselves to be "bluffed." We hear no more of permits, of well-intentioned tolerance, of the fright of our poor Territorial sentry at the threatening tone of some self-styled highly ranked personage, or of some really powerful individual actuated by curiosity and afflicted with an indiscreet eloquence. Nobody is allowed to pass; not even an English woman disguised as a dairymaid or stating herself to be related to some native of the place. The provost-marshal is ruthless; he knows nobody, not even an influential voter. This sternness does not seem to worry those tradesmen whose business brings them to the towns in which the British are quartered; it only troubles people whose designs are evil, or people who are not wanted and who are almost as dangerous as the former.

The British have formed a real union with the French, with the soul of France. England understands. I have rarely been more touched than when, a few days ago, we were permitted to see one of the brigades of the New Army. We had inspected these new

arrivals, all well-made fellows, of fine appearance, and standing motionless like veterans as we passed down the ranks. We had just returned to the flag placed in front of the line, when the General in command gave an order. These thousands of soldiers took off their head-dresses, placed them on the points of their bayonets, and the whole brigade, *d'un élan magnifique*, shouted: "*Vive la France!*" As I left the review ground with the troops still cheering my country, I thought how much ground had been covered, how much had been done, to arrive at this result. This is one of the great lessons of the war, one which must lead the enemy to reflect and which will cause the disappearance of the vain hope he has cherished for our disunion.

PREPARATION FOR THE EFFORT.

The British Army already possesses new divisions, and their numbers are always increasing. The guns are there; the munitions will soon be adequate for the needed expenditure. The aviation squadrons, which inaugurated the great bombing raids, have a numerous and bold *personnel*, while the material is of the best. The services of supply, of making good wastage in men, horses and material, the medical organization—and I have omitted mention of the five-and-twenty *trains d'évacuation* of which each costs the trifle of £18,000, and are as beautiful and as practical as the special models seen at an exhibition—the lines of communication from the different bases to the front, the convoys, all the machinery working for the existence of a really great army is admirably adapted to the end in view.

How, then, is this army now prepared for war?

At the outbreak of war it seemed doubtful, no matter how great the reserves of officers, to make a proper use of them owing to the dearth of the necessary *cadres*. How was England, with her small army, to provide the necessary *cadres* for these huge formations? The solution of the question was to be found in the composition of the army itself.

The innumerable colonial wars in which the army had been engaged had produced a considerable number of good non-commissioned officers and staff officers quite out of proportion to the numbers of men actually with the Colours. On the other hand, the British discipline of sport, the habit of obedience rendered to captains of football and cricket teams, makes the military discipline easily understood. Then the huge losses in officers suffered by all the different armies from the beginning of the war have equalized the position of the opposing forces. In Germany, as in France, many companies are commanded by reserve officers who, not having worked very hard at the military profession during peace, may be said to have learnt everything since the commencement of and during the war. The *poilus* who began as corporals are to-day lieutenants and company commanders; individual merit has done everything. Why should not a similar phenomenon have been apparent in the British Army, among the men of this nation in which energy and initiative have always been to the fore? The course, too, which the war has taken, demand-

ing rather power of resistance, courage and *sangfroid* than tactical science, especially for the company officers, has levelled the more striking of the differences between the purely professional officers and those whom the war has improvised.

Britain has not, however, in any way neglected the education of her new officers. There are some who have been under instruction for upwards of a year in special schools and who are now with the new formations, and others who are trained behind the front ready to replace those who have fallen. In two colleges, *châteaux* of the Pas de Calais, which have been re-named Marlborough House and Somerset House, there are young men who, considered suitable for commissions, have been withdrawn from the trenches and there go through a course of instruction, practical rather than theoretical, drawn up with an eye to the teaching of duties and useful matters.

There are schools for bomb-throwers, schools for machine-gun instruction, everything is carried on intently and intelligently and without interruption. All is done practically. Those who have been privileged to see Mr. Gill's pictures—Mr. Gill is a sergeant-instructor and a painter of real merit, one of the Artists' Rifles—will never forget his panels, e.g., "Vendress, September, 1914," scenes of the great deeds of the Black Watch; "Landrécies," where the Coldstream Guards so distinguished themselves; "The Menin Road," where, in May, the 2nd Camerons were victorious; "Richbourg-l'Avoué" in sunshine; "Hill 60," a moonlit landscape, in which certain scarlet touches given by the tiles of the fallen houses relieve the sadness of the scene, as does the red apron of a peasant woman a picture by Corot. Practical work is taught by seeing its complete presentment, and the men who leave these schools are thoroughly equipped for the work that is before them.

The story is much better than a mere joke, of the lady who asked Lord Kitchener when the war would be over, and who received the reply from the Field-Marshal: "I do not know when the war will be over, but I do know that it will begin in May." Britain was not able until then to cause the full extent of her effort to be felt. Germany had wished for a crushing victory by means of an overwhelming attack. The Marne battle deprived her of this hope. She then hoped to outflank us on her right and to pierce our line by masses pitilessly sent forward to the attack, but the Battle of Flanders cost her hundreds of thousands of men and definitely checked the German *élan*.

Germany never expected British intervention. One recalls to mind the now historical telegram sent to his Government by Sir Edward Goschen after his last interview with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg:—"I found the Chancellor greatly agitated. His Excellency at once commenced an harangue which lasted twenty minutes; he said that the action of the Government of His Britannic Majesty was in the highest degree terrible—just for a mere word—'neutrality'—a word which nobody heeded in war time—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to war. . . . His Excellency was in a state of intense excitement, he was evidently overcome at the news of our action. . . ."

Did the Chancellor realize what at long last meant Britain's intervention? Do we here find the reason for the agitation which he was unable to suppress? The Emperor spoke once of "the contemptible little British Army"—no doubt for the encouragement of his troops. He has since denied having pronounced this judgment, but all that has happened gave the lie to his words before his denial was made known.

LES CHEFS.

L'armée anglaise, riche en hommes, en munitions, en matériel, a des chefs digne d'elle, travaillant en étroit accord avec notre haut commandement et en liaison constante avec lui, grâce à la mission que dirige le général Huguet, notre ancien attaché militaire à Londres, groupant autour de lui d'éminents officiers.

(Then follows a very brief account of the services in the past of some of our army and corps commanders, and the articles conclude with the following graceful and appreciative words):—*Ces chefs, et il y en a d'autres, beaucoup d'autres, ont eu une carrière riche en expérience, ou les soucis d'organisation, les prodiges d'organisation, ont tenu une place plus importante que le "Kriegspiel" théorique. Aux qualités d'imagination et de science militaire françaises viennent se joindre ces dons et cette expérience.*

De cette heureuse union sont déjà nées des victoires. Le passé répond de l'avenir.



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCIENCE OF MINE-SWEEPING.

Translated from *Nauticus* for 1914.

THE issue of *Nauticus* for 1911 contained a paper on the constructive development of the under-water protection of warships, while in the volume for 1913 the development and employment of mines were described. The following article, in completion of the two earlier ones, will treat of the methods which military science has devised for the protection of ships against mines, as also for the discovery of such mines and the rendering of them harmless.

As has always hitherto been the case in matters connected with war, the development of measures for the combating of mines followed immediately upon the natural development of the mine itself and the resultant progress in its military employment. As was shown in the last number of *Nauticus* the mine was from the very first used as a weapon of offence. Quite apart from the early experiments of Bushnell with his submarine boat which was to attach the mine to the enemy ship, military history has, from the date 1777, made us acquainted with moving machines which were discharged by the ingenious Bushnell in the "Delaware" against British ships lying off Philadelphia. These caused the British very considerable anxiety, because intelligence of the threatened attack by these weapons had reached them, and to ward off all danger fire was for many hours kept up on anything detected floating on the river—a procedure which was later made fun of in a comic ballad called "The Battle of the Kegs."

At that time no better method presented itself for protection against this novel danger. But just as little did the heads of the British Admiralty make any attempt to combat the new arm, when Fulton offered the Admiralty his first defensive anchored mine, and all they did was to endeavour by payment of a large sum of "hush-money" to prevent its introduction—according to present ideas a most foolish procedure. The mine now became a legitimate weapon of war, and was employed in the blockade of the American harbours by the British in 1813, and to an increased extent during the Crimean War. No reports were, however, published as to any steps which were taken to combat these mines, so that it appears that nothing more useful was employed in their detection and destruction than dragging for them with nets, etc.

When, however, during the American Civil War, mines began to be used on a really large scale, the losses caused by them to their ships obliged the Northern States to formulate certain measures of

offence and defence against the danger menacing them in all rivers, and which it was feared would make it impossible for them to patrol enemy waters. The first idea was to creep for and find the electric cable connecting these torpedoes which served as observation mines. It was hoped that the creep would break the cable or would so hold it that the mines would be exploded. For this work small light-draught craft were employed. Later, attempts were made, by means of chains towed between two vessels, to seize the moorings of the mines, these being then raised and rendered harmless. It is not on record whether this procedure was or was not successful in a few isolated cases. But at any rate the losses increased among the blockading squadrons, until at last, in 1863, the resourceful engineer, Captain Ericson, was directed to devise some sort of fore-structure which should




DIAGRAM 1.

not only protect vessels from mines when entering the Charleston waters, but would also assist in the removal of obstacles in the fairway of the stream.

Ericson then constructed an apparatus which was known as "Ericson's torpedo," but which would to-day be called a "mine-destroyer with self-acting explosion arrangement" or an "automatic counter-mine." (See diagram 1.) It consisted mainly of a strong float which was fixed to the fore part of the ship and which protruded beyond the ship's bow; at the extreme end of it, and several metres below the water-level, was fixed the explosive (b), consisting

of the, for those days, enormous charge of 700 lbs. of powder; in front of it a piece of timber was so rigged that on engaging any obstruction it closed, as does a parallel ruler, thereby igniting both the charges at (d). The really important part of the invention was contained in the air-chamber (a), placed immediately in front of the charge; this gave way at the push of the explosion and sent its full force forward against the obstruction, so that the float itself was protected from any injury. Many experiments which were conducted proved the soundness of this theory, for obstructions composed of wire hawsers and tree trunks were completely destroyed, while the float was in no way damaged, a result which was very satisfactory considering the degree of technical knowledge of explosives obtaining in those days. The speed of the monitor, "Patapsko," with the float attached, was three-and-a-half knots.

A large number of these mine-catchers were turned out as quickly as possible, but for some reason or another no further use was made of the invention. The enterprising Federal Admiral Dupont attempted to construct a mine-catcher of another type, made of big spars, chains, nets, etc., which was also thrust forward in front of the ship; but no particular result was arrived at, although during an attack in which it was employed no losses were occasioned by mines.

Up to quite modern times history has nothing to tell us of the perfecting of any methods for the detection of mines. The reason for this may be found in the fact that up to that time the mine was purely a defensive weapon, intended and used merely for the protection of coastal localities, or for the closing of channels upon the forcing of which the enemy strategy depended more or less for success. The finding of some effective weapon against mines became now an urgent necessity in view of the offensive employment of unanchored mines, which it became customary to strew broadcast in the enemy's path, as was so often done in the Russo-Japanese War. The conduct of the operations was largely influenced by this new development, and the losses experienced by either side from meeting with mines in places where they had not been expected, made it a vital matter to discover and provide some means of securing the voyages of ships against the risk of mines, and thus from this period may be dated the really modern development of the science of mine-sweeping and detection.

One of the oldest methods of protecting valuable vessels from destruction by mines was found in the employment of less valuable ships as mine-exploders. By this is understood vessels which move in advance of those which it is intended to protect, or which are directed upon a mine-field whose whereabouts is known, and which by striking and exploding a mine or several mines make a breach in the mine-field. If such vessels are to properly effect their object, they must have a draught at least equal to that of the ships they are intended to protect, since it cannot always be estimated that the mines will be laid at any less depth. Since, therefore, the majority of battleships have a draught of over 24 feet, it follows that the choice of these mine-exploding vessels is no easy matter, for steamships

of such a size have a very considerable value. But certain merchant steamers can at need be so laden as to be brought down to the required draught. But it is also to be borne in mind that it is desirable that the mine-exploder should not necessarily suffer destruction by contact with the first mine encountered, nor be brought to by injury to the engines, nor should sink actually in the mine-field. These considerations limit the choice to such vessels as have their engine-rooms aft, as is usually found in tank steamers; the explosion of a mine will then, as a general rule, affect only the bow or central portion of the vessel, permitting the engines to go on working, driving the ship forward on to other mines, or at least leaving free the passage made in the mine-field. Theoretically the chances of a single mine-exploder effecting anything of importance are not very great, unless the mines are placed very close to one another and the passage through the mine-field is direct; for instance, with a vessel having a beam of 15 metres and the mines being set 45 metres apart, the odds would be three to one. It would therefore be necessary to employ several mine-exploders, moving forward in echelon, as in diagram 2, in order




DIAGRAM 2.

to have a better chance of effecting good results. With merchant steamers such a procedure presents considerable difficulty, and under certain conditions of stream and tide it might very easily happen that none of the mine-exploders would strike a mine, while the warship following in rear might be struck.

It is needless to say that an extraordinarily high standard of self-confidence and courage is required of the crew of such a vessel, which is almost foredoomed to destruction. In this connection modern naval history affords us some splendid instances in the work of the Japanese who attempted to force the mine-fields before Port Arthur, or to block the entrance to the harbour by sinking steamers in the fairway. Very few of the volunteer crews escaped the mines or the fire from the covering Russian guns, and got away to sea in small boats. The results also were practically *nil*.

Another means of protection from, and of discovering mines, is the mine-catcher, which is rigged to the fore part of the vessel to be

protected, and of which there are several methods of employment. The float used by Ericson in 1863 and already sketched and described, differed from the plan of the mine-catcher which as a rule followed that pictured in diagram 3. On either side of the hull of the vessel are fixed long wooden baulks or steel frames supported and stiffened below by wire hawsers. The length of the apparatus is so calculated that the engaged mine can be exploded as far as possible from the hull of the ship. Its draught must correspond with that of the vessel, and something must also be allowed for pitching in a sea-way, while if the engaging and breaking of the mine-moorings is contemplated, the average depth of these must also be taken into consideration. As already explained a mine-catcher must either break the moorings so that the mine rises to the surface, when it may of course come in contact with and injure the vessel, or it may be overturned and the




DIAGRAM 3.

explosive displaced, or the explosion arrangement may be in some way put harmlessly in action. But in any case it is at least very probable that the resulting explosion of a mine will destroy some useful part of the mine-catcher, necessitating frequent repair or replacement; while there are also other disadvantages. A mine-catcher of this description would have to be specially strongly constructed if it is to have the necessary power to break a wire hawser without suffering injury itself. This would make it very difficult to handle, and although its weight could be controlled by employing steam, it seems highly doubtful whether, however strongly constructed, such a mine-catcher would be able to stand the resistance of the water except when moving at a very slow pace. It seems certain that in

stormy weather the mine-catcher would have to be hauled up, which would make it of very small value for use in a sea-way.

Again, it is highly improbable that the apparatus would provide a complete protection for the ship, since it might be temporarily displaced by the effect of tide or wind, which would usually have to be reckoned with. A simple example will explain what is meant. A mine-catcher for a ship having a beam of 25 metres and a length (mine-catcher included) of 150 metres, must have a breadth of at least 25 metres in order, theoretically, to afford the minimum of protection




DIAGRAM 4.

to its ship. Let us take its breadth at 30 metres, whereby the limit of handiness would probably be reached, since the weight of the mine-catcher would be about 10,000 kg. If, then, as illustrated in diagram 4, the ship is carried out of her direction so much as one mile in the hour, at a speed of seven knots she would need 43 seconds to cover a distance equal to her own length. In this length of time the error of direction would become 21.5 metres (43×0.5), while

the protection given to this side of the ship is only 15 metres, i.e., half the breadth of the mine-catcher. A mine (m) which the mine-catcher has passed by, would consequently strike the ship at m¹. The prospects of evasion would be even less favourable were the ship of greater length or were it driven by wind or tide still more to one side. The mine-catcher would secure a certain measure of protection by using torpedo nets; but as these do not maintain their position when a ship is moving at any speed, and either get damaged or become useless, they would not give the desired result; and a really thoroughly secure protection against the danger from mines can only be met by some weighty arrangement of an obstructive character.

To complete our understanding of the matter, mention will here be briefly made of counter-mines, although these are employed less to seek out mines, the position of which is not accurately known,




DIAGRAM 5.

than to destroy those the presence of which has been established. When a mine-field has been located, it is usual to send forward boats equipped with a number of counter-mines connected with one another by a cable. The different boats join up their series of counter-mines, put them in the water and the counter-mines then sink some metres beneath the surface, being kept in position by buoys. These lines of mines are then towed along on as wide a front as possible, and, helped by wind and tide, are drawn against the mine-field which it is intended to destroy. (See diagram 5.) When it is found that the counter-mines have taken hold, the boats sheer off to the extent necessary and explode all the charges together by electricity, whereby in all probability the mines near at hand will be destroyed, holed and sunk, or caused to explode. Naturally this procedure depends for success upon the naval conditions prevailing at the time, and its employment is impossible in the open sea.

The creep is another method of searching for the cable connecting such mines as are exploded from the land by electrical contrivances. Although the usual form of a creep is a many-fluked grapnel—usually one having four flukes—diagram 6 represents an explosive creep containing a charge which is exploded from the vessel by which the creep is actuated. Such an explosive creep can be used with advantage in those cases in which the fished-up cable fails for some reason to break. Of course, it is impossible to know for certain of what the drag has hold. But since as a general rule in such places




DIAGRAM 6.

where connected mines are laid down, ships are not permitted to anchor during peace time, the bottom may usually be held to be clear, while it may also be accepted that for such work a close acquaintance with the locality would previously have been acquired, so that on the whole searching for mines with a creep should promise certain definite results.

It would, of course, be arranged that the mine-sweeping vessels should perform their work covered by armed ships, and that the coastal waters concerned should be controlled by the attacker.

During the American Civil War attempts were made to search for mines with chains and hawsers. For such work chains were

usually found to answer best, as rope hawsers did not always sink, and if they did they frequently suffered injury on the ocean bed. It is the method which will be ordinarily followed by those engaged in war when other means are not to hand. Thus, during the siege of Port Arthur the Russians commenced searching for the mines, laid night after night with great perseverance by the Japanese about the Russian harbour mouth and channels. For this purpose they at first employed small tugs and steamers, and later, as the work developed, they used powerful steam lighters and dredgers with an arrangement which, like the above-mentioned mine-destroyer, had the advantage that it was rigged aft.

When sweeping with hawsers or chains the intention is to grapple the anchor gear of the mines, and, by dragging them along, either to cause them to explode or to break their connecting cables, thus bringing them to the surface, where they float and can easily be destroyed by firing into them. Mines can as a general rule be exploded, the detonating machinery of which is set in motion by a sharp inclination of the mine-casing. This frequently happened to the Japanese mines when the Russians were sweeping for them; but the ignition of the charge and consequent detonation was more rarely




DIAGRAM 7.

effected with such mines as were actuated by a blow on the percussion cap or pressing of the trigger arrangement. In the case of such mines as these, whose ground tackle is strong enough to hold and which cannot be brought to the surface, there are serious difficulties in the way of bringing these to book by means of ordinary hawsers. The employment of hawsers and chains has also other disadvantages, since such a hawser or chain when towed invariably rises towards the surface owing to the resistance produced by the fact of towing. (See diagram 7.) At a certain rate of progression the hawser which is being towed leaves the sea bottom and travels at a certain, not easily calculated, elevation. Further, the influences set in movement force the two ends of the towed hawser to form a sharp angle in the centre, so that actually only a small portion of the ocean bed between the mine-sweeping vessels is really thoroughly covered. The safety of a squadron or vessel following in rear can only be guaranteed, when a channel of a certain breadth and depth can be reported as being absolutely clear of mines. By employing a chain the conditions are much the same, possibly rather more favourable, but in

order to effect a real improvement the following has been introduced. The sweeping-cable (a) (see diagram 8) is weighted at either end (b), which can be drawn in or let out, according to the depth of water, from the mine-sweepers by means of the ropes (c). This sort of arrangement is used largely by fishermen when searching for lost anchors, etc., and who drift over the spot to be searched.




DIAGRAM 8.

Trawls can also be used for the purpose of mine-sweeping. The basic plan of the trawl is that the net itself is maintained open and on the ocean bed by means of two beams arranged scissor-wise. These beams are towed by long hawsers, graduated according to the depth at which they are to be used, and are so




DIAGRAM 9.

arranged with a four-armed spar that while on one side the strain is outwards, thus retaining the necessary breadth, on the other their position and the current produced drive them to the bottom, thus resisting the upwards tendency of the tow-line. This arrangement, with certain variations, can be used also for ordinary mine-sweeping purposes. (See diagram 9.)

Mention may also be made, in connection with chains and hawsers, of the mines made by an English firm, which includes the means of raising mines without risk. (See diagram 10.) The anchoring arrangement of this mine is equipped below the body of the mine itself with a kind of drag (a) forming a coupling between the mine and the anchor-cable. When such a mine is caught by the sweep, this runs up to the drag and raises and loosens the coupling, when the mine rises to the surface and frees itself. It will be clear that mines made on these designs, mainly constructed to facilitate the clearing of a mine-field off the home coasts at the conclusion of




DIAGRAM 10.

a war, are also advantageous to an enemy since the mine-field can equally easily be cleared by enemy mine-sweepers.

The above-mentioned disadvantages of mine-sweeping with ordinary or weighted hawsers soon obliged the Russians at Port Arthur to improve their arrangements. The result was a device which may be described as a heavy search-trawl, and which did good work for the Russians and later also for the Japanese after the capture of Port Arthur and the obtaining of the command of the sea.

Two mine-sweepers towed each behind them a float (a) (see diagram 11) with a weight (b) hanging immediately below it. The floats are connected by a buoyed line (c), the weights by a hawser (d) equipped with steel creeps. The lines (c and d) are again connected by uprights (e) at regular intervals. The floats are so constructed as to shear outwards and so give the sweep the necessary spread. The distance between the two mine-sweepers is usually about 100 metres, as it is found that with a greater interval the heavy apparatus becomes almost uncontrollable. Should a mine be encountered there is far more likelihood of exploding it or of causing it to break away by means of the sharp creeping-hooks than with the ordinary hawsers. The depth can be regulated by the uprights (e). The Russians were able to tow this trawl at a pace of six knots, and they usually employed in this mine-sweeping several lines of vessels, which followed each other either in lines one behind the other or in echelon.




DIAGRAM 11.

This stage of the development of the science of mine-sweeping is particularly worthy of note, because here an organized mine-sweeping flotilla was for the first time employed, searching the channel on a regular plan, clearing it and affording ships a safe means of ingress and egress. Consequently no Russian ships thenceforth went out of harbour unless the mine-sweeping flotilla had first done its duty. When Port Arthur fell, the Japanese came into possession of all these appliances, and employed them vigorously and for many months to clear the mine-strewn waters and make them once more passable for ships.

Naturally, even this apparatus possessed many disadvantages, although it showed a considerable advance over others which had preceded it. Naval men did their best to overcome the principal difficulties met with in casting and hauling in, which can be appreciated when the weights of the hawsers and other parts of the trawl are all

reckoned up. Any explosion, too, destroyed the greater part of the hawsers immediately adjacent to it, and after any injury of this kind the trawl had to be hauled in, mended and cast again. All this required much time; the speed of six knots was very low; and means had to be discovered of simplifying the apparatus so that the speed could be increased and the efficiency of the method improved.

Above all, the raising of the speed of the mine-sweepers was necessary, coupled with some arrangement for preventing the towed hawsers from coming to the surface and for keeping the apparatus at a certain depth. For this purpose use is made of the log of the ordinary depth indicator. As is well known, a long pent-shaped log is towed behind the ship by a long thin line, and which, by reason of certain peculiarities of construction, always maintains the same depth at a certain calculated length of tow-line.




DIAGRAM 12.

Further, depth control is largely dependent on the length of the tow-line employed, which may be easily realized when one thinks of lengthening the tow-line of a log towed closely in rear. It may be sufficient to state that such a kite or log towed at a certain distance and speed, can be controlled at a certain calculated depth, and is well adapted to give mine-sweeping results at such a depth. An example of such a mine-sweeper is found in the patent of a Swedish inventor—one Sjöstrand. (See diagram 12.) Two kites, connected by a cable, are controlled in a certain depth of water in accordance with the rules given above. The kites hang in this case beneath buoys, which prevent them from sinking to the bottom should movement cease. The buoys are towed and are prevented, by the arrange-

ment already described earlier in this article, from closing in to one another. The tow lines are attached to drums with a brake arrangement. When the apparatus is towed by a single vessel, the buoys and kites remain about 30 metres apart, while the tow rate is between nine and ten knots. Consequently, should it be necessary to search a considerable breadth of water, a certain number of vessels must be employed either in lines, chequer-wise, or in echelon. For instance, if it is required to ensure the safety of a ship, of 200 metres in length, when anchoring in the searched channel, a cleared breadth of 200 metres will be necessary, if the conditions of wind and current are favourable, and of from 300 to 400 metres if conditions are unfavourable, or if the ship swings and has to manœuvre after getting up her anchor. To clear or search a channel 300 metres in breadth the simultaneous employment of ten mine-sweepers will, theoretically, be necessary, practically, that of fifteen or more.

Should the connecting cable of this apparatus encounter a mine, so much pressure is put upon the buoy ropes that the brakes are released on the drums, the hawsers run out and the apparatus remains lying beside the mine. Possibly, also, the anchor cable is cut by the sharp wire hawser or the mine is exploded. If neither of these happens, the position of the mine is at any rate disclosed and it can be raised and removed. The Swedish device can, however, only be looked upon as a mine-searcher, while an invention, such as the Russian "search-rake," merits the description of mine-remover, since it absolutely effects the clearance of the mine-field. The great advantage of this search apparatus lies in the rapidity with which it can be used; its disadvantages are the narrowness of the channel swept, the impossibility of lowering or raising the apparatus during progress, and the necessity of employing special measures for destroying the mines when found. The need then arose to be able to do away with these disadvantages without sacrificing its one advantage. As a result we have now the search apparatus with the explosive sweep.

Since it was necessary to break away the moorings of any mine which might be discovered, some arrangement had to be provided whereby the moorings could be caught and held, and which should have either a clip or an explosive charge. Such was the explosive drag which has already been described. After many experimental machines had been made, it became possible so to fashion this creep, which will henceforth be styled the "catcher," that the required result was arrived at. Diagram 13 explains the general idea of the arrangement. The "catcher" (a) is made fast to the kite (b), and is thereby moved along at the required depth. Should the connecting hawser come in contact with a mine, the catcher is cut adrift from the kite either by the action of a spring or by the release of a pin. As the vessel moves on the catcher comes in contact with the mine and pays out an electric cable (c) connecting the vessel with the catcher. When the catcher has gripped the moorings of the mine this is observed from the vessel, and the catcher is exploded, when either the mine floats to the surface and is put out of action by rifle fire, or is blown up or holed by the explosion of the catcher.

In order to increase the extent of surface searched, the towing vessel is equipped with strong pile-masts with yards of a span of some 30 metres, to the arms of which the lines of the buoys are attached. It is thus possible to keep the two tow-buoys as far apart as 35 or 40 metres, though not, of course, when moving at any considerable speed. The result is better when the machine is rigged on two vessels keeping parallel courses and maintaining an interval of 40 to 50 metres between one another. But it will be understood that a very skilful and careful navigation of the towing vessels is necessary, for otherwise the catcher may be slipped without being noticed and without a mine being gripped.

This machine, which the French call *appareil serres*, and which in England is known as an "explosive sweep," in distinction to the "rapid sweep," has the disadvantage that in shallow water the catcher may easily touch bottom and thus fail to grip the mine. Further,




DIAGRAM 13.

the electric cable may fail to act while being towed through the water. Both these evils are avoided in another arrangement which has been patented, the special advantages of which are as follows:—The catcher is made fast to the kite or drag-weight by a slip arrangement and is, when set free, supported by a buoy which prevents it from sinking to the bottom. This supporting buoy is attached to the towing buoy, frees itself a few moments after the catcher is released and then follows it. The onward movement of the starboard towing vessel brings the catcher against the mine moorings which

it then grips, when the search line is let go, and as the catcher is freed a friction tube is struck, thus causing the detonation of the charge.

The removal of surface mines is done in the simplest and least dangerous way by firing at them. For this a good number of firers are required, as appears from the accounts of meetings with free mines after the Russo-Japanese War, since the water only enters very slowly by the holes caused by small-bore rifle bullets. The destruction of such mines can be more quickly carried out when small-calibre guns firing shell are available, because the holes then made in the mine are larger and it is always possible that the shell fragments may explode the mine charge.

The already-mentioned search appliance of Swedish origin has been further developed in England. So far as can be gathered from the meagre details which have appeared in the Press, it has developed on the following lines:—The kite already referred to is made very big and strong and is therefore adapted for manœuvring in deep waters with heavy hawsers. The kite is towed by a strong steel hawser, while a second hawser is carried from the towing vessel through a ring on the kite to that of the second vessel and thence to the deck. The ends of this hawser are secured in such a way that it can be towed and the chief part of the strain taken by a dynamometer. The centre part of the line is furnished with buoys so that its great weight may not cause it to strike the bottom in shallow water. The intention of this machine is to tear loose the mines which it takes hold of, to explode them by causing them to heel over, or to remove them. In the case of mines which are very firmly anchored, or the explosion of the charge of which does not depend upon heeling over, the result of the operation of the apparatus is not so certain, and under certain conditions much delay may be caused, the more that it cannot always be established with certainty whether a mine has been caught or removed. In order, therefore, to be certain that the channel in question is absolutely free from mines, it will be necessary to go over it again with a sensitive appliance such as the Swedish. The advantages of the heavy apparatus lie in its seamanlike simplicity. More will be said about it later under the head of "Organization."

All that has hitherto been discussed in regard to the search for and removal of mines, starts with the assumption that the mine is secured under water and can be discovered by disturbing its moorings. Drift mines stand on quite a different footing. By Article 1 of the Second Hague Peace Conference the laying of unmoored self-acting contact mines is forbidden, unless these are so constructed that they become harmless within an hour of the time that those who laid them have lost control of them. It is further required that mines which break loose must be provided with an arrangement whereby they become disabled by the mere fact of going adrift. Apart from the fact that seven Powers, Russia and Sweden among them, did not subscribe to this ruling, there is no means of controlling the action of other States, as to whether they strictly observe these obligations,

or as to whether the technical means they have adopted to secure the desired results actually effect the object required. This uncertainty illustrates the limitations of international decisions. A belligerent must always, for prudence sake, reckon on meeting with mines which have broken adrift or which are intentionally beyond control, and must do what he can to make them harmless or to protect himself against them. In the Russo-Japanese War there was no really effective means of protection against drifting mines. The belligerents had to confine themselves to keeping a good look-out so as to be able to avoid the danger betimes. At night this was impossible, as the constant use of a searchlight for this purpose could not be entertained. And even to-day seamanship and technical knowledge have evolved no workable ways and means. The proposal has been put forward that the danger zone should be searched with nets,




DIAGRAM 14.

and for this purpose nets of certain patterns have been invented to be towed between two vessels, and which by certain arrangements can be kept well splayed out. But practical tests have given no results, while the nautical difficulties of such a measure are very great. The only improvement, and indeed almost the only real protection against drifting mines, lies in the development of naval aircraft. As was before pointed out in *Nauticus* in 1913, the presence of mines in clear water can be established from aircraft. The same applies also, of course, to drift mines which are even more easily discernible since they float on or just below the surface. But since the seaplane is not as yet so developed that its efficiency can be absolutely relied upon under the best weather conditions, there is still as heretofore a want of a real means of security against drifting mines. All that can

be done to ensure a limit of safety is to select such places for ships to anchor in which by reason of conditions of wind, stream, etc., are as far as possible removed from the dangerous drift of such mines. In addition a most careful look-out is all-important, coupled with an effective patrol by small craft.

The immense importance which the experience of war attaches to all means for combating mines, besides the century of neglect from which it has suffered, has led in the last few years to a number of new suggestions and appliances, the majority of which have been patented, but which in practice could not be turned to good account, because the patentees were not practical men, were, above all, not seamen. If this review of the technical position of affairs closes with a few examples of such failures, this proceeds from a well-intentioned endeavour to spare future German inventors from any similar waste of trouble and expense.

Diagram 14, for instance, represents an arrangement for searching for drifting mines. Two vessels are connected by a toothed




DIAGRAM 15.

arrangement. It is here wrongly accepted that the drifting mine is always composed of two parts connected by a rope, and that when the rope comes in contact with the trapping arrangement an electric alarm will be actuated.

The objection to this is that, even in a small sea-way, the connection between the vessels would be interrupted; the interval between them is so narrow that only quite a small space would be controlled which could equally well be searched without so cumbersome a paraphernalia. The inventor of this was a man who lived in a mountainous country.

Another arrangement—see diagram 15—was one in which several structures of a torpedo kind were connected by rods and were drawn along side by side. The mines were intended to be caught by means of vertical rods fitted with hooks, and to be either torn open by turning the rods upwards after the mine had been seized, or to be exploded by means of a charge. The whole appliance contained

its own machinery, and was steered through an electric cable paid out from a distance of a few hundred metres from the ship. In the central portion of this was a gyroscope with its directing controls set in a particular way. Thus any change of course was answered by the action of the gyroscope.

Disadvantages: technically impossible, useless in a sea-way, easily destroyed by the explosion of a mine, and disproportionately expensive.

The fantastic invention of an American may be mentioned as a third and last example. This was a kind of semi-submarine (see diagram 16) furnished on the outside with rollers over which an endless band, equipped with knives, was driven. This band was to be perpetually in motion and the knives were to sever the moorings of any mine with which the vessel came in contact.




DIAGRAM 16.

Disadvantage: the almost certainty of destruction of the vessel by the explosion of a mine.

Here closes the list of possible and impossible methods of defence against mines.

ORGANIZATION IN DIFFERENT NAVIES.

It was not every navy that recognized the need of providing any regular organization, or by the provision of any effective search appliances seemed to attach such importance to the question as it really merited. The smaller Powers troubled themselves but little in the matter; for the most part because their small finances were required for the acquirement and building of ships needed by the countries concerned, while thoroughness and care in preparation for war, among which must be included considerations in regard to mine-sweeping, only comes into the balance in war time, though then it is all the heavier. But, at any rate, a navy which not only possessed many ships but intended to perform valuable service had no right wholly to neglect such a matter. Again, the strict secrecy which had to be maintained, coupled with the very mild interest evinced in

reports of experiments, may have conveyed the impression that but little was being done.

The importance of the mine as a weapon of offence, and the need of some sort of protection against it, had already been realized in Germany even before the Russo-Japanese War. The experiences of this campaign also impelled us finally to improve upon previous efforts by organizing a regular naval department. In the year 1905 a Mine Company, the present Mine Detachment, was formed in Cuxhaven, the business of which was to train men for mining and mine-sweeping service. For mine-sweeping out-of-date torpedo boats were made use of, and thus performed good service for a considerably extended length of time. The boats were formed in groups and were provided with everything necessary for the due performance of their duties.

The British Admiralty has, so far as can be gathered from Press reports, experimented with various methods for mine-sweeping. It may be concluded from the report of an accident in Portsmouth in November, 1904, that experiments have been carried out with counter-mines, such as have already been described. (See diagram 5.) Later, another method was adopted, that of the "rapid and explosive sweep," with the view of providing protection when under way in the open sea. In 1910 this was abandoned in favour of another method. A number of fishing boats were purchased or chartered and experiments were carried out with a new appliance. Several torpedo-destroyers of the "Gossamer" and "Seagull" types were equipped with powerful steam winches and other contrivances. From the connection of these with fishing vessels, and from a Press announcement that the equipment for mine-sweeping was much the same as that for trawling, it may be inferred that a heavy mine-trawl, similar to that shown in diagram 11, has been made use of. It seems clear that the speedier destroyers are intended to accompany the fleets at sea and on long voyages, while the trawlers are rather intended to be responsible for mine protection in home waters.

A special procedure was adopted for the manning of the very numerous trawlers which would be required in war and for the instruction and training necessary in peace. By proclamations published in the chief fishing ports, such as Grimsby, practical fishermen of all classes were enlisted and were engaged, under various agreements, to serve on the mine-trawlers. After considerable hesitation among the fishermen, by the summer of 1911 a numerous *personnel* had been got together, and was thenceforth entered as the "Special Trawler Section" of the Royal Naval Reserve, and was trained for the duties required of it in war during regular manœuvre periods. The manœuvres were held under the commanders of mine-sweeping destroyer flotillas, and torpedo boats were also employed in mine-sweeping.

In France there is no special organization for mine-sweeping, but the Press reports of experiments make it certain that attention has been directed to the matter. Nothing especial is known about the particular system in use beyond that the already-mentioned *appareil*

series is in use. Single vessels are used for towing this appliance, that is, torpedo-boat destroyers, and, lately, steam trawlers which have been purchased and altered. The last Navy Estimates provided for the means of obtaining two mine-sweeping vessels for Bizerta.

The Russian mine-searching methods have been already mentioned (*vide* diagram 11) and are thoroughly well known from the reports of the war. Whether these are employed in the same or some other form cannot be definitely stated. It may, however, be surmised that the Russian war experiences have forced the Russians to further testing and perfecting of the work of mine-sweeping, the more so that the Russian Navy has ever been particularly skilled in mine work of all kinds, and appears to expect to achieve much in war with this arm. The Russian mine-sweeping divisions are composed of a number of steamers and torpedo-boats.

But very little is known about the other naval Powers.

The above remarks have been made to afford instruction to the readers of *Nauticus* in regard to a branch of the conduct of war, of which, in general, less is known than about the other weapons of attack and defence. It is certain that the science of mine-sweeping will not stand still at its present stage of development, but will have to expand in accordance with growing military requirements. The naval warfare of to-day has a far richer choice of weapons than has hitherto been the case, and that navy will be wise which does not neglect in peace any of the more important weapons which may be offered to it or forced upon its attention.



LETTERS CONCERNING THE 44th REGIMENT DURING THE RETREAT FROM CABUL IN THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR.

(From a Manuscript kindly lent by Mrs. de Wend.)

These documents are all signed as true copies by
Captain James Douglas de Wend, 44th Regiment.

[This officer was on his way up country with drafts for the regiment, to find on arrival that it had practically ceased to exist. Captain de Wend's grandson, Douglas Fenton de Wend, of the 2nd Bn. Duke of Wellington's Regiment, was killed in the first great battle of Ypres, aged 24, acting as temporary captain.]

Buddeabad, Valley of Lugman, 40 miles from Jellallabad,
30th January, 1842.

FROM BRIGADIER SHELTON, H.M.'s 44TH REGT., TO MAJOR JOHNSTON,
H.M.'s 44TH REGT.; RECEIVED BY THE LATTER ON 6TH MAY, 1842.

MY DEAR JOHNSTON,

You will have heard of the all but total annihilation of the Cabool force in the retreat. We left Cabool on the 6th instant, and unfortunately not only delayed but actually halted a day at Khoord Cabool on the snow, instead of pushing quickly over it, which led to the disorganization of all the troops, except H.M. 44th and 5th Lt. Cavalry, and Horse Artillery. We took five days to accomplish the three ordinary marches to Tazeen. We halted on the snow the 9th at Cabool, when the whole of the irregular cavalry went over in a body to the enemy, and when we left it, on the morning of the 10th for Tazeen, the Sepoys threw away their arms and accoutrements and absorbed into camp followers. Singular to say, not one single Sepoy out of four regiments remained or retained his arms and accoutrements, and from this moment, there only remained the men of H.M. 44th, which could not now much exceed two hundred men under arms, having suffered severe loss on the 7th and 8th: with these, with the exception of one company forming the advance, I formed the rear guard, and we had to bear the brunt of the enemy's attacks all the way to Jugdulluck, which we reached on the afternoon of the 11th by marching the whole night of the 10th, the enemy increasing in

numbers and pressing more warmly in his attacks on the latter place, so that our loss in killed and wounded was great in proportion to our numbers, which was now reduced to less than a hundred men fit for duty. All the baggage was lost the day we left Khoord Cabool. About 4 o'clock of the afternoon of the day we reached Jugdulluck, Sirdar Mahommed Acbar Khan sent to say, that if General Elphinstone and myself would go to him, he would cause all attacks to cease, and give us safe escort. We accordingly went and remained with him that night, the next morning the Ghilzie chiefs visited him, when a proposition was made to give them two lacs of rupees for safe conduct through their country. They went away to consult, and I wrote to the troops to say we were in treaty for their safe march down, but it would appear my note did not reach, for about 8 o'clock on the evening of the 12th, when we were writing to say that the Ghilzies had agreed to the terms, and that the Sirdar had offered to advance a part of the money, we heard firing, and soon found that the troops were again in retreat, through despair, I believe, in consequence of not having heard anything of the General and myself during the day. The 13th we were joined at Jugdulluck by some officers and their families who had gone over to the Sirdar at Khoord Cabool, and on the 14th we turned off to the left and arrived that evening on the right bank of the Cabool River. On the 15th we proceeded to Tiggerel, near where Lameck, the Father of Noah, is buried, and on the 17th came to this place, where we meet with every attention to our wants; in truth the Sirdar has treated us with much kindness ever since we have been under his protection, nor have the ladies any reason to complain, he having sent quantities of cloth, chintzes, longcloth, &c., for themselves and children. Our party consists of fourteen officers, eight ladies and their children, one or two ordnance people, Sergt. McNee, of the Artillery, and ten men H.M. 44th, *viz.*, Reynolds, Marshal, Robinson, Hanley, Stott, Moore, Miller, McGlynn, Milwood, Brady; these, I believe, including myself, are all that remain of the whole party of H.M. 44th. Report says some officers and a few men are in safety in different forts between Gundamuk and Jellallabad, and I shall be happy to learn that some of ours are amongst the fortunate few. The sad reverse of fortune places the Corps in a singular position. I write you this much to enable you to give the necessary information on the subject to the authorities here and at home. I expect this may reach you at Peshawar, in which case inform the Italian Governor of my existence.

Having lost every particle of baggage, I came here with only the clothes on my back, and have since picked up a second shirt and pair of socks to save me the necessity of lying abed while the ones I had on were washed. I have not had my clothes off since the 2nd November. Remember me to my nephews, if with you. Frederic had better now give up the idea of leaving the corps now; if not already removed, I would recommend his writing to Lord FitzRoy to this effect. Let me hear from you, and should you not come up, send your letter to Capt. Havelock, who is with H.M.'s 13th Lt. Infy. Write to poor Mrs. Halahan, and Wade, and Leighton, the latter was

taken with White in kajowars on a camel and may be alive. Wade was killed at Jugdulluk, where I left Halahan alive and well.

Believe me,

Very sincerely yours

(Signed) J. SHELTON.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL TAYLOR, COMMANDING H.M.'s 9TH FOOT, DATED JELLALLABAD, 21ST APRIL, 1842, TO MAJOR JOHNSTON, H.M.'s 44TH REGT.

Of the 44th only Shelton and Souter and eight men survive. I have seen Sergt.-Major Lisant's narrative of events from 5th to 13th Janry. very clear, explicit, and horrid; he remained with the last of the 44th till near Soorkab, when the last forty men (half without arms or ammunition) were destroyed, except four who were taken with Griffiths. Lisant and four others hid themselves in a cave, from whence they were taken prisoners. He speaks well of the behaviour of the 44th to the last, about 300 kept well together till stopt by the barricades at the Juddalen Pass, where half of them lost their arms in getting over under a heavy fire. Kershaw (13th Lt. Infy.) and two officers stuck to them to Soorkab. Scott was wounded on the 11th or 12th and left in the rear, no doubt of his fate therefore. Leighton and White were last seen in kajowahs sick and wounded, they may therefore turn up yet, though little hopes can be entertained of such. We hear all sorts of stories here about the Cabool business, among others commonly spoken of, that Shelton was sent out with 400 of 44th and 400 of 37th N.I. I believe on 23rd he was assailed by 25,000 Afghans, and though he repeatedly sent for reinforcements kept his ground till nearly all were killed, when the remainder broke and rushed back into cantonments, threw off their belts, *and swore they would not go out again.* Both Elphinstone and Shelton are greatly blamed for this, the former for not sending reinforcements, the latter for his obstinacy in not retiring in time. Dodgin is killed certain. Ameer Ooloo Khan, our bitterest foe, has been assassinated at Cabool, and the alarm there and all through the country at our successes and advance is excessive, the chiefs and people about here are all coming in seeking protection and promising supplies. The prisoners are about Tazeen, some communication has been made to the chief in charge of them about a ransom, we hear they are at six's and sevens among themselves, Shelton speaks to no one, and all the ladies have cut Lady Macnaghten, so report goes. I hope the report current of the destruction of those left at Cabool may prove untrue, but we have great fears of their fate, especially as it is known that serious disturbances and fights have lately taken place there between the rival factions.

(Signed) A. B. TAYLOR.

Kurnaul, 3rd June, 1842.

The following officers of H.M.'s 44th Regiment were killed at Cabool and interred in the burial ground at that place:—

Captain Robinson.

Captain Swayne.

Lieutenant Raban.

Colonel Mackrell. (Lived but a few hours and died of his wounds at 12 o'clock at night.)

Captain McCrea.

Major Scott had been slightly wounded previously, but left Cabool with the regiment; at Khoord Cabool I saw him in a kajowah (pannier) with Captain Leighton on a camel in rear of the regiment, and near Tazeen he was killed by ball and tulwar. I left his body lying a little off the road, quite naked, the enemy having stripped off all the clothes, without leaving even the socks upon his feet.

Captain Leighton marched with the regiment from Cabool and a little past Khoord Cabool. I saw him in a kajowah (pannier) on a camel with Major Scott, apparently wounded. I did not see him afterwards, but I suppose he was killed with Major Scott, for soon afterwards I saw an Afghan cut down the camel driver and lead the camel off the road. At this time there was a halt in front and much fighting commenced, and from the great crowd and pressure in rear, I could not see what became of Capt. Leighton.

Lieutenant Dodgin left Cabool with the regiment. I observed him riding in rear on a tattoo belonging to the late Captain Swayne; he reached Jugdulluk, where I saw him with the remains of the corps which advanced again towards Jellallabad at 8 p.m., General Elphinstone and Colonel Shelton having been taken prisoners here before the troops marched off the ground; and at 11 o'clock that night he was killed, or, rather, at that hour I recognized his body lying on the road in the snow stripped by the enemy of all clothes, he was quite dead, and near him I saw also Serjeant Henshaw and the bodies of four or five soldiers of the regiment lying about.

Lieutenant Evans was left behind in charge of the sick and wounded in Cabool.

Lieutenant Souter marched with the regiment from Cabool, and I saw him with the remnant of the corps at Jugdulluk, but not afterwards. I have since heard that he saved the Colours of the regiment, and is now a prisoner at Looghman.

Lieutenant White left Cabool with the regiment, and I saw him next at Khoord Cabool wounded, but on horseback: he had a white cloth, which was marked with blood, wrapped round his jaw and head, and Private Moore, of the grenadier company, was giving him some assistance in feeding his horse. I did not see him after the troops advanced from Khoord Cabool, but I suppose he died there of his wounds.

Lieutenant Wade left Cabool with the regiment. I saw him at Khord Cabool, and not afterwards, but I heard he was killed near Soorkab.

Lieutenant Hogg accompanied the regiment from Cabool marching with the company. I saw him as far as Khoord Cabool but not afterwards, nor do I know anything more of him.

Lieutenant Cumberland had been previously wounded in the arm, but left Cabool with the regiment quite well. I saw him last at Seah Sung, and I suppose afterwards he was killed with others.

Lieutenant Collins marched from Cabool with the regiment, and I heard he got as far as Jugdulluk and was there killed.

Lieutenant Cadell marched with the regiment from Cabool, riding by the side of the grenadier company, and I heard on enquiry that he was killed in the Khoord Cabool Pass, where there was great fighting, but I did not see him.

Lieutenant Swinton had been wounded previously at Cabool, but marched with the regiment quite well; I believe he was killed between Khoord Cabool and Tazeen.

Lieutenant Fortye was wounded in the arm or shoulder at Cabool, but left with the regiment. I heard he was killed somewhere between Tazeen and Jugdulluk.

Lieutenant Gray left Cabool with the regiment and reached Jugdulluk, where I heard he was killed with the last of the Europeans.

Paymaster Bourke accompanied the regiment from Cabool. I saw him riding as far as Tazeen, where the guns of the horse artillery were abandoned, and soon after this his khitmutghar came and told me that his master, Captain Bourke, had been cut down by the enemy, who stripped off all his clothes, and left his body in the snow.

Quartermaster Halahan had been wounded on the shoulder by a ball some time before, but left Cabool with the regiment. I saw him riding in rear with Lieutenant Dodgin as far as Jugdulluk, where there was one day's halt and an advance again at 8 o'clock in the evening, when I saw him with what was left with the corps. After they had gone on about two miles on the Jugdulluk road, I saw his body, together with that of Lieutenant Dodgin, lying in the snow on the road, partially covered with a cloak which was saturated with blood, and he was to all appearance quite dead.

Doctor Harcourt marched from Cabool with the regiment. I saw him on horseback at the Peshawur Gate of Cantonments at the time the regiment was passing out, and I did not see him or hear anything of him afterwards.

Doctor Balfour, I believe, marched from Cabool with the regiment, but I did not see him myself.

Doctor Primrose, I heard, was left with the sick and wounded at Cabool, but I did not see him.

The foregoing is the statement of Kalcuttiah, Dhobie, who was in the service of the late Colonel Mackrell up to the time of his death, and from my own knowledge of his being an old and trustworthy servant of the late Colonel, I have no doubt as to the correctness of

his statement, more particularly as he bears testimony only to what he himself witnessed as connected with the fate of the officers of the regiment. He was taken prisoner near Jugdulluck, where he saw the last struggle and the destruction of the Europeans; the enemy put a rope round his neck and dragged him off to some fort, where he was detained a prisoner for nearly three months, after which he was liberated, and arrived at Kurnaul on the 27th May, 1842.

(Signed) P. W. MACMAHON,
Lieut., 44th Regiment,
Acting Interpreter to Detachment.

The above Kalcuttiah, Dhobie, I have known for many years as a trusted and trustworthy servant of the late Colonel Mackrell, and I have no doubt as to the correctness of his statement.

(Signed) J. DOUGLAS DE WEND,
Capt., 44th Regt.

STATEMENT OF THE NARRATIVE OF GULAUM ASSEM, BHESTIE, GRENADIER COMPANY, H.M. 44TH REGIMENT, AND ALSO OF SHAIK GHAUSSIE, THE REGIMENTAL KOTWAAL, WHO SERVED IN CABOOL WITH THE CORPS FROM COMMENCEMENT TO TERMINATION, AS TAKEN BY THE INTERPRETATION OF LIEUT. MACMAHON.

Bhestie's Statement.—At the time the four companies of the 44th under command of Major Scott left Cabool for the Zoormut country, the Afghans fled as they advanced and betook themselves to another place, the force destroying partially a few forts from which they took some wood for firing, a few people returned to their homes, and said they were farmers, and begged of the force not to destroy their crops: three soldiers and one Bhestie died in hospital with the four companies while on this expedition. About this time the 13th Light Infantry, 35th and 37th Regiments N.I. marched from Cabool under General Sale on their way to Hindoostan, and they had only left two or three days when the whole of the force under Colonel Oliver returned from the Zoormut country, including the four companies of the 44th, and arrived at Cabool. Soon after a letter arrived, and it became known then that the people from the Zoormut country who had left their homes on the advance of the force I mentioned before, had made a circuit and attacked the 13th Light Infantry with whom they were fighting. General Sale continued his march on (Buraber) to Jellallabad with the 13th and one native regiment, the other native regiment stood fast at Boodhak with some European invalids who had left Cabool a few days after General Sale. On the second or third day the invalids returned to Cabool, and the regiment that General Sale left at Boodhak came into Cabool six or eight days afterwards, having lost all their baggage. Soon after this (I cannot say exactly) the Afghans began to collect in numbers about Cabool, and I heard that Burnes Sahib had either been murdered or put in

prison and all the money taken from his house in Cabool—at this time the 44th Regt. were in the entrenched camp (Khilah). An order was immediately issued to prohibit any European or native going into the city of Cabool, as the Afghans were murdering and plundering in every direction. About two hours afterwards there was an alarm, every one on the alert and bugles sounding. Colonel Shelton then went to the Bala Hissar with one company of the 44th, two or three guns of the Horse Artillery and some companies of the 54th Native Infantry, and from this time firing commenced from the Bala Hissar and the entrenched camp on the town, which continued day and night for several days. That day the Grenadier and No. 1 went out to fight, and when there had been fighting for many days, a small fort outside of the entrenched camp was plundered by the Afghans of all the rum, tea, sugar, attar, rice, &c., that it contained. The Lord Sahib (Genl. Elphinstone) had made no arrangement for its protection; it was reported to Colonel Shelton, who was very angry and came to the entrenched camp, and told the Lord Sahib that had he been there, it would not have occurred, and how could he suppose the men could fight without food: this godown was only protected by a subadar's guard of Sepoys, and when the place was attacked some of them were killed, and the rest ran away. About a week or ten days after this a small fort in possession of the enemy outside and near the entrenched camp was breached by our guns from the entrenched camp, and taken by our people. The Afghans all fled on the attack, and we entered it and found some grain, onions, wheat, and other commissariat stores, which the troops removed back to the entrenched camp, leaving a guard of one company of the 44th and one of a native corps, which were relieved daily. The fighting continued every day, the Afghans collecting in large numbers and always running off on our large guns opening on them, as they were greatly frightened at our artillery. At length they brought two guns against us, and no one could tell where or how they got there, and one day a ball from the enemy fell in the entrenched camp in the place where the magazine was, but did no harm, and many of the officers examined it enquiring where it was made, but could not discover. Still the fighting on both sides went on daily, and one day the Afghans appearing in great force on a hill close at hand, a strong party of our troops under General Shelton, consisting of the Grenadiers, No. 1, and another company, the number of which I have forgotten, of the 44th, together with several companies of the 5th and 37th N.I., went out from the entrenched camp and attacked the enemy on the hill, whom they beat off, and captured one gun, which was brought into the entrenched camp, and on examining it the name Runjeet Sing was found to be written upon it. This occurred in the afternoon, and it was quite dark when the troops returned into quarters. A brother Bhestie, who accompanied my company, the Grenadiers, with water, was wounded by a ball in the thigh.

Shaik Ghaussie, Regimental Kotwall, 44th, corroborates the entire of the foregoing statement of the Bhestie, and further states that Sir Alexander Burnes was murdered on the 2nd November, on

which date Captains Trevor and Johnston escaped from the city to the entrenched camp: Captain Trevor, with wife and children, leaving his house not by the usual road, but by a bye road. He first sent on his wife and children in advance, and following himself was pursued by the people, but he kept constantly throwing away behind him the rupees to the amount of two thousand, which he was carrying with him from his house, the people delayed to pick them up and he thus facilitated his escape. On the 3rd November no officer was killed, but Lieutenants Waller and Sturt were wounded. Captains Robinson and Swayne were sent out on the 4th with their companies to the relief of a commissariat godown situated between the entrenched camp and Bala Hissar and commanded by several forts in possession of the Afghans. On this occasion both these officers were killed and their companies nearly cut to pieces, the only bodies they were enabled to bring back into quarters were those of the officers. On the night of the 4th the Commissariat Serjeant and the guard evacuated the godown in question and made their way into cantonments. Brigadier Shelton was recalled from the Bala Hissar on the 6th into the entrenched camp, two days after Brigadier Shelton with four companies of the 44th and a detail from each Sepoy corps of the entrenched camp, and ten or twelve small forts were taken from the enemy, of whom a great number were killed: on that day the Brigadier succeeded in capturing from the enemy 5 or 6,000 maunds of commissariat supplies, which were brought into the entrenched camp, where there was not at the time one day's provisions for the troops. On this occasion Colonel Mackrell and Captain McCrea were killed at the taking of the Rickabashi's Fort, the former officer dying of his wounds soon after. From this time the fighting continued daily, Brigadier Shelton on all occasions heading the troops and driving off the enemy with severe loss. On one occasion the Brigadier issued from camp with a strong force and captured a gun, and on the 23rd November there was very severe fighting, when the three or four companies of the 44th that were out that day behaved most gallantly, as the corps had done on all occasions, bearing the brunt of the different attacks. The troops went out at 12 o'clock at night and were fighting until 3 o'clock the following day, when they were forced to retire down the hill towards cantonments, having received no assistance, and as the Afghans had increased to the number of fifty thousand men, and our men having at this time expended all their ammunition. On reaching the foot of the hill they formed up and made a stand, but the guns not being fired on the enemy from the ramparts of the entrenched camp, our troops finally retired into cantonments late that evening harrassed by fatigue and hunger. After this there was a cessation of fighting, and the troops in the Bala Hissar returned into the entrenched camp. Some time after the envoy was murdered and a treaty followed. Subsequent to the great fight on the 23rd November, Brigadier Shelton went to the General and told him they were totally without food in the entrenched camp, and that if he would allow him to head a party of volunteers from the different corps, that he would take the city of Cabool, or die in the attempt, and thereby gain abundance of supplies

for the troops, but as this did not happen, I suppose the Brigadier's request was not complied with. This I was told by Lieut. Hogg, 44th Regiment, who ordered me to tell all the camp followers and bazaar people to be in readiness to accompany the force on this expedition for the purpose of assisting in plundering Cabool of provisions, &c., &c. An agreement was next entered into, fourteen lacs of rupees were to be given with eight hostages for Dost Mahomed, and the troops were to evacuate Cabool and proceed to Peshawur, the chiefs supplying provisions and carriage, &c., for the army. On the 6th January the army commenced its march, the 5th Cavalry forming a portion of the rear guard, which was attacked on leaving the entrenched camp and suffered severely. The troops advanced only about three miles the first day and reached Boodhak, nine miles, on the 7th Janry., when Akbar Khan joined the force and took away the ladies; and on the 8th we arrived at Khoord Cabool, where there was a halt. On the 10th the troops marched again for Tazeen, to which place there was a continued running fight, and only one gun drawn by sixteen horses came in with the force to Tazeen. At 8 o'clock at night there was an advance again, the remains of the force and camp followers continuing on without a halt to Jugdulluk, three marches, the fighting being kept up all night, and next day, the 11th, when they halted about 2 or 3 o'clock in the day at Jugdulluk much exhausted, having had nothing to eat since leaving Cabool except the three small loaves issued to each man at starting on the morning of the 6th. Almost immediately after leaving Tazeen on the night of the 10th, I was made prisoner with some hundred other natives, but allowed to follow in rear of the column, and from that time Akbar Khan's horsemen kept us all apart from the troops a little off the road, in rear and out of range of the fire. Owing to this I was not near enough to the troops at Jugdulluk to be able to speak as to all that occurred there, but from a hill where I was desired by the enemy to remain, I could see the men of the 44th fighting desperately, and I saw small parties detached from the main body in all directions in the act of driving off the enemy, who were collected in immense numbers on the hills close at hand, and were firing from small forts. At this time the men were suffering dreadfully from hunger, and some of the Europeans (the 44th) had begun to strip off the flesh from dead horses and were eating it raw. All the killed and wounded on the road from Tazeen I observed were almost entirely Europeans, with a few Sowars of the 5th Cavalry, but I did not see the bodies of any Sepoys after leaving Tazeen. What remained of the 44th left Jugdulluk about 8 o'clock on the night of the 12th. I was removed myself with other native followers to a fort at some distance, and I heard soon after that the last of the Europeans were cut to pieces almost immediately after leaving Jugdulluk.

(Signed) P. W. MACMAHON,

Lieut., 44th Regt.,

Adjt. and Acting Interpreter to Detachment.

ADDITIONAL PARTICULARS OF THE NARRATIVE OF SHAIK GHAUSSIE,
KOTWAAL, H.M. 44TH REGT.

Shaik Ghaussie further states, in addition to what he has already mentioned, that some months previous to the general rising of the people of Cabool on the 2nd November, 1841, it was generally believed that Sir Alexander Burnes, who resided in the city, had sent for and taken by force a very beautiful young Cashmeer girl from the house of Sirdah Abdoolah Khan Echukzai, who had intended her to be the wife of his son, and it was well known to every one that the Sirdar complained of this conduct to the King Shah Soojah, who made a strong remonstrance on the matter with Sir William MacNaghten, but the girl was never restored to the Sirdar's house. On this account a good deal of discontent was observable at the time among the people, and altogether this circumstance seems to have contributed much to fan the flame of the insurrection which followed.

2nd November, 1841.—In the morning, when it was reported to the King that Sir Alexander Burnes' house in the city was attacked and set on fire, he immediately despatched his son, Futtee Jung, with one of his own irregular corps (a sort of burkundaze) about 500 strong, and three guns from the Bala Hissar, to the assistance of Burnes Sahib, but on this party reaching the Shoar Bazaar in the city, their progress was stopped, and they were there cut to pieces or dispersed by the populace. Futtee Jung got a tulwar wound, but escaped into the Bala Hissar, leaving in possession of the insurgents the three guns they brought with them. These lay afterwards for a long while outside and close to the ——— in the spot where they had been abandoned, neither party being able to carry them off, on account of the exposed situation.

On the 4th November, 1841, when the two companies of the 44th were sent out to the relief of the commissariat godown, the Commissariat Serjeant, it would appear, did not expect this succour, for at the time, being driven to great straits to hold the place, he had, with the assistance of the small native guard, collected all the camel saddles in the place and piled them up one over the other against the inside of the gate as a barricade to keep the enemy from coming on him, and when the companies in question arrived at the godown, the gate was so securely blocked up with these camel saddles there was no means of entrance, nor were there sufficient hands inside to remove the obstacle, and therefore the Europeans could do nothing, but were exposed while at the gate to a raking fire from the stone walls and large gate of the King's garden, where the enemy were concealed and at a distance; here Capt. Robinson was killed, and after some loss the whole had to leave the place and retire. The Commissariat Serjeant, with his party, escaped that night into cantonments, and the enemy took quiet possession of the place and all the stores it contained, on the following morning at daylight.

The day following the great fight of the 23rd November, a general parade of Sepoy corps was ordered under Brigadier Shelton,

when in the evening an order was read to them by their interpreters, to the effect that their firing generally, and more particularly on the preceding day, was very bad, and in consequence the General was much dissatisfied, having observed that the firing was either directed in the air or on the ground, and not even sufficiently straight to hit the practice butts (Chandmari), and for this reason their fire did not tell on the enemy in the same degree as the fire of the Afghans did on them, the Sepoys; after which Brigadier Shelton himself pointed out to them the necessity of their being more careful for the future in firing straight, saying, that by proper attention to this point their fire would take greater effect on the enemy, and their own loss would be much less than it was yesterday and the preceding day. The native troops on this occasion were drawn up on the parade in front of the European barracks. The Brigadier also expressed to these troops the General's and his own displeasure at the manner in which they had fired on the preceding day, the 23rd Novr., 1841. From this time hostilities on our side were carried on only by the fire of artillery occasionally from the ramparts on the near approach of the enemy, who always dispersed and made off when the guns opened on them, but no parties of ours were sent out to fight and some negotiations were then being made. Akbar Khan caused all fighting to cease for the time, and ordered into cantonments abundance of supplies of all sorts for the troops who were then upon half rations. The Lord Sahib, Sir William MacNaghten had many conferences with Akbar Khan at this time, and was much occupied in making arrangements with the different sirdars of Cabul.

6th December, 1841.—About 8 o'clock in the morning I had occasion to take the commissariat indent for signature to Lieut. Gray, 44th Regt., as he always at that time signed these sort of papers for Quarter-Master Halahan, who was wounded and unable to write. On enquiring at Mr. Gray's quarters I was told by his bearer that he was on duty in the Old Fort (Kheela Shuruf), to which place I at once went, and there found him in a small apartment with another officer belonging to a native corps. He signed the paper, and I returned to the entrenched camp, between which and the fort, the distance is not more than about 100 yards across the road. Some time after, perhaps an hour and a half, bugles were heard in all directions, and it was reported that the Europeans and Sepahees who guarded the Old Fort, had run away out of the place, and come into cantonments, owing, it was said, to a few Afghans having scaled the wall and jumped in on them, and on the guard evacuating it the enemy issued in numbers from the Shah Bagh, and coming quickly down took possession of the place without any opposition. I had heard that Lieut. Gray had been wounded on this occasion, and shortly after I saw him in Mr. Halahan's room, where Dr. Harcourt was dressing a wound in the upper part of his arm. In consequence of this all was astir in a moment in the camp, and the troops turned out under arms but did not leave cantonments. Some guns were fired from the ramparts on the enemy in the fort, and there was some firing

from both sides. After a few days all was pretty quiet, and conferences commenced again with Akbar Khan, when MacNaghten Sahib wrote the letters to the different chiefs which led to his own death. During the occupation of the Old Fort, above mentioned, by our troops, a mine had been laid by us, and mussucks of gunpowder placed under its battlements at the side facing the Shah Bagh, that being the quarter whence the enemy would approach, and it was known to every one in camp that this was done with the view, should the enemy come down suddenly in numbers and scale the wall, that the mine was immediately to be fired, and then the guard or party on duty were to make their way out across the road into cantonments, leaving the fort to be blown up with the enemy who might have got in. I heard all this from Sepahees who were and had been on duty in the place, besides it was generally asked in the bazaar and in camp daily what the news was regarding the fort, and I heard the Sepahees saying that we had laid a mine, that so many mussucks of gunpowder had been placed on such a day, and on enquiring the reason they stated that the order was, as soon as the Affghans came down in force, and attempted to get in by scaling, the party inside were at a fitting moment to fire the mine, and that accomplished, rush out of the place and get into cantonments, thereby abandoning the fort to the enemy, who would be blown up with the ruins.

The Lord Sahib, Sir William MacNaghten, was murdered about the 13th December, 1841, but I do not recollect the exact date, and then an order was issued prohibiting the Affghans from coming any more into cantonments, but soon after some arrangement was made by Pottinger Sahib, and this restriction was removed, and on the people from the city beginning to come again into cantonments to sell bazaar supplies, every one asked them why Akbar Khan murdered Sir William MacNaghten. The Affghans all said that it was entirely owing to the treacherous part which he, the envoy, had acted in having a short time previously written a letter to Ameenoolah Khan stating that if he brought him the head of Akbar Khan, he would give him three or four thousand rupees, and otherwise handsomely reward him, but to this Ameenoolah Khan gave no reply. A similar letter was written by MacNaghten Sahib to Sirdars Oosman Khan, Jubar Khan, Mumuk Zumuh Khan, and Papalzaie ka Sirdar, offering each a reward to the one for the head of the other, and he finally wrote to Akbar Khan offering him a reward of thirty thousand rupees (some accounts said thirty lacs) for the head of Ameenoolah Khan. This, the people said, was first discovered by some person informing Ameenoolah Khan that Akbar Khan had been offered thirty thousand rupees by the Lord Sahib for his head, on hearing which, he, Ameenoolah Khan, sent for Akbar Khan, who came to his house, and he then told Akbar Khan what he had heard, and as that was the case—presenting his tulwar—he said that he, Akbar Khan, might take his head off at once, and go receive his reward, as he was quite content. Akbar Khan then confessed that he had received the letter in question and having had some suspicion that MacNaghten Sahib had

made similar offers to other sirdars, and perhaps to him, Ameenoolah Khan, who was constantly in the habit of going to him, he, Akbar Khan, for this reason was very angry, and certainly did partly consent to the proposal, believing that there was some treachery at work. However, he added, if you all show me the letters (if any) which you have received, I'll be your friend, but otherwise I must remain your enemy. Ameenoolah Khan immediately admitted that he had received a letter, which he then produced to Akbar Khan, whom he at the same time strongly advised to call all the sirdars together in one appointed place, and ask them the question. This was done accordingly, and at the meeting of the sirdars, they all gave up to Akbar Khan the letters Sir William MacNaghten had written to them, and Akbar Khan then declared his intention of having an interview with the Lord Sahib early on the following day, when he would confront him with his own letters, and then and there kill him for his treacherous conduct. Akbar Khan accordingly despatched a messenger with his salaam to Sir William MacNaghten, and invited him to a conference the next day, where the Lord Sahib went, according to promise, at an early hour to meet Akbar Khan, who was waiting at the usual place of meeting in the open air at a short distance from, and opposite to, cantonments. After the customary compliments both sat down on the loongee spread on the ground, and Akbar Khan then drew from his breast the letters in question, saying as he presented them to Sir William MacNaghten, "What have you written here? What is the meaning of all this?" but the Lord Sahib made no reply, and only held his head down, although the question was repeated three or four times. Akbar Khan then caught hold of his arm saying he should go with him into the city, but that he would not allow him to return to cantonments, at least not until he had some more conversation with him at his own house in Cabul. On this Sir William MacNaghten pulled away his arm and bent down more firmly on the ground, saying "Chordo, Haramzadah," on which Akbar Khan fired at him, but shot dead one of his own attendants without touching Sir William; however, he drew another pistol and wounded the envoy. Captain Trevor then fired at Akbar Khan, but without effect, and Captain Trevor was himself immediately shot down by some one of Akbar's attendants standing close behind. Sir William MacNaghten received another shot from one of the chiefs present, and then Akbar Khan had him removed with Trevor, Mackenzie and Lawrence to the city.

After the envoy's murder conferences were renewed and carried on by Pottinger Sahib with Ameenoolah Khan, and other sirdars of influence, but all intercourse with Akbar Khan had ceased, he being considered an enemy; and now a treaty was entered into to the effect that we were to give twelve lacs or fourteen lacs of rupees for the safe conduct of the force to Peshawur, eight hostages were to be given by us as guarantee for the restoration of Dost Mahommed, and we were to leave the country. The Affghans, on the other hand, agreed to give six thousand men as a protecting escort to the retiring force to Peshawur, and also five sirdars in exchange for our eight hostages

by way of security for their true faith, and when the army had been safely conducted to Peshawur the money being given, the escort was then to be permitted to return to Cabul, but the five sirdars to be detained until every article of the treaty was fulfilled and our hostages restored. At this time some of the money had already been advanced by Pottinger Sahib, who, it was said, gave bills for the remaining amount, and abundance of provisions came into cantonments. Marching establishments were next secured, and it was arranged that the army was to march on the 6th January, 1842, but previously about the 3rd of January the hostages, sick and wounded men, who were to remain behind, were removed to the city. On the morning of the 6th Janry. at the time the troops were to march, it was expected that, according to stipulation, the escort of six thousand men and the five sirdars would have been ready waiting to afford the troops safe conduct out of the country, but nothing of the kind was done, and the Affghans it was evident had broken faith, although we had fulfilled our part by giving up hostages and money. When the troops were moving off on the morning of the 6th the enemy were assembled in great force, and as we left thousands occupied the cantonments and attacked the rear guard which remained, destroying all that came in their way, and as soon as the Affghans, who were at a distance, saw this, they commenced to loot, and plunder the baggage close to the column, and then the General ordered the artillery to fire on them; this dispersed them to a distance, and in this way the force moved off the first day and got as far as Poola Bee Grammee, about two koss from Cabul. At this place the Affghans said we should halt, as there was no water to be got further on. On the morning of the 7th the troops marched for Boodhak, where they arrived about noon, and a few hours after Akbar Khan came up attended by about twenty-five Sowars, but remained at a short distance from our troops. Brigadier Shelton immediately went with H.M. 44th Regt. and two guns, and formed them up in front of Akbar Khan, who, on the Brigadier's appearance with this force, sent to say that he came to have an interview with the General and Pottinger Sahib, and not to fight. On that Pottinger Sahib sent Captain Skinner to the sirdar to ask what he wanted, or had to say; the sirdar replied that it was true he was guilty of having killed the Lord Sahib, Sir William MacNaghten, and he was ashamed of the act, but he was now anxious that the army should be protected, and as the party with whom the late treaty was made had not fulfilled their agreement, the sirdars and escort of six thousand men not having come, that under those circumstances he was willing and anxious to afford all the assistance in his power by protecting the troops from being annoyed or attacked by the different tribes on the line of march down, and if they went to Khoord Cabul he would see that all the necessary supplies were furnished and then gladly enter into any arrangement, as otherwise he was convinced the army would perish. On this occasion Pottinger and Lawrence went over to speak with Akbar Khan, with whom they remained, and ten or twelve men were here ordered by the sirdar to remain with the General and army to forbid any firing or violence being offered on its march. On the 8th

Janry. the force left for Khoord Cabul, and got on without any opposition until its arrival at the pass, where firing commenced from all sides on our people, of whom, in consequence, there was great slaughter: and on the advance debouching from the pass and getting on the plain, I saw the General and Brigadier, close to whom I happened to be at the time, calling out to the irregular cavalry and Sowars, who were all mingled in confusion, moving in advance to halt and form up in some order, but they would not obey this order and continued to proceed in the greatest confusion without listening to any order; here it was snowing very hard and all suffered much from the cold. When the two Generals were calling out to the native troops in advance to halt and recover their order, the officers of these corps were in advance also at some distance, and most probably could not, or did not, hear any order given. At this time the ladies were likewise in advance in kajowahs on camels. This day H.M. 44th Regt. were a long way in rear and I had come on with some commissariat people. At the place and time I speak of there was a dreadful press in front of camp followers, Sepahees, and Sowars all in one dense mass of confusion, a mile further on was our halting ground, covered with snow, which had fallen to a great depth. On the 9th Janry. we started again, but had not gone much more than half a mile when an order came for the force to return to its old ground, for the reason, it was said, that Akbar Khan promised some provisions and proposed to make some arrangement if the army halted that day. So at Khoord Cabul we delayed in the snow all the 9th Janry. without a morsel to eat, and the troops, having no tents or shelter of any kind, suffered dreadfully from the severity of the weather. On that day all the ladies and their husbands went over for protection to Akbar Khan, who was in a village not far off with Pottinger and Lawrence Sahib. In the evening parties of the enemy fired occasionally some shots at us from a distance. After the ladies went away many natives began to leave also, but the Brigadier (Shelton) seeing this, had the artillery put in position facing the road, so accordingly no one for the time went over. On the 10th Janry. the whole marched for Tazeen, H.M. 44th Regt. leading and accompanied by the few Sepahees who had retained their arms, the greater number of the Sepahees having become by this time so paralyzed with the cold, that they permitted the Afghans to take their arms and accoutrements from them without making any defence, so in consequence there was great disorder among the natives, and the rear on this day's march was one host of camp followers. The irregular cavalry were present on leaving Khoord Cabul, but I know not what became of them afterwards, for I did not see them again. My corps, H.M. 44th Regt., maintained the fight with the enemy the whole way to Tazeen, where I observed that I did not see any armed Sepahees, but hundreds of natives were arriving every minute mounted on tattoos, and in straggling parties, but no large bodies. The 44th (that is the remaining handful of men), as I have already stated, fought their way on to Jugdulluck, near which

place they were destroyed, and I have now nothing more to add, as all other particulars are detailed in my former statement.

(Signed) P. W. MACMAHON,
Lieut., H.M. 44th Regt.,
Adjt. and Acting Interpreter to Detacht.

Kurnaul, 27th July, 1842.

FROM SERJT. ALEXANDER FAIR, H.M. 44TH REGT., A PRISONER AT LUGHMAN, TO CORPORAL JOHN WILSON, H.M.'S 13TH LT. INFANTRY, DATED AT BUDDIABAD (LUGHMAN), 7TH JUNE, 1842.

MY DEAR JACK,

I had an opportunity on the 20th May last of sending you a note from Mrs. Quinn, which I trust you have forwarded, this is now waiting for another chance that may turn up, our treatment now is very bad, only getting a little flour daily. I should wish you to write to Mrs. Quinn every time you have any news regarding us, as now we don't expect to be released 'till some exchange of prisoners, which will likely not be for two months more. Will you kindly go to Major Johnston of ours, or send him word, that the Regimental Color is safe and *with me*. It is now getting very warm in day but evenings are cool. On the other side is a list of our officers, which you can also give Major Johnston, as perhaps it will be useful to him. The old fort alluded to is the one near the bazaar adjoining the King's Garden; also an abstract of our casualties in Cabool. We left Cabool 438 men, in which number 12 boys and 34 sick are included. I also send a letter for Mrs. Fair, which I trust you will send as soon as possible. Mention to Mrs. Quinn that I wish Mrs. F. to write a letter to your address for me, and you can keep it till an opportunity turns up of sending it. Release all letters for me and send me a few of the oldest, and the same of the latest, also some newspapers concerning our failure in Cabool. If Major Johnston is in Jellallabad ask him if he has any cigars for me, if so send me a small box, and in it put 6 Rs., all to be settled on a future day. We heard some time ago of Captain Mackenzie being in making arrangements for the release of the gents, send us any word you may hear regarding our release, as we are anxiously looking out daily for it and we can get no news from the officers. Tell the Bayleys and all friends that Jack Marshall is doing well, his feet are nearly healed, send him half a wax candle; no more now Jack, but

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) ALEXANDER FAIR.

Jack, I send these papers principally to have them out of the way, so I wish you to keep them until I am released, but of course I have no objection to any one getting copies of them for their own information. I think you might as well tell Captain MacGregor about the Color and see what he says, we hear a good deal of news

but can place no faith in an Afghan. Enquire of Captain MacGregor when the messenger is returning, as I don't think he will stop long.

(Signed) ALEXANDER FAIR.

Brigadier Shelton	Prisoner, 11th January, 1842.
Lieut.-Col. T. Mackrell	{ Died of wounds received at the capture of the Rickabushie Fort, 10th November, 1841.
Major W. B. Scott	{ Wounded, 8th Janry., 1842, Khoord Cabool Pass; killed 10th Janry., 1842, Tazeen Pass.
Captain T. Swayne	{ Killed, 4th Novr., 1841, at the Old Fort—Mahomed Sherif.
„ R. B. McCrea	{ Killed, 10th Nov., 1841, at Rickabushie's Fort.
„ A. W. Gray	{ Leave 2nd October, 1841.
„ T. R. Leighton	{ Wounded, 8th Janry., Khoord Cabool; killed 10th Janry., 1842, Kheela Thanah, Huft Kothul.
„ T. Robinson	{ Killed, 4th Novr., 1841, at commissariat godown.
Bt.-Capt. W. H. Dodgin	{ Killed, 12th Janry., 1842. Second barrier.
„ J. C. Collins	{ Wounded left arm, 11th Janry., 1842, at Kutter Sung; killed 13th Janry., 1842, Gundamuk Hill.
Lieut. Evans	{ Wounded in the head, 23rd Novr., 1841, at Denerak, left on duty at Cabool.
„ Wade	{ Killed, 12th January, 1842, Jugdulluck Hill.
„ Souter	{ Wounded, 13th Janry., 1842; prisoner, Gundamuk
„ Hogg	{ Wounded, 4th Novr., 1841, at commissariat godown. Killed 13th Janry., 1842, at Gundamuk Hill.
„ E. S. Cumberland	{ Killed, 6th Novr., 1841, capturing Old Fort—Mahomed Sherif.
„ Raban	{ Killed, 12th Janry., Sookall Bridge.
„ Cadett	{ Wounded, 23rd Novr., 1841, at Denerak; killed, 13th Janry., 1842, at Gundamuk.
„ Swinton	{ Wounded, 4th Novr., 1841, Old Fort (Mahomed Sherif); killed 11th Janry., 1842, entering Jugdulluck.
„ Fortye	

Lieut. Gray	{ Wounded, 6th Decr., 1841, Old Fort— —Mahomed Sherif—proceeded in advance; killed, 13th Janry.
Pay Master Bourke	{ Left at Jugdulluck wounded; died.
Adjutant White	{ Wounded, 7th Janry., 1842, at Bood- hak; killed 10th Janry., 1842, Kheela Thanah, on Huft Kothul.
Qr.-Master Halahan	{ Wounded, 4th Novr., 1841, garden adjoining commissariat godowns; killed, 12th Janry., 1842, second barrier, Jugdulluck Pass.
Doctor Harcourt	{ Killed, 12th Janry., 1842, 2nd barrier, Jugdulluck.
„ Balfour	{ Killed in advance with Lieut. Gray, 13th Janry.
„ Primrose	{ Killed, 13th Janry., 1842, Gundamuck Hill.

If he thinks it would be necessary I could send you a list of all the non-commissioned officers and when they fell. We have thirty men and three invalids at Cabool and eight of your regiment, kind regards to all friends and hopes you are all well. I hope we will soon meet again, till then, believe me,

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) ALEXANDER FAIR.

P.S.—Could Captain MacGregor point out any place or person that would afford us security, as effecting our escape is easily done from this, if even a few men was sent convenient so as to escort us on the road.

KILLED AND WOUNDED IN NOV. AND DEC., 1841.

Date.	Killed.	Died of Wounds.	Wounded.	REMARKS.
3rd November, 1841...	—	—	5	1842, Janry. 6th, 7th, and 8th
4th „ „	11	3	16	52 killed, 93 wounded.
6th „ „	4	1	11	
10th „ „	26	5	58	Captain Leighton, Adjutant
13th „ „	1	3	7	White, and Major Scott
23rd „ „	19	4	39	wounded.
6th December, „	1	—	2	
	—	—	16	On the Ramparts.
	78		154	

(Signed) ALEXR. FAIR.

True copy of copy.

(Signed) P. W. MACMAHON,
Lieut., 44th Regt.,
Adj. to Detachts.

COPY OF EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SERJEANT FAIR, 44TH REGIMENT,
TO HIS WIFE.

As I have not yet described to any one how I was saved, I will now do so for the information of my ——— as she is the only individual that it will interest. On the 12th of January, up to which date I got off free, except my horse, which received two musket balls on the 8th and another on the 10th, I received two musket balls, which only grazed me slightly; that night we left Jugdulluk for Gundamuk, when everyone was in the greatest confusion imaginable. No commanders, no any one in fact to do anything except talk, in this way we marched. I previously had arranged for the conveyance of Lang and Quin, to the latter I gave my own horse, and the former my pony; during the night I received one ball in the left arm but not very severely. Next day was our unfortunate one at Gundamuck, where we arrived about 6 a.m., 13th Janry., 1842. On arriving at Gundamuck we took up a position on the top of a hill, seeing that it was our safest place for a halt, when we had arrived and saw the skeleton the unfortunate regiment was reduced to (the native corps, both horse and foot, having deserted us on the road to Tazeen), we saw by the immense number of the enemy that our only alternative was to make a negotiation with them, according we waved a white handker, and the firing ceased on both sides: when two horsemen belonging to one Golam John Nrsbayre, came to make arrangements with us. After some talking between them and Captain Hay, of the Irregular Horse, Major Griffiths, 37th Native Infantry, was sent to that chief to make the final arrangement. Unfortunately during the time the enemy had come up to the top of the hill, and all that the chief horsemen could do we could not keep them from closing in upon us, except we went to use force. After Major G. had been away some time, the enemy took advantage of their treating in seeing our small numbers, and (the greatest part of them frozen or wounded, I don't suppose there was 30 effective men altogether, not of course including the officers) commenced to loot (steal) any article that came in their way, even to some of the men's muskets, and all we could do it could not be prevented; unfortunately, in rear, where there was some depredations committed, they could not submit to it, and commenced to fire upon the thief as well as enemy, when everyone immediately ran off the hill, so we kept possession of the hill till about 12, noon, frequently compelling the enemy to retire with great loss. Of course our numbers, which at first was very few, decreased in proportion, and at last we found ourselves with only about twelve effective men. The enemy now commenced to grow bolder, altho' I am quite sure was upwards of 8 or 900 men. We thought to make one desperate charge down the hill might prove effective in keeping them off till evening, when we would again start for Jellallabad. According the charge was made, and in that proved our disaster, the enemy gave way in our front, but completely surrounded us in our flanks and rear. Then our ruin commenced. Now for my individual part of the transaction. An Afghan came up coolly towards me

(where I was standing with about five or six more) in advance to do so, we all concurred that it would be better to rely upon their mercy as we could not hold out any longer. Accordingly I advanced and gave him a sword of Captain Grant's (who had given it to me on the hill), and he received it very politely, but next moment another came up and demanded my fuzil, which of course I had to do, and immediately on delivering it up they stript me of my clothes piece by piece, asking me for kuldars (rupees), but I had none about me, and I was left with only my drawers and one sock, with the pair of comforters my — sent me in Jellallabad, my thoughts at this moment I will never mention till I see you. Enough to say that death never once struck my thoughts; the fellow that had stripped me then went away, I suppose to fall upon some other unfortunate victim. After he had left me about five minutes, and me looking at the work of death making its ravages in the most brutal means imaginable, a young Afghan came up and caught hold of me by the comforter of the right wrist, and dragged me off the field of carnage. No more about that day till we meet once more, which I trust in the Lord will be in a short time. We could have no doubt left this long ago, if we wished to make our escape by force, but that would not do, for by doing so our lives would not be secure five minutes among these barbarians. Another thing my —, Captain Souter, who was also saved, got away with the Regimental Color of the regiment, and the Brigadier, on leaving this, first made it over to me, which you may rely upon it I am doing in endeavours to get it away safe, as it will do me some good hereafter. We had a letter from Captain MacGregor, Political Agent at Jellallabad, a few days ago, offering to pay Company's rupees (1,200) twelve hundred for our ransom, and that if the chief who has it would not take it, that M. General Pollock had it in his power to effect an exchange of prisoners with the existing Government at Cabool, and that us here would be included in the exchange. The man here in charge of us has sent a letter to Mahomed Shah Khan concerning us, and we expect an answer in a few days. Our treatment here is very poorly, but still we manage to live pretty well. My friends at Jellallabad has sent some clothes very kindly. I forgot to mention that I have lost the use of my left thumb by a sword cut, and I received a ball through my left side, but now, thank God, I am quite well.

True copy of extract.

(Signed) P. W. MACMAHON,
Lieut., H.M. 44th Regt.,
Adjt. to Detachment.

Serjeant-Major Lisant, 37th Regt. N.I., accompanied his regiment, leaving Kurnaul in October, 1838, and was with it during the Cabul campaign; the 37th Regt. N.I. left Cabul along with the 13th Lt. Infy. and 35th N.I. on their return to the plains, Sergt.-Major Lisant

being with his corps; but at Tazeen they returned, and were to have accompanied General Elphinstone, the field hospital, &c., that were to have wintered at Jellallabad, and were waiting at Khoord Cabool for the General, when an express came for their return to Cabool in consequence of an outbreak. The following is a copy of the journal kept by Serjeant-Major Lisant of the occurrences at Cabool after the insurrection broke out, and during the disastrous retreat which followed:—

2nd Novr., 1841.—Two companies H.M. 44th Regt., 54th N.I., Shah Soojah's 6th Regt., three guns Horse Artillery, two $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch mortars, two 9-pounders, were sent into the Bala Hissar. Colonel Oliver, 5th N.I., was the first who brought into the cantonments about the outbreak in the town, as he had been taking his usual morning ride, and coming home through the city passed through the mob without any one offering to molest him. In about an hour after some Sepoys of the 5th N.I. came home severely wounded. Lieut. Sturt, Engineers, was also wounded on leaving the King's palace, also the murder of Sir Alexander Burnes and other European residents in the city took place on the same date. Serjt.-Major Lisant was assured by persons who witnessed the outbreak, that had a regiment of infantry and a couple of guns been sent into the town in time on the morning of the 2nd November, 1841, they might have put down the insurrection, as at first not more than four or five hundred rose. Large mobs now began to surround the cantonments, and small parties of two companies H.M. 44th Regt., two companies 5th N.I., a few cavalry and two guns were sent out to engage them, and this occurred sometimes twice or thrice a day, and many men were lost, and were always obliged to retire, for the enemy had every advantage, laying in nullahs and water courses, where neither guns or cavalry could get at them—this was repeated daily. The enemy took possession of the Shah's garden and a small fort adjoining it, from which they kept up a constant fire on the cantonments, and the Commissariat Fort was daily threatened, it was held by a guard of 50 Sepoys, the enemy several times set fire to the gate and tried to force it. The Commissariat Serjeant (Anderson) dug a well in the fort, and barricaded the gate with camel saddles; the Sepoys were fagged out, being on watch night and day, and the enemy so numerous about the gate way of the Shah's garden, it was certain death to any one who put their head over the wall. Captain Boyd, Commissariat Department, represented it to the General, and a company H.M. 44th were sent down to its relief. The serjeant, not knowing they were coming, had not removed the camel saddles, so that the company stood under a most galling fire, and had to retire to cantonments. Next morning Captain Boyd represented the matter to the General, who refused any men, but sent an European officer to command. The serjeant guaranteed to get every particle of stores out of the fort if the General would only grant him a carrying party at night, and have them lodged in the cantonments. This was refused, he was told to hold it as long as he could and leave it. He

did so by cutting a hole through the wall into the garden and got safe into cantonments with the guard, leaving everything behind. Many men in cantonments having been killed by shot from the small old fort adjoining the Shah's garden, it was resolved to breach and storm it. Three 9-pounders were got into battery during the night, and early on the morning 6th Novr., 1841, opened a fire on one of the bastions. A storming party of two companies 5th N.I., all under Major Swayne, 5th N.I., had been told off and were waiting at the Kohistan Gate till the breach should be pronounced practicable, which was in about two hours done. The party moved off in column of sub-divisions and marched steadily up the road, till they came opposite the breach, when they broke into double time, and in a few seconds Lieut. Raban, H.M. 44th, was seen on one of the inner walls waving his sword. The enemy were speedily driven out and took to the Shah's garden, it was held possession of till next morning, when it was left in charge of forty Europeans with one subaltern, with another and fifty Sepoys. The fort was made tenable by working parties at night: Lieut. Raban, H.M. 44th, fell in this action. A party was afterwards sent to drive the enemy from the garden; they had reached the wall and Major Swayne was giving directions to the men when the General from cantonments ordered the retreat to sound, and they returned. About this time it must have been that the Commissariat Fort was abandoned, which the enemy soon discovered, and they could be seen as thick and as busy as bees carrying out the stores into the Shah's garden. No effort was made to retrieve it, though H.M.'s 44th volunteered to go and take the fort, and bring away the stores, but nothing was done. The garrison were on short allowance, the Europeans on six ounces brown bread, no liquor, but plenty of meat; the Sepoys a quarter of a seer ($\frac{1}{2}$ -lb.) raw wheat one day, and a quarter of a seer ($\frac{1}{2}$ -lb.) attah (flour) the next. Every man was obliged to sleep on the ramparts. About the 9th November, Brigadier Shelton came into cantonments with two companies H.M.'s 44th Regt. and the Shah's 6th Regt. On the 10th it was determined to storm the Rikabashie Fort, a portion of H.M.'s 44th, 37th N.I. and 6th Shah's, with some cavalry as a reserve, moved out of the Sia Sung Gate, when a terrible fire was opened from the nullahs and water courses. They made for a house and baths which had been partly demolished, and so to the rear side of the fort, where there was a small window which was blown in, and many had effected their entrance when the retreat was sounded (by Major Scott, 44th Regt., on seeing Colonel Mackrell, 44th Regt., fall), and as soon as our men gave way, the enemy's cavalry came round the corner of the fort and killed many, amongst these, Colonel Mackrell, 44th Regt., Captain McCrea, 44th, and Captain Westmacott, 37th N.I. (Colonel Mackrell, on being borne from the field mortally wounded, turned to Major Scott, 44th Regt., and said, "Scott, you have murdered me"). Col. Mackrell was pierced by seven bullet wounds, besides sabre cuts; he lived till he reached his quarters; Captain McCrea was cut to pieces. We rallied, and the cavalry coming to assist us, we got into the fort. Immediately after two small adjoining forts were taken

possession of without much opposition, the enemy making off to Sia Sung Hill were played on by a horse artillery gun with good effect. The enemy generally assembled about 10 a.m. in the Shah's garden and the Hill over Bemorah, great numbers of them were killed in passing, and at length they brought two guns on the hill and fired into cantonments. About 4 p.m. they appeared to have retired, leaving about twelve men with the guns: this was a ruse, they had gone a short way down the slope of the hill. Brigadier Shelton, with two companies H.M.'s 44th Regt., two companies 5th N.I., two companies 37th N.I., two companies Shah's 6th Regt., two horse artillery guns, and some cavalry were sent to take the guns. When near the summit a body of horsemen suddenly charged and broke the two leading subdivisions H.M.'s 44th, which caused some confusion. The cavalry coming up at this time drove the enemy from the hills, and captured the guns, the heavy one was spiked and thrown down the hill, the light one was brought in. Major Thain was wounded in the arm, also Captain Paton's, and amputated. Snow fell early in the month, and nothing particular occurred until the 23rd Novr., 1841, when Brigadier Shelton was ordered to drive the enemy from the village of Bemorah. About six hundred (600) men and one 6-pounder left cantonments about 3 a.m., and reached the hill without being observed, not a man was to be seen though firing was kept up till sunrise—when Major Swayne, 5th N.I., was sent with two companies to drive them out, but it was too late, they were driven back with loss and some men on the hill were killed also. At this time the enemy were seen coming from the town in thousands, both horse and foot. Major Kershaw, 13th Lt. Infy., was ordered to hold the hill with a few men of his own and two companies 37th N.I., the main body under Brigadier Shelton proceeded to drive the enemy off the hill, they were charged and driven from the hill, the Brigadier still continued to hold the hill. Meantime the enemy rallied, were strengthened every moment, came boldly up to the men, though mowed down in great numbers by grape, they pressed so hard that for a moment the men gave way, a corporal, Horse Artillery, who would not leave his gun, was cut to pieces. The men rallied and retook the gun, the enemy had taken away the limber and horses. H.M.'s 44th and 37th N.I. forming one square, and the 5th N.I. another in rear, the gun was at an angle in the front square and mowed down immense numbers. At this time the enemy's cavalry were observed to leave the hill, evidently to cut off the retreat. We remained in position a considerable time, Major Swayne fell, two or three officers H.M.'s 44th Regt. were carried away wounded, the men were falling very fast, and the enemy trying to surround the party. Captain Troup went to the Brigadier and told him if he did not retreat it would be too late; Colonel Oliver, 5th N.I., named it also, but the reply I did not hear. Colonel Oliver was hit immediately in the arm, he took no notice of it, he was almost at the same moment hit in the thigh, within another minute he received a shot and fell dead. The enemy were pressing still closer, the front face of the front square had been three times cut up and filled again, one serjt. and two gunners

only left alive, and the serjt. at length reported he had no one to work the gun, the Brigadier told him to limber up and go to the rear; whilst doing this the squares broke, and every one made his best way into cantonments. The artillery men behaved with the utmost gallantry and steadiness. Before this occurred the cavalry would not charge, although both promised and threatened. The men on the hill under Major Kershaw suffered most, attempts were made to rally, but as no men were sent from cantonments 'twas useless—the dead were brought in. Akbar Khan arrived at Cabool, and soon after the negotiations commenced; no sally was made after the men's spirits appeared broken.

On the 6th Decr., 1841, three Afghans had contrived to scale the wall of the small fort, when some men, H.M.'s 44th, shouted they were coming in thousands. A panic seized them, off they ran, Sepoys and all, except the sentry, H.M.'s 44th, who shouted there were only three, and he would not leave his post, and threw hand grenades, &c., &c., till he was overpowered and cut to pieces. The regiment hooted the men, and each company by company volunteered singly to go, retake the fort, and maintain it, but it was not done. Negotiations went on, and after the treaty was agreed on, the new fort, the Rika-bashie's Fort and the mosque in front of the Kohistan Gateway were given up to the enemy, or, as it was worded in orders, "Our Affghan Allies." We were expecting all the month of December to march, officers buying Yaboos and Commissariat camels. A number of camels were furnished by Akbar Khan or other chiefs, and almost daily we were sending out Yaboos laden with barrels of powder, muskets, tents, &c., and several ammunition waggons. The 54th N.I. and horse artillery came into cantonments from the Bala Hissar, and the sick and wounded were sent into the city under Affghan escort and hostages given over. Orders were issued to march on the 6th January, 1842.

Thursday, 5th January, 1842.—Orders were issued by Major-General Elphinstone that the troops in garrison at Cabool should be prepared to march towards Jellallabad on the morrow in the following order. First bugle at 5 and the second at 6 a.m.

Regiments left in front.—H.M.'s 44th Foot, Shah's Sappers, and the mountain train guns, to form the advance guard, together with the 5th Lt. Cavalry, under the command of Brigadier Anquetil. The main column, under the command of Brigadier Shelton, to be composed of the 5th N.I., 37th N.I. in charge of the magazine and treasure, two guns horse artillery, Anderson's Horse, 6th Regt. Shah Soojah's. The rear guard, under the command of Colonel Chambers, to be formed by the 54th N.I., four guns horse artillery, and the remainder of the cavalry, regimental magazines and baggage to follow in rear of corps respectively.

A road having been cut through the rampart near the rear gate and the ditch filled in, the advance moved off from cantonments about 8 o'clock a.m. to lay down a temporary bridge across the Cabool River, the one built by Lieut. Sturt having been destroyed by the enemy. The bridge now formed to enable the infantry to

cross dry shod, was made with the platforms of ammunition waggons, and the doors of the barracks taken down for that purpose. After the bridge being laid down and a quantity of the baggage across the river, a sudden stop was put to any more passing out of cantonments by order of the General; this was caused by a note having been received from Akbar Khan stating that he was not prepared to accompany us, but that on the morrow (Saturday, 7th Janry.), after prayers, he would be ready with his escort. I cannot vouch for the truth of this further than I heard several officers say so. Akbar Khan, I also heard, urged it was an unlucky day, and that if we started we must take our chance, for he could not, and would not, be responsible for the consequences. Accordingly, General Elphinstone ordered all the baggage back, as also the advance, when, as Lieut. Hawtrey told me, several officers strongly opposed this, and remonstrated with the General, who, when he saw so many opposed to him, wrote to Akbar Khan (as the same officer told me) telling him he could do nothing now but go on, but would wait his (Akbar Khan's) arrival on the plain the other side of the Logar River. Accordingly, after two or three hours' delay, during which time the baggage had all crowded up about the gateway, orders were given to move on, but such was the press that it was impossible to move. It was sunset when the 37th N.I. crossed the hills into Siah Sung, what time it was when the rear guard moved off I cannot say, but I heard Lieut. Hawtrey say much of the baggage was yet in cantonments, when the enemy broke in over the ramparts in all parts, and that the troops left behind to prevent this were ordered not to fire but to get together as quickly as possible and get away from the garrison. Thousands of Afghans were in waiting to pounce upon the baggage, and as it was getting late their patience seemed exhausted, and they fell upon all they could lay hands on. The snow was about eight or ten inches deep, and we were from 6 o'clock in the morning till about 10 or 11 o'clock that night (6th Janry.) before we reached the opposite side of the Logar River, where we were to stop for the night. I cannot say what time the rear guard came in. I can safely aver that not one camel in twenty that left cantonments reached the Logar River. Hundreds of camp followers perished this night, being frozen to death, and numbers, both of Sepoys and camp followers, were unable to proceed on with the column next morning towards Boodhak, and were abandoned, no kind of conveyance to be had.

7th Janry., 1842.—We started for Boodhak, and had not proceeded far when a sharp fire was opened on us, and the road from Cabool was covered with Afghans following hard after us. From time to time some portion of baggage was left behind to give us a start, but in a short time they would be after us again like hungry wolves, no parties were thrown out, neither was the rear guard strengthened, consequently they had to abandon the mountain train-guns, Lieut. Green being severely wounded, and his serjeant killed; reached Boodhak and took up the best position we could, H.M.'s 44th Regt. being detached to drive the enemy from the hills, which they effected, and maintained the post till night, when they were

called in. Arriving early at Boodhak the camp was regularly formed, regiments forming a kind of square facing outwards, all the cattle, and what baggage was left, inside. Remained very quiet during the remainder of the night, but as soon as day broke, the morning of the 8th Janry., the enemy opened a fire on all sides. H.M.'s 44th Regt. took up a position in the mouth of the pass, and two guns horse artillery were also detached to the rear with the 37th N.I., which took up a position to the rear and left of the camp to prevent the enemy from coming down upon the baggage as it was loading. Keeping this position for some time Akbar Khan sent into camp to say he wished to speak to Capt. Lawrence. I saw two or three officers go where Akbar Khan was, and one rode back to halt the column and baggage until Akbar Khan's men went on in front to clear the pass. H.M.'s 44th Regt. and 37th N.I., with the two horse artillery guns, were ordered to form the rear guard under Colonel Chambers, and after a great deal of delay the column moved off. We were no sooner in motion than the enemy again opened a terrible fire on us, and the party Akbar Khan left to protect and bring up the rear was most busy in plundering and murdering all they could lay hands on. H.M.'s 44th were told not to fire on the people in the rear as they were our friends; the men forebore as long as they could, but when so many of their comrades were falling around them, they would hear no more but opened a fire upon all sides. By this time we began to enter the pass, and then a fire from both sides of the pass was opened upon us which did much damage. The hills were covered with the enemy, though not a man was to be seen: their fire resembled the file firing from a square, and an incessant fire was kept up upon our rear. By the time we reached that part of the pass where the barrier had been thrown across the press was tremendous, as baggage, camp followers and soldiers all got intermixed, and of course great slaughter ensued. From this time to the end of the pass there was no order or regularity among the troops, hundreds must have fallen this march, the two guns horse artillery, after every man was cut down at his post, fell into the hands of the enemy. After getting through the pass, the cavalry and horse artillery were formed up facing the mouth of the pass, while the infantry passed on and formed up in column of sections. When some order had been restored the infantry were ordered to move on, while the horse artillery and cavalry, with some portion of H.M.'s 44th, maintained a position at the mouth of the pass; some firing took place on both sides. I passed on with my regiment, it began to snow rather heavily, we proceeded about two miles from the pass and halted for the night. We could see the enemy's fires on the hills all around us during the night, but they offered no molestation.

9th Janry., 1842.—At daylight we prepared to march towards Tazeen, some straggling shots were fired by the enemy as soon as they saw us in motion; the advance guard, H.M.'s 44th Regt., moved off, a portion of the baggage and camp followers and the 37th N.I. had taken up its position in column and waiting the order of march, when Captain Skinner rode up and said we were not to march

to-day, orders having been sent on ahead to recall the advance and baggage, and we returned to our old ground. All classes of natives were laying in scores dead and dying from the cold and snow, 'twas a most heartrending sight. We halted at Khoord Cabool the 9th Janry., and after midday the ladies left camp and went towards Akbar Khan. During the day the hills were occupied by the enemy, who occasionally sent a shot in. The cause of the halt was said to be about 8,000 men at Tazeen who intended to oppose us, and it was necessary Akbar Khan should proceed and settle affairs. Next morning, 10th Janry., 1842, as soon as we got into motion, the enemy opened their fire on all sides and around us. The Sepoys, from having had no food or covering since leaving Cabool, scores were unable to proceed, their feet being like large pieces of burnt wood, and their hands so dreadfully swollen and cracked that they could not hold, much less use, a musket. H.M.'s 44th Regt., with two guns and some cavalry, the advance guard, the 37th N.I. next followed, but I cannot positively say how the other regiments followed, and proceeded in pretty good order till we reached the corner where the ascent begins, leading towards Kabbur Jubbur Khan, here a terrible fire was kept up, the followers got so mixed up with the column, and from this commenced the slaughter that ended the native regiments. Both horsemen and footmen rushed in and cut down both Sepoys and followers without any opposition. On reaching Kubbur Jubbur Khan, the General and Brigadier were endeavouring to form to check the advance of the enemy. After halting about an hour, without firing a shot, though both horse and foot had pushed on towards the Tazeen Pass, we then moved on towards the descent without much interruption, but when near the bottom a very heavy fire was opened from the heights on both sides, and many fell here. We reached the valley about 4 p.m., delighted to be clear of the snow; we were to have halted but several officers urged the General to push on, so we started again about 8 o'clock p.m., leaving behind our last remaining gun, a 12-pounder howitzer, first spiking it. From this the remaining horse artillery men acted as cavalry. From Tazeen to Siah Baba there was not a shot, but thence we maintained a running fight into Jugdulluk, where there was very hard fighting chasing the enemy from several hills. We took up our night quarters in an old fort, the enemy meantime firing from the heights all around with fatal effect. All were much exhausted from hunger and fatigue, being on foot from leaving Khoord Cabool at 8 a.m. on the 10th Janry. until 3 p.m. on the 11th Janry. The General had three bullocks killed and fairly divided amongst the Europeans—some negotiations were carrying on with the enemy.

12th Janry., 1842.—Halted, much to the regret of every one, as the enemy were firing all around from the heights doing much damage to men and horses. Here H.M.'s 44th made some very gallant charges and drove the enemy from their position several times, although the men were worn down with hunger, so much so, that as the horses fell, both officers and men stript the flesh off, and in very many instances ate it raw; General Elphinstone and Brigadier Shelton were

taken from us as hostages. About 7 o'clock p.m. this evening word was quietly passed amongst the Europeans that we were to march immediately, our situation somewhat explained to us, the officers exhorting us to hang together, as this was our only chance, for we should have to fight our way to Jellallabad. Commenced our march about 7 or 8 o'clock on the evening 12th January, leaving behind us all that had been wounded on this ground, as no means could be found to bring them on; 'twas heartrending to hear the poor fellows calling on their comrades to endeavour to bring them on, and not leave them there to be cut to pieces by the enemy. Brigadier Anquetil led and commanded the column. We had no sooner moved than the enemy were on the alert, some passing to the rear, others pushed on to the pass ahead, but little or no damage was done as the shot passed over, until arriving at the barrier which had been thrown across the road on the ascent from Jugdulluk. Here all was confusion, horse, foot and followers all got into such a heap that no one could move for a time, such a press I never witnessed; many were trodden to death, and the enemy, getting in the rear, slaughtered at their pleasure. The barrier was so strong and intricate that it resisted the efforts of the men to pull it asunder, more than one half of the remaining 44th lost their muskets in endeavouring to cross it, but those who succeeded, on reaching the top of the pass, the men halted, formed in sections, despatched a company as a rear guard, the enemy still keeping up a sharp fire, and proceeded in this way for some time, when the men in the rear were constantly calling to those in front to halt, whilst the officers urged the expediency of losing no time, so as to reach Gundamuk by daylight, and they would then be safe. Some men halted, others pushed on, till the cries from the rear became more loud and frequent to halt. At last the men said, "The officers seem to care but for themselves, let them push on if they like, we will halt till our comrades come up." From this point some officers went on, as all regularity seemed at an end, and this continued till morning, when not more than forty men of the 44th were left and half without arms. The men were fagged and began to talk of proceeding no further, but myself and four of them kept on as I knew the road, and hoped by hiding in the day we might make our way to Jellallabad by night. We continued till we reached a cave hungry and faint. We were discovered during the day, and in the evening removed to a fort at some distance. We remained there five days and were taken to another, where we found Major Griffiths, 37th N.I., and four more men, who told me that after we left the men were so completely knocked up, they determined to proceed no further and took up a position on a hill near Gundamuk for a last struggle, the enemy being in great numbers about them; firing had continued for some time on both sides, when a signal was made, the enemy opened their fire and concluded in a general slaughter, save in the other four men who escaped with Major Griffiths, on the thirteenth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and forty-two.

Jellallabad.

MY DEAR MAC,

A hurried epistle to give you news that must prove very acceptable, it is that Capt. Troup, one of the Cabul prisoners, who arrived here on Thursday eve, gives a most excellent account of the conduct of the 44th, and declares that most of what has appeared in the public papers respecting your old corps is perfectly false; you may rest assured, my dear Mac, that the prisoners will not fail to disprove the vile statements which have appeared in the papers. Shelton has forwarded by Troup a very favourable account of the conduct of the corps, and also the dates on which the different officers were killed. Troup dined with me last eve, and really his account of your old corps has quite delighted me; he told me that on one occasion, four hundred of the regt. were engaged near Cabul, and lost 170 killed and wounded, and after telling me this last eve, his exclamation was, how can people say they behaved badly. Troup is a staff officer, and I fancy was out on nearly every occasion, he is a very smart, intelligent officer, and I have no doubt he will give a very clear statement of all that occurred.

(Signed) E. ROCHE,
Lieut., 3rd Dragoons.

MY DEAR HALL,

In the hopes that these few lines will soon be taken into Genl. Pollock's camp with a batch of letters for our friends in Hindoostan, I venture to send you a brief account of our late disasters in Cabul and subsequent retreat therefrom. I need not inform you that while I am writing this I am a prisoner in the hands of the Affghans. Of course the newspapers have informed you of my safety with some other officers and several ladies and children, who are, like myself, detained prisoners by Akbar Khan, by whom we have all of us been as well treated as his situation and circumstances have afforded him the means, but owing to his recent defeat at Jellallabad by General Sale and the daily expected move of Pollock's army towards Cabul, we have been a good deal harassed from place to place during the heat of the day. Money has been offered for our ransom, which Akbar Khan has refused, and says that it is not money he requires of our Government but its friendship in return for our freedom. Something I trust will be done for us when the army marches for Cabul, but lest it might be thought matter treasonable, I must not prolong the subject further than having a hope that we unfortunates may see the plains of Hindoostan again at the commencement of the coming cold season, and that I may be afforded the opportunity of congratulating you then on your promotion to a troop, though under such circumstances it is painful thus to stride the ladder of promotion, yet such is, and ever has been, the fortune of war. Colonel Chambers fell above two miles on this side of Jugdulluck, where the army had thrown up barriers across the road having steep hills on either side, the road had been flooded, which had frozen, and was as slippery as glass. Here we

had an awful hand to hand fight with the enemy, but the camp followers rushed in amongst the soldiers for protection, which threw them into confusion, and caused them to break into detached parties. Blair and Basset, being both previously wounded, were riding in kajowahs at this time; in this way they fell into the hands of the enemy and were killed, both shared the same fate and on the same spot. Collyer, along with Dr. Harpur, Capt. Bellew, with two or three other officers, left the column near Soorkab, accompanied by about twenty troopers, in the hope of reaching Jellallabad (thirty miles distance); we heard that they fell into the hands of the Affghans and were killed almost in sight of Jellallabad. Hamilton reached Gundamuk with a handful of our men; here the finishing conflict took place, poor Hamilton was shot in the right side, and received another ball while upon the ground, he was in this state when I saw him last; we were shortly afterwards overpowered, and all were slaughtered that remained alive, excepting myself, a serjeant and seven European soldiers. The evening previous I had taken one of the Colours from its staff, and folded it across my body over my right shoulder, and under my posteen. In the struggle during the m  le  , the Colour became exposed, which attracted the attention of two or three of the enemy, who, in place of cutting me down, as I expected, seized me and dragged me down a hill, when I was stripped of all my clothes except my trousers and cap, and walked off to a village a distance of two miles, where I was reported to be a great Bahadur. The second day of my sojourn in this village, the man into whose clutches I fell came to see me, and brought my own telescope to shew him the use of it. This man's son came frequently to see me, and eventually brought me back the Regimental Colour, which, together with my posteen, pea jacket and shirt, was cut through, inflicting a severe wound from the joint of my shoulder eight inches down the blade bone, which for the present has partially deprived me of the use of my right arm. However, the Commander-in-Chief has promised to promote me immediately I reach the plains, which will recompense me for the perils and sufferings I have undergone, though there are six vacant companies in my own regiment. Young, who is at Cawnpore, and Evans, who was left in charge of sick and wounded European soldiers at Cabul when we commenced to march out of it, are my only seniors. Shelton, who went over to Akbar Khan at Jugdulluck to treat for terms along with Elphinstone, and was not allowed to return to the troops, this probably preserved his life, the remaining poor fellows, alas, are no more, two serjeants and seven men of the 44th, and three or four artillery men are the only European survivors of the retreat. Our loss was great before we quitted Cabul, cold and starvation paralyzed the Sepoys, and they suffered their arms and clothes to be taken from their persons without making the slightest defence, and when we drove the enemy, as we did often and often, the cavalry refused to charge. The scene from the commencement would fill a volume, I must therefore reserve the further detail of these disastrous events until we meet, if God spare me. I received a letter a short time ago from Mrs. Souter, who is still residing at Kurnaul; the Commander-

in-Chief has granted for her to receive one hundred rupees per month from my pay, and I hope she has received assistance as well from the Cabul relief fund. I need not say that I lost everything that I possessed, and I fear my servants are all dead. Oldfield, Plowden, and Maine were lucky in getting away from Cabul before the outbreak. The Bala Hissar, which commands the city, was my post with one hundred men of the 44th for several days; part of Nicholls' troop of artillery was stationed there, also the 54th N.I. and some of the Shah's Hindoostanees. We had harassing work of it, I assure you, and when we were removed into cantonments we had daily fights outside. Poor little Raban was killed in capturing a small fort on the 6th Novr., 1841. Mackrell died after having an arm amputated; he died worth ninety thousand rupees, which he willed to his natural daughter, his last will must be lost, though I can swear to its contents, having been one of the Committee to examine his effects. Swayne and Robinson were killed on the same day, we had nearly one hundred men killed before we left Cabul, and left it with only three hundred and ninety-two bearing arms. The total number of officers killed since the outbreak, including politicals, one hundred and two, the 44th alone lost twenty-two. I hope shortly to get an ensigncy for my son, he was noted for a commission last October, plenty of vacancies occur in the regiments serving in India in these eventful times. Sarah and Frank are at Simlah with Mrs. Leighton; by the bye, I intend to sojourn a few months at the hills and give my family the benefit of a change next hot weather. We prisoners have all adopted Affghan dresses, except Shelton, provided for us by Sirdar Akbar Khan, and none of us have seen a razor since Novr. last; every now and then we receive packages from Jellallabad containing letters and newspapers, tea and some necessaries for the ladies; and oh! a fortnight ago we got a box containing a thousand cigars; drinkables are out of the question. We are much cooler here than you are in Hindoostan, the mornings and evenings, I may add, are pleasant in the extreme. Will your promotion make any change with regard to your appointment in the Stud Department? you ought to be a happy fellow, no drill nor bother, and plenty of horse flesh to admire. Considering I have a lame and rheumatic wrist my letter is a tolerably lengthy one, besides, my writing table is nothing better than a book cover placed upon my knees, its contents will, I hope, afford you information and amusement at all events, and if so, it will afford gratification to

Yours ever sincerely,

(Signed) J. A. SOUTER.

P.S.—Kelah Ke Con, five miles east of Cabul, 15th of June, 1842. I was, while a prisoner near Gundamuk, to have been ransomed for a thousand rupees, in the mean time Akbar Khan came into the neighbourhood and made claim to me. Adieu.

LETTER FROM LIEUTENANT SOUTER TO HIS WIFE.

Zundah, near Tazeen, Affghanistan,
21st April, 1842.

MY DEAREST HANNAH,

You may imagine how rejoiced I was to receive your letter dated the 23rd of March, it reached my hands safely on the 16th of this month. I am sorry to hear the weather has set in so oppressively hot, and that yourself and the children are suffering from its effects, until the last few days the weather has been the contrary with us. We are at a great elevation above Jellallabad (which is about 70 or 80 miles from this) and snow very close at hand. We were hurried from Lughman to this place in consequence of the defeat of Akbar Khan by General Sale, and, notwithstanding the weather was very inclement when we first arrived here, we had nothing but bad tents to live in, which is still our only shelter. The ladies and children are at times greatly to be pitied, but they all seem cheerful and as happy as people can expect to be under such circumstances. I need not enumerate the names of the ladies, for the newspapers must already have informed you, suffice to say that their husbands owe their lives to the presence of their wives in the late disastrous retreat from Cabul. Providence has indeed been kind towards me, protected as I have been by Him through the perils and dangers of one of the most harassing, bloody and disastrous succession of fights on record in the annals of military history. On the commencement of the insurrection on the 2nd of Novr., 1841, I was ordered into the Bala Hissar (which is above the city) with a hundred men of the 44th; there for a succession of days and nights we were engaged in defending our position and in firing upon the enemy in the city; then I was ordered again into cantonments, some small forts commanded our lines and barracks, which it became necessary to capture, in these undertakings we lost a number of men and several officers. Swayne and Robinson fell on the same day, the 4th Novr., 1841, Raban on the 6th, and Mackrell and McCrea on the 10th, Mackrell died during the night, after suffering amputation of one of his arms, one of his legs was also broken; McCrea was cut down and killed upon the spot. Though we generally defeated the enemy and gained our point, yet the numbers opposed to us were so great that the loss of life was always great and victory dearly earned. At length, cut off from all supplies, our draft bullocks consumed, and our grain stores empty, nothing was left for us but to capitulate and enter into a treaty to evacuate the country, all fighting ceased, and then supplies came in to us, though at a dear rate. The weather was remarkably and intensely cold, and the snow fell to a great depth; well, after it was agreed that these refractory chiefs were to receive twelve (12) lacs of rupees, provided they allowed us to march out of their country unmolested, in spite of this agreement they commenced an attack upon our rear as soon as we were out of our cantonments at Cabul. Our halting ground for four or five days was upon a great depth of snow, the Sepoys became paralyzed from cold, most of them suffered their arms,

accoutrements and clothes to be taken from their persons without making any resistance, hundreds of them were cut up by the enemy, as well as camp followers and servants, many took to the hills and there perished. After the third day not an armed Sepoy was to be seen out of four regiments, consequently the whole brunt of defending the column in its retreat fell upon the remaining handful of the 44th Regiment and European artillery, whose cannon were abandoned owing to the depth of the snow and owing to the wretched condition of their horses. The native cavalry refused to follow their officers against the enemy, clung to the infantry and embarrassed their movements. In like manner camp followers and others rushed in upon us for protection when attacked by the Affghans, so much so that we were at times powerless. The surrounding hills were generally covered with people that poured deadly discharges of musketry upon us, even during night marches we were equally assailed, and hourly the column became diminished in numbers. At Jugdulluck General Elphinstone and Shelton went over to Akbar Khan and other chiefs to offer terms, which they agreed to accede to. While this was going on we were suddenly attacked, our men falling very fast and fighting bravely at the time during which, seeing the perilous situation of our Colours, I tore one from its staff and wrapped it about my person. Cumberland took the other, but was unable to button his great coat over it, he then handed it to Serjt. Carey, who secured it about him, but he fell during the night of our last march, the enemy pressing so close prevented our disengaging the Colour, and it was unavoidably lost. Elphinstone and Shelton were not allowed to return to us, but were detained prisoners. In this state of affairs a night march was determined upon, the 44th reduced to between 70 and 80 men capable of carrying arms, a few artillery men and 5th Cavalry, and still an encumbrance of camp followers, &c., started at 8 o'clock at night. We soon came upon an encampment of the enemy, who commenced following up our march, looting (stealing) and cutting up stragglers in the rear, until we came to a gorge between two ranges of low hills; here the road was barricaded in two places with bushes, the progress of the column was stopped, and a hand to hand fight took place with the enemy, who had been in wait for us. Here my horse fell with me, or, rather, a trooper of the 5th Cavalry, who, in trying to pass me, pushed me down the side of the hill, the horse, from weakness (having been hit by two balls and having eaten scarcely anything for four days), was unable to rise, and I was unable to rise either until two men raised the horse a little and I extricated myself. I lost the horse with my only remaining clothes that were on his back, and I felt the effects of the fall for a considerable time after. At this time and place fell Brigadier Anquetil, Major Thain, Dodgin, Dr. Harcourt and poor Halahan, Captain Nicolls, of the Artillery, and many other officers, including Captains Bott, Blair, and Bassett, of the 5th Cavalry. On clearing the gorge we mustered but half the force we started with. At 8 o'clock we continued our march, the enemy fearing to come near us, though we were reduced to a handful of men, but kept up a fire upon us at a distance. I took a trooper by force from his saddle

and mounted his horse; we approached Gundamuk as daylight appeared, which displayed to the enemy the smallness of our force. The enemy increasing in numbers with the daylight, we were compelled to leave the road and take to a hill, before ascending which the trooper's horse was shot under me, staggered a few yards and fell. Some Affghan horsemen appeared, to whom we made a sign to come to us, which they did. Firing ceased, Major Griffiths and a Mr. Blewitt accompanied the party to negotiate with a neighbouring chief for a certain sum of money to let us proceed to Jellallabad, a great number of Affghans came up the hill, and appeared friendly with our people until they commenced snatching swords and pistols from the officers; this we could not stand, but drove them from the hill, and the fight commenced again. After two hours, during which we drove the Affghans several times down the hill, our little band (with the exception of about (20) twenty men and a few officers of different regiments) being either killed or wounded, the enemy suddenly rushed upon us with their knives and an awful scene took place, and ended in the massacre of all except myself, Serjeant Fair (our Mess Serjt.) and seven men, that the more than usual humanity displayed by Affghans were induced to spare. In the conflict my posteeen flew open and exposed the Colour; thinking I was some great man from looking so flash, I was seized by two fellows (after my sword dropped from my hand by a severe cut on the shoulder, and my pistol missing fire), who hurried me from this spot to a distance, took my clothes from off me, except my trousers and cap, led me away to a village, by command of some horsemen that were on the road, and I was made over to the head man of the village, who treated me well, and had my wound attended to. Here I remained a month, seeing occasionally a couple of men of my regt. who were detained in an adjoining village. At the end of a month I was handed over to Akbar Khan, and joined the ladies and the other officers at Lughman. In the last struggle Collins, Hogg, Cumberland, Swinton and Dr. Primrose were killed, and about a dozen other officers, Stewart, of the Artillery, and Hamilton, of the 5th Cavalry, amongst them. In making through the Khoord Cabul Pass Leighton was shot in the thigh, and fell from his horse; afterwards, in coming through the Tazeen Pass, he and White (who was wounded in the head) were in kajowahs, the enemy got amongst the people, dragged away the camel with Leighton and White upon it, and, I fear, they were deliberately killed. Every enquiry concerning Leighton and White has been made since we arrived here, which is close to Tazeen, but no tidings have been heard of them, and had they been taken into Cabul, we should certainly have heard before this. Wade was killed at Jugdulluck. Evans is a lucky fellow in being left at Cabul in charge of sick and wounded European soldiers, but for safety they have been moved six marches from Cabul. Mackrell left his money to his daughter, about 90,000 rupees, but the will is lost, it was in poor Leighton's possession. Evans and myself were on the committee to examine his effects, and can swear to the will; were also on the committee to award passage money, and a provision to take Mrs. McCrea to England, the sum, I forget what it

was, but it was everything we could give her; the papers were made out and signed to be sent to Calcutta, but we were never able to send them. I lost everything I possessed, my little tent, eatables and Kidmudgar's traps went the first day, the pony took fright at the firing and got away, the next night I lost Master Jack (Tom's pony), he got off by pulling up his peg, his office was to carry grain and Bass ale. The horse I bought for Tom carried my trunks and bedding. I lost him and my traps in the Tazeen Pass (near to this), my riding horse cost 150 rupees, he was shot in the jaws and in the ribs, and, as I said before, he fell, and I was obliged to leave him. My bearer, the Sayce, and Kidmudgar got as far as Jugdulluck, but very foot sore, I never saw them afterwards, nor have I been able to learn that either of them reached Jellallabad. Though a great many of the officers and men were severe sufferers from frost and laying on the snow, I escaped by always taking the precaution to wrap the sheepskin that I had upon the saddle round my feet when I laid down, but I have suffered from rheumatism and have it still about me. My wound, which is from my right shoulder a long way down my blade bone, is an ugly wound, but it is quite healed, the cut was made through a sheepskin posteen, under which the Colour was concealed, laying over my right shoulder, that thick mussoorie coat I used to wear at Kurnaul, a flannel and shirt; my sword fell from my hand, the pistol I had in my left hand missed fire. I threw it then upon the ground and gave myself up to be butchered; the man I tried to shoot seized me, together with his son-in-law, and dragged me down the hill, then took my clothes, the Colour and my money. I was eventually walked off to a village two miles away. This same man and his son-in-law, whose names are Meer Jawan, came afterwards to the village, where I was, with my telescope, to shew them how to use it. Afterwards this son-in-law and I became *thick*, he brought me back the Colour (though divested of the tassels and most of its tinsel) one day to my agreeable surprise; both the Colours have been nothing but like a bundle of ribbons for some years. The Gundamuk people assailed us on the side of the hill I happened to be, and by these people myself and the few men were spared. I was to have been ransomed for a thousand rupees, and all was settled, but the old malick of the village persuaded me to write to Capt. MacGregor at Jellallabad to give him more money. In the mean time Akbar Khan came into the neighbourhood, and the old rascal was obliged to hand me over to him; however, I laughed at him for losing his 1,000 Rs., and told him I would learn no more prayers. It is to me a miracle that I should have escaped with a whole skin through all our fights at Cabul, and in our retreat therefrom, until the last conflict. I am the only officer surviving who witnessed the last and total annihilation of the 44th Regt., I regret to say. It is gratifying to know that the Commander-in-Chief in India has expressed himself in approval of my conduct, and that he has promised to promote me, but here are six companies vacant in the 44th, and Young and Evans now only senior to me to fill two of them. I intend writing to him by the first opportunity on the subject. I have received a letter from the Horse Guards informing me that Tom

is noted for a commission; now if you know anyone, or if you know anyone that knows anyone that is acquainted with either the Lady Nicolls or the Misses Nicolls, to mention that I have a big son, who is noted for a commission at the Horse Guards, with the interest that is now exerted in my behalf, and the vacant ensigncies occasioned by the late disasters, would, I think, insure Tom a commission almost immediately, if it could be so managed to reach the ears of Sir Jasper Nicolls; does Mrs. Leighton visit the ladies in question, or does anybody that you know? at all events try in what way you can to make interest in that quarter. My mind is greatly relieved to find that arrangements have been made to give you a monthly allowance from my pay. I also hope you receive something from the Cabul Relief Fund. Negotiations, I believe, are going on to obtain our release, but in the present state of affairs it is impossible to say when that will occur, it is a difficult matter to come to an understanding upon. We have waited patiently upwards of four months, and we must wait with patience now, until the time arrives for our release. We all wear Affghan dresses of one sort or the other except Shelton, who has not adopted them; he looks the picture of misery, with a great big grey beard and moustachios, he meets with little courtesy, everyone thinking himself on an equality with the other. None of us have shaved since we left Cabul, a young lad of my own regt. attends upon me, and Shelton has got another lad; the remainder of the men, 17, were left at Buddeeabad in Lughman, but we hear they are to be given up, and sent into Jellallabad immediately. In mentioning that Dr. Balfour and young Gray were killed during our march, I should have told you that they left the column during the night in company with some other officers to try to reach Jellallabad, a distance of 30 miles, but only one of them was lucky enough to get in, it was Dr. Brydon, the rest met with their deaths on the road. Having written a tolerably lengthy account of our disasters, with a cover of a book in lieu of a table, and squatted upon the ground, to say nothing of a rheumatic wrist, I may now come to a conclusion. By the way, I am glad you have written to my brother, his regt. is in Ireland. A great many newspapers have been sent to us from Jellallabad and a little money. I received seven Derby newspapers but no letter from home. I see my niece Harriet is married. General Elphinstone you will have heard before this died a short time ago, and his remains taken to Jellallabad. Akbar Khan (our retainer), in spite of all that the newspapers say about him, has treated us well since we have been his prisoners, he is by far the less bigotted of the chiefs, and had it not been for their counsels, I have no doubt we should have been released long ago. He is a laughing, merry fellow, and he is the same even under adversity. Tell Emma I thank her for the slippers she worked for me. I hope to live to wear them at home, and the shirts, etc., alluded to in your letter. I shall travel down to Hindoostan in very light marching order. Marshall is amongst the men that are saved, but he is badly wounded and has lost all his toes from frost; singular to say that the two men belonging to my company who have been saved are both drummers. Make my best regards to Mrs. Halahan, and to Mrs. Leighton. Mrs.

Wade, I take it, is with her brother; how much happier would it have made me could I have sent more cheering accounts of their husbands. Freddy and Harriet scarcely recollect me. Freddy does not remember that I used to call him old chap, and Harriet Mota Missy. I scarcely recollect the young one's features, has she got well over her teething? When it pleases God to release us I shall not be long before I rejoin you all. I then expect to find you in rude health, blooming and beautiful, with these my good wishes and best love to you and the children.

Believe me, thy affectionate husband,

(Signed) J. A. SOUTER.

Since writing this letter we have been suddenly moved to within five miles of Cabul.

29th May, 1842.

MY DEAR FENWICK,

In my letter to Forester which I wrote last night, I requested him to tell you that, owing to the short notice received, I was not able to scratch even a line to you by Troup, whose second mission to Jellallabad is very sudden, but finding that he is to call here for Lawrence (who is to accompany him) on his way, I am in hopes to be able to have a few lines written before he arrives. I received yours of the 24th and eight small gold pieces sent me by MacGregor, for which, when you see him, return him my thanks. I am obliged to you for having sent on all my letters. Did you approve of my letter to Col. Luard? but I omitted to say that at Brigadier Shelton's request, I made the Colour over to him. I mention this because I see the newspapers have it that he took the Colours from me. They have got such a pack of lies into the newspapers regarding what occurred during our retreat, that I am almost induced to take up my pen in order to set them right, for they will not do justice to our service. I do not believe a hundred shots were fired by Sepoys after our first march out of cantonments. This I know, that the *whole* brunt of the fight coming through the Khoord Cabul Pass, fell entirely upon the 44th, for them I commanded. Scott and Leighton were wounded entering the Pass; the 37th N.I. that composed the rear guard with us suffered the Affghans to take their muskets and clothes from them without offering the slightest resistance, and their officers must have quitted them in disgust for not one of them was to be seen, and after we quitted Koord Cabul not an armed Sepoy was to be seen, excepting a few of the 5th N. Cavalry, the column was protected only by the 44th Regt. and a few artillery men up to its total annihilation. They talk of the horse artillery having behaved nobly, and that they died at their guns, it might have been added that not a few of them were gloriously drunk at the time, and so were several of the 44th; in distributing their praise, deal it out fairly, that is all I ask. Shelton does not appear by any means so anxious to obtain his freedom as he did at one time—a few things in the newspapers meet his eyes occasionally that cannot be very pleasing to his feelings. Matters are

looking more favourable, I am glad to say, and our release now I believe rests more with Pollock than Akbar Khan, for I understand he has agreed to all the terms proposed by Pollock, I therefore trust the mission of Troup's will finally settle the business. Troup will take charge of anything for me not *too* bulky, a number or two of Bentley's or magazines of that kind and size will not encumber him. I have accepted Forester's offer and have asked him to send me a few bundles of cigars; I am begging at present from Mein, with whom I chum; the fork and spoon you sent me I received, but not the knife, the spoon is broken. Assist Forester to make me up a small parcel, though I suspect your wants are almost on a par with my own. Mein desires his regards, *entre nous* he has had his beard dyed, and so has Shelton and Boyd, and Anderson, Magratte and I are thinking of following their example. Mrs. Trevor was confined of a daughter some days ago, and Mrs. Sturt on Sunday last of a daughter also. Waller and Mackenzie who have been very ill indeed are recovering. We have had many cases of fever amongst us, and I have been slightly indisposed with the rest. The travellers are preparing to start, so here closes my letter; remember me kindly to King, to Cox, to Gerrard when you see him, and all enquiring friends, and trusting you are well on your legs again from fever.

Believe me, sincerely yours,

(Signed) J. H. SOUTER.

Casualties of men of H.M.'s 44th Regt. during retreat from Cabul. The regiment marched from Cabul on the 6th Janry., 1842, with 438 fighting men, in which number 12 boys and 34 sick are included :—

Janry. 6th.	To Banyram,	6 miles	1 man killed.
" 7th.	" Boodhak,	4 do.	16 men "
" 8th.	" Khoord Cabul,	9 do.	35 " "
" 9th.	Halted.		—
" 10th.	" Tazeen,	10 do.	58 " "
" 10th & 11th.	Night march to Jugdulluck		... 94	" "
" 12th.	Halt. In attacks during this day		82	" "
" 12th.	Night on the road to Gundamuk		68	" "
" 13th.	Gundamuk		65	" "
	Prisoners at Gundamuk		7	" "
	Do. at Jugdulluck		2	" "
	Do. at Tazeen		8	" "
	Do. at Soorkab		2	" "
Total				438 " "

Near Cabul,
29th July, 1842.

(Signed) J. SHELTON,
Lieut.-Col., 44th Regt.

**DIARY OF LIEUTENANT C. F. TROWER,
33rd BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY,
DURING THE AFGHAN WAR OF 1842.**

(From a manuscript in the Royal United Service Institution.)

THIS diary, which is admirably and very fully illustrated in pen and ink, sepia and watercolour, commences on the 29th April, 1842, on which date Lieutenant Trower was ordered to proceed from Ferozepore to Peshawar in charge of a convoy consisting of 279 camel loads of ordnance stores and camp equipage for the British forces in Afghanistan. The convoy was escorted by a company of sappers and miners with the engineer park, under Lieutenants Goodwyne and Irwine of the Engineers, and two duffadars and eighteen troopers of the 4th Irregular Cavalry. Lieutenant Trower was also accompanied by Lieutenant Harris, 1st Light Cavalry, who was proceeding to join his corps. Lieutenant Trower's account of his march, the passage of the Sutlej, the Chenab, the Jhelum, and the Indus at Attock, his remarks on the country and on the Sikh army are all of great interest. Peshawar was reached on the 20th June, and it was not until the 18th August that the diarist records the receipt of orders for the advance on Cabul. As the journal is too long for publication in full in these pages, it has been judged best to commence the narrative on 18th August, and to give only the record of the advance through the Khyber with the army under General Pollock, the retirement, and the arrival again at Ferozepore, when the diary ends.

PESHAWAR, AUGUST 18TH.—To-day came the welcome news that the army is to advance to Cabul before returning to the provinces. This sudden determination, so much at variance with all the previous arrangements that foretold our immediate return, has been thus caused : It appears that when General Nott received his instructions at Candahar to retire, he wrote to know "by what route—whether via Cabul or the Bolan Pass?" It was a noble question and the result has been, that the G.G. has given him the option of either route, and that gallant old soldier immediately availed himself of this discretionary power, and having made his arrangements for carriage and 40 days' provisions left Candahar for Cabul with his artillery, cavalry and one European and six native regiments. Brigadier England with a sufficient force remains at Candahar until he shall hear of Nott's arrival at Cabul, when he is to retire through the Bolan Pass. In the meantime,

Pollock's force, minus four native regiments left for the protection of his communications, is to advance from this side on Cabul and meet Nott there on the 15th of September, when after having settled our differences there the combined armies are to retire to Peshawar, which they expect to reach by the middle of October. Nott's arrangements which I have seen, together with the correspondence, are in my opinion admirable, and one material point in them, is that Pollock should not go on to Cabul itself, but occupy the passes on this side and as he retires, leave depôts of grain and forage for Nott's force. I almost fear however that he will endeavour to take his share in the glory anticipated and push on to Cabul, in which event, as the communication between the two armies must be very uncertain, some "contre-temps" will infallibly occur, and dim the glory otherwise certainly in store for our arms. I wrote on receipt of this news, begging to be relieved from all my duties here, and to be permitted to join my regiment, and I am most anxiously awaiting the order. Pollock's army is much crippled for want of carriage: he can carry no tents for his Sipahies and only seven days' provisions. If therefore the combined movements are not well timed, if he should push on before Nott's arrival is certain, he runs in my opinion a fair chance of ruining his force in the passes from cold and starvation, even if no other enemies appear. *Nous verrons!*

ALI MUSJID, AUGUST 25TH.—On the 22nd, I received the order for which I had applied to join my regiment now forming a part of the advanced army going to Cabul, and yesterday at 2 a.m., having previously run my little baggage up to Ali Musjid, I started from Peshawar with an escort of ten Sowars. It had been my intention to have pushed on to Dhakka to-day, but last night news was brought in from our outposts that about 1,000 of the Malikdeen Khail had taken up a position on the road near Lunde Khaneh, about 8 miles from hence, and that they were threatening an attack on that post. They plundered the Carfila of camels that went yesterday, killed and wounded a few of our men, and succeeded in carrying off 29 camels and some bullocks. The guard however fought well and carried the Carfila into Dhakka. Mackeson has therefore directed the present Carfila of mules to halt until to-morrow, when a strong party can accompany it. Ali Musjid does not improve upon a further acquaintance—its only recommendation is that the nights are cool and the air sweet—which from the reverse being the case at Peshawar, was to me a very delightful contrast. At the foot of the perpendicular face of the rock is the impression of a gigantic horse-shoe, regarding which there is a legend that it is the imprint of the foot of Borâk, the prophet's horse, which he is said to have ridden up this ascent—a very tolerable feat even for Mahomet. The spot is held in great veneration and the tradition very universally believed by the Khyburrees.

AUGUST 26TH.—At 6 a.m. with a strong escort of 400 men to protect the baggage mules, and in company with Corsar of the 64th¹

¹ Evidently the 64th Bengal Native Infantry is meant.

who commands the levies here, I left Ali Musjid, and proceeded to Lunde Khaneh, 12 miles. For the first two miles the road is a continuation of the narrow gorge, with abrupt and lofty precipices on either side, but upon reaching the neighbourhood of "Gurreelalabeg" the country becomes more open. This village of which I give a sketch, and of a curious old mound, somewhat similar to that at Manikyala, is the residence of Alladad Khan, the King of the Khyber. His Majesty was absent but I saw his son, a most dirty-looking youth, amongst a race proverbially filthy. I really should imagine that they never change their clothes, but suffer them to rot off, and the story is current, that they calculate their age by the number of suits they have had. For instance, a man asking an old Khyburee, evidently 60 years of age, how old he was, receives for a reply, "How old? why this is my second suit." About 3 miles from this village and 9 from Ali Musjid commences the descent of the Lunde Khaneh Pass, which is long and very abrupt, and must have been, until the late admirable road was made by my friend Goodwyne, very difficult. This is by far the most hazardous part of the whole Khyber, and would be the most dangerous to force.

AUGUST 27TH.—At daybreak started for Dhakka, 8 miles, the road more level but stony, and the Shinwarries, who inhabit this part of the pass, were seen on the hill tops and at one time I thought would have attacked us, but fortunately a large return guard made its appearance as they were collecting and descending the hill, and I suppose they thought better of it. It was lucky for me they did so, for I had but 20 Esuffzyes with me. About a mile and a half from Dhakka, you emerge from the pass, and come upon a large stony plain, through which runs the Cabul river. On its banks I hailed with great pleasure the white tents of the 3rd Brigade. On the opposite shore is the fort of Lulpoora, the residence of Toorabaz Khan, almost the only chief who has throughout remained faithful to us.

AUGUST 28TH.—Forwarded my baggage to Chardeh, 22 miles, and remained at Dhakka, as I have horses laid on the road, and intend to ride in the 42 miles to Jellalabad direct.

AUGUST 29TH, CHARDEH.—I started when the moon rose, about 11 p.m., with four of Tait's Irregular Horse, intending, as before stated, to ride in at once to Jellalabad, but on the road I was taken rather seriously unwell, and have consequently been obliged to pass the day here under a tree. The village, which is a straggling dirty-looking place, belongs to Akalul Khan, a friendly chief, to whom I have letters. The road from Dhakka is tolerably good, and thro' an open country except for about half a mile thro' the "Chota Khyber Pass." I was too unwell to note the appearance of the country particularly, but many parts of the country and road are flooded. The 2nd Brigade of the army in advance at Mammoo Khail, about 4 miles beyond Gundamuck, has had a brush with the enemy, who met it there. We succeeded in capturing and burning the fort and village, but considering the small numbers engaged, our loss (50 in killed and wounded, including amongst the latter three officers) was great. The effect

produced has been good, as the Ghilzei chief and some 2,000 men have come in. My corps was not engaged.

AUGUST 30TH, JELLALABAD.—As the moon rose I started with my small party of eight Esuffzyes and four of Tait's horse and we proceeded for about 6 or 7 miles without any inconvenience, along the stony road that runs thro' a desert, dangerous, on account of the frequent simoons, to pass during the day. We had passed this danger and just entered a defile between two low ranges of hills, which extends for about three miles, when suddenly a volley from both sides was fired into my party, and about 40 or 50 men made a rush down on my baggage. One mule alarmed by the firing cast her load and bolted. As quickly as I could and before the robbers could reach us, I got my small party to the rear with the exception of three whom I directed to hurry on with my remaining mules, whilst I endeavoured to check the attacks on our rear. In the first charge I made with three troopers I recovered my mule, but the fire was too hot to permit of my suffering the risk of dismounting my troopers and bringing away the load which was thrown, and I accordingly determined to sacrifice it and limit my exertions to the defence of the remainder. Taking advantage of any slopes in the ground or when the enemy pressed too close on us, we charged back and followed them firing our matchlocks at them, when they invariably fled and were up the hills in a second. This desultory kind of fighting continued for the three miles whilst we were in the pass, and fortunately day broke as we reached the plains and the villains were not bold enough to attack us there. But all through the defile they kept firing upon us, every now and then attempting to come down upon us, and as often sent flying back by our charges at them. One man of my little party was killed, but was not missed until day-break, and two wounded, and the greater part of my small supply of linen and all my servants' clothes were lost. It was merciful that our loss was so small, for the running fight lasted a good half-hour, during which I suppose not less than 400 shots were fired at us, but the balls chiefly went whizzing over our heads, as I could plainly hear. All with me behaved well and stood by me manfully, except one Punjabee Saies who at the first volley took to his heels and shot ahead like an arrow. About five miles on, and after sunrise, we discovered the poor frightened fool squatting under a rock like a hare on its form. He has had his punishment in the jeers of his fellow servants. I am very much inclined to think, that a general rising of the Khails or tribes in our rear will soon take place. This attack upon me is the opening of the ball, the road having previously been considered perfectly safe. How grateful I should be for the attack of illness that prevented my riding on at once to Jellalabad with a couple of troopers, as I had intended. About 9 a.m. I reached Jellalabad, 22 miles.

AUGUST 31ST, JELLALABAD.—This fortress, which is a large mud building, and has been greatly improved, as to its defences, by our officers, is situated about a quarter of a mile from the banks of the Cabul river, which here runs thro' a beautiful green valley, abounding in little forts and dark foliage. Lofty mountains are on

three sides, and raising its still snowy head above them all towers the "Sufed Koh." The signs and traces of war however have been left here so as not only to offend the eye but the nostrils—"Oh! it smells to heaven." Never was I in such a putrid atmosphere, arising from the carcasses of dead camels and other carrion, strewed around the fort in every direction. The numerous forts and gardens have all been demolished and our extensive cantonments to the east and south of the fortress are now deserted, the two regiments composing the garrison being within its walls. The effect of all these miles of river are melancholy to look upon. Within the fort all is life and bustle, works being repaired, and irregularities being filled up and all the noise and din of military preparation. As I have to take charge of a large convoy of elephants, camels and 600 bullocks, with grain for the army in advance and start with the moon to-morrow morning, I have pitched outside, near the Cabul gate, not far from "Fifer's hill" of notoriety, and also not far from the scene of the grand engagement with Achar on the 7th April last. From what I witness here with reference to our preparations and means, I despair of success in this advance. I fear it is an ill-judged measure, if, as report says, the force is to go to Cabul. But I will wait a day or two and learn more, before making up my mind.

SEPTEMBER 1ST.—Marched at 2 a.m. with my convoy, reached Futhiabad at 2 p.m. fagged with my 12 hours' ride at a snail's pace. The bullocks could not travel after 8 o'clock when it became hot. Rejoined with great delight the Headquarters of my own regiment, from which I had been absent nearly nine years.

SEPTEMBER 2ND.—"Futteh Jung," having effected his escape from Cabul, came into Pollock's camp last night, and was greeted with a royal salute. It is said, that if we were to advance, the chiefs, seeing that we really did intend resisting them, would all come in and no opposition be met with. I do not see how we can advance. To move the 2nd Brigade, which left this morning, 500 camels had to come back from Gundamuck, and 300 from our brigade were also indented for. Thus it appears that to get on even 2 brigades, we require 800 more camels. I fear that our brigade (the 4th) will have to be left behind at Gundamuck, notwithstanding that we have orders to make arrangements to carry 8 days' provisions for ourselves and camp followers, as we best can. The General's camp was fired upon last night and several holes made through the mess tent of the 9th Foot. A party of our cavalry grass cutters were attacked and cut up at noon this day and the head man of the village of "Bala Bagh" close to our camp was murdered by the enemy for assisting us with supplies. A party of our horse endeavoured to overtake them, but only succeeded in killing one man.

SEPTEMBER 3RD.—Shifted our ground of encampment to the site lately occupied by the 2nd Brigade, across the river. Rain and hail preceded by such a dust-storm.

SEPTEMBER 4TH.—Marched to Neemla, 8 miles, the road stony but tolerably level. We are encamped in a basin, amongst the small hills,

with abundant forage about, and beautiful streams running through our camp. The "Sufed Koh," which appears to have donned a white nightcap since the last two days, appears close above us. The village here is demolished, but a beautiful garden of immense plane trees and cypresses planted alternately is still flourishing. The whole garden is impervious to the sun, and a cooler or more luxuriant retreat during the summer months cannot be conceived. The neighbourhood is "Yaghi," *i.e.*, in rebellion, or literally "discontented" and no one can with safety leave the limits of camp. Several small parties of the enemy were hovering about.

SEPTEMBER 5TH.—Marched to Gundamuck, 6 miles, to accomplish which occupied eight hours, from 4 a.m. to noon. The road was rather hilly, yet by no means bad, but the horses of the artillery are in such wretched condition that they could not drag the guns, which working parties from the infantry were obliged to pull up. I never witnessed such a scene as our march—no order—no arrangement! Artillery, cavalry, infantry and baggage all mixed together, and consequently impeding each other. Had we but an active enemy every man might have been cut up. God only knows how we shall get on! This march of only 6 miles killed some 40 camels, out of our already crippled means. A mile from the General's camp are the ruins of a fine old bridge of three arches, the centre one of an enormous span. It is now impassable. Passed thro' the General's camp and encamped about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles in advance.

SEPTEMBER 6TH.—It has been decided that a wing of my Regiment is to remain behind, and at 11 o'clock p.m. I received orders to march with 2 companies back to Bala Bagh, near Futhiabad. There were no men off duty in the lines and so, tho' directed to march at 12 o'clock, it was 4 a.m. before I started, but before even reaching the other camp, a counter order came and back we went again, after being harassed all night. Two H.A. guns, 2 squadrons of cavalry and a wing of my corps and of the 60th, are to prepare an entrenched camp here, and hold Gundamuck. Most unjustly I have been selected to remain, and for this reason, that the Major commanding the wing was not fit to be trusted alone, and could not get on without me! This was what the Colonel assigned on my representing the injustice done me. I cannot express my disappointment after having travelled so far, and with such difficulty having got away from Peshawar, to find myself again debarred from all chance of seeing Cabul. At 4 p.m. shifted ground to where the camp is to be, the very worst spot that could have been selected. The General never condescended to look at it, and altho' he has been idle here for weeks, it was only this evening the working parties commenced their labours. I am sick and suffering slightly from fever, caused I fancy by the extreme contrast between the days and nights. The latter are piercingly cold and no number of blankets keep one warm, whilst the former are insufferably hot. The sudden change that immediately occurs at sunset is almost miraculous.

SEPTEMBER 7TH.—The 1st Division and Head Quarters marched in progress to Cabul. The rear guard did not leave the ground until

noon, and such confusion I never saw. We ourselves in our to-be-entrenched camp (the future "illustrious garrison") are in rather a ticklish situation, and shall have to do well to hold our own: indeed General Sale last year with his entire brigade could not do so: but for the force preceding, it is very fortunate that a "sweet little cherub" sits up aloft: for everything seems to be left to Providence. Two thousand loads of commissariat stores were abandoned at Futhiabad and the party of ours, coming from thence, were peppered at all the way from Neemla. Nearly an equal number are left on the ground this morning, and we are trying to bring it in on private carriage, with picquets out to keep the enemy off from plundering. Pollock will I daresay reach Cabul. Hurrying on in advance, he neither knows, nor from all accounts cares much for what happens in his rear. It will be thought a fine feat, and if the prisoners are recovered, the *éclat* will be great, and he will have "his blushing honors thick upon him." He will be praised by the public prints and his despatches will look well on paper, but those only on this spot know what share of credit is justly his due, and how severe are hardships needlessly inflicted on humble officers, many of whom have sacrificed their all, and are proceeding with strictly nothing but what they wear on their persons. There is a fine spirit pervading all, but a willing horse may be ridden to death, and the feat I think does not add to the reputation of the rider. I am not inclined to grumble at hardships, but it is cruel to see the reckless way in which they are inflicted and when a little consideration and method might evade them. We discharged our first few shots with the enemy to-day. Working all day with my men at the entrenchments, which has not done my fever good. I wish we had a man with a *head* to command! It is not so I fear!

SEPTEMBER 8TH.—The 2nd Division marched this morning and now we are fairly afloat and left to ourselves. I have been looting the abandoned stores and have managed to lay up nearly a month's supplies for my cattle and camp followers, and something also for the men of my company. This I think is necessary, for I believe we have but four days' provisions as yet. In wandering about near the limits of camp a very melancholy sight was met with—the remains of the last party of the 44th Foot which contrived to fight its way as far as this. The small conical hill on which the last stand was made is close to us, covered with skeletons, which, the fair hair still attached to the skulls of many, prove to have belonged to these unfortunate soldiers. One had a black leather stock such as is worn by privates still encircling the bones of the neck. In the little forts around us (now demolished) names of some, who succeeded in concealing themselves for a day or two, are scratched on the walls. Altogether the associations connected with our post, and the very position itself, are anything but cheering. However, under Providence, we trust with bold hearts and stout hands to hold our own for a month or six weeks, until the force returns from Cabul.

SEPTEMBER 13TH.—Hitherto the enemy have not attempted to molest us in any way, and all kinds of supplies and grapes of the finest

description are daily brought into camp. These latter are sold for one rupee a donkey load. We have by our exertions (no thanks to the General who never gave us a thought) contrived now to lay in rations for nearly a month and can readily procure more. On the 11th a Sipahie of my company who must needs wander from camp never returned, he is supposed to have been cut up. Numerous letters and books, being property formerly plundered from our Cabul troops, have been found in a small ruined fort not far from our camp. We have heard but once from the advanced troops. They were opposed at Jugdulluck, but very quickly drove the Afghans from that pass, not however without suffering a loss of 64 in killed and wounded, including amongst the former an officer of the 66th, Nugent, and amongst the latter General Sale, who was again slightly wounded. Another son of the late King, and one also of the Zeman Shah, came into our camp for protection on the 10th. The inhabitants it appears are deserting Cabul by hundreds. General Nott having defeated the Governor of Ghuznee and his forces, who advanced to meet him, that fortress has been evacuated and I hope is now levelled. Large supplies of our own ammunition unpacked and untouched by the Afghans were here recovered.

We have nearly completed our works, and just by way of change, and to break this monotonous and stupid life we are leading, I wish the enemy would try their strength. They look well and are I think strong.

SEPTEMBER 17TH.—Still unmolested. No news from the advance since passing the Huft Kotal, where again the enemy were routed and two of our guns lost at Cabul recaptured. Particulars of the action have not been received, but it is known that Acbar Khan here commanded in person, and that upon our forcing the pass, he fled with Captains Troup and Lawrence, who are prisoners with him, to the Adamzei country, and that he is now at a fort called Soorkab, about 40 miles from hence. A Cosid arrived last night and brought the news of Pollock's arrival at Cabul on the 15th. General Nott, having levelled Ghuznee to the earth, was to be there also on the following day. The gates of Cabul were closed, but the city was entirely deserted. Some few of the late Shah's followers had possession of the Bala Hissar, and the Kuzzelbashies, who were coming in to meet the General, held their own quarters at the back of the city. We have received no letters, but I fancy the Cosid's story is tolerably correct.

SEPTEMBER 18TH.—Last night at mess I proposed that some of the officers should make up a party and proceed this morning to the hill about four miles from our camp, where the skeletons of the poor remnant of the Cabul army were still lying exposed, and bury them. We accordingly mounted 12 European Horse Artillery men, and with a party of Afghan Irregulars from Capt. Thomas' corps, and with pickaxes and shovels, we started at sunrise. On reaching the particular hill as painful a sight as it was possible to witness met our eyes. The whole hill side was covered with the skeletons of Europeans, many dreadfully cut and mutilated. We dug a shallow sort of a grave and

consigned within it, rearing up over the pile a large heap of stones, 161 skeletons. Amongst them, the body of poor Percy Hamilton of the 5th L.C., an old friend of mine, was recognized. The skin over the face, altho' dried, was perfect, his hair and whiskers were in good preservation, but the feature that enabled us to be certain as to his identity was a tooth in the upper jaw, what was broken in a peculiar manner, and regarding which he himself when alive, used to make many a joke. From the length and peculiar fashion of wearing the hair, we recognized also the remains of two other officers—one of them being, as we all thought, Colonel Chambers. It was a melancholy work, and should have been performed long ago; however I am glad to have originated and to have taken a part in it. Just as we had nearly finished our labours, an alarm was given of a party of horse coming down upon us, and sure enough, when we looked up, there they were tearing along the opposite hill. We formed up our party immediately and prepared for attack and proceeded carefully along on our return for about two miles, when we discovered, that the party of cavalry belonged to the Seiks, who were out for a "tamasha" as they said, and to exercise their horses. The Esuffzyes of Thomas' corps worked right well and willingly in assisting us to collect the skeletons, and in heaping them all up together. I do not believe that any native troops in India would have behaved as they did this morning, making no objections to carrying the skeletons, and showing themselves as free from all prejudices on this point as any European could be. A few Afghans watched our proceedings, and kept along our flanks on our return, and one in particular most valiantly kept flourishing his sword; but a small party sent to the heights soon frightened them away and we reached camp, without any accident, about 10 a.m.

SEPTEMBER 20TH.—Fired a rough salute in honor of the British Flag being again placed on the citadel of Bala Hissar. Letters from the advance were received yesterday, confirming most of the news brought by the Cosid. Pollock arrived on the 16th, Nott on the 17th. From the force under the latter officer a brigade has been detached to Bameean via the Goorbun Pass to support the Kuzzelbashies, who under Khan Shereen Khan had proceeded there at the General's desire, to endeavour to secure our prisoners. God grant they may succeed! but the character of the chief (Mahomed Shah Khan, Ghilzei) under whose charge all our prisoners are placed by Acbar, does not afford room for much hope, for he is said to be active, bold, cruel and fanatical to a degree. The first qualities will in all probability ensure him from being surprised, and the latter make me fear that if hard pressed, he would sacrifice the lives of his charges, rather than lose them.

SEPTEMBER 22ND.—Another Cosid arrived to-day. He had been entrusted with despatches from General Pollock's force, but was seized by the Ghilzeis in the passes, had his papers taken from him, and arrived here severely wounded, having narrowly escaped with his life. He reports that the party sent towards Bameean have been completely successful; that at Syghan, a fort two marches beyond Bameean, they

surprised the chief who had charge of the prisoners, recaptured them all, and that every one is now safely lodged in Pollock's camp. Khan Shereen Khan, the chief of the Kuzzelbashs, who effected this rescue, has received a lac of rupees for his labours. It is to be hoped that as now all our avowed objects have been gained, we shall not much longer remain in this country. What a joyful day it will be for all when we recross the Indus at Attock. The native troops are half mad with delight at the report of the recapture of our prisoners; they have all along recognized that our Government would never quit this country without them, and had made up their minds to pass another winter here amidst the inhospitable snows of Cabul, dreaded by them a hundred fold more than any enemy they have ever met. Indeed for the Afghans, as an enemy, they have a great contempt: in my opinion not unmerited, for except at following up a retreating force, they are despicable soldiers. But now as an old Soobadar told me this morning, "Burre burrosa hye, ke is moluk se chulenga"; they have great hopes that they shall return. Our native troops have behaved nobly throughout and deserve well from their masters. I always thought well of them, and believed that when properly led and under good officers, they would do all that could be expected from any troops, but they have even risen in my opinion since I have been up here with them and seen them work.

SEPTEMBER 24TH.—Letters from General Pollock's camp received to-day confirm the Cosid's story in almost all particulars. Captain Bygrave is the only one of our prisoners missing, and he is with Mahomed Acbar. All our guns, and several of the Europeans, were also recovered. The celebrated covered bazaar of Cabul is to be destroyed, and the army, leaving Futteh Jung in the Bala Hissar, are to commence their homeward march on the 15th of next month.

SEPTEMBER 25TH.—More letters from the advance giving particulars. Of the prisoners it appears Troup and Dr. Campbell and Captain Bygrave were with Acbar at the time he opposed us at Tazeen. During the engagement the two former contrived to escape over to our forces. Four officers were wounded at Tazeen and 160 killed and wounded on our side. The Afghans fought desperately and defended every peak, from which they were only dislodged at the point of the bayonet. Mahomed Acbar might have been seized by a party of the 3rd Dragoons, had it not been owing to the folly and vacillation of that much overlauded and overrated individual Sale. He recalled a squadron of that corps, just at the critical moment, when Acbar and numerous chiefs were at his mercy. It appears that the recovery of the prisoners was almost miraculous—an hour later than the arrival of the party sent to their rescue and they would have been beyond our reach, for the messenger from Acbar, with a letter, now in Pollock's possession, arrived an hour after our party with instructions to convey them at once to Bokhara, or, if unable to do so, to destroy them. I cannot conceive a moment of more thrilling interest than that on which Pollock's force first sighted the successful party on their return. A salute from the guns greeted their entrance into camp. I shall never

forget or forgive the injustice that prevented me from sharing in these scenes.

SEPTEMBER 30TH.—About a couple of miles from our camp in the direction of Neemla, and just beyond the bridge mentioned in my journal of the 5th instant, is a large and very curious white stone called by the natives the "Sufed Sung," to which certain peculiar properties are attributed. They say it is impossible to break a piece of it off, altho' by pounding another stone upon it, a portion can be reduced to powder which in this state they assert to be a sovereign remedy for toothaches. I rode there this morning taking 12 men of my company with me, for the villages about its neighbourhood are "yaghi," and endeavoured by all the means I could think of, except blasting, to break a piece of the stone, but without success. Some of the powder I have brought with me and shall see if the effects are as described. An officer of the 60th, a Captain Doughty, tried the remedy, when he himself was suffering from severe toothache, and declares that he received immediate relief. This is very curious, if true. Letters from Cabul received to-day. Bygrave, the only missing prisoner, arrived in Pollock's camp in safety. No particulars are given, but as he was known to be a favourite of Acbar's, I daresay he was permitted to go. Certainly Pollock's luck has been immense. When I reflect how the advance was undertaken, how shamefully the means were adapted to the ends proposed, what an utter absence of all arrangement and forethought existed, and then consider how one bit of success has followed another, until nothing further is left to be desired, I cannot but admit with thankfulness, how visible, how perceptibly visible, is the hand of Providence, and its mysterious workings throughout the whole affair. Surely never was such success gained, when the means to ensure it were so completely neglected. Never was there such undeserved good fortune as far as the measures of the General and his staff are concerned. The effect of all this will be great both in the provinces, and on our friends the Seiks. To witness the gathering of an army of 25 or 30,000 men, at such a distance from our own frontiers, will give the latter a tolerable idea of our immense resources, whilst the inhabitants of the former will perceive, that if we can so signally punish such distant enemies, there will be but little chance for offenders nearer home.

Of the Afghans I have had very good opportunities of judging. Numerous chiefs frequent our camp, and the bazaar outside, to which I daily adjourn to see them, is thronged with the natives from all the neighbouring hills and valleys. With the view of seeing more of them I have several of them constantly at my tent, and have entertained one as a personal attendant. I do not like them. They have few qualities, excepting personal good appearance, to make them liked. I have certainly seen amongst them some magnificent looking men, but even this advantage has been marred by their apparent love of filth. There is no such thing as a clean Afghan. Truth they know not the meaning of. I never heard such wilful, such needless liars. Their treachery is proverbial, even amongst themselves. Two brothers, chiefs of some tribes in the Kohistan, had long been at feud :

at length Gool Khan, the eldest, proposes an interview with his brother, points out the folly of longer continuing their disputes, and the mutual losses they had both suffered, and proposes a reconciliation, and as a commencement of better times asks his brother and the leaders of his "Khail" to a "ziaful." In the meantime the tent in which this meeting of reconciliation was to be held is all undermined, and the caverns filled with powder. Azeer Khan the younger brother and his chiefs to the number of about seventy are no sooner well seated, than the mine is exploded and the whole party blown half way to heaven. This is a true occurrence, and a good sample of their usual sincerity. Their avarice equals their good faith, and even in the quality of courage, for which before we knew them they always gained credit, they are very inferior to the Hindustanees. Throughout the whole campaign they have never once stood as a body when advanced upon. Small parties here and there, when possessing the advantages of strong ground, have occasionally (as they did at the Huft Kotal) shewn good fight: but they have never proved themselves a gallant race.

As another instance take the attack upon me by the Shinwarries between Chardeh and Jellalabad. They were more than four to one, and yet, even on their own ground amongst the passes, we kept them in check, and on our reaching the open plain, they dared not attack us. But the country they inhabit is beautiful beyond any I have ever seen, and rich and fertile, and its valleys beyond conception. There are two valleys close to us here, into which I have just peeped, for without a strong force no entrance is admitted, the people being "yaghi"—but these two valleys of Hissaruk and Ispahan could not be exceeded in loveliness by anything in the wide world, I should imagine. And then their noble mountains covered with magnificent fir and cedar, and in many instances capped with eternal snow. Oh! it is a beautiful country, yet I shall be right glad when I turn my back on it.

But notwithstanding the disappointments I have met with, in being kept behind and having had no opportunities of seeing active service, I rejoice, nevertheless, that I came up here. Besides seeing at least so much of a country, which probably will be rarely visited again by Englishmen, I have learnt one or two useful practical lessons. I have learnt the value exactly of newspaper accounts: I have learnt how far official despatches are to be trusted, I have learnt with what discrimination rewards and honours are bestowed, and what is the best way to gain them. Lastly I have learnt what an utter "humbug" (I have no other word to convey my meaning) campaigning on a large scale is. I have seen the writing of despatches entrusted to junior officers who had no business even to be present in the affair described. I have seen those despatches assert that such a one took a fort most gallantly when of my own knowledge I swear he never even saw it, the name of the party who really did carry it never being even mentioned. I have read in those despatches of the advance of the force in three columns with admirable precision and order, "and how the enemy were gallantly expelled from the strong position they

occupied," whereas I know the advance to have been a rush of a rabble rout in nearer 500 columns, without order or method of any kind, and that the enemy bolted at the first round of grape at 900 yards' distance.

All this kind of thing might be laughed at, but that it entails such injustice on those who really *do* deserve all that is so lavishly showered on the others. They however have the satisfaction of knowing that all present in camp know where to place the praise and credit. This should comfort Backhouse and Monteath, McKenzie of the Madras Army and poor Skinner, if living, and this should hallow the memory of Dennie and Percy Hamilton.

OCTOBER 3RD.—More news from Cabul. The two brigades under General McKaskill, which proceeded into the Kohistan with instructions to destroy Chareekar, found the enemy strongly posted at the Fort of Istalif. They were immediately attacked, and after some resistance routed completely. The celebrated chief Ameenoolah Khan commanded, and here was collected the whole of the plunder of Cabul, as well as all the women and females of the inhabitants. Considerable property was secured by our troops, as well as numerous women, many stands of arms (our own formerly), two six pounders and a number of Hindustanee prisoners. The defeat was most complete and it is said the enemy have entirely dispersed. Acbar Khan was not there. The same letters also mention that he sent in Captain Bygrave unconditionally with a letter in his own handwriting to the General. This was a liberal and noble act, which I imagine no other Afghan in the country would have done. But Acbar is undoubtedly the best of them and has often shewn traits of a fine character. The news of the return of the force on the 10th is corroborated, and it seems, that General Nott has brought away the famed sandal wood gates of "Ghuznee Shurreef" with him. This will be a most popular trophy to all our Hindoo subjects, the gates having been originally taken from one of their own most sacred temples (at Soomnat in Guzerat). Our loss at Istalif is not mentioned, but one officer of the 41st Foot was killed and an artillery officer wounded, besides Broadfoot, Orr, and Spencer of the 26th Regt. N.I.

It is singular that we have, so long remained unmolested in our camp here: for, very injudiciously I think, our present wise commander has been (contrary to orders) destroying and burning all the forts and villages within tolerable reach. Yesterday we attacked and burnt four, which were all blazing at the same time. This is not fair warfare, and not to my taste. Scarcely any resistance is made to our advance: in fact as the Afghans see us approach (and our parties are always small—about a company of foot usually and 40 troopers) they drive off their women and cattle to the hills, and from the large rocks on its side, fire a few long shots at us. During the destruction of some twenty or twenty-five forts only three or four men have been wounded and one killed. Our allies the Seiks, of whom we have 700 encamped close to us, amuse themselves in this way and it is the sort of work to suit them, but is unworthy of us, to say nothing of its exceeding bad

policy, for as we are directed to form a dépôt here and collect large supplies, it is surely our interest to conciliate and not needlessly irritate the neighbouring villagers.

OCTOBER 7TH.—I tried this morning to get a sketch of the entrance of the Hissaruck valley and rode out for that purpose about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles: but just as I had dismounted and was cutting my pencil to commence, the appearance of some 10 or 12 armed Afghans sneaking rapidly down the hill side, so as to get between me and the camp, made me retire at the double-quick. A part of Cabul has been destroyed by fire, and an attempt made by a large body of Afghan Horse to cut up two squadrons of the 1st L.C. The squadrons lost a number of men, but succeeded in bringing the forage party they were protecting safely into camp. Yesterday we had a fight nearer home. Golab Singh, the commander of the Seik troops at Neemla, tried to make a "chapao" on Kujjeer, a large village close under the hills. He got the worst of it, however, and had 15 men killed and a very large number wounded. I am heartily glad of it, for the Kujjeer Nawab has been hitherto very friendly, has abstained from molesting any of our parties and has assisted us greatly in supplies. It is fortunate that we have not much longer to remain here, for these Seiks being suffered to harass the neighbouring villages has quite prevented our getting in any further supplies. Yesterday also, thro' the means of the Nawab who is with us, we recovered 12 camels and 3,500 rupees in Company's paper, endorsed in favor of the 44th Foot. A poor Hindustanee woman and two boys who had been prisoners were also recovered: they had all lost their feet from the frost. They mention that in the village from which they were brought, there were two more Hindustanees, who refused to come back being very comfortable where they were.

OCTOBER 10TH.—Thermometer this morning at half an hour after sunrise was below 50° . The weather is now very cold and the natives suffering considerably in consequence. Within the last two days our grass cutters and camp followers who go for forage have been attacked and one poor fellow was killed. This system of annoying is the result I think of the conduct of the Seiks, for until they were molested the Afghans around us were quiet enough. Near Thuk Khan, I was again obliged to make a rapid retreat from the villagers coming down at me. I always leave my Saies and ride armed myself, so that if I keep a tolerable look out there is no great risk run.

OCTOBER 12TH.—We now get in our dāk from Cabul pretty regularly. One order received here yesterday has not a little frightened and disgusted some of our camp. Colonel Eckford, commanding at Jellalabad, has received instructions to collect wood and artificers and to make bricks, for the purpose of building barracks there. This I conceive to be merely a *political blind* intended to throw dust in the eyes of the various chiefs, who whilst thus occupied in making tenders and collecting materials, will suffer the force to slip quietly thro' the passes without trouble or loss. This cunning is not to my taste, nor do I think it wise. Our motives will never be appreciated by the Afghans, who will immediately set this sort of return down to the

effects of fear. Pollock is strong enough to force his way anywhere, and it is a well-known characteristic of the Afghans, that the more alacrity we show to fight, the less inclined they are to indulge us.

Although Futteh Jung (wise man!) has refused to remain at Cabul after our return, his younger brother, "Shahpoor," a youth of about 15 or 16 years of age, has been persuaded by the Kuzzelbash and Populzei chiefs to do so, and to endeavour to maintain his rights to the throne. He is a bold boy, for the chances are fifty to one that he is murdered within the month. We are collecting enormous supplies for the returning army and cutting down all the beautiful mulberry trees, the vineyards and pear trees, for firewood, forgetting the old Mosaic law as laid down in Deuteronomy that "When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them, for thou mayest eat of them and thou shalt not cut them down (for the tree of the field is man's life) to employ them in the siege." It is curious enough that no natives, especially Mahomedans, will, or do willingly, destroy any fruit trees, or others, in their warfare, and that they assign as a reason the very same one, that is given in the above quotation in parentheses, *viz.*, "that the tree of the field is man's life." The Seiks are almost the only race I know who do wantonly destroy trees, vineyards, &c., &c. Our allies alongside of our camp gave us a false alarm last night, by blazing away at imaginary enemies. As captain of the week I had to turn out, and prevented any of our picquets from being guilty of the same folly. The whole cause of the alarm was that one of the Seik camp followers was wandering outside the picquets, when the nearest sentry, without any challenge, shot him right thro' the heart, and for company's sake I suppose every other Seik sentry let off his matchlock also. Such a noise, and all for nothing, I never heard before.

OCTOBER 13TH.—Our forage parties are now daily attacked and the Afghans prowl about all night close to camp. Another camp follower of the Seiks was cut up within 30 yards of their sentries. I do not think our regular cavalry, who compose the forage escort, are doing their duty over well, for altho' the grass cutters have been often attacked, they have never once tried even to come to close quarters with the enemy. I am sorry for this, for I would gladly see this arm of the service recover from the stain that has been thrown upon it by many circumstances during this campaign. It is rather curious regarding this subject, that in the despatch of General Nott, the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, who suffered a very severe loss, far exceeding that of any other corps engaged at Nanee, are not thanked, or even mentioned. I hope there is no good cause for this silence but that it may have arisen from an oversight, what can be rectified hereafter. Conversing with some of the Seik troops this morning, I learnt a piece of news which may account, and not very improbably, for the order to build barracks at Jellalabad. They assert that General Avitabile has been ordered from Lahore to take possession of this part of the country, and that he is to come up with 12 regts. of infantry, 6 of cavalry and

6 troops of horse artillery. In this case, if we have ceded the country to our allies, it is very probable that the supplies ordered will be collected, and that the mystery regarding the occupation of the barracks will still be kept up as a blind until we leave the country. Time will shew. Old Avitabile will surely desert—he never will venture up into these inhospitable regions, for he appears from all accounts to have but small abstract love of fighting, and of that there will be plenty after our departure. These Seiks also told me another very poetical legend attached to a building with a very poetical name, *viz.*, the "Peri Mehal," a palace of the fairies at Hussan Abdal in the Punjab, of which spot I have given a sketch in a former book. This "Palace of the Fairies" is now old and ruinous, but in the days when Acbar and Humaroon, and the other Emperors of Delhi, resorted to Hussan Abdal as a summer residence, it was, as its remains still prove, a beautiful building and worthy of its name. The fairies being a constant race are still said to haunt the spot and keep their revels there, though the glory has departed from their palace, and if the seed of the common Indian corn is sown within its ruins at sunset, the following morning the plant is found to have arrived at its maturity; not however bearing the ordinary appearance, but having each separate grain on the ear of a separate and brilliant colour, blue, purple, scarlet and all the bright tints that fairies love. The idea is pretty and poetical, and so are many contained in Mahomedan legends, of which the above is one.

OCTOBER 14TH.—At last I have succeeded in breaking up the "Sufed Sung" which has so long resisted all our attacks upon it. By heating a large fire around and under it and when thoroughly hot throwing a "mushug" full of cold water suddenly over it, the huge stone split into about five pieces with a loud report. When in this state I found that with a hammer I could knock off as many bits as I can afford to carry. I am no mineralogist but the stone appears to me to be a sort of sparry "mica" with chrystals too brittle to enable it to bear a polish, or to be worked up.

There is a legend also attached to both these stones, for there are two of them, the one large and the other small, but both equally white and as difficult to break. Two damsels, it is said, of exquisite beauty and of high birth, who were betrothed in marriage to two chiefs of districts to the eastward of this, were being escorted down to their future husbands when, suddenly, upon crossing the stream that runs close by, they were attacked by a large party of Kafirs, who had been tempted by the rumour of their beauty to endeavour to seize them. The fight was desperate and was so doubtful, that the maidens prayed to the Prophet, that rather than suffer them to fall into the hands of the enemy to be dishonoured by them, he would convert them into stone. The prayer was heard: they were instantly metamorphosed, and remained, until we destroyed them, a monument of the Prophet's power. These stones were much venerated by the Afghans, for besides the merit of being a certain cure for toothache, they were supposed to possess the property of rendering barren women prolific.

OCTOBER 15TH.—To-day positive information has been received of the march of the whole army from Cabul on the 12th. The 1st and 2nd Brigades travel by the Goorbun Pass and by the Hissaruck valley, and enter this road again close to our present camp. Before leaving, a wing of my corps, of the 6th and of the 31st Foot were ordered to destroy the bazaar. News has also been received from the provinces to-day mentioning that the officers on this campaign are to receive medals and every individual six months' batter. I sincerely hope the first part of the story may be true, and I should have no objection to the second turning out so likewise.

OCTOBER 18TH.—The 1st Division and Head Quarters arrived here this morning, but by the direct route and not via the Goorbun Pass and Hissaruck. I rode out a few miles to meet them, and certainly such a sight as the line of march presented is not often witnessed. Winding through the pass came the sunburnt column of Europeans, then the native infantry, the cavalry leading their horses, the guns and batteries of kinds, our recovered prisoners, including the ladies and children in their demi-Afghan costumes, Futteh Jung, the ex-King, and the poor blind monarch, Shah Zeman, now both very humble individuals, especially the latter who had but one tattered attendant with him. Shah Zeman is always preceded by the corpse of his favourite daughter, which (although she died years ago) he never suffers to leave his sight. The body is carried with some state, upon a bier covered with crimson cloth, deeply and richly fringed with gold. Still increasing the train followed Futteh Jung's zenanah, riding on camels, but closely shut up in kajawehs covered with blue and scarlet cloth, and various Kuzzelbash and Populzei chiefs with the "Naib Shurreef" of Cabul at their head, who, from the part they had taken on our side, feared to remain behind after our departure.

Clambering up the tracks on the side of the road were clouds of camp followers and Afghan women muffled in their peculiar "Boorkas": whilst seated upon a projecting rock was a singular Faquir with a pack of dogs, which as he played upon a kind of flageolet would commence howling and dancing on their hind legs. Such a bustle, such jostling, and such noise never disturbed the quiet of these barren hills. Of course the most interesting portion of the train were the prisoners, who, it appears, owe their liberation chiefly to their own exertions. The report formerly current and which I noted at the time, was erroneous, for Khan Shurreen Khan was not present, or even aided in their recovery. The prisoners themselves bribed the man in charge of them, a fellow named Sallee Khan, formerly a Subadar and deserter from one of the Shah's regiments, to detain them at Syghan until the force sent for their recovery should arrive. His price was 20,000 rupees and 1,000 a month for life.

We furnished from our camp working parties to assist the artillery up the hills, and I could not help remarking the superiority for this country of Backhouse's train and Abbott's battery, which came up the hills at a trot and without assistance.

OCTOBER 19TH, NEEMLA.—Not far from Gundamuck is the fort and town of Kujjur, situated under the Sufed Koh and celebrated for

its fertility and beautiful pomegranates which are seedless. The chief of the place was "yaghi" and his people had occasionally annoyed us, so it was determined to destroy the place. Our allies, the Seiks, were selected for this duty, and as Lawrence the Political Agent was willing that I should accompany him, I yesterday paid my first visit to General Pollock and preferred my request to be allowed to do so. Certainly nothing could be more bearish and uncourteous than the way he received my request. "Pray are you on duty with the Seik contingent?" "How can you go?" "What regiment do you belong to?" "I never heard of such a request." "Are you attached to the Maharajah's force?" &c., &c. Rather snubbed I confess by the replies of the little great man, I yet mustered courage to return to the attack a second time, explained that I did not aspire to the honor of serving the Maharajah, and was but a humble captain in his own force, but that if he would give me leave of absence for four days, I wished to accompany the "Singhs" on service as an amateur, and would undertake to join my corps at Jellalabad. After sundry grunts and nasal noises he at last assented, and so this morning I marched with Lawrence here, with a small escort of Sowars. This has been the Head Quarters of the Seik force, and on arrival, dismounting, we proceeded at once to the "Durbar" of General Golab Singh, our entry being greeted with a well fired salute from his artillery. The General is a pleasant and intelligent old gentleman and amongst his officers were some very smart fellows. A Colonel Cheyt Singh, who sat on my left side, amused me much and his system of treating Afghans, which he strongly recommended to my consideration, was so characteristic of the Seik, that I cannot omit to note it down. He had been attacked, a portion of his property taken and some men wounded. With a stronger party he returned to the spot, took his revenge, and brought away several prisoners, four of these he sent back to treat for his lost property, the remainder he whipped daily and made them carry his wounded men on the march. The alteration in the manner of the Singhs was very marked, for they are now exceedingly civil, a result caused not a little, I think, by our recent successes, which have opened their eyes to our power. We passed the day under the beautiful plane trees planted by the Emperor Baber. The garden boasts of a tree that I never saw, or heard of before, a "weeping cypress," a most elegant tree. I brought away many cones from it.

OCTOBER 20TH, URGUZ.—Started with the whole force, about 5,000 of all arms and 2 guns, at 3 a.m., reached this fort which is about 3 miles from Kujjur, pitched our camp, and before sunrise were off again to attack this latter place. Lawrence commanded the main column with all the infantry, which went up the centre of the valley, whilst I took the charge of the cavalry, who somewhat to the left advanced in a parallel column. The first fort (for there were eight altogether) we found deserted, and as the infantry fired it in their advance, I pushed on to get between the last of the forts and the hills, so as to intercept the retreat of the enemy, who from the smoke would now be aware of our advance.

My manœuvre was successful as far as the few enemies remaining in the forts were concerned, but the greater proportion had fled the previous night. No opposition was offered and but one man was cut down, but it was with the greatest difficulty I could save some of the women and children and kutties, for my brave army scattered and took to plundering and I found myself at the head of 13 instead of 2,000 horse. Notwithstanding my best exertions many children were taken off, and I only succeeded in restoring three young girls to their parents. This was the painful part of the business—the ludicrous scenes were many, horsemen scouring over the valley after pugnacious bullocks and cows and kicking donkeys, footmen running after fowls and tumbling over one another in their mad scrambles, whilst others were unwinding the dresses off the prisoners, who were twirled round and round like tops. Before we returned to camp we had destroyed the fort of Munsoor Khan, Barukzie, two of Mozzuffer Khan, chief of the Koghianees and five others, besides 2 villages, making a total of 8 forts and 2 villages before breakfast. Not such bad work for the Seiks! A considerable quantity of plunder was taken, and so intent were all upon it, that when we wished to return, and to form a rear guard (for the Afghans usually wait until then before they attack) we could not collect more than 10 infantry soldiers out of our whole force. In the forts and villages destroyed were numerous articles belonging to Europeans of the late Cabul force.

OSMAN KHAN KE KILA, OCTOBER 21ST.—We had planted strong picquets on the heights that commanded our camp and passed a quiet night, contrary to my expectations. Lawrence and self both remained with the rear-guard but only three shots were fired altogether and we reached this fort at 10 a.m. On the way we visited Balabagh, another of the Imperial gardens, in which are many trees planted by Baber himself. It is even a finer garden than that of Neemla. At the western corner of it are two enormous cypresses of peculiar beauty, and planted so close together that their branches entwine and most lovingly embrace each other. They are called from this circumstance by the natives, Leila and Mujnoon, the names of the celebrated Eastern lovers. The fort against which we are pitched is the property of Osman Khan, Barukzie, a cousin of Dost Mahomed's, and is entirely new. We have fired it and it is now blazing away gloriously. In the despatch that Lawrence had to write to the General of our proceedings at Kujjur, I am honourably mentioned! I wish there had been any work to do to have deserved this.

OCTOBER 22ND, JELLALABAD.—Before leaving the ground this morning, we mined the principal bastion of the fort and blew it up, but we made so short a train that both Lawrence and myself who ourselves fired it, could not get out of the way of the falling ruins fast enough. He was only peppered by small pieces, but I got rather severely hit behind the ear by a large mass, which is causing me considerable annoyance. We proceeded to Sultanpore, where I parted with the Seik army, as our routes were different, but finding that no advance party had arrived from the 2nd Division of our army expected

there this morning, I was obliged to ride in straight here. I regret this, for there is a Seik shrine at Sultanpore, which for the last 30 years has existed there unscathed, and which is well worth seeing. The soldiers and camp followers of the 1st Division destroyed all the villages and plundered the inhabitants of the valley in this neighbourhood yesterday. This was against orders, but nothing could restrain them. One private got 6,000 rupees worth in gold mohurs. All this is bad—having once been let loose it is very difficult to restore order or discipline. As a proof, they fired and plundered our own bazaars here this morning, and shamefully illtreated the women attached to our own camp. I regret to say that the Europeans always set the example on these occasions. Unless some stop is put to this by shooting or hanging offenders, our troops will be doing the same in the Punjab and at Peshawar, and will certainly embroil us with the Lahore Durbar.

OCTOBER 23RD.—Plundering and excesses of all kinds still going on, and I neither see nor hear of any measures having been taken to check them. Officers' servants are attacked and their baggage from the fort plundered. The Captain on duty at the Peshawar gate killed one Sipahie of the 2nd Regt. with his own hand, and two others were wounded in their attempts to force the guard.

OCTOBER 25TH.—Two shocks of earthquake were experienced to-day, the first was severe. I was writing at the time, and could not at first conceive what caused the table and chair on which I was sitting to vibrate.

The bastions of Jellalabad were blown up to-day, the curtains all levelled and the town fired. In the midst of the blaze some attacks were made on our picquets, and a very sharp fire was kept up as long as they were engaged. One bullet struck my tent pole and fell on my bed. It is odd to see how coolly this sort of thing is now taken. Before the advance, when our troops, both men and officers, were comparatively raw, the whole camp would have turned out at hearing half such a fire as went on for an hour. Now the only question is "Who is on duty?" and no one else moves. This is much better, and affairs are better managed when there is no crowd.

26TH OCTOBER.—Picquets were engaged again for an hour during the night, and we were obliged to send out a small party from our regiment to clear some ruins within range. My tent was again struck by two bullets. To add to our discomforts, a most furious dust storm came on as if the "genius loci" wished to bid us farewell (for we march to-morrow) in character. The dust storms of Jellalabad are celebrated, and surpass even those of the Punjab.

27TH OCTOBER.—Marched to Alibaghan, 7 miles. We moved (the entire of Pollock's army) together, and from an hour before sunrise until past sunset, the stream of baggage and camp followers still continued pouring along the road. I fancy there are not less than 40,000 head of carriage cattle of kinds, and about 50,000 camp followers. This latter estimation is I am sure under the mark, for we muster 22,000 fighting men. Alibaghan had been formerly plundered and

destroyed by our troops, there was nothing to see or to note. A miserable wet night closed our first day's journey.

28TH OCTOBER.—Butticote, 13 miles. I was on rear guard to-day with the rest of my corps, and Broadfoot's, besides two H.A. guns and a squadron of N. Cavalry. The rain prevented the column moving off until 9 a.m. It was noon before we saw everything off and prepared to leave, when small parties of Afghans began to shew themselves in various directions and to openly cross the river on rafts of inflated skins. A shell was thrown, but burst too soon, and was followed by a round shot so well directed, that it cut in two the leader of one of the parties crossing the river. This rather cooled their courage, but as we wished to prevent their following up and annoying us, and deemed that the best plan of doing so would be to make them feel that we were in earnest, a small ambuscade of troopers was formed behind a little hill and the rear guard moved off. As soon as the main body was well off, the Afghans came pressing on, when suddenly down charged our little party and drove the whole into the river where several were drowned, five were cut down in the charge and one shot on the banks. After this, altho' it was 8 p.m. before we reached our ground, we were unmolested. The system pursued in this hilly country is good for the protection of the baggage. As the advance guard goes on, it detaches to every commanding height a small picquet, which is to hold that post until the rear guard passes, when it comes down and forms in the rear of that again, and so the guard goes on increasing in strength to the end of the march. These picquets on all the hill tops form very picturesque objects, but the duty is sometimes no joke. It often happens that when the rear guard is late, as it was to-day, the picquet remains on the solitary hill from 8 a.m. to sunset, and sometimes it has hard fighting to hold the hill. Another wet night, knocking up men and cattle. I am fairly tired out.

29TH OCTOBER.—Hazarmhow, 13 miles. The clouds still so hung about that it was impossible to see the surrounding country. Parties were detached from the main column as we came along to destroy several small forts. I wish I knew anything of geology, for I am confident that the hills here would repay any search expended upon them. Some of the "strata" are perfectly perpendicular and give a very curious appearance to them. One near Barsowl has a long continual wavy and deeply defined black mark all down its side, which the Afghans assert to be the mark of some particular serpent, that rested here when the "flood gates of heaven were opened," and the Deluge occurred. It does not look unlike a large snake coiling up the mountain side.

OCTOBER 30TH, DHAKKA.—A few men shewed themselves as the rear guard left the ground, and again were caught and cut up. It was a dreadful march, and no baggage came up until midnight, altho' the distance was but 8 miles. This was entirely owing to the want of arrangement, and the consequent rush made to get first through the "Khoord Khybur," a narrow pass of about a mile in extent. The main column itself, to which I was this day attached, did not reach the ground here until noon, so entangled was it with the baggage.

OCTOBER 31ST.—LUNDE KHANA.—The 1st Brigade and ours (the 4th) with the General and Head Quarters pushed on into the pass to-day. Thank goodness, the force is again divided, for from our very numbers we were unwieldy. No opposition was offered, nor was the rear guard (on which duty I was) molested. The heights were crowned and all the usual precautions taken, for it is uncertain as yet whether the Khyburrees intend peace or war. Whilst waiting at Dhakka for the baggage to move off a shock of earthquake was felt, accompanied by a remarkably loud report like the roar of a salvo of big guns. It astounded us all, and for some seconds the general impression was that a large magazine had blown up. I arrived here, having seen all up in safety, at 5 p.m., and encamped nearly on the old ground occupied on my journey up, immediately under the "Kafir Keela," a ruinous fortification on the mountain tops of immense extent, supposed to be the work of Alexander the Great.

NOVEMBER 1ST, ALI MUSJID.—Is it not extraordinary that no extent of experience will tend to make some officers know their duty? Because this march from Lunde Khana to Ali Musjid was the most difficult and most dangerous, that very wise individual, General Sale, must needs cease to take the precautions we have all along observed. There was no crowning of heights, no leaving detachments to guard suspicious ravines, no lining the flanks of the baggage by our horse. Instead of this it was a complete "happy go lucky" kind of march, pushing on right ahead, careless of what might happen behind. And what was the consequence? The Khyburrees availed themselves of our blameable neglect, engaged the rear guard, whilst another party rushed into the line of baggage, plundered 200 mules and numerous camels, and killed many of our troops, both European and native. One company of my corps lost every article, and the four poor fellows who were with the camels were killed. A very great portion of property was lost, the rear guard were nearly cut off, and, as it is, are too fagged to be worth much for to-morrow's duty.

NOVEMBER 2ND.—We formed a portion of the advance and marched to Jumrood. The same shameful system was again pursued, but this day with little or no loss, thank God. I hope to see my baggage and a tent pitched before midnight, a luxury that I have not enjoyed for three days. I am too tired to write but I cannot omit how thankful I am to Providence that I am now clear of this most horrid of all horrid countries.

NOVEMBER 6TH, CAMP CHAMKANNIE.—On the 3rd the 1st Division moved to (illegible), where I obtained permission to be absent until to-day to visit Peshawar and bring away what property I had left there. I was seized with fever on the road, and it has not yet left me, but I think that the joy of being once again on this side of Peshawar will go far to set me right again. The 2nd Division of the army, pursuing the same shameful system that we did, suffered much in following us through the Khybur. Two guns were lost (of which one was recovered the following day) two officers, Christie of the artillery and Nicolson of the 30th, and about 200 of our people killed. Nothing

could have been more disgraceful and nothing more loudly demands enquiry. General Nott's army, with some loss, but small in comparison, is also safely out of the pass: so now our whole army is quit of Afghanistan. It is impossible to describe the confusion, or to calculate the amount of loss of property in Peshawar. Every one is complaining either that he has lost his tent, or his boxes, or other property. Fortunately I put all mine in charge of a native friend at Peshawar, received it over from him without loss or trouble, and am ready to march to-morrow, if ordered. Every day that I live I believe more firmly in what natives term the "Sirkar ke ikbal." How on earth affairs go on at all, when no arrangements are made or care taken, surpasses my comprehension. As I have before observed, Providence seems to be with us, and in all truth everything is left to it. Would any reasonable being believe that the General commanding such an army as this, and having to extricate it from such a country as the Khybur, ran on ahead, and has been for four days feasting and nautching at Avitabile's, whilst his force was being harassed, his soldiers cut up and guns lost in his rear. God grant my next campaign whenever it may happen may be under the auspices of another sort of General, than this saddler's son, who, I suppose will on some future day be raised to the British Peerage for his "distinguished leading."

NOVEMBER 9TH.—Still at Chamkannie. I was ordered with my company to be detached and joined this morning the 1st Brigade under Sir R. Sale. The rest of my corps remains with the 4th under General Monteath. This arrangement by keeping me with the Head Quarters will enable me to reach Ferozepore a fortnight earlier than I otherwise should have done.

NOVEMBER 11TH, NOWSHERA.—Another day's delay was caused by the want of carriage or rather by the want of the necessary orders for its arrangement. How could it be otherwise with the camp at Chamkannie, the General at Peshawar and the Commissariat at Vizier i Bagh. This morning I marched with the first Brigade here, 17 miles. Breakfasted *al fresco* with Generals Pollock and Sale, Sir R. Shakespeare and Macadam, all of us seated on the ground, and eating away at cold mutton and stale bread.

NOVEMBER 12TH, ACORA.—I have just arrived (5 p.m.) having had the command of the rear guard: nothing to note.

NOVEMBER 13TH, CAMP ATTOCK.—A very admirable bridge of boats had been prepared across the Indus, and the Dragoons, horse artillery and other cavalry having started at 3 a.m. and got over before us, we had little difficulty in fighting our way thro' the strings of camels, elephants and mules, and marching across at once. The sight was grand, and as the band of the 13th L.I., which headed the column, struck up a lively march on reaching the pier head, the guns from the fort of Attock bellowed out a salute to us, which was echoed and reechoed again amongst the wild mountains around us. By the bye, this system of striking up the music when crossing a bridge of boats or a pontoon, is exceedingly foolish and dangerous. It causes the men

to keep step and time, thereby adding fearfully to the weight and consequent strain upon the boats, and is likely to be attended with accidents. But when did Sir Robert Sale do a wise thing? Everything crossed over without accident, however, and the rear guard was in the camp by 10 p.m. Owing to some mistake the tents, &c., had been taken on to the next ground 9 miles further, so we had a foraging day as far as meals went, and the "blue heavens for our canopy" which sounds pretty on paper, but in reality is not the best covering during a hot day, or freezing cold night.

NOVEMBER 14TH, SHUMSHABAD.—Nine miles from the last ground. Old Sale leads the column at such a pace that the rear is always at a double. We marched at the rate of five miles an hour. This quite upset the poor old bowelless Hindoo non-commissioned officers, poor old fellows, who had not attained that grade until perhaps after 30 years' service, and when quite "done." On the line of march they run up to me holding their stomachs with both hands, and begging to be allowed to come on in the rear, "Khodawund, yih Kuddum moojhse nahin chule jate." It is almost as bad for the native commissioned grade, who ride thin half starved tattoos, brutes who can't walk, who go "jig-jogging" on, shaking poor "Soobadarjie" who is never a horseman, into a perfect mummy by the end of the march. If it were not for pity's sake, I could laugh for ever looking at these poor old gentlemen holding the pummel firmly with one hand, and their lower jaws with the other, as if the horrid rough pace their miserable brutes were accomplishing, threatened to shake the few remaining teeth out of their old heads. Poor old souls, how on earth you have gone through the hardships of such a campaign as this surpasses my understanding. For your own comfort, and for the benefit of the Service, I hope a large portion of you may be transferred to the Invalid Establishment.

NOVEMBER 15TH, BOORHAN.—To-day the whole brigade paraded to witness the execution of Badul Khan, late a Subadar of the 27th Regt. N.I. Whilst besieged in Ghuznee with the rest of his regiment, he traitorously deserted his post and went over to the enemy, taking with him many of the Mussalman Sipahies. He was condemned to be shot by musquetry, and the entire force with us, amounting to about 4,000, was drawn up in three sides of a square, around which the prisoner was marched, preceded by the band of the 13th L.I. playing the "Dead March." His behaviour to the last was that of a gallant, bold man, free from any recklessness, but firm and collected. He never lost step, saluted the officer of the firing party respectfully and stood up straight before the Provost Serjeant who bandaged his eyes. Five balls entered his body, and he died instantly. Altogether it was a painful and an impressive sight, but to me it seemed to affect the Europeans more than the natives of the force.

NOVEMBER 16TH, WAH.—On the march passed the dead body of one of our Kidmudgars, who was cut to pieces whilst proceeding with the advance baggage over night. Many would not keep with the guard that accompanies the baggage, and were attacked and wounded :

some officers lost considerable property. The dâk was attacked and plundered. It is a wild country we are traversing, and a fitting theatre for such wild deeds.

NOVEMBER 17TH, JANE KA SUNG.—More attacks by robbers and more property lost. Not a day passes but some one loses a horse, or his mules, or his tent. Hitherto I have escaped. May it be so to the end of the chapter.

NOVEMBER 22ND, PUCKA SERAI.—These intervening days have been occupied in making the same marches, as I did on my way up. We halted the 19th at Rawal Pindi and left there "Futteh Jung" who had so far accompanied us. During the time of his father's residence in the Punjab, Rawal Pindi had been the spot selected by the Seik Government for him, and a large staring house which overlooks the principal bazaar of the place was built by him. There is some doubt if the Lahore authorities will suffer him to remain, and as our Government has prohibited his journeying to Hindustan, the poor "ex King" will be perplexed whither to wander next. Nothing else worthy of mention has occurred. Old Sir Robert as usual pushes along gaily, keeping the column at a trot, and always mistaking the road if possible, or taking the worst of two, where two exist. The sappers and miners, who are in advance, have made a very good road for the guns, but I suppose there is something more military in avoiding roads, and clambering amongst huge rocks and deep ravines, with which this country hereabouts abounds.

NOVEMBER 28TH.—Left bank of the Jhelum. Crossed the river (now but a stream compared to what it was when last I saw it in May) yesterday afternoon. There was a ford about a mile down the stream, practicable for unladen camels, but the guns and baggage, &c., &c., were crossed by ferry. The passage of the brigade was well contrived. I was ordered to remain to the last to see everything over, and prevent confusion at the different ghâts, and altho' we marched in the morning from Bhotas, 12 miles, I brought over to this bank the last boat load at 4 p.m. The retrodden road offers no novelties, and the duties of camp are so monotonous that one day is like another, and brings forth nothing to notice. But before closing my journal I cannot help giving an anecdote of each of our Generals of divisions, Pollock, McKaskill and Nott, which are characteristic of the firmness and decision of the first, the wisdom of the second and the amiability and good breeding of the last.

A foolish young officer seized a goat belonging to a Seik and refused either to pay for it or give it back. Pollock was appealed to, and he wrote to the officer directing its return. An hour passed and no goat appeared. The General issues a second note to the young man, which was treated with "silent contempt," upon which Pollock with a face of woe rushes into the tent of his Adjutant General, and exclaims "Ponsonby! what's to be done now? What in God's name shall I do? He positively refuses to give up the goat."

Anecdote No. 2 is as follows: The victory of Istalif where McKaskill commanded was chiefly an affair of advance guard and

skirmishers, who, contrary to orders, rushed through the surrounding gardens and carried the town, being well backed up almost immediately after by the leaders of the different regiments and corps, all acting on their own responsibility. McKaskill with his staff were awaiting the result of some movements he had ordered, and knew not that the place was carried till an officer rode up and said, "General, Istalif is taken." "No, is it indeed, Captain Mayne? Will you take a plum," offering one at the same time from amongst a handful he was about to eat. On retiring upon another occasion when his rear was heavily attacked, and much firing was going on there, "Tell them to stop that firing in the rear," says the General. "We have had quite fighting enough—I will have no more fighting, I tell you." All uttered in the tone of a crying child.

Of Nott's good manners, the following is a specimen. An officer of the Quarter Master General's department was ordered to go and meet him on his first arrival at Cabul, and to show him the ground for encamping. "Pray, Sir, who are you?" says Nott. The officer explained his object.—"And pray, Sir, who are all these?" pointing to a few irregular horsemen, who had accompanied him. "They are my escort," says Quarter Master. "Then, Sir, tell them to go to h—ll." Nothing taken aback, the officer desired them to withdraw to a little distance, upon which Nott again exclaims "You're a nice fellow, Sir, for the Quarter Master General's Department, not to know the Hindustanee for 'go to h—ll.' It's Jehannum ko jao, Sir—Jehannum ko jao."

DECEMBER 11TH.—The Chenab was crossed by ferry on the 4th of this month without any trouble, and yesterday we arrived here at Bungeelpore, passing the river Ravee by a bridge of boats. Here we have to halt for some days to enable the brigades in the rear to move up to us, so that we may enter Ferozepore in an "imposing manner" and with theatrical effect. I wish our very demented Governor-General would think more of the inconvenience and loss that this absurd arrangement will cost us all, and less of the melodramatic nonsense that he is meditating on, as a shew off to the native chiefs, his "Brethren and his friends" as he styles them, who are to be assembled at Ferozepore to witness the tomfoolery. One would have thought that our campaigns to the north-west had cost the Government enough already, without adding as a last item or two to the account, sixteen thousand rupees for sweetmeats to the native troops, and five thousand for fireworks. Shades of Clive and Warren Hastings, of Wellesley and of Moira, fancy rewarding the remnants of a dying army (for so we are from the sickness universally raging) with sweetmeats and fireworks!

DECEMBER 19TH, FEROZEPORE.—At 3 a.m. I was detached with a party from my regiment to protect the bridge over the Sutledge, and to keep it free for the passage of the troops across. The bridge was a very fine affair with flags, large and small, and at the left bank of the Sutledge a sort of arch composed of cloths, dyed the colours of the "Ribbon of India." Under this the troops passed, and immediately

after them, being the last man across, I followed with my detachment, and once again re-entered our own provinces. Looking back upon the last eight months, I must needs confess, that all that I have seen or done was certainly not worth the trouble of so long a journey. Still I do not regret by any means that I came: it has afforded me an opportunity of seeing the Punjab and Afghanistan, which will now be a closed country to us for years to come: I have learnt, as I have before written, one or two practical lessons, and of my profession, as a soldier, I have at least acquired some *negative* knowledge. I have learnt what good Generals should *not* do—how arrangements should not be made—how armies should not be led, and how difficult passes in an enemy's country should not be traversed. The reverse of this, *viz.*, how these all *should* be done no one can have learnt from this campaign, for no one, I vow, has witnessed it. Still the *negative* knowledge even is useful. One knows which to avoid at all events, for all have seen the deplorable results, the recollections of which will I think last me through life, for many many of them were painful beyond belief: especially the want of regard to sick and wounded, and the general indifference to the comforts and welfare of the native troops. I have known frost bitten cripples, soldiers recollect, crippled in our service, left deserted in an enemy's country, or if not deserted left to the best means that a weak rear guard, provided only with one doolie, could devise to bring them on. I have known officers so horrified with this, that they have endeavoured to carry on these poor fellows on their backs. I have done this myself, and have frequently walked a whole march giving up my horse to a sick or wounded Sipahie. I have known sick and wounded men put by hundreds on rafts without supplies, without people to attend on them, and committed to the mercy of a two days' journey on the Soondee river—those who survived the trial and reached the Ghât at Peshawar have been left there, dead and dying, until picked up accidentally by the Surwâns and other commissariat servants, proceeding for forage, and although this was reported no notice was ever taken of it. But why recapitulate all the thousand disgraceful facts connected with this campaign, that I could disclose? Suffice it to say, it has been one entire humbug, a campaign of despatches, the value of which those who were present know—*but*, it has been successful, and for those wise souls who are in the habit of knocking down people with proverbs, with whom proverbs are convincing, clinching arguments, it will be quite enough to say "The proof of the pudding is in the eating"!!

God indeed has been gracious unto us, and has fought on our side!

THE WAR AND GERMAN UNIVERSITIES.

By FRANCIS H. SKRINE, F.R.Hist.S.

AMONG the many surprises of the war now raging is the enormous power of resistance and aggression developed by Germany. That a mystic born in the purple should aim at universal dominion, and find ignorant dupes eager to promote his insane ambition, is quite intelligible. Such things are in the normal course of social evolution, and they will recur until democracies are sufficiently advanced to guide their own destiny. We stand aghast at the spectacle presented by 65,000,000 highly-instructed Europeans consenting to be used as a battering ram against civilizations far older and finer than their own. For such a phenomenon as this there is no precedent in history. Some light is cast on the problem in racial psychology which it offers by a bird's-eye view of German universities, which was published in Paris just before William II. shot his bolt from the blue. It proves conclusively that the nidus of the present war must be sought for at the centres of higher education throughout the Fatherland. The author of this profoundly interesting work is Dr. René Cruchet, of Bordeaux. After attaining the M.D. degree in 1900, he devoted his vacations for thirteen consecutive years to a study of Germany's twenty universities. He enriched his own *alma mater* with two reports on their inner working, and crowned his long labours with an exhaustive survey entitled *Les Universités Allemandes au XX^e siècle*.

Dr. Cruchet entered on his self-appointed task with an open mind and the power to weigh evidence which a scientific training confers. He has given the world a perfectly impartial account of institutions which are but little understood in Western Europe and America. For, although German universities numbered many hundreds of foreign alumni, the true inwardness of their teaching was sedulously hidden from all who stood outside the Teutonic pale. Dr. Cruchet renders ample justice to the scientific training, self-sacrifice and self-devotion which the youth of Germany owes to her system of higher education. He contrasts the vigorous organic life enjoyed by every German university with the torpor which attends excessive centralization in France. But deeper knowledge compelled him to charge a glowing picture with shades. Efficiency on the material side of life is dearly bought if it involve an abject surrender of one's personality. All Teutons exaggerate the ovine instinct which attends and checks the advance of civilization; their youth is indeed "wax to receive and iron to retain" the lessons of the classroom. On the other hand self-interest forbids their instructors to pursue the main object of education, namely, the formation of character. Teachers, from the self-important Herr Professor to the humblest pedagogue of a village school, are part and parcel of that sinister machine which has oppressed

Germany for a hundred years. Their curricula and text-books are prescribed by central authority; and the slightest display of independence is severely punished by Disciplinary Courts from whose decision there is no appeal. Standing in mortal dread of the espionage which dogs every German from his cradle to his grave, and confronted with the alternatives of implicit obedience or ruin, the Professoriate has made itself an accomplice of the military caste. It inoculates German youth with overweening racial pride, with lust of conquest, and hatred or contempt of foreign nations who thwart Germany's heaven-appointed mission to rule the world. Thus the stream of knowledge, which should fashion human raw material into citizens of the world, is poisoned at its very source.

In 1909 Dr. Cruchet visited the aristocratic University of Bonn, where William II. became a convinced Chauvinist by consorting with the descendants of Prussian robber-knights. Its leading spirit was a Professor Siegert, who received our author with effusive cordiality, and piloted him through the hospitals and laboratories of the Medical School. After expatiating on their unrivalled efficiency, Siegert passed abruptly from "shop" to politics, remarking:—

If there be one consummation which all of us Germans long for from the depths of our hearts, it is a complete understanding with France. Ah, Germany and France arm in arm, what a splendid combination they would make! Between them they would rule the world.

Then, after a slight pause, as though he could read his young colleague's innermost thoughts, he went on:—

Yes, I know all about that—your lost provinces; Bismarck is accused of having engineered the war of '70 with his famous Ems telegram; but all that is falsehood, nothing else than falsehood. The truth is that Napoleon III. wanted war at all costs; the fault lay with him and with him alone. We can well understand your hatred of that man of evil destiny; rest assured that we sympathize with you. But why hark back to an old, old story, in which we Germans were nowise to blame? Why cast it in our teeth against all evidence to the contrary? Our fathers and yours did their duty nobly in dying for the Fatherland; let us honour their memory. If we beat you forty years ago owing to your Emperor's blind folly, that is surely no reason why we should remain at daggers-drawn. Friendship with France is our golden dream, our most cherished desire. We love France as deeply as we hate England. Yes; those English are a selfish, commercialized race, free from all prejudice, friends to-day, enemies to-morrow, as their own interest may dictate. Intensely jealous of our rapid maritime progress, they long to ruin us, root and branch. But our navy, though still young, is not afraid of theirs, we have perfect confidence in our brave sailors. As for the Italians, let me warn you against that fickle and faithless race. No one can count on their friendship. Be on your guard in dealing with them; they will play you a dirty trick one of these days! On the other hand Austria knows what your hearty co-operation with her would mean; she is leagued with us by language, policy and aspiration.

It is superfluous to animadvert on the gross travesty of historical fact revealed by Professor Siegert's remarks. The self-same lack of moral sense is conspicuous in the Manifesto, packed with sophisms

and perversion of truth, which so many lights of German science were not ashamed to father. And Dr. Cruchet found that Siegert's opinions were shared by his colleagues throughout the Fatherland. They preached Pan-Germanism of the most uncompromising type and made no secret of the means by which they hope to secure its triumph. Their common talk was of engines of war, explosives, espionage, and military efficiency. In conversing with foreigners they put on a mask of Pacificism because it was in fashion throughout the non-Teutonic world, and enabled them to lull their neighbours into a fallacious sense of security.

It is said on all sides that pacific ideas are gaining ground among the younger general officers. People who hold such language must be wilfully blind to facts; and they would find ample evidence to the contrary at Bonn. There everything seems to smell of villainous saltpetre; army officers reign supreme; the students adore them, and slavishly copy their peculiar manners. It is true that every Teuton, whether he be a professional man, merchant, manufacturer or artist, follows the Kaiser's lead in proclaiming a love of peace. One may fondly hope that they are sincere; but when one finds a great medical authority holding such views as Professor Siegert one cannot help doubting the good faith of their pacific professions.

At Heidelberg, which ranks with Bonn as a focus of junkerdom, Dr. Cruchet lived the life of a student for four months, and was at first received with open arms by his German colleagues: he writes:—

I noted a marvellous spirit of order and discipline in the young fellows with whom I associated. They were punctual in attending the classes, and never indulged in noisy demonstrations at the beginning or end of a lecture. For hours together they listened without betraying impatience, and testified approval by guttural laughter. About 1 p.m. I used generally to breakfast at Schiff's Restaurant with a couple of young chemists who seemed to take especial pleasure in my company. They arrived on foot or bicycle, devoured every course in silence and with elbows planted on the table, and left in ample time to pursue their daily routine. Such conversation as I had with them possessed very limited interest, my friends' culture being quite superficial. Like all South-Germans they affected a dislike for Prussia; but their main theses were universally German greatness, English perfidy, and deep regret that Frenchmen should still refuse to grasp the olive-branch extended to them by the Kaiser.

They showed the cloven hoof, however, on finding Cruchet impervious to their hypocritical professions, and inclined to suspect that Germany sought the friendship of France solely in order to use it as a weapon against Great Britain. They began to hark back to the war of 1870, and allowed him to perceive that his countrymen were regarded as suffering from national paralysis since that terrible year. On a certain afternoon the worm turned and rent its ignoble persecutors.

One of the young chemists with whom I was wont to breakfast boasted for the hundredth time of the indisputable superiority of the German Army over all others, our own included. At last I lost patience. In accents trembling with suppressed wrath I took up the cudgels on behalf of our splendid soldiers. I enlarged on the prowess of our frontier troops, especially praising the Alpine battalions, in which my military service had been

spent. I declared that no artillery in the world could compare with that of France, and waxed enthusiastic in describing its mobility and range; its rapid and deadly fire. I quoted anecdotes in support of my contention, and multiplied facts, demolishing in a few minutes every argument *contrà* which had been dinned into my ears for weeks together. At first my adversary was simply incredulous, but he soon squirmed beneath my torrent of burning words. His features contracted, revealing the fury that possessed his soul. When I paused, glad to have relieved my mind, but just a little ashamed of my vehemence, I saw his eyes flashing deadly hate as he gasped out, "Your artillery; yes, your artillery; we all know what it did in 1870!"

At Freiburg-in-Brisgau a house surgeon on the university staff directed Dr. Cruchet's attention to one of the countless monuments with which Germany keeps green the memory of 1870. It consists of a rectangular granite column, crowned by a colossal Victory and flanked, like our Wellington statue at Hyde Park Corner, with four bronze figures typifying the cavalry, artillery, line and reserve forces. Its inscription recounts the exploits of the local army corps at the battle of Belfort and the siege of Strasburg. "Are you pleased with this monument?" asked Dr. Cruchet's guide with truly German tactlessness and bad taste.

Our author's wanderings ended at Strasburg, which boasts of possessing the most up-to-date university in all Germany. Its perfect appliances for relieving pain seemed the result of vainglory rather than of sympathy with human suffering. Buildings which should have been dedicated solely to peaceful ends were "contrived a double debt to pay," like the chest in Goldsmith's "Deserted Village." A professor who conducted Dr. Cruchet over the hospitals blurted out an admission that its electric bakeries could supply a whole army corps with bread.

Dr. Cruchet's peroration fully explains the genesis of the volcanic conditions prevalent in Central Europe. He waxes enthusiastic in describing the equipment of German universities. He tells us that each is an organic growth with its roots thrust deeply into the past, but ever ready to assimilate new ideas that germinate in other countries. Governing bodies spare no pains to improve on imported models. They are perpetually rebuilding and enlarging hospitals and laboratories, for the greater glory of the Fatherland and with a fixed resolve to make its people the first on the habitable globe. But our author asks:—

Does this marvellous organization give foreigners the same conception of its devisers' incontestable superiority as every German feels? To deem oneself first in every walk of life is, to say the least of it, unusual. Such arrogance may be excused in early youth; displayed by middle-aged pedants and grave university dons, it simply takes one's breath away. Converse with any given professor, and you will hear not only that his clinical installations are the finest in the world, but that the German Fleet fears no other—not even England's; that the German Army is an unrivalled war-machine; German commerce and industry leads the universe; every German musician and painter is founder of a school; Zeppelin is by far the greatest aviator alive, and so on *ad nauseam*.

The state of the Teutonic mind was reflected in that of a man under treatment for general paralysis in Kiel University Hospital. He laid claim to the gift of tongues, and on hearing that Dr. Cruchet hailed from Bordeaux he stammered out a few words of French:—

Then, suddenly raising his voice, while every feature was distorted by a ghastly grin and a pair of bony arms swung menacingly, he said, "Ah, you're a Frenchman: well, let me tell you, Mr. Professor, that the Germans are the greatest nation on earth, and *I* am the greatest German! Your army is no longer to be reckoned with; your manufactures and commerce are dead; your navy is rotten—completely rotten. But Germany is grand, the grandest of nations, and *I*—." My guide hurried me off, but the poor maniac's ravings gave me a cold shudder! Had he not blurted out opinions which vast numbers of his fellow-countrymen—and the sanest of them, too—cherish in their heart of hearts?

Yes, it is beyond all question that the poison distilled in university classrooms has deepened German brutality into acute megalomania; from which, alas, there is no remedy but copious bloodletting.



THE WAR.

ITS NAVAL SIDE.

WORK OF THE FLEETS.

There have been no changes during the period of three months covered by these Notes—from the end of July to the end of October—in the composition of the Board of Admiralty, nor have any important changes been made in naval administration, except in regard to the organization of the Air Department. The strength of the personnel now stands at the limit of 300,000 officers and men fixed by the Supplementary Navy Estimates presented at the end of June, which showed an increase of 50,000 over the Estimates issued in February last. In regard to the cost of the navy votes, Mr. Asquith stated in his speech on the Vote of Credit on September 15th, that "the expenditure rose steadily till the end of June. Since then it has shown a decline, and, on the whole, we are not disposed to think the expenditure for the last six months of the year on the navy will exceed that upon the first six months. The daily rate for the expenditure on the navy in September is £600,000." In his Budget speech on September 21st, Mr. McKenna referred to "the triple task which this country has assumed in the war—to keep the command of the sea, to maintain an army, and to assist our Allies by furnishing them with supplies, and by aiding them in financing their purchases in countries other than their own. My predecessor pointed out the interdependence of these military efforts and their mutual limitations. When he spoke he had in mind a navy which, during the current year was to cost £146,000,000, an army which was to cost £600,000,000, and external advances to the amount of £200,000,000. We have now to contemplate a navy costing £190,000,000, an army costing £715,000,000, and external advances to the amount of £423,000,000."

On the occasion of the anniversary of the declaration of war, a number of tributes from British and foreign ministers and officials was paid to the manner in which the fleet, ably assisted by the sea forces of the Allies, is performing its task in the conflict. In reply to a communication from Count Reventlow entitled "A Year of Naval Warfare," Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the Admiralty, addressed a letter to Mr. Tuohy, of the *New York World*, the text of which was published in the British Press on August 2nd. In this he described the seven functions which a fleet can perform, and showed how all had been successfully carried out by the British Fleet. On August 4th, in a speech at the London Opera House, Mr. Balfour referred to the navy as the saviour of civilization, and showed that "the possibility of carrying on the war depended at its foundation on the superiority at sea of the Allied Fleets, and the Allied Fleets would not have been superior at sea had we, in an unhappy moment of blindness and folly, kept out of a contest which we might have pretended to ourselves with some plausibility was no immediate and pressing concern of ours." Great Britain, by means of her navy, was able to prevent the great military Powers from possessing that predominance at sea which in other hands could have been only an instrument of national tyranny. At the same meeting, Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Premier, said that the Oversea Dominions realized that the pathways of the seas are the veins and arteries of this Empire, through which its lifeblood must flow. If these are once stopped or interfered with in any way the Empire cannot continue to exist. "We are as conscious as

you are conscious," added Sir Robert, "of the wonderful vigil in the North Sea and of the patience, endurance, and fortitude of officers and men. We are grateful, as you are grateful, with the most intense appreciation of all they have done for us; and, more than all, the fact that they have rid the seas of the marauders by which our commerce was troubled has enabled us to keep in close contact with you and keep up that intercourse which is so absolutely necessary."

Among foreign representatives who expressed their views, M. Augagneur, the French Minister of Marine, said, in a message to the Press, that on the sea victory is realized; "Germany has abandoned the seas to our domination. She dare not risk a fair fight. After a year of war the Allied Navies have cause to be proud of the results attained. They will render those results all the more striking if our enemies consent to give battle." In an interview with a correspondent, M. Augagneur said that the fleet enabled France to bring her troops from North Africa, and Great Britain hers from India and the Dominions, while it gave the Allies a free breakfast table. The French Minister referred to Mr. Gladstone's phrase, "The flowing tide is with us, the ebbing tide with them," as summing up the general situation very well. The Russian Minister of Marine, speaking to a Press representative at Petrograd, said that the British Navy "has adapted itself splendidly to the new forms of naval warfare, and has defeated, in a manner worthy of its best traditions, the operation of the most important new weapon—the submarine—upon which Germany so largely relied. The services rendered by the British Fleet throughout the war are superb, and have markedly influenced the course of the struggle against our powerful foe. I affirm without hesitation that your fleet has done more than even its warmest admirers had ever expected, greatly as they appreciated its power and capabilities." Among Italian tributes, that of the newspaper *Secolo*, of Milan, may be quoted. "England is mistress of the seas," said this journal, "which is not a mere phrase; it is a fact which all the German submarines and German sophisms are unable to controvert, and the best proof of the assured success of the English blockade is the rage of the Germans. England's mastery of the sea has bottled Germany's Fleet up completely, and stopped her sea trade; it prevents her protecting her colonies or exporting her merchandise." In the United States also, the success of British naval effort was commented upon, and the New York *Evening Sun* stated in an editorial that the fleet had saved the Allies from "speedy and irrevocable disaster." It had determined the fortunes of the war up to date, and would remain the "vital element in the military situation. It will be the principal factor in success in the struggle, even though no naval battle of great magnitude may be fought." A well-known American author, Mr. John J. Chapman, on returning from a visit to Europe, where his son was fighting with the French Army, said: "If it were not for the British Fleet, the Germans would be bombarding Long Island to-day."

Following his earlier visits to the fleets at sea, King George has, during the past three months, made tours of some of the principal dockyards and naval establishments, in all of which he has been heartily welcomed by the sailors and workmen. He had been to Portsmouth in May last, and among the places included in the later visits were Plymouth and Dover. At the former, His Majesty, accompanied by the Queen, made a stay of two days, cheering the war workers—the troops, wounded, men of the navy, and employees in the establishments. At Dover, which was visited on September 23rd, the King embarked in a pinnace and crossed the naval harbour, inspecting some ships *en route*, and afterwards landed at the dockyard. A number of visitors, British and foreign, have also been permitted to see the Grand Fleet at work during the period under

review. On August 11th it was officially announced that the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer had been the guests of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. Before their departure the officers and men from a number of ships were assembled, and the Prime Minister addressed to them, and through them to their comrades in the fleet, some words of congratulation and confidence. During the week ending September 4th a distinguished party of Frenchmen visited the Grand Fleet. The group included M. Stephen Pichon, Senator, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs, and now political editor of the *Petit Journal*; M. Joseph Reinach, Senator, one of the best-known of French publicists; M. René Bazin, Academician and novelist; M. Pierre Mille, of the *Temps*; and M. Ponsot, of the French Foreign Office. On their return, the first four of these gentlemen wrote some descriptive articles concerning the fleet in the French Press—M. Pichon in the *Petit Journal*, M. Reinach in the *Figaro* (under the pseudonym of "Polybe"), M. Bazin in the *Echo de Paris*, and M. Mille in the *Excelsior* and *Temps*. Permission was also granted to an American journalist, Mr. Frederick Palmer, to visit the Grand Fleet and witness it putting to sea on a certain date. His impressions were published in the form of two articles in New York and other American journals on September 6th and 7th.

Light has been thrown upon the steps taken to secure the early concentration of the British Fleet at the outbreak of war, by the publication of letters from the officials concerned. In the course of a lecture delivered at Sheffield by a naval writer, in April, 1915, credit was given to Mr. Winston Churchill for the fact that the fleet was mobilized and at its war stations when hostilities were declared, but in reply to a correspondent who drew the attention of Admiral H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg to this statement, the latter officer, who was First Sea Lord at the date under discussion, said: "To be quite accurate, it was your humble servant, and not Mr. Churchill, who was spending the week-end with his wife at Cromer, who ordered all ships to stand fast instead of demobilizing as ordered." This letter of Prince Louis was dated April 20th, 1915, but was not published in the newspapers until August 7th, in connection with articles which had appeared on the anniversary of the declaration of war. A fortnight later, on August 21st, the Press Bureau was requested to issue for publication a letter from Prince Louis of Battenberg to Mr. Churchill, dated August 19th, 1915, in which the Admiral, after stating that the publication of his letter of April 20th was unauthorized, gave the following account of what happened when he was in charge of the Admiralty on July 26th, 1914:—"The news from abroad, on the morning of July 26th, was certainly in my opinion very disquieting, and when you called me up on the telephone from Cromer about lunch time, I was not at all surprised to hear you express the same view. You then asked me to take any steps which in view of the foreign situation might appear desirable. You reminded me, however, that I was in charge of the Admiralty, and should act without waiting to consult you. You also informed me you would return that night instead of next morning. After making myself acquainted with all the telegrams which had reached the Foreign Office, and considering the different steps towards demobilization, which in the ordinary course of events would have commenced early next morning, I directed the secretary, as a first step, to send an Admiralty Order by telegraph to the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets at Portland, to the effect that no ship was to leave that anchorage until further orders. For the time this was sufficient. You fully approved of this when you returned, and we then in perfect accord decided upon the further orders as they became necessary day by day."

A reorganization of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Air Department at the Admiralty was announced on September 8th, when Rear-Admiral C. L.

Vaughan-Lee was appointed to the new post of "Director of Air Services," and Commodore M. F. Sueter, previously Director of the Air Department, was made "Superintendent of Aircraft Construction," with the rank of Commodore, First Class, and to be given charge of the material side of naval aeronautical work. On September 13th Admiral Sir Percy Scott was appointed to take charge of the gunnery defences of London against attack by enemy aircraft. There were Zeppelin raids on the nights of August 9th, 12th, and 17th, and on September 7th, 11th, 12th, and 13th, over the Eastern Coast and Counties; and on September 8th and October 13th over the London area. Mr. Balfour referred to the aerial defence of London in a speech in the House of Commons on September 15th, when he described the steps taken to deal with the problem and expressed confidence in Sir Percy Scott.

A change in the chief command of the French Navy has occurred since the last issue of the JOURNAL. On October 10th it was officially announced that Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère had resigned on account of ill-health, and Vice-Admiral d'Artige du Fournet had been appointed Commander-in-Chief in his place. Vice-Admiral Fournet had been in command, since the outbreak of war, of the French Fleet off the coast of Syria, and subsequently of the fleet in the Dardanelles. On the same day Rear-Admiral Guépratte, commanding the Supplementary Division of the Navy, was promoted to be Vice-Admiral.

NAVAL OPERATIONS.

NORTH SEA AND BALTIC.

GERMAN DESTROYER SUNK.—On July 26th, a German destroyer of the "G 196" class was sunk by a British submarine near the German coast, the incident being officially announced on August 3rd by the British Admiralty. The lost boat belonged to a fairly modern type, built in 1911 by the Krupp Germania yard at Kiel, with a displacement of 650 tons and a speed of 32½ knots. On September 13th, Commander C. P. Talbot was awarded the D.S.O. "for his services in sinking a German torpedo-boat destroyer off the enemy's coast on July 26th, 1915, whilst on patrol duty in his submarine." This officer, commanding "E 6," was favourably mentioned in despatches for his services during the action in the Heligoland Bight on August 28th, 1914, and for reconnaissance work, and was specially promoted to Commander on October 21st, 1914.

GERMAN TRANSPORT SUNK.—On July 30th, a large German transport was sunk in the Baltic by a British submarine, the fact being announced in the Russian *communiqué* on August 2nd. The event was of some importance in connection with the German military operations in Courland, the vessel containing reserves who were being sent to Libau to assist the army of General von Below. A writer in the *Novoe Vremya*, emphasizing this fact, said that, as a result of the British submarine's feat the maritime conveyance of the enemy's reinforcements might cease, or at any rate become extremely cautious. It became known through the Russian Press in September that the successful boat was commanded by Commander Noel F. Laurence, who afterwards torpedoed the "Moltke."

GERMAN GUNBOAT ATTACKED.—On August 4th, the Russian official *communiqué* from Petrograd stated that "Our seaplanes attacked a German gunboat near Windau and forced it to run ashore. The same machines attacked and put to flight an enemy Zeppelin and two seaplanes, one of which was

brought down." The Russian seaplanes were understood to be working in conjunction with the torpedo craft on the Russian side, whose object was to hamper or prevent any operations undertaken by sea on the part of the enemy in connection with the military progress in Courland. It was off Windau, on June 30th, that the Russian gunboat and destroyer flotilla engaged the German cruisers and torpedo-boats, supported by a coast-defence battleship, which were endeavouring to make a descent on the coast, but which were repulsed with loss from mines and other agencies.

CASE OF THE "PALLAS."—A semi-official Note, dated July 23rd, was issued in Christiania to the effect that the British Foreign Office had replied to Norwegian representations on the subject of the ship "Pallas." The British Foreign Secretary regretted to find that the spot at which this vessel was



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captured by a British armed trawler was undoubtedly in Norwegian waters. The Norwegian Government was assured that the British Government deeply deplores this mistake, and that the Admiralty impresses upon the fleet the greatest respect for the territorial limits of Norway. No date or place in connection with the incident were revealed.

"METEOR'S" CRUISE.—On August 7th, the German auxiliary steamer "Meteor," formerly in the Hamburg-American service, made an advance into the North Sea. The German official version spoke of her "having broken through the enemy's forces on the night of August 7th-8th," and described the ship as "a commercial vessel of medium size, equipped as a minelayer." She had already come into notice in the war for her interference with neutral shipping. On June 16th, she was reported to have sunk the Swedish ship "Verdandi" off Christiansund, and to have captured the Swedish steamer "Thorsten," from Gothenburg to England, which she took into Kiel, the English mails on board being returned through the Swedish postal authorities. Her adventure, which began on August 7th, however, resembled that of the

Hamburg-American steamer "Königin Luise" on the first day of war, just a year earlier.

"RAMSEY" SUNK.—An August 8th, the "Meteor" sunk the small armed patrol vessel "Ramsey," commanded by Lieutenant H. Raby, R.N.R. Five officers, including the commander, were lost, and forty-six men; but four officers and thirty-nine men were saved. In the British announcement of the loss, no details were given, and the only statement on the German side was that the "Ramsey" was sunk "after a splendid manœuvre." The "Ramsey" was commissioned for patrol service on November 20th, 1914, but Lieutenant Raby was not appointed to her until later, from the cruiser "Sappho." After her destruction, according to the German account, the "Meteor" burned off Horn's Reef, on the Danish coast, the Danish merchant vessel "Jason," and afterwards detained a Norwegian steamship, transferring to the last-named the British prisoners from the "Ramsey" and the crew of the "Jason."

"METEOR" BLOWN UP.—On August 9th, the "Meteor" was overtaken by a squadron of British cruisers, and her commanding officer, realizing that escape was impossible, ordered the crew to abandon the ship, and then blew her up by exploding her mines. The German account stated that there were four auxiliary cruisers in the British squadron, and that the whole of the "Meteor's" crew safely reached a German port. An account in a weekly journal on October 3rd said that the "Meteor" was disguised as an ordinary merchantman, with guns and torpedo tubes masked, and flying Russian colours, when she sunk the "Ramsey," and the place where she blew herself up was fifteen miles from the German coast. On returning to Kiel, the "Meteor's" crew were greeted as heroes, being received by Prince and Princess Henry of Prussia, the former of whom made a speech, as did the commander of the "Meteor."

"LYNX" MINED.—On August 9th, the destroyer "Lynx" had the misfortune to be sunk by a mine in the North Sea, which was understood to have been one of those laid by the "Meteor." Four officers and twenty-two men were saved from the vessel, but about seventy officers and men were lost, including the commanding officer, Commander John F. H. Cole, and the first lieutenant, Lieutenant Brian Thornbury. The "Lynx" belonged to the "K" class, and was launched by the London and Glasgow Shipbuilding Company in 1913. She was the third British destroyer officially reported lost in the war, the others being the "Recruit," torpedoed on May 1st, and "Maori," mined on May 8th. A wireless message issued through the station at Sayville, Long Island, U.S.A., stated that the mines of the "Meteor" were dropped off the Orkney Islands.

"INDIA" TORPEDOED.—On August 8th, the British auxiliary cruiser "India," whilst engaged on patrol duty in the North Sea, was torpedoed by a German submarine and sunk. The commanding officer, Commander W. G. A. Kennedy, and twenty-one officers were saved, and 120 men; whilst the number lost was ten officers and about 150 men. It was reported that the "India," formerly in the P. and O. service, was attacked off the island of Hellevoer, near Bodö, at the entrance to the West Fiord, and was about two-and-a-quarter miles from land when she sank. A Swedish steamer, the "Gelderland," which was near by expecting to be detained and searched, saw the cruiser founder, and was able to rescue some eighty survivors. Others were picked up by the British armed trawler "Saxon" and by merchant vessels. On August 10th and 11th, fifteen seamen who lost their lives were buried at Bodö with full military honours.

NORWEGIAN PROTEST.—On August 12th, the Norwegian Government informed Germany that the "India" was torpedoed in what have always been

maintained to be Norwegian territorial waters. It was stated in the protest that the Government of Norway maintained this in face of the contrary contention of the British Government, and they therefore likewise informed the German Government that the West Fiord in its entirety has from time immemorial been regarded as belonging to Norwegian sea territory. This was specially the fact with the part of the Fiord where the "India" was attacked. The Norwegian Government also decided to intern the survivors rescued by the "Saxon," but not those saved by neutral vessels. The former were therefore conveyed to the military establishment at Joerstadmoen, situated near Lillehammer, in mountainous country at the northern end of Lake Mjoesen. On September 5th, it was reported that twelve of the interned officers, having given their word of honour not to leave Norway, would be allowed to live in a large hotel in the health and winter resort of Lillehammer, with freedom to move about the environs of the place.

GERMAN ATTACK ON RIGA.—On August 8th, a German naval force, consisting of nine battleships, twelve cruisers, and a large number of destroyers, made persistent attacks at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, but they were everywhere repulsed. The Russian *communiqué* stated that their seaplanes by throwing bombs contributed to the success achieved, while a German cruiser and two destroyers were damaged by mines. It was unofficially reported at this time that the German Baltic Fleet had occupied the port of Libau as a naval base, and that efforts were in progress to repair the harbour and fortify the town. On August 10th, the Germans denied having lost three vessels off Riga in the attack on the 8th. No important action was undertaken on this date, it was asserted, "but only a reconnaissance for the purpose of ascertaining the position of the Russian mines, in the course of which two small minesweepers were lost."

ALAND ISLANDS ATTACKED.—On August 10th, large German forces approached simultaneously the entrance to the Gulf of Riga and the Aland Skerries and bombarded the lighthouses, but were driven off by the Russian warships and shore batteries. In the German report, which stated that the attacks were made upon Russian torpedo craft near the entrance to the Gulf of Riga and in the archipelago near the Schaeren Isles, it was asserted that the Russian vessels were forced to withdraw. A cruiser of the "Makaroff" class was mentioned as forming part of the squadron near the Schaeren Isles, and the German vessels were also said to have avoided damage from repeated submarine attacks.

FIGHTING NEAR OESSEL.—On August 12th, further engagements were reported unofficially to have taken place near Oesel Island. It was at first reported that a large German cruiser was destroyed and several other warships severely damaged, the Russian ships sustaining no loss or serious injury. Russian seaplanes again rendered valuable service. The German purpose was represented to be the reconnoitring of the waters of the northern Baltic and to bottle up if possible the Russian Fleet in the Gulf of Finland and Gulf of Bothnia. In this way, it would have been possible to provision the army of von Below by sea and to send transports to Libau or Windau. The operations were therefore subsidiary to the land warfare. On the 14th, however, it was denied from Berlin that any loss or damage had been inflicted upon the German forces on the 12th. Only outpost fighting, it was affirmed, took place between destroyers, the Russian boats retiring after being "successfully shelled."

LIVES LOST BY SUBMARINE ATTACK.—An official statement made by Dr. Macnamara showed that during the months of April, May, and June the number of officers and men of the mercantile marine who lost their lives owing to attack by German submarines was approximately 502. It is estimated that ten of them

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
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were killed by gunfire. On July 29th, Dr. Macnamara announced that up to July 27th the number of persons reported killed as a result of attack by German submarines on neutral merchant vessels was twenty-two, the nationality of those lost not being definitely known at the Admiralty. The number of persons killed by attacks on British merchant ships was approximately 1,550, but again the nationality of those who lost their lives was not definitely known at the Admiralty. The Admiralty had no record of any German non-combatants having been killed as the result of attack by British submarines.

PATROL CRUISERS.—On August 7th, the Admiralty issued a list of awards to officers and men "in recognition of their services in the patrol cruisers since the outbreak of war." Ten officers, three of whom were in the armed merchant cruiser "Alsatian," flagship of Rear-Admiral D. R. S. De Chair, received the D.S.O. and eight the D.S.C., while three were promoted to the rank of acting captain and two to that of acting commander. It was stated that "The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, speaks in the highest terms of the manner in which the patrol cruisers have performed their arduous task, especially during the winter months under exceptionally bad weather conditions. They have suffered severe losses, both in officers and men, and have been exposed continually to dangers from mines and submarines."

NAVAL GUNS IN BELGIUM.—In the same *Gazette*, five naval officers received the Distinguished Service Order or Cross for other services, which were unspecified except in the case of two officers who were awarded the D.S.C. for gallantry on shore in Belgium on April 28th, 1915. These officers, Lieutenant I. B. B. Tower and Sub-Lieutenant A. H. S. Casswell, were in charge of naval guns mounted on shore, and showed great coolness and bravery under heavy and accurate fire from hostile artillery. This was the first official indication that naval guns had been landed in Belgium since Lieutenant E. S. Wise was killed in the defence of Nieuport on October 18th, 1914.

THE SUBMARINE "BLOCKADE."—On August 18th, the "blockade" of the British Isles by submarines had been in progress exactly six months. In that period, the number of British merchant vessels sunk was 122, or an average of between four and five a week. The highest number of victims in any one week was ten, but in the week ending July 21st no ships were sunk, and in four weeks out of the twenty-six only one ship was destroyed. The number of arrivals and sailings of oversea steamers of over 300 tons net at ports of the United Kingdom during the six months was from 1,234 to 1,604. About a hundred fishing vessels were also destroyed from the beginning of April, when submarine attacks on these craft began, to the end of July.

MENACE "WELL IN HAND."—From this time onwards, the results of the German submarines' efforts were very varied, falling away to infinitesimal proportions in some weeks, and rising in others. In the week ending August 25th, they had the most successful "haul" of their career, when twenty ships of a gross tonnage of 79,727 were sunk. Generally, however, the "blockade" was characterised by fitful activity. Speaking on August 26th to a meeting of representatives of the Royal Agricultural Society, Lord Selborne said that "after the war, the whole question of our agricultural and economic policy of the food production at home will have to be revised in the light of our submarine experience. The navy have the submarine menace well in hand, and I am not afraid of the Germans being able to interrupt our sea communications during the course of this war, though they may be periodically disturbed."

"ARABIC" TORPEDOED.—On August 19th, the White Star liner "Arabic" was torpedoed and sunk over sixty miles off the south of Ireland. The ship was

attacked without warning, and foundered within fifteen minutes. Of 181 passengers and a crew of 248, the number saved was 390, leaving thirty-nine persons unaccounted for, including two Americans. The White Star Company officially announced that the submarine was not seen, and no question of the "Arabic" having tried to ram it therefore arose. The liner was in peaceful trading, with various nationalities on board, and was outward bound, so that there was no question of munitions. She was not disguised in any way, nor had she any guns mounted.

ASSURANCE TO AMERICA.—News of the sinking of the "Arabic" aroused some feeling in the United States, whose last Note to Germany on the submarine warfare before this attack stated that placing the lives of non-combatants in jeopardy would come within the category of acts which the United States would regard as "deliberately unfriendly." On August 25th, Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, asked the American Government not to take a definite stand until the official report was received. Two days later he notified the Government, on instructions from Berlin, that "full satisfaction" would be given to the United States for the sinking of the "Arabic," and on the same day the American Ambassador at Berlin cabled the substance of a conversation with Herr von Jagow to the effect that "Germany, before the sinking of the 'Arabic,' had adopted a policy designed to settle the entire submarine problem."

GERMAN DECLARATIONS.—On September 1st, Count Bernstorff informed the American Secretary of State that his instructions from Berlin concerning the German answer to the last "Lusitania" Note contained the following passage:—"Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning, and without ensuring the safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." This policy, the Count asserted, was decided upon before the "Arabic" was attacked. On August 31st, it was reported from Berlin that "the German Government considers the 'Arabic' incident closed, and has declared its willingness to blame the submarine commander for torpedoing the vessel when he returns."

LINER'S ASSAILANT.—Statements were published in the American Press during the first week of September that the submarine which torpedoed the "Arabic" had been sunk. A despatch dated September 1st said that the boat attempted to torpedo the British steamer "Niconsin," which arrived at Liverpool from New Orleans on August 24th, five days after the liner went down. The "Niconsin" escaped, and the submarine, while attempting to sink her, fell victim to a patrol boat. A high official of the German Admiralty, interviewed by a Press representative, also advanced the suggestion that the submarine had been sunk, adding that "it will be possible within a very short time, I cannot say precisely how many days, to tell whether our apprehensions regarding the submarine are correct. We usually get a report on any torpedoing operations in from eight to fourteen days, rarely later than a fortnight after the occurrence."

COMMANDER'S REPORT.—On October 5th, the American Secretary of State issued the following statement which he had received through the German Ambassador at Washington:—"The orders issued by his Imperial Majesty to the commanders of German submarines, of which I have notified you on a previous occasion, have been made so stringent that a recurrence of incidents similar to that of the 'Arabic' case is considered out of the question. According to the report of Commander Schneider, of the submarine which sank the 'Arabic,' and his affidavit, as well as those of his men, Commander Schneider is convinced that the 'Arabic' intended to ram his submarine. On the other hand, the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith of the affidavit of the British officers in the 'Arabic,'

according to which the 'Arabic' did not intend to ram the submarine. The attack of the submarine was undertaken against the instructions issued to the commander. The Imperial Government regrets and disavows this act, and has notified Commander Schneider accordingly."

"HESPERIAN" SUNK.—On September 4th, about 8.30 p.m., the Allan liner "Hesperian," Liverpool to Montreal, was damaged seriously by an explosion, understood to be that of a torpedo. She remained afloat for a day and a-half, or thirty-five hours, foundering at 6.47 a.m. on the 6th while being towed to Queenstown. Thirty-two passengers and crew out of about 600 on board were missing, including one American, owing to the capsizing of a boat. Some wounded Canadian soldiers were returning in the vessel, one of whom had the remarkable experience of recovering his sight by shock when he was thrown from a boat into the water.

CAUSE OF THE SINKING.—On September 14th, a semi-official statement from Berlin said that the "Hesperian" was not sunk by a German submarine, as the war plans for the distribution of submarines showed that none was in the vicinity on the date in question. On the 20th, however, the British Press Bureau stated that "undoubted proof exists that a German submarine was actually in the locality where the 'Hesperian' was attacked, and ships were sunk both to the north and south of this spot on September 4th and 5th. The explosion was of the type caused by a torpedo, and this is conclusively proved by a fair-sized fragment of the torpedo (now in the possession of the Admiralty) which was picked up on board the ship before she sank." Four days later, the German Admiralty contradicted this, and reiterated its assertion that the "Hesperian" was not attacked by a German submarine. Several unofficial witnesses, however, testified in support of the British statement, including Captain Smellie, of the steamer "Crossby," who said that he saw the "Hesperian" lurch after being struck, and he started to her assistance, but was chased by the submarine for several hours. On the other hand, an investigation was undertaken on behalf of the American Ambassador by Lieutenant McBride, U.S.N., Assistant Naval Attaché, who is a naval constructor by profession, and who proceeded to Queens-town for the purpose, with the result that it was concluded the "Hesperian" was sunk by a mine.

GERMAN DESTROYER SUNK.—On August 22nd, two French destroyers attached to the Second Light Squadron sunk a German destroyer off Ostend. The German statement of the occurrence said the destroyer, on outpost duty, was attacked off Zeebrugge, and sunk after a brave defence. Part of the crew were saved. The fight took place after dark, and was described as a brilliant spectacle in the moonlight. It became known afterwards that the French vessels were the "Oriflamme" and "Branlebas," and although the range was short the quick-firing guns in these destroyers failed to sink the German craft, which was accordingly torpedoed by the "Oriflamme." The French had no casualties, and only slight structural damage was done by one shell and a few splinters and fragments.

WHITEHAVEN SHELLED.—On August 16th, a German submarine fired several shells at Parton, Harrington, and Whitehaven between 4.30 a.m. and 5.20 a.m., but no material damage was done. A few shells hit the railway embankment north of Parton, but the train service was only slightly delayed. Fires, which were soon extinguished, were caused at Whitehaven and Harrington, but there were no casualties. A fortnight earlier, the first coastal bombardment by submarine reported to have occurred during this war was made by a British vessel in the Sea of Marmora, and this futile German raid may have been intended as something in the way of a reprisal. The submarine commander showed his knowledge of

British naval history by selecting Whitehaven, which was the place at which Paul Jones, the American seaman, carried out a raid on April 23rd, 1778, during the War of Independence. On August 28th, the Berlin wireless asserted that a benzol factory was destroyed near Harrington, with a benzol warehouse and the furnace belonging thereto, but there was no foundation for such a statement.

GERMANY AND DANISH SHIPS.—On August 21st, it was announced that an apology had been offered by Germany to the Danish Government for the sinking of the steamer "Betty" in the North Sea by a German submarine on May 26th. The Germans stated that the commander of the submarine regarded the steamer as an enemy vessel because he could not see any mark of nationality, and judging from the vessel's route he believed it was going to act as an auxiliary for the British Fleet. Remarking that it was far from the commander's intention to attack a vessel under the Danish flag, the German Government expressed its deep regret at the "unhappy incident," and its willingness to pay the Danish owners compensation, both Governments to appoint an expert to fix the amount.

ATTACK AND WARNING.—Early in August, a German explanation for an attack on the British liner "Orduna" was published which was of special interest for the manner in which it admitted that this vessel was attacked first and warned to stop afterwards. On July 17th, the "Orduna," of the Pacific Steam Navigation Co., arrived at New York with 227 passengers, including eighty women and forty children, and reported that at a time when nearly all the women and children in her were asleep a German submarine fired a torpedo, which missed the liner by only ten feet. The captain ordered all possible steam, altered course, and brought the "U" boat astern, when it began shelling the liner, fortunately without result, although four shots came within a few feet of the vessel. According to the German Ministry of Marine, the submarine commander reported officially that he sighted the "Orduna" through the periscope at a distance of 6,000 yards, and discharged a torpedo, which missed. He then brought his vessel to the surface and signalled the liner to halt. When the order was not heeded he fired several shots until it was evident that pursuit was unavailing.

SUBMARINE SUNK BY AIRMEN.—On August 26th, the Admiralty announced that Squadron-Commander A. W. Bigsworth, R.N., had destroyed on the morning of that day, single-handed, a German submarine by bombs dropped from an aeroplane. The submarine was observed to be completely wrecked, and sank off Ostend. The *communiqué* added: "It is not the practice of the Admiralty to publish statements regarding the losses of German submarines, important though they have been, in cases where the enemy have no other sources of information as to the time and place at which these losses have occurred. In the case referred to above, however, the brilliant feat of Squadron-Commander Bigsworth was performed in the immediate neighbourhood of the coast in occupation of the enemy, and the position of the sunken submarine has been located by a German destroyer."

GERMAN SUBMARINE LOSSES.—The reference to "important" losses of enemy submarines in this *communiqué* was the first official admission that the Germans had suffered the destruction or capture of other boats besides those already made public. On September 5th, however, Mr. Balfour, writing to a correspondent, said: "The losses inflicted upon German submarines have been formidable," and the criminals had paid heavy toll through their methods of warfare. "Some have been rescued," he said, "and are prisoners of war. But from the very nature of submarines, it must often happen that they drag their crews with them to destruction, and those who send them forth on their unhonoured mission wait for their return in vain."

THE ANTI-SUBMARINE WAR.—Further references to this subject were made by the visitors to the Grand Fleet whose letters were published in September.

Mr. Frederick Palmer, the American writer, said he was shown maps marking points where German submarines had been sighted and the results of the attacks on them classified under "Captured," "Supposed Sunk," and "Sunk." In reply to his question, "How did you get them?" the officers said: "Sometimes by ramming, sometimes by gunfire, sometimes by explosives, and in many other ways which we do not tell." England has 2,300 trawlers, mine-sweepers, and other auxiliaries outside of the regular service on duty on the blockade from the British Channel to Iceland, said Mr. Palmer, and in keeping the North Sea clear. Their reservist crews have been most zealous in performing their important part in overcoming the kind of naval warfare which Germany has waged.

FRENCH REVELATIONS.—Writing in the *Echo de Paris*, on September 8th, M. René Bazin said that he was able to state that the British had struck a rude blow at the German submarine fleet that would prevent its ever being a determining factor at sea, though it might still be a nuisance. Half the original submarine flotilla had been accounted for, he stated, and this was the secret of Germany's humility before neutrals, her losses in submarines being too large for her to carry on universal warfare. In the *Excelsior* on the previous day, M. Mille said that he was informed by an admiral that "we are sinking more than they are building." In the *Temps*, M. Mille said: "Two years are necessary for training an efficient submarine crew. The German losses are so great and irreparable that sailors taken for submarine work become so terrified that in spite of their habits of passive obedience they refuse to embark in submarines." In the *Figaro* on September 13th, M. Reinach said that about half the German submarine fleet had been destroyed, and though others of larger tonnage were building, the numbers did not compensate for those which had been destroyed, while the crews were wanting in the boldness and cleverness of the original complements, and seemed conscious of the risks which their piracy involved. Though the submarine war was ardently pursued by net, cannon, explosive bomb, and other means, the war was too narrow to please a fleet bred in the traditions of big battles.

GERMAN ADMISSION.—In the *Berliner Tageblatt* on August 11th, Captain Persius stated that the results of the German submarine campaign were viewed in many circles as "very modest." From an expert estimate of the efficacy of the submarine, and in view of the number of German submarines, the success and effect of the new naval warfare could appear only after a considerable time. There was no more complicated fighting instrument than the "U" boat, which meant that the task of commanding and managing it is not simple or easily learnt, and that some time must elapse before the commander and crew were familiar with the boat. The British, said Captain Persius, would only be accused by a child of being bad mariners; they know how to defend themselves, so have devised many kinds of protective measures. "It becomes more and more difficult," he added, "for 'U' boats to get near hostile ships and launch a torpedo. Almost fabulous skill is required to avoid all the pitfalls, etc., and get away from torpedo-boat destroyers and nevertheless make a successful attack."

AMERICAN DISCLOSURES.—On September 23rd, the *Providence Journal* (Rhode Island, U.S.A.) announced that it was positively known that sixty-seven German submarines, twenty-eight of which were of the newest and latest construction, had been sunk since May 5th. These boats mostly were destroyed by the great nets placed in the paths of the submarines. Operations under the new methods had been in progress over a period of four months. On October 3rd, despatches from Washington stated, on the basis of the "authoritative information" in possession of the Administration, that between sixty and seventy German submarines had been sunk or destroyed.

FIRST LORD'S STATEMENT.—On September 30th, Mr. Balfour stated in Parliament that an inevitable margin of doubt attaches to any attempt to estimate the numbers of enemy submarines destroyed. A submarine is not like an ordinary vessel. If the latter sinks, it sinks for ever. With a submarine, this is not necessarily true; and there was every gradation from absolute certainty through practical assurance down to faint possibility. Facts like these were not fitted for statistical statement. Were the Admiralty to take only cases of certainty, they would be understating the truth; but if they included all cases of reasonable probability they might be exaggerating the truth; and no defensible line could be drawn between these two extremes.

Loss of "U 27."—On September 7th, the German Admiralty Staff said that according to a report from one of the German submarines which met "U 27" on the high seas, the latter boat, about August 10th, sank a small British cruiser of an old type, west of the Hebrides. "U 27" did not return, and as she had not been heard of for a long time she must be regarded as lost. No confirmation of the reported British cruiser loss was available, and it was assumed that it referred to the torpedoing of the auxiliary cruiser "India," on August 8th, although that vessel was sunk well to the east of the Hebrides, off the Norwegian coast. The announcement regarding "U 27" was the first occasion on which the Germans had taken the initiative in revealing a submarine loss.

BATTLE IN RIGA GULF.—During the whole of the week ending Saturday, August 21st, there was fighting between the Russian and German forces in and near the Gulf of Riga, the outcome of which was that the Germans were compelled to evacuate the waters of the Gulf with certain losses. After their earlier operations to ascertain the situation of the Russian mines, they brought up large forces which, on August 25th, forced back the Russian ships protecting the entrance to the Gulf. The gunboat "Sivutch" was sunk after a gallant defence, and the Germans also claimed to have sunk the "Korietz" and damaged other vessels, including the "Novik." They admitted, however, that three of their torpedo boats were damaged by mines, with the result that one of them sank, one was able to run ashore, and the other was escorted to port.

THE GERMAN SET-BACK.—In an official summary issued at Petrograd on August 23rd, it was shown that the German scheme to penetrate into the Gulf of Riga was favoured by thick fogs and misty weather. The enemy entered the Gulf itself on the 18th, and reconnaissances in various directions were made on the 19th and 20th. The "Sivutch" was destroyed in Moon Sound after stubbornly resisting a German cruiser which closed with her to a range of about 400 yards. It was on the 21st that the enemy, in view of the losses he had sustained, and considering the barrenness of his efforts, apparently evacuated the Gulf. From August 16th to 21st, added the *communiqué*, two cruisers and not less than eight torpedo craft belonging to the Germans were either put out of action or sunk.

REPORTED LANDING ATTEMPT.—On August 22nd, the President of the Duma, in the course of a statement, said that "The Germans tried to make a descent near Pernau. Four barges of enormous dimensions crammed with soldiers took part. The descent was repulsed by the Russian troops without the co-operation of artillery, the Germans being exterminated and the barges captured." In regard to this reported attempt to land troops in the north-west corner of the Gulf of Riga and create a diversion on the Estonian coast, however, the commandant of the fortress at Reval stated on September 5th that, "in order to allay the apprehension expressed by the inhabitants of Reval, the commandant appeals to the good sense of the inhabitants to judge for themselves

what damage threatened Reval through the fact that two small enemy boats, with three empty steamers, profited by the fog to approach Pernau, where they were sunk in the river by the Germans themselves." A German semi-official statement, dated August 25th, agreed with this, it being said that "The ships which were captured, according to the Russian report, are steamers sunk by us in order to block the Channel."

"MOLTKE" TORPEDOED.—On August 19th, in the same week as the Riga fighting, the German battle-cruiser "Moltke" was torpedoed by a British submarine, which was afterwards reported to be the "E 1," commanded by Commander Noel F. Laurence. The British submarine flotilla in the Baltic was thus able to afford timely assistance to the Russian forces. The Germans denied on August 25th that any large ship had been sunk or seriously damaged "in the Gulf of Riga," which was probably true as far as it went, but Scandinavian fishermen reported having seen a large German cruiser, surrounded by lighters, being towed in an easterly direction, probably towards Kiel, about the time that the "Moltke" was attacked.

TSAR'S DECORATION.—On September 24th, it became known, through the medium of the *Russkoe Slovo*, of Moscow, and other Russian newspapers, that the Tsar of Russia had conferred the Fourth Class of the Order of St. George upon Commander Noel F. Laurence for having successfully attacked the "Moltke" on August 19th, and for sinking a large German transport on July 30th. The January official "Navy List" showed Commander Laurence to have been in command of submarine "E 1" since October 17th, 1912. In an interview with his father, who resides in Maidstone, it was stated that he took the first British submarine through to the Baltic, and in the New Year list he was promoted to the rank of commander in recognition of the achievement.

BRITISH IN THE BALTIC.—On September 30th, Mr. Balfour stated in Parliament, in reply to a question asking whether he could confirm the statements made officially in Petrograd, and furnish any details regarding the torpedoing of a large German cruiser in the Baltic, that the Admiralty felt precluded from giving information about the proceedings of the Russian Fleet beyond that which the Russian Government think it expedient to publish in the Press. The British submarines which have done such excellent service in the Baltic, said the First Lord, are not an independent force, but are acting under the command of the Russian Admiral.

LOSS OF "E 13."—On August 19th, in the early morning, the British submarine "E 13," while on its way to the Baltic, grounded on the Danish island of Saltholm, in the Sound. All efforts to refloat her failed. At 5 a.m., a Danish torpedo-boat which appeared on the scene, informed the commander that twenty-four hours would be allowed to try to get the vessel off. At 9 a.m., while three Danish vessels were anchored close to the submarine, two German destroyers arrived, one of which fired a torpedo from a distance of about 300 yards, the missile exploding on hitting the bottom close to the submarine. At the same moment the German destroyer fired with all her guns, and Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Layton, seeing that his vessel was on fire fore and aft, and unable to defend himself owing to being aground, gave orders for the crew to abandon her. While the men were in the water, they were fired on by machine-guns and with shrapnel. One of the Danish torpedo-boats immediately lowered her boats and steamed between the submarine and the German destroyers, which therefore had to cease fire and withdraw.

FATE OF THE CREW.—Exactly one-half of the thirty officers and men in "E 13" were killed, and the British Government accepted the offer of the

Danish Government to send their bodies to England. They arrived at Hull on August 28th and 30th, fourteen of them being conveyed in the Danish steamer "Vidar," and one in the "J. C. Lacour," from Copenhagen. Special tributes of respect and sympathy from all classes, from Queen Alexandra, who sent wreaths, downwards, were manifested as the bodies passed through Hull on the way to their homes for interment. Captain Regnan Hammer, of the Royal Danish Navy, travelled in charge of the "Vidar," and on September 2nd was received in audience by Queen Alexandra and King George. His Majesty, after expressing his thanks to the captain, decorated him with the C.M.G. On October 7th, Commander Layton and the surviving members of the crew were released on parole, being free to go anywhere in Copenhagen. The hull of "E 13" was refloated a fortnight after grounding, on September 3rd, for repairs and interment.

NEW GERMAN MINEFIELD.—On September 22nd, it was announced in the *Nachrichten für Seefahrer*, or German "News for Mariners," that a new minefield was being laid at the southern outlet of the Sound, the narrow water connecting the Baltic and North Sea. The bearings indicated a small elliptical field south of the island of Saltholm. To enable neutral shipping to pass the Sound a pilot service was instituted one mile east of the Drogden lightship, the orders of which vessels were cautioned to follow to avoid serious damage. Certain alterations in the minefield were reported in the *Nya Dagliga Allehanda*, of Stockholm, on September 27th. The laying of mines in this locality caused some concern in Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. The Göteborg *Handels Tidning* asserted that these mining operations were contrary to the 18th Article of the Declaration of London, which states that neutral ports and coasts are not to suffer by mining directed against an enemy. The same paper also declared that according to Article 1, the blockade of connections between seas, as, for example, the Straits of Gibraltar and the Ore Sound, is not permitted.

SUBMARINES IN THE BALTIC.—The work of the British submarines in the Baltic, to which the German minefield was a reply, was eulogized by the Russian Minister of Marine in an interview published on October 4th. "We in Russia know," he said, "and appreciate to the full, the fine qualities displayed by British seamen who man the submarines now acting in the Baltic against our common enemy, and on behalf of the Russian Navy we compliment most heartily the British naval officers in charge of them. The services rendered by the British Fleet throughout the war are superb, and have markedly influenced the course of the struggle against our powerful foe."

GERMAN MERCHANTMEN SUNK.—On October 3rd, what was described as a new phase of the British submarine operations in the Baltic, was inaugurated when the Stettin steamer "Svionia," 2,800 tons, was run ashore off Arcona, in the island of Rügen. Her crew were landed without injury or loss of life. The vessel belonged to the Kunstmann Line. In the German wireless news on October 4th, it was asserted that her assailant "first flew the German and then the English flag, and shelled the ship, which was run ashore." Up to this time, the British submarines had not molested German merchant ships, so far as had been made known, but this turning of the tables was of considerable importance, in view of its effect on the stopping of contraband traffic in minerals from Scandinavian ports. Following the "Svionia," steamers were sunk or driven ashore at the rate of more than one a day. Four vessels, indeed, were reported to have been accounted for on October 11th. In this week, the British submarine "E 19" was stated to have destroyed the "Nicomedia," of Hamburg, with 6,800 tons

of metals on board. This submarine was the fourth of the "E" type revealed as having been at work in the Baltic.

BELGIAN COAST SQUADRON.—During the quarter there has been continued activity shown by the Allied squadron operating off the coast of Belgium. Its work has been done in conjunction with that of the army on shore, and it played its part in the artillery preparation for the advance which begun on September 25th. The British Admiralty have made no references to the work of the squadron, and the only official information concerning it is to be gained from brief sentences in some of the French, Belgian, or German military *communiqués*, and from a note of appreciation in one of Sir John French's Orders of the Day. From the Dutch newspapers, moreover, a great deal more information has been published.

ZEEBRUGGE SHELLED.—On July 23rd an attack on Zeebrugge by French vessels was reported by a Dutch news agency, on the authority of a correspondent who had just returned from Holland. A German torpedo boat was said to have been damaged. Air raids on the port were also stated to have taken place. During the previous three months, whilst aerial attacks had been fairly frequent, no important bombardments from the sea appear to have taken place, although it was reported that the Allied flotilla kept a close watch and guard upon the place, with a view to catching hostile submarines using it as a base, or to prevent the extension of the minefields in the neighbourhood. Further firing at the coast positions by British ships was reported on August 9th. No further losses from mines were reported after the destruction of the destroyer "Maori" on May 7th.

BOMBARDMENT RENEWED.—On August 23rd an attack in force began, coinciding with the opening of the artillery bombardment of the German lines along the entire Western front. The German official *communiqué* of the 23rd said: "Early this morning an enemy fleet of some forty vessels appeared off Zeebrugge, but disappeared in a north-western direction after it had been attacked by our coast artillery." Dutch reports said that the ships were in action also at Knocke and Heyst, among other places, the firing beginning at daybreak. A destroyer crept inshore to draw the fire of the batteries, and aircraft were employed for spotting purposes. Among the places damaged were the Solvay Works, between Zeebrugge and Lisseweghe, which had recently been used for the manufacture of poison gas; the Mole at Zeebrugge; and a submarine "dug-out" or shelter excavated from the banks of the Zeebrugge—Bruges Canal. Several submarines were damaged, and at least one destroyed. The casualties were said to have amounted to 200 killed and wounded in Zeebrugge.

AIR AND SEA ATTACKS.—On September 3rd, in an official review of the work of their naval aeroplanes, the French Ministry of Marine stated that "Last week, despite a violent cannonade and the use of spot-lights, our naval airmen threw more than three hundred 4-in. shells on the German naval installations on the Belgian coast." On September 7th, the naval bombardment was reported to have been resumed with great intensity. It was stated that in the first big attack some shells from the ships fell in close proximity to fourteen German submarines, the parts of which had been assembled at Zeebrugge. Accordingly further attempts were made to destroy this group of boats, with what result was not stated. From about September 7th, firing was heard almost daily from the coast of Holland. On September 8th a French official *communiqué* stated that the French land guns had assisted the British Fleet in its bombardment, and that, in conjunction with the British Naval Air Service, French aircraft had bombarded the aviation sheds at Ostend. Both French and German *communiqués* referred to a vigorous attack on September 19th, on which day it was stated that the French heavy artillery in the region of Nieuport acted in conjunction with the ships in counter-attacking the batteries on that side which replied to the fire from the sea.

THE ALLIED ADVANCE.—On the morning of the advance on shore, September 25th, some thirty vessels opened a bombardment along the entire coast at 6.30 a.m., which lasted for four hours. Guns of the heavier types were used, according to the Dutch accounts, which said that some of the shells came from what were apparently 28-cm. (11-in.) weapons. In addition to the places on the coast itself, others which were situated some distance from the shore were made to feel the effect of the bombardment, and it was reported that the railway station at Lisseweghe was hit. The bombardment was said to have been the heaviest on record since the German right wing was first shelled from the sea in October, 1914.

ADMIRAL BACON IN COMMAND.—In a Special Order of the Day issued on September 30th, Field-Marshal Sir John French, after expressing his appreciation of the manner in which the troops under his command had carried out their duties in the advance, said: "We are also much indebted to Vice-Admiral Bacon and our naval comrades for the valuable co-operation of the fleet." This was the first official indication that Vice-Admiral R. H. S. Bacon was in charge of the Belgian coast squadron. He was appointed in April to what was described as an important naval post on the south coast of England, which involved the hoisting of his flag. The revelation of Sir John French showed that the Vice-Admiral had succeeded Rear-Admiral Hood as Admiral Commanding the Dover Patrol.

MONITORS IN ACTION.—The German reports of the coast firing referred to the presence in the British squadron of vessels of the monitor class. On October 1st the official *communiqué* said that "enemy monitors unsuccessfully bombarded the environs of Lombartzyde and Middelkerke," and on October 4th it was announced that "early yesterday morning five monitors appeared before Zeebrugge and directed a fruitless fire against the coast." From illustrations which were allowed to appear in the English papers, and from the Dutch reports, it was indicated that these monitors carry heavier guns than the "Severn" class, and their immunity from torpedo attack and gun-fire indicates shallow-draught and adequate protection.

ATLANTIC.

SUBMARINES IN BISCAY BAY.—On September 15th it was indicated in a note issued by the French Ministry of Marine that "U" boats had appeared in the Bay of Biscay, evidently driven there by the British counter measures in more northern waters. The French *communiqué* said: "The operations of German submarines on the shores of the ocean, off the estuaries of the Loire and the Gironde, ought not to alarm the maritime populations. The Minister of Marine has long taken the necessary precautions against the aggressions of German submarines; the existing naval units have been reinforced, and will be reinforced still further if it should appear necessary. Just as in the Channel, where the defence has been so effective, the German practices, contrary to international laws and to the most elementary principles of humanity, can result only in rare and isolated acts."

NO BASES IN SPAIN.—In reply to rumours that German submarines must have been receiving supplies from bases in Spanish territory to enable them to operate so far from their home ports, the Spanish Premier, Senor Dato, issued a denial that anything of the kind had occurred. He showed that the measures taken by his Government regarding the sale of oil and benzine rendered it virtually impossible to establish surreptitious bases for submarines. The Spanish Minister of Marine also denied the accuracy of the reports referred to, and added his opinion that, while it was possible for German submarines to sneak through the

Straits of Gibraltar, those which had been operating in the Mediterranean had more probably been shipped overland and launched from an Austrian port on the Adriatic.

OPERATIONS IN THE CAMEROONS.—The navy has continued its co-operation with, and support of, the military forces engaged in the conquest of the Cameroons. On September 25th, the fact that a naval gun had assisted in the capture of the town of Garua was revealed by the award of the D.S.O. to Lieutenant L. H. K. Hamilton, R.N. Garua surrendered on June 10th, and its fall was announced by the British Colonial Office on the 15th. Speaking to a Press representative on September 17th, the French Colonial Minister described how this important garrison town had been besieged for several months, and only fell when a large-calibre gun was transported there. It was brought upon boats 160 miles up the lower reaches of the Niger River, thence 480 miles up the Benue River, and 60 miles by land. The effect of its projectiles was so terrifying that after a short bombardment the population and garrison offered to surrender to the Franco-British force under Colonel F. H. G. Cunliffe. Lieutenant Hamilton was the officer in charge of the transport of this weapon. He had previously been in command of the river flotilla which drove the Germans out of Dehane, another place in the Cameroons, at the end of December, 1914.

ADRIATIC.

"U 11" ATTACKED.—On July 1st, the Austrian submarine "U 11" was attacked by two bombs from an aeroplane piloted by the French airman, Sub-Lieutenant Rouillet, from a height of fifty feet. In an official *communiqué* from Rome issued on the following day, it was announced that the bombs exploded under the water very close to the turret, apparently with success. According to news received via Geneva, the boat had to be towed back into port with four dead and several wounded on board, and in need of repairs.

AUSTRIAN BOAT SUNK.—On July 11th, a message from Turin to the *Stampa* stated that in the course of the operations for the recovery of the Italian submarine "Medusa," which was sunk in the previous month, divers found, close to the hull of the boat, another submarine, which was evidently an Austrian one. Examination led to the conclusion that the two underwater craft had been engaged in a duel, as a result of which both had been destroyed.

ADRIATIC CLOSED TO SHIPPING.—On July 9th, a Reuter message from Washington stated that the American Ambassador at Rome reported the Adriatic Sea to have been closed to merchant vessels of all nations, except those bound to Montenegro or Italian ports possessing a permit of the Italian Ministry of War. A similar announcement was published in the *London Gazette* on July 23rd. This placed the Adriatic in the same category as the North Sea by making it a "military area." A blockade of the coast of Albania had already been declared in May, as recorded in the last issue of this JOURNAL.

AIRCRAFT ATTACKS.—On July 4th, an Italian airship dropped bombs on the Stabilimento Tecnico, the great shipbuilding establishment at Trieste. Admiral Thaon di Revel, Chief of the Italian Naval General Staff, reported next day that the vessel returned safely after inflicting serious damage. On July 7th, in a further raid, a fire visible for twenty-five miles was caused. Seaplanes dropped bombs on Austrian destroyers concentrated in the Fasana Canal, near Pola, on July 14th. Other seaplanes made raids about this time upon railway and signal stations and other military objectives.

PELAGOSA CAPTURED.—On July 26th, the island of Pelagosa was captured and occupied after a night raid by destroyers and auxiliary vessels of the Allied Fleet. Although it had often been bombarded, it was found that the place was still being used as a base for submarines and as a signal station, and its occupation was therefore desirable. In spite of several attempts at recapture, the island remained in the hands of the Italians up to the middle of October.

LAGOSTA RAIDED.—At the same time as the capture of Pelagosa, a raid was made upon the island of Lagosta, to cut the submarine cable and destroy the supplies for submarines and aeroplanes known to be on the island. In this operation the French destroyers took the chief part, supported and assisted by an Italian light cruiser, and the "Magon" and "Bisson" were mentioned as having specially distinguished themselves by their skill and audacity.

AUSTRIAN RAIDS.—On July 27th Austrian light cruisers and torpedo boats attacked the railway from Ancona to Pesaro, bombarding the station buildings, magazines, guard-houses, and railway bridges along this part of the coast. The railway stores at Fano were reported to have been set on fire. Simultaneously the Austrians announced that their seaplanes attacked the railway station, barracks, and other military points at Ancona.

ITALIAN AIRSHIP LOST.—On August 5th, an Italian airship, after making a successful raid on Pola, fell into the sea on the return journey. The crew of three officers and three men were made prisoners by the Austrians. The Austrian account of this occurrence gave the name of the vessel as the "Città di Jesi," and stated that she was brought down by shrapnel fire.

MONFALCONE RAIDED.—On August 7th and 8th, Austrian artillery, supported apparently by aircraft, threw incendiary shells into the dockyard at Monfalcone, causing a great fire, which was, however, soon got under control and restricted. By means of what the Italian *communiqué* called a continuous curtain of shrapnel the Austrians endeavoured to prevent the arrival of detachments sent to extinguish the flames, but in this way they were only partially successful. On September 12th shells were again fired at the docks and some vessels damaged thereby.

SUBMARINE DUEL.—On August 11th, the Chief of the Italian Naval General Staff announced that in the Upper Adriatic the Austrian submarine "U 12" was torpedoed by an Italian submarine, and sunk with all on board. On the 14th, the Austrians admitted the loss, stating that the boat had not returned from a cruise in the Northern Adriatic. Wireless news from Vienna announced that the boat was under the command of Captain Zerch, who, in December, "sunk" the French flagship "Courbet." This battleship, of course, was not sunk, but only damaged, and at the time she was attacked "U 12" was the latest submarine in the Austrian flotilla.

"U 3" SUNK.—On August 13th, or two days after the loss of the "U 12," another Austrian submarine, "U 3," was sunk. The second-in-command and eleven men of the crew were saved and taken prisoners. An Italian auxiliary cruiser was patrolling the Lower Adriatic on August 12th, when "U 3" attacked her with two torpedoes, which missed, and the vessel turned on the submarine and rammed her. The "U" boat was only damaged, however, and a flotilla of Italian and French destroyers was sent in pursuit of her. They discovered her next morning, when the French destroyer "Bisson" sunk her with gunfire. The loss was reported to have reduced the Austrian submarine flotilla to six.

FRENCH SUBMARINE'S FEAT.—On August 13th, Lieutenant Cochin, commanding submarine "Papin," was mentioned in an Order of the Day for taking his vessel safely through an Austrian minefield. Several mines were floating on the surface, and, after having destroyed them, Lieutenant Cochin and his men continued their journey through the minefield and cut the cables of about 100 mines, which were destroyed. To keep a proof of his exploit, the commander towed two mines to an Italian port, where his capture was noted, afterwards putting to sea and destroying them both.

AUSTRIAN RAID.—On August 11th, Austrian vessels bombarded the Italian littoral and railway works from Molfetta to San Giorgio, and claimed to have damaged railway viaducts, depôts, or signal stations at the two places mentioned and also at San Spirito and Bari. The ships employed all got back safely, and the Vienna *communiqué* claimed that with the exception of one submarine off Bari nothing was to be seen of the Italian naval forces.

TORPEDO ATTACK.—On September 9th, the "Papin," already mentioned, further distinguished herself by torpedoing a group of Austrian torpedo boats in the Middle Adriatic, near Cape Planka. One boat was stated to have been severely damaged. The Italian *communiqué* showed that the "Papin" was attached to the Italian naval forces.

"BENEDETTO BRIN" BLOWN UP.—On September 28th, it was announced that following a fire the Italian battleship "Benedetto Brin" had been destroyed by an explosion. Eight officers and 379 bluejackets were saved, or about half the crew. Among those lost were Rear-Admiral Rubin de Cervin. The explosion occurred in the after magazine while the ship was lying in Brindisi harbour. There was no question of foul play. The vessel was laid down in 1899 and launched in 1901. In the Tripolitaine War she carried the flag of Vice-Admiral Faravelli and fired the first shot in the bombardment of Tripoli on October 3rd, 1911.

FRENCH STEAMER SUNK.—On October 3rd, the French steamer "Provincia," of 3,523 tons, built in 1902, was sunk by an Austrian submarine off the island of Cerigo, on the south-west coast of Greece. The ship was making for the Piræus, and her crew were given ten minutes to escape. They rowed ashore in four boats. This was the first reported instance of the sinking of an Allied merchant steamer by an Austrian submarine.

SERBIA.

AUSTRIAN MONITORS ATTACKED.—On April 26th, there was published from the Serbian Press Bureau at Nish, a telegram stating that, on the night of April 22nd-23rd, a surprise attack was made on the Austrian river gunboats north of Semlin. One of them was damaged, which caused great confusion among the rest of the flotilla and on both banks of the Danube. The enemy replied with rifle and machine-gun fire, which did no damage.

BRITISH OFFICER DECORATED.—On June 30th, it was announced in the *London Gazette* that the D.S.O. had been awarded to Lieutenant-Commander (acting) C. L. Kerr, R.N., for services in command of a picket boat which reconnoitred the position of the Austrian monitors on the Danube on the nights of April 21st and 22nd. He torpedoed one of them under heavy fire, the enterprise being boldly and skilfully conducted.

"TERROR OF THE DANUBE."—In July, it became known through newspaper articles that the British officers serving in small craft on the Danube had been

very successful in their operations against the Austrians. One writer said that Commander Kerr's picket boat had earned the nickname of "Terror of the Danube." Night after night this vessel had gone forth on errands of the utmost danger, and had kept fairly terrorized an enemy force of literally more than a hundred times its strength.

BRITISH ADMIRAL AT BELGRADE.—On August 10th, Mr. L. S. Amery, M.P., in a speech at Birmingham, said that two or three months before he had visited Belgrade, and was greatly surprised to find the British Navy in full command under a British admiral, "with a British battleship which had been taken there by a truck, and which had succeeded in sinking an Austrian monitor in her moorings. That was one of the finest things of the war, but as at that time nobody was supposed to know the British Navy were at Belgrade the story was never made public."

REAR-ADMIRAL TROUBRIDGE.—On September 12th, it was at length revealed that Rear-Admiral E. C. T. Troubridge was in command of the British contingent of bluejackets and marines co-operating with the Serbian Army. A report from Paris stated that good practice was made every day with the powerful guns in the hands of these officers and men, and in this manner the Austrians were kept from bombarding the capital and harassing the Serbian troops. Belgrade was also said to have been protected from hostile air raids by a squadron of French aeroplanes.

BULGARIA AND THE WAR.—It was on October 1st that Sir Edward Grey issued a statement to the effect that information had been received that for several days German and Austrian officers had been arriving in Bulgaria, with a view of taking an active part in directing the Bulgarian Army. Since the Allied Powers, it was stated, were bound to support the States who were threatened by such proceedings in Bulgaria, this news was regarded as of the utmost gravity. Three days earlier, Sir Edward Grey had announced in Parliament that if Bulgaria assumed an aggressive attitude, Great Britain would give her friends in the Balkans all the support in her power in a manner that would be most welcome to them in concert with her Allies, "without reserve and without qualification."

WAR DECLARED.—On October 14th, Bulgaria notified Greece that, in consequence of a violation of the Bulgarian frontier at two points by Serbian forces, Bulgaria and Serbia were at war from 8 a.m. on the morning of that day. On October 16th, it was officially announced in the British Press that in view of the fact that Bulgaria had announced that she was at war with Serbia, and was an ally of the Central Powers, the British Government had informed the Bulgarian Government, through the Swedish Minister in London, who was in charge of Bulgaria's interests, that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Bulgaria as from 10 p.m., October 15th.

LANDING AT SALONIKA.—In the week ending October 9th, it was reported that Allied troops had arrived at Salonika and were being disembarked with a view to proceeding to the help of the Serbian Army. The conveying naval force was said to have included a French cruiser and the Russian cruiser "Askold."

BLOCKADE ANNOUNCED.—On October 16th, it was officially announced that the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron of the Allied Fleets had declared a blockade of the Bulgarian coast in the Ægean Sea, beginning from 6 a.m. on that day. Forty-eight hours' grace from the moment of the commencement of the blockade was assigned for the departure of neutral vessels from the blockaded area.

DARDANELLES.

FRENCH MINELAYER SUNK.—During the night of June 3rd-4th, the French minelayer "Casabianca" struck a mine at the entrance to the Ægean Sea. The captain, one officer, and sixty-four of the crew were rescued by a British destroyer. Other survivors were reported to have gained the coast and to have been taken prisoners by the Turks.

SUBMARINE BASE ATTACKED.—On June 14th, it was reported that two French destroyers had bombarded the port of Chesme, on the coast of Asia Minor, opposite Chios, which was being used as a base for hostile submarines. During a forty minutes' bombardment all the sailing ships in harbour, the customs and telegraph offices, and the petrol stores were destroyed.

"CARTHAGE" TORPEDOED.—On July 4th, the French liner "Carthage" was torpedoed and sunk off Cape Helles, at the entrance to the Dardanelles. Sixty-six of her crew were rescued, but six were missing when the Ministry of Marine announced the loss a few days later.

NAVAL BOMBARDMENTS.—On July 17th, a British battleship and four destroyers were reported to have fired with marked success 200 shells against the Turkish positions at Gaba Tepe, and on the following day a cruiser, assisted by torpedo craft and aeroplanes, bombarded the Turkish right wing near Ari Burnu.

SUBMARINES' WORK.—In the week ending July 24th, British submarines were again successful in the Sea of Marmora, and sank two Turkish transports, one being the "Viga." At Constantinople a Turkish destroyer was damaged. A portion of the Galata quay was blown away, and an attack made on the bridge near the Guebbez Station of the Anatolian Railway.

"MARIOTTE" LOST.—On July 26th, the French submarine "Mariotte" was sunk by the Turks. She had entered the Straits to operate in the Sea of Marmora. Thirty-one officers and men were made prisoners. She was the second French submarine reported lost at the Dardanelles, the other being the "Saphir" on January 19th.

SUBMARINE EXPLOITS.—On August 2nd, the Admiralty announced that a British submarine in the Sea of Marmora had torpedoed a large steamer of 3,000 tons off Mudania Pier, and a small steamer close to Karabogha Bay. Torpedoes were also fired at lighters alongside the arsenal at Constantinople.

SHORE BOMBARDMENTS.—A novel feature of the Admiralty *communiqué* of August 2nd was the statement that the Government powder mills at Zeitunlik had been fired at by a submarine, and that the railway cutting one mile west of Kara Burnu was bombarded and the line blocked temporarily, so that a troop train was unable to pass, and was fired at as it steamed back, three truckloads of ammunition being blown up.

GALATA BRIDGE ATTACKED.—On August 2nd also it was reported by *The Times* correspondent at Mitylene, on the authority of information from Dedeagatch, that the Galata bridge had been attacked and blown up by shells from a submarine. This bridge, connecting Galata with Stambul, was begun in 1909 and publicly inaugurated in 1912.

"ST. LOUIS" IN ACTION.—On August 12th, it was officially announced that the French battleship "St. Louis" was reported by Sir Ian Hamilton to have put out of action five out of six guns in Asiatic batteries.

"BARBAROSSA" TORPEDOED.—On August 9th, an official Turkish *communiqué* stated that the battleship "Kheyr-ed-Din Barbarossa" was sunk on the morning of that day by a submarine. The greater part of the crew were rescued. This

ship was one of the two purchased from Germany in 1910. A German report said that it was a British submarine which torpedoed her.

"ROYAL EDWARD" SUNK.—On August 14th, the British transport "Royal Edward" was sunk by an enemy submarine in the *Ægean*. She had 32 military officers and 1,350 troops on board, with a crew of 220. The troops consisted mainly of reinforcements for the 29th Division and details of the Royal Army Medical Corps. About 600 were saved. The Turkish report said it was a German submarine which sank the vessel, and that a hospital ship rescued a small number of those on board. This was the first British transport reported lost in the war.

TURKISH SHIPS TORPEDOED.—On August 12th, an Admiralty *communiqué* announced that the Turkish gunboat "Berk-I-Satvet," and an empty transport, had been torpedoed in the Dardanelles by one of the British submarines. The gunboat was a German-built vessel, completed in 1907. Other ships unofficially reported to have been torpedoed at this time were the transport "Khay," with a cargo of military stores, which was run ashore at Sibivria; the coal transport "Ispahan," torpedoed at Haidar Pasha; the "Tenedos," of the German Levant Line; and four large Turkish sloops conveying troops from Lampsaki, on the Asiatic side of the Straits, to Gallipoli.

TRANSPORT SUNK BY AEROPLANE.—On August 12th, Flight-Commander C. H. K. Edmonds, R.N., was reported to have destroyed a transport in the Dardanelles, with all on board, by dropping a bomb on the vessel from an aeroplane. He descended low enough to drop the bomb, a heavy one, full on the deck of the vessel, which was completely wrecked.

ADMIRAL'S DESPATCH.—On August 16th, the despatch of Vice-Admiral John M. de Robeck, covering the operations of the navy in connection with the landing of the troops in the Gallipoli Peninsula, was published in the *London Gazette*. A number of honours were awarded at the same time for service in these operations, including the bestowal of the V.C. upon Commander Unwin, R.N., two midshipmen, and two seamen for gallantry in the armed transport "River Clyde." A number of decorations were also conferred for services at the Dardanelles between February 19th and April 25th, for which period no despatch was published.

RUAD ISLAND OCCUPIED.—On September 1st, the Ministry of Marine announced that the Island of Ruad had been captured and occupied by a detachment from the French squadron which was blockading the coast of Syria. The French flag was hoisted without resistance, the inhabitants giving the seamen a hearty welcome. Ruad is between Latakia and Tripoli (Syria).

"INDIAN" TORPEDOED.—On September 8th, while at anchor off Rhodes, the French auxiliary cruiser "Indian" was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine. Of her crew of sixty-two, twelve were missing. The "Indian," of 800 tons, was a vessel captured off Adalia two months earlier. She sank in about 60 ft. of water, her funnel and masts being visible from the lighthouse of St. Nicholas.

"E 7" LOST.—On September 16th, the Admiralty announced that the enemy claimed to have sunk submarine "E 7," Lieut.-Commander A. D. Cochrane, off the Dardanelles. As no news had been received from this submarine since September 4th, this report was accepted as correct. Three officers and twenty-five men of the crew were reported to be prisoners.

"AE 2's" CREW.—On September 20th, it was reported that Rear-Admiral Sir William Creswell, in Australia, had received a letter from Lieut.-Commander Stoker stating that the crew of submarine "AE 2," sunk on April 30th, were cheerful in captivity, and were proud of the fact "that an Australian warship was the first British vessel to pass through the Dardanelles."

ARMENIANS RESCUED.—On September 22nd, the French Ministry of Marine announced that a French cruiser rescued at the beginning of September about five thousand Armenians who had taken refuge towards the end of July in the Missij of Djétel Moussa, to the north of the Bay of Antioch. Their provisions were failing and they seemed certain to fall into the hands of the Turks when they were able to signal to the cruiser, which took them to Port Said.

GUNS ON BARGES.—On October 4th, it was reported from Mitylene that a British light squadron had bombarded the Turkish positions at Fenki. The Allies were stated to have placed long-range naval guns on specially built barges, and to have bombarded the forts on both sides of the Straits.

SUBMARINE OFFICER'S FEAT.—On October 8th, the Admiralty announced that the D.S.O. had been awarded to Lieutenant Guy D'Oyly-Hughes, R.N., D.S.C., for gallantry in swimming ashore from a submarine in the Sea of Marmora and mining a Turkish railway. Extracts from the report of the commanding officer of the submarine were given in the official announcement. Lieutenant D'Oyly-Hughes had already received the D.S.C. on June 25th for service in the Sea of Marmora as second-in-command of submarine "E 11," Commander Nasmith's boat.

SUVLA BAY LANDINGS.—No naval despatches or *communiqués* were issued concerning the work of the fleet during the landings at Suvla Bay on August 6th and successive days. Certain information, though of a meagre character, may be gained, however, from the military reports, and from the descriptive accounts of Mr. E. Ashmead-Bartlett.

BLACK SEA.

RUSSIAN CONTROL.—With the "Goeben" reduced by a succession of mishaps to a much lower level of fighting efficiency than at the outbreak of war, the Russians have practically exercised the naval control in the Black Sea ever since the beginning of 1915. In a statement made to the Press on the anniversary of the declaration of war, the Russian Minister of Marine said:—"In the Black Sea, our fleet, there, too, not so strong as the united Turco-German Navy, has also paralysed its adversary and inflicted severe losses on him, and, without sustaining loss itself, is step by step developing the problem so dear to the Russian heart. . . . The workmen are doing wonders in productive energy, so that the Baltic Fleet was strengthened towards the end of last year by new fighting units, and so was the Black Sea Fleet."

"MEDJIDIEH" REFLOATED.—On June 8th, it was reported that the Turkish light cruiser "Medjidieh," which was sunk by a mine near Odessa on April 3rd, had been refloated and brought into port, to be dry-docked for repairs.

"GOEBEN'S" DAMAGES.—On June 7th, a report was made from Athens, based on information said to have been derived from Constantinople, that a rupture had occurred between Admiral Souchon, commanding the Turco-German Fleet, and Captain von Muller, of the "Goeben," as a result of which the latter was to be recalled and held responsible for the irreparable damages to the "Goeben."

"BRESLAU" IN ACTION.—On the night of June 11th, two Russian destroyers encountered the light cruiser "Breslau" near the Bosphorus, and at once attacked her. Several shells struck the vessel, and a fire was started on board, but owing to the darkness it was impossible to estimate the damage. Unofficially, it was reported that twelve officers and eighty men were killed. One of the Russian destroyers had an officer and six men wounded. About a fortnight later, the "Breslau" was reported damaged by a mine in making a sortie from the Bosphorus.

TURKISH SUBMARINE ATTACKED.—On July 7th, it was officially announced from Petrograd that Russian destroyers near the Bosphorus had attacked a Turkish submarine, which fired a torpedo without result. A heavy and accurate fire was opened on the submarine, which dived, but its fate was unknown.

GERMAN SUBMARINE REPORTED SUNK.—About July 15th, information was received at Varna that a German submarine described as "No. 51" had been sunk in the Black Sea by Russian ships. This was held possibly to refer to "U 21," under the command of Lieut.-Commander Otto Hersing, who in the German wireless news on June 13th was stated to have received the Order of Merit for his success in making the 3,000-mile voyage to the Dardanelles and sinking two British warships. The fact that no more successes were reported or claimed for Hersing's boat was held to support the belief that his submarine had been destroyed by the Russians.

TURKISH CONVOY ATTACKED.—About the middle of July, Russian torpedo boats met a convoy of fifty-nine Turkish sailing vessels bound for Trebizond, with war material for the Ottoman Army in the Chorokh regions. After the crews had been made prisoners the convoy was destroyed by gunfire. On other occasions during June and July, Russian torpedo craft were reported to have been active in their operations against Turkish shipping and supply ships.

RUSSIAN HUMANITY.—On August 3rd, the General Staff of the Russian Navy issued the following :—"A German official *communiqué* accuses our sailors in the Black Sea of barbarous acts against Turkish ships, alleging that the Russians sink vessels with their crews without first examining them. Although the accusations are made by a Government which violates not only international laws, but the customary principles of humanity, the General Staff feels bound to refute these accusations, declaring that the German *communiqué* is a lie. Our sailors destroy Turkish ships because they transport war material, coal, and petrol. On every occasion they adopt all measures to save the crews, and the ships are only shelled if they refuse to stop after demand, and in these cases the crews are always captured first. In several cases the sailors prefer to regain the shore by swimming, in order to avoid capture, and they are never fired at, and all those who surrender are taken on board the warships and sent to Sebastopol. This rule is followed even when the Turkish ships, pretending that they wish to surrender, open fire on our submarines. Special lists are made of the prisoners captured, and they prove that not a single man of the captured crews has been left to his fate. All the prisoners every time express their satisfaction for the humane treatment accorded them."

COLLIERS SUNK.—About the middle of July, a systematic effort was made with success by the Russian Navy to stop the transport of coal to Constantinople and other Turkish towns by sea from the colliery district of Zunguldak. On July 27th, it was officially announced that the Russian torpedo craft had destroyed 150 sailing craft off the Anatolian coast, and had bombarded buildings at the ports of Samsounieh and Rizeh. On the 30th the destruction of a large steamer loaded with coal, and of forty-seven sailing vessels, was reported officially. On August 2nd, the Petrograd *communiqué* said : "In the Black Sea our torpedo boats raided the whole Anatolian coast, and destroyed over 450 sailing vessels and four naval yards. The crews of the vessels captured were made prisoners."

DESTROYER ATTACK.—On July 30th, it was officially announced in the Russian *communiqué* that some of their destroyers had fought what was described as a duel with the batteries near the town of Chili, in the neighbourhood of the Bosphorus. The outcome was not mentioned.



"HAMIDIEH" ATTACKED.—On September 5th, the Russian destroyers "Pronzitelny" and "Bystry," commanded by Captain Prince Troubetzkoi, attacked, near Zunguldak, the cruiser "Hamidieh" and two Turkish torpedo boats. After an action lasting two hours, the damaged Turkish ships fled in the direction of the Bosphorus, pursued by the destroyers. There were left behind four colliers, which were sunk with their cargoes.

A COAL CONVOY.—From further details supplied to Reuter's correspondent at Petrograd, it was indicated that the Turks were attempting to transport coal in four large transports and one barque, under the convoy of some warships, including the "Hamidieh," when the foregoing attack was made. This system had become necessary owing to the failure of the previous one of shipping coal in sailing vessels, of which so many had been sunk by the Russians. The newer plan was no more successful, as the four transports were also sunk, and the Turkish ships damaged as well.

"GOEBEN" REAPPEARS.—On September 22nd, it was announced in the Russian *communiqué* that in the Black Sea near the Bosphorus the Russian destroyers had exchanged shots with the battle-cruiser "Goeben." A later unofficial report said that the "Goeben," about fifty miles from the mouth of the Bosphorus, had cut off the retreat of a number of Russian torpedo craft, but these escaped by their skilful handling and the inaccuracy of the "Goeben's" fire.

ZUNGULDAK BOMBARDED.—On October 2nd, a division of the Russian Black Sea Fleet bombarded and destroyed buildings belonging to the Zunguldak Collieries, which the enemy had rebuilt. On the same day, the destroyer "Zavietny," in the Platana Roadstead, near Trebizond, succeeded, under the violent fire of a detachment on shore, in capturing a motor schooner, which was taken to Batum.

SUBMARINES AT VARNA.—In the first week of October, it was reported that four German submarines had been sent to Varna, off which place the Russian Fleet was said to have appeared. The port was stated to have been heavily mined under German supervision.

TURKISH CRAFT SUNK.—On October 7th, two Russian torpedo boats off the Anatolian coast destroyed nineteen Turkish sailing ships with cargoes for the Turkish troops. One of them, a munition ship, blew up; the others had cargoes of grain on board.

INDIAN OCEAN.

MESOPOTAMIA OPERATIONS.—On June 6th, the Press Bureau issued some information received from General Nixon which showed that in the military operations in Mesopotamia the navy had been affording effective help. The gunboat flotilla under Captain Wilfrid Nunn, R.N., was mentioned. Later official statements were made on July 22nd, through the Press Bureau, and on July 26th, by Mr. Austen Chamberlain in Parliament. On September 30th, it was officially announced that the Anglo-Indian forces were within a hundred miles of Bagdad. On September 13th, the *London Gazette* contained the announcement that Commander Colin Mackenzie had been specially promoted to captain for his services during the operations on the Tigris River for the attack on the Turkish positions north of Qurnah and the advance on and occupation of Amara.

PACIFIC.

ADMIRAL PATEY'S REPORT.—On July 31st a report which had been issued by Vice-Admiral Patey concerning the operations of the Royal Australian Navy at the

beginning of the war was published in the London Press. The period covered by this report was from July 30th to October 4th, 1914.

NEW AUSTRALIAN DESTROYER.—On August 28th, a new Australian destroyer was launched at Sydney. King George cabled his congratulations. It was reported that the vessel was the "Torrens," the second of three destroyers building at Sydney, the "Derwent" having been launched on December 19th, 1914.

"BRISBANE" LAUNCHED.—On September 30th, the light cruiser "Brisbane" was launched at Sydney for the Royal Australian Navy. She is the first vessel of her class built in the Commonwealth, and is a sister-ship of the "Melbourne" and "Sydney."

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ITS MILITARY SIDE by J. D. F.

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- II.—Dates of Declaration of War (add).
- XIX.—The third German Operations against Warsaw from January 30th to February 8th, 1915.
- XX.—The Campaign in East Prussia, and towards the Rivers Niemen and Narew, from February 6th to March 10th, 1915.
- Appendix V.—Despatch from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the British Forces, dated February 2nd, 1915.
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Tilsit—Johannesburg, while the Russian Army of the Naru was moving towards the line Johannesburg—Mława. As the movement appeared threatening the Germans decided on a general advance.

German Army.

Army of the Left—Koenigsburg on Kovno.

Army of the Lakes—via Augustovo on Grodno.

Army of the Centre—base, Lyck—Mława, on Ossowitz.

Army of the Right—south of Mława on Novo Georgievsk and Warsaw.

FEB. 6TH.—The Russian Tenth Army was on the line Tilsit—east of Lotzen—Johannesburg; while the Army of the Naru was east of Mława—Johannesburg.

FEB. 7TH.—The general German advance commenced. The Tenth Russian Army had to retreat, as the northern wing was defeated north-west of Suwalki after very severe fighting by the German Army of the Left, while its southern wing was pressed back on Ossowitz with considerable loss.

FEB. 12TH.—The general line of the two northern German armies was east of Tilsit—Mariampol—Suwalki—Augustovo.

FEB. 15TH.—The two southern German forces, after very severe fighting, reached the line west of Ossowitz—west of Lomza. The Russian forces were now along the upper reaches of the River Niemen and on the River Bobr.

FEB. 19TH.—The Russians now made a stand to check any further German advance, the general position being Kovno—Drusskeniki—Grodno—west of Lomza—Prasnitz—Czechanow.

The Germans commenced to attack all along the line.

FEB. 20TH.—28TH.—Severe fighting took place all along the line, but the Germans made little or no progress as the Russian supports began to come up. The attempt on Ossowitz failed, but a vigorous attack on Prasnitz succeeded, the place being captured on February 24th. On February 26th, however, the Russians retook it, and by the end of the month the Germans had retired to approximately their original front, except on the north where they maintained their ground.

MARCH 1ST.—The Russians continued their attacks all along the line, the Germans retreating slowly.

MARCH 5TH.—The German Army of the Centre gave up the attack on Ossowitz, and a general German retreat was ordered. Very severe fighting west of Grodno.

MARCH 10TH.—The general position was Mariampol—west of Ossowitz—Mława—west of Prasnitz.

APPENDIX V.

Despatch from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the British Forces, dated February 2nd, 1915.

I have the honour to forward a further report on the operations of the Army under my command.

1. In the period under review the salient feature was the presence of His Majesty the King in the field. His Majesty arrived at headquarters on November 30th, and left on December 5th. At a time when the strength and endurance of the troops had been tried to the utmost throughout the long and arduous Battle of Ypres-Armentières the presence of His Majesty in their midst was of the greatest possible help and encouragement. His Majesty visited all parts of the extensive area of operations and held numerous inspections of the troops

behind the line of trenches. On November 16th Lieutenant His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, K.G., Grenadier Guards, joined my Staff as Aide-de-Camp.

2. Since the date of my last report the operations of the Army under my command have been subject almost entirely to the limitations of weather. History teaches us that the course of campaigns in Europe, which have been actively prosecuted during the months of December and January, have been largely influenced by weather conditions. It should, however, be thoroughly understood throughout the country that the most recent development of armaments and the latest methods of conducting warfare have added greatly to the difficulties and drawbacks of a vigorous winter campaign. To cause anything more than a waste of ammunition long-range artillery fire requires constant and accurate observation; but this most necessary condition is rendered impossible of attainment in the midst of continual fog and mist. Again, armies have now grown accustomed to rely largely on aircraft reconnaissance for accurate information of the enemy; but the effective performance of this service is materially influenced by wind and weather. The deadly accuracy, range, and quick-firing capabilities of the modern rifle and machine-gun require that a fire-swept zone be crossed in the shortest possible space of time by attacking troops. But if men are detained under the enemy's fire by the difficulty of emerging from a water-logged trench, and by the necessity of passing over ground knee-deep in holding mud and slush, such attacks become practically prohibitive owing to the losses they entail.

During the exigencies of the heavy fighting which ended in the last week of November, the French and British forces had become somewhat mixed up, entailing a certain amount of difficulty in matters of supply and in securing unity of command. By the end of November I was able to concentrate the Army under my command in one area, and, by holding a shorter line, to establish effective reserves. By the beginning of December there was a considerable falling off in the volume of artillery fire directed against our front by the enemy. Reconnaissance and reports showed that a certain amount of artillery had been withdrawn. We judged that the cavalry in our front, with the exception of one division of the Guard, had disappeared. There did not, however, appear to have been any great diminution in the numbers of infantry holding the trenches.

3. Although both artillery and rifle fire were exchanged with the enemy every day, and sniping went on more or less continuously during the hours of daylight, the operations which call for special record or comment are comparatively few. During the last week in November some successful minor night operations were carried out in the IVth Corps. On the night of November 23rd-24th a small party of the 2nd Lincolnshire Regiment, under Lieutenant E. H. Impey, cleared three of the enemy's advanced trenches opposite the 25th Brigade and withdrew without loss. On the night of the 24th-25th Captain J. R. Minshull Ford, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and Lieutenant S. L. Morris, Royal Engineers, with fifteen men of the Royal Engineers and Royal Welsh Fusiliers, successfully mined and blew up a group of farms immediately in front of the German trenches on the Touquet-Bridoux road, which had been used by German snipers. On the night of November 26th-27th a small party of the 2nd Scots Guards, under Lieutenant Sir E. H. W. Hulse, Bt., rushed the trenches opposite the 20th Brigade; and after pouring a heavy fire into them returned with useful information as to the strength of the Germans and the position of machine-guns. The trenches opposite the 25th Brigade were rushed the same night by a patrol of the 2nd Rifle Brigade, under Lieutenant E. Durham. On November 23rd the 112th Regiment of the XIVth

German Army Corps succeeded in capturing some 800 yards of the trenches held by the Indian Corps, but the General Officer Commanding the Meerut Division organized a powerful counter-attack, which lasted throughout the night. At daybreak on November 24th the line was entirely re-established. The operation was a costly one, involving many casualties, but the enemy suffered far more heavily. We captured over 100 prisoners, including three officers, as well as three machine-guns and two trench mortars.

On December 7th the concentration of the Indian Corps was completed by the arrival of the Sirhind Brigade from Egypt. On December 9th the enemy attempted to commence a strong attack against the IIIrd Corps, particularly in front of the trenches held by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the Middlesex Regiment. They were driven back with heavy loss, and did not renew the attempt. Our casualties were very slight. During the early days of December certain indications along the whole front of the Allied Line induced the French Commander and myself to believe that the enemy had withdrawn considerable forces from the Western Theatre. Arrangements were made with the Commander of the Eighth French Army for an attack to be commenced on the morning of December 14th. Operations began at 7 a.m. by a combined heavy artillery bombardment by the two French and the IInd British Corps. The British objectives were the Petit Bois and the Maedelsteed Spur, lying respectively to the west and south-west of the village of Wytschaete. At 7.45 a.m. the Royal Scots, with great dash, rushed forward and attacked the former, while the Gordon Highlanders attacked the latter place. The Royal Scots, commanded by Major F. J. Duncan, D.S.O., in face of a terrible machine-gun and rifle fire, carried the German trench on the west edge of the Petit Bois, capturing two machine-guns and 53 prisoners, including one officer. The Gordon Highlanders, with great gallantry, advanced up the Maedelsteed Spur, forcing the enemy to evacuate their front trench. They were, however, losing heavily, and found themselves unable to get any further. At nightfall they were obliged to fall back to their original position. Captain C. Boddam-Whetham and Lieutenant W. F. R. Dobie showed splendid dash, and with a few men entered the enemy's leading trenches; but they were all either killed or captured. Lieutenant G. R. V. Hume-Gore and Lieutenant W. H. Paterson also distinguished themselves by their gallant leading.

Although not successful, the operation was most creditable to the fighting spirit of the Gordon Highlanders, most ably commanded by Major A. W. F. Baird, D.S.O. As the 32nd French Division on the left had been unable to make any progress, the further advance of our infantry into the Wytschaete Wood was not practicable. Possession of the western edge of the Petit Bois was, however, retained. The ground was devoid of cover and so water-logged that a rapid advance was impossible, the men sinking deep in the mud at every step they took. The artillery throughout the day was very skilfully handled by the C.R.A.'s of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Divisions: Major-General F. D. V. Wing, C.B., Brigadier-General G. F. Milne, C.B., D.S.O., and Brigadier-General J. E. W. Headlam, C.B., D.S.O. The casualties during the day were about 17 officers and 407 other ranks. The losses of the enemy were very considerable, large numbers of dead being found in the Petit Bois and also in the communicating trenches in front of the Gordon Highlanders, in one of which a hundred were counted by a night patrol. On this day the artillery of the 4th Division, IIIrd Corps, was used in support of the attack, under orders of the General Officer Commanding IInd Corps. The remainder of the IIIrd Corps made demonstrations against the enemy with a view to preventing him from detaching troops to the area of operations of the IInd Corps. From December

15th to the 17th the offensive operations which were commenced on the 14th were continued, but were confined chiefly to artillery bombardment. The infantry advance against Wytshaete Wood was not practicable until the French on our left could make some progress to afford protection to that flank. On the 17th it was agreed that the plan of attack as arranged should be modified; but I was requested to continue demonstrations along my line in order to assist and support certain French operations which were being conducted elsewhere.

4. In his desire to act with energy up to his instructions to demonstrate and occupy the enemy, the General Officer Commanding the Indian Corps decided to take advantage of what appeared to him a favourable opportunity to launch attacks against the advanced trenches in his front on December 18th and 19th. The attack of the Meerut Division on the left was made on the morning of the 19th with energy and determination, and was at first attended with considerable success, the enemy's advanced trenches being captured. Later on, however, a counter attack drove them back to their original position with considerable loss. The attack of the Lahore Division commenced at 4.30 a.m. It was carried out by two companies each of the 1st Highland Light Infantry and the 1st Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles, of the Sirhind Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. H. Ronaldson. This attack was completely successful, two lines of the enemy's trenches being captured with little loss. Before daylight the captured trenches were filled with as many men as they would hold. The front was very restricted, communication to the rear impossible. At daybreak it was found that the position was practically untenable. Both flanks were in the air, and a supporting attack, which was late in starting, and, therefore, conducted during daylight, failed, although attempted with the greatest gallantry and resolution. Lieutenant-Colonel Ronaldson held on till dusk, when the whole of the captured trenches had to be evacuated, and the detachment fell back to its original line. By the night of the 19th December nearly all the ground gained during the day had been lost.

From daylight on December 20th, the enemy commenced a heavy fire from artillery and trench mortars on the whole front of the Indian Corps. This was followed by infantry attacks, which were in especial force against Givenchy, and between that place and La Quinque Rue.

At about 10 a.m. the enemy succeeded in driving back the Sirhind Brigade, and capturing a considerable part of Givenchy, but the 57th Rifles and 9th Bhopals, north of the canal, and the Connaught Rangers, south of it, stood firm. The 15th Sikhs of the Divisional Reserve were already supporting the Sirhind Brigade. On the news of the retirement of the latter being received, the 47th Sikhs were also sent up to reinforce General Brunker. The 1st Manchester Regiment, 4th Suffolk Regiment, and two battalions of French Territorials under General Carnegie were ordered to launch a vigorous counter-attack from Pont Fixe through Givenchy to retake by a flank attack the trenches lost by the Sirhind Brigade. Orders were sent to General Carnegie to divert his attack on Givenchy Village and to re-establish the situation there. A battalion of the 58th French Division was sent to Annequin in support. About 5 p.m. a gallant attack by the 1st Manchester Regiment and one company of the 4th Suffolk Regiment had captured Givenchy, and had cleared the enemy out of the two lines of trenches to the north-east. To the east of the village the 9th Bhopal Infantry and 57th Rifles had maintained their positions, but the enemy were still in possession of our trenches to the north of the village. General Macbean, with the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, 2nd Battalion 8th Gurkha Rifles, and the 47th Sikhs, was sent to support General Brunker, who at 2 p.m. directed General Macbean to move to a position of readiness in the second line trenches from Maris northward, and to counter-attack vigorously if opportunity offered.

Some considerable delay appears to have occurred, and it was not until 1 a.m. on the 21st that the 47th Sikhs and the 7th Dragoon Guards under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Lempriere, D.S.O., of the latter regiment, were launched in counter-attack. They reached the enemy's trenches, but were driven out by enfilade fire, their gallant Commander being killed. The main attack by the remainder of General Macbean's force, with the remnants of Lieutenant-Colonel Lempriere's detachment (which had again been rallied), was finally pushed in at about 4.30 a.m., and also failed. In the northern section of the defensive line the retirement of the 2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkha Rifles, at about 10 a.m. on the 20th, had left the flank of the 1st Seaforth Highlanders, on the extreme right of the Meerut Division line, much exposed. This battalion was left shortly afterwards completely in the air by the retirement of the Sirhind Brigade. The 58th Rifles, therefore, were ordered to support the left of the Seaforth Highlanders, to fill the gap created by the retirement of the Gurkhas. During the whole of the afternoon strenuous efforts were made by the Seaforth Highlanders to clear the trenches to their right and left. The 1st Battalion 9th Gurkha Rifles reinforced the 2nd Gurkhas near the orchard where the Germans were in occupation of the trenches abandoned by the latter regiment. The Garhwal Brigade was being very heavily attacked, and their trenches and loop-holes were much damaged; but the brigade continued to hold its front and attack, connecting with the 6th Jats on the left of the Dehra Dun Brigade. No advance in force was made by the enemy, but the troops were pinned to their ground by heavy artillery fire, the Seaforth Highlanders especially suffering heavily. Shortly before nightfall the 2nd Royal Highlanders on the right of the Seaforth Highlanders had succeeded in establishing touch with the Sirhind Brigade; and the continuous line (though dented near the orchard) existed throughout the Meerut Division.

Early in the afternoon of December 20th orders were sent to the 1st Corps, which was then in general army reserve, to send an infantry brigade to support the Indian Corps. The 1st Brigade was ordered to Bethune, and reached that place at midnight on December 20th-21st. Later in the day Sir Douglas Haig was ordered to move the whole of the 1st Division in support of the Indian Corps. The 3rd Brigade reached Bethune between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. on the 21st, and on the same date the 2nd Brigade arrived at Lacon at 1 p.m. The 1st Brigade was directed on Givenchy, via Pont Fixe, and the 3rd Brigade, through Gorre, on the trenches evacuated by the Sirhind Brigade. The 2nd Brigade was directed to support; the Dehra Dun Brigade being placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding Meerut Division. At 1 p.m. the General Officer Commanding 1st Division directed the 1st Brigade to attack from the west of Givenchy in a north-easterly direction, and, the 3rd Brigade from Festubert in an east-north-easterly direction, the object being to pass the position originally held by us and to capture the German trenches 400 yards to the east of it. By 5 p.m. the 1st Brigade had obtained a hold in Givenchy, and the ground south as far as the canal; and the 3rd Brigade had progressed to a point half a mile west of Festubert. By nightfall the 1st South Wales Borderers and the 2nd Welsh Regiment of the 3rd Brigade had made a lodgment in the original trenches to the north-east of Festubert, the 1st Gloucestershire Regiment continuing the line southward along the track east of Festubert. The 1st Brigade had established itself on the east side of Givenchy. By 3 p.m. the 3rd Brigade was concentrated at Le Touret, and was ordered to retake the trenches which had been lost by the Dehra Dun Brigade. By 10 p.m. the support trenches west of the orchard had been carried, but the original fire trenches had been so completely destroyed that they could not be occupied. This operation was performed by the 1st Loyal

North Lancashire Regiment and the 1st Northamptonshire Regiment, supported by the 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps, in reserve. Throughout this day the units of the Indian Corps rendered all the assistance and support they could in view of their exhausted condition.

At 1 p.m. on the 22nd Sir Douglas Haig took over command from Sir James Willcocks. The situation in the front line was then approximately as follows: South of the La Bassée Canal the Connaught Rangers of the Ferozepore Brigade had not been attacked. North of the canal a short length of our original line was still held by the 9th Bhopals and the 57th Rifles of the same brigade. Connecting with the latter was the 1st Brigade holding the village of Givenchy and its eastern and northern approaches. On the left of the 1st Brigade was the 3rd Brigade. Touch had been lost between the left of the former and the right of the latter. The 3rd Brigade held a line along, and in places advanced to, the east of the Festubert Road. Its left was in communication with the right of the Meerut Division line, where troops of the 2nd Brigade had just relieved the 1st Seaforth Highlanders. To the north, units of the 2nd Brigade held an indented line west of the orchard, connecting with half of the 2nd Royal Highlanders, half of the 41st Dogras and the 1st Battalion 9th Gurkha Rifles. From this point to the north the 6th Jats and the whole of the Garhwal Brigade occupied the original line which they had held from the commencement of the operations. The relief of most units of the southern sector was effected on the night of December 22nd. The Meerut Division remained under the orders of the 1st Corps, and was not completely withdrawn until December 27th. In the evening the position at Givenchy was practically re-established, and the 3rd Brigade had re-occupied the old line of trenches. During the 23rd the enemy's activities ceased, and the whole position was restored to very much its original condition. In my last despatch I had occasion to mention the prompt and ready help I received from the Lahore Division, under the command of Major-General H. B. B. Watkis, C.B., which was thrown into action immediately on arrival, when the British forces were very hard pressed during the battle of Ypres—Armentières. The Indian troops have fought with the utmost steadfastness and gallantry whenever they have been called upon. Weather conditions were abnormally bad, the snow and floods precluding any active operations during the first three weeks of January.

5. At 7.30 a.m. on January 25th the enemy began to shell Bethune, and at 8 a.m. a strong hostile infantry attack developed south of the canal, preceded by a heavy bombardment of artillery, minenwerfers, and, possibly, the explosion of mines, though the latter is doubtful. The British line south of the canal formed a pronounced salient from the canal on the left, thence running forward toward the railway triangle and back to the main La Bassée—Bethune road, where it joined the French. This line was occupied by half a battalion of the Scots Guards and half a battalion of the Coldstream Guards of the 1st Infantry Brigade. The trenches in the salient were blown in almost at once; and the enemy's attack penetrated this line. Our troops retired to a partially prepared second line, running approximately due north and south from the canal to the road, some 500 yards west of the railway triangle. This second line had been strengthened by the construction of a keep half way between the canal and the road. Here the other two half battalions of the above-mentioned regiments were in support. These supports held up the enemy, who, however, managed to establish himself in the brick stacks and some communication trenches between the keep, the road, and the canal—and even beyond and west of the keep on either side of it. The London Scottish had in the meantime been sent up in support, and a counter-attack was organized with the 1st Royal Highlanders, part of the 1st Cameron Highlanders, and the 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps, the latter regiment having been sent forward from the Divisional Reserve. The counter-attack

was delayed in order to synchronise with a counter-attack north of the canal which was arranged for 1 p.m. At 1 p.m. these troops moved forward, their flanks making good progress near the road and the canal, but their centre being held up. The 2nd Royal Sussex Regiment was then sent forward, late in the afternoon, to reinforce. The result was that the Germans were driven back far enough to enable a somewhat broken line to be taken up, running from the culvert on the railway, almost due south to the keep, and thence south-east to the main road. The French left near the road had also been attacked and driven back a little, but not to so great an extent as the British right. Consequently, the French left was in advance of the British right and exposed to a possible flank attack from the north. The Germans did not, however, persevere further in their attack. The above-mentioned line was strengthened during the night; and the 1st Guards Brigade, which had suffered severely, was withdrawn into reserve and replaced by the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

While this was taking place another and equally severe attack was delivered north of the canal against the village of Givenchy. At 8.15 a.m., after a heavy artillery bombardment with high explosive shells, the enemy's infantry advanced under the effective fire of our artillery, which, however, was hampered by the constant interruption of telephonic communication between observers and batteries. Nevertheless, our artillery fire, combined with that of the infantry in the fire trenches, had the effect of driving the enemy from his original direction of advance, with the result that his troops crowded together on the north-east corner of the village and broke through into the centre of the village as far as the keep, which had been previously put in a state of defence. The Germans had lost heavily, and a well-timed local counter-attack, delivered by the reserves of the 2nd Welsh Regiment and 1st South Wales Borderers, and by a company of the 1st Royal Highlanders (lent by the 1st Brigade as a working party—this company was at work on the keep at the time), was completely successful, with the result that, after about an hour's street fighting, all who had broken into the village were either captured or killed; and the original line round the village was re-established by noon. South of the village, however, and close to the canal, the right of the 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers fell back in conformity with the troops south of the canal; but after dark that regiment moved forward and occupied the old line. During the course of the attack on Givenchy the enemy made five assaults on the salient at the north-east of the village about French Farm, but was repulsed every time with heavy loss.

6. On the morning of January 29th attacks were made on the right of the 1st Corps, south of the canal in the neighbourhood of La Bassée. The enemy (part of the XIVth German Corps), after a severe shelling, made a violent attack with scaling ladders on the keep, also to the north and south of it. In the keep and on the north side the Sussex Regiment held the enemy off, inflicting on him serious losses. On the south side the hostile infantry succeeded in reaching the Northamptonshire Regiment's trenches; but were immediately counter-attacked and all killed. Our artillery co-operated well with the infantry in repelling the attack. In this action our casualties were inconsiderable, but the enemy lost severely, more than 200 of his killed alone being left in front of our position.

7. On February 1st a fine piece of work was carried out by the 4th Brigade in the neighbourhood of Cuinchy. Some of the 2nd Coldstream Guards were driven from their trenches at 2.30 a.m., but made a stand some twenty yards east of them in a position which they held till morning. A counter-attack, launched at 3.15 a.m. by one company of the Irish Guards and half a company of the 2nd Coldstream Guards, proved unsuccessful, owing to heavy rifle fire from the east and south. At 10.5 a.m., acting under orders of the 1st Division, a

heavy bombardment was opened on the lost ground for ten minutes; and this was followed immediately by an assault by about fifty men of the 2nd Coldstream Guards with bayonets, led by Captain A. Leigh Bennett, followed by thirty men of the Irish Guards, led by Second-Lieutenant F. F. Graham, also with bayonets. These were followed by a party of Royal Engineers with sand bags and wire.

All the ground which had been lost was brilliantly retaken; the 2nd Coldstream Guards also taking another German trench and capturing two machine guns. Thirty-two prisoners fell into our hands. The General Officer Commanding 1st Division describes the preparation by the artillery as "splendid, the high explosive shells dropping in the exact spot with absolute precision."

In forwarding his report on this engagement, the General Officer Commanding First Army writes as follows:—

"Special credit is due—

"(i) To Major-General Haking, Commanding 1st Division, for the prompt manner in which he arranged this counter-attack and for the general plan of action, which was crowned with success.

"(ii) To the General Officer Commanding the 4th Brigade (Lord Cavan) for the thorough manner in which he carried out the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Division.

"(iii) To the regimental officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the 2nd Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards, who, with indomitable pluck, stormed two sets of barricades, captured three German trenches, two machine guns, and killed or made prisoners many of the enemy."

8. During the period under report the Royal Flying Corps has again performed splendid service. Although the weather was almost uniformly bad and the machines suffered from constant exposure, there have been only thirteen days on which no actual reconnaissance has been effected. Approximately, one hundred thousand miles have been flown. In addition to the daily and constant work of reconnaissance and co-operation with the artillery, a number of aerial combats have been fought, raids carried out, detrainments harassed, parks and petrol depots bombed, etc. Various successful bomb-dropping raids have been carried out, usually against the enemy's aircraft material. The principle of attacking hostile aircraft whenever and wherever seen (unless highly important information is being delivered) has been adhered to, and has resulted in the moral fact that enemy machines invariably beat immediate retreat when chased. Five German aeroplanes are known to have been brought to the ground, and it would appear probable that others, though they have managed to reach their own lines, have done so in a considerably damaged condition.

9. In my despatch of November 20th, 1914, I referred to the reinforcements of Territorial troops which I had received, and I mentioned several units which had already been employed in the fighting line. In the positions which I held for some years before the outbreak of this war I was brought into close contact with the Territorial Force, and I found every reason to hope and believe that, when the hour of trial arrived, they would justify every hope and trust which was placed in them. The Lords Lieutenants of Counties and the Associations which worked under them bestowed a vast amount of labour and energy on the organization of the Territorial Force; and I trust it may be some recompense to them to know that I, and the principal commanders serving under me, consider that the Territorial Force has far more than justified the most sanguine hopes that any of us ventured to entertain of their value and use in the field. Commanders of cavalry divisions are unstinted in their praise of the manner in which the Yeomanry regiments attached to their brigades have done their duty, both in and

out of action. The service of Divisional Cavalry is now almost entirely performed by Yeomanry, and Divisional Commanders report that they are very efficient. Army corps commanders are loud in their praise of the Territorial battalions which form part of nearly all the brigades at the front in the first line, and more than one of them have told me that these battalions are fast approaching—if they have not already reached—the standard of efficiency of Regular infantry.

I wish to add a word about the Officers' Training Corps. The presence of the Artists' Rifles (28th Battalion, The London Regiment) with the Army in France enabled me also to test the value of this organization. Having had some experience in peace of the working of the Officers' Training Corps, I determined to turn the Artists' Rifles (which formed part of the Officers' Training Corps in peace time) to its legitimate use. I therefore established the battalion as a Training Corps for Officers in the field. The cadets pass through a course, which includes some thorough practical training, as all cadets do a tour of forty-eight hours in the trenches, and afterwards write a report on what they see and notice. They also visit an observation post of a battery or group of batteries, and spend some hours there. A commandant has been appointed, and he arranges and supervises the work, sets schemes for practice, administers the school, delivers lectures, and reports on the candidates. The cadets are instructed in all branches of military training suitable for platoon commanders. Machine-gun tactics, a knowledge of which is so necessary for all junior officers, is a special feature of the course of instruction. When first started the school was able to turn out officers at the rate of seventy-five a month. This has since been increased to one hundred. Reports received from divisional army corps commanders on officers who have been trained at the school are most satisfactory.

10. Since the date of my last report I have been able to make a close personal inspection of all the units in the command. I was most favourably impressed by all I saw. The troops composing the army in France have been subjected to as severe a trial as it is possible to impose upon any body of men. The desperate fighting described in my last despatch had hardly been brought to a conclusion when they were called upon to face the rigours and hardships of a winter campaign. Frost and snow have alternated with periods of continuous rain. The men have been called upon to stand for many hours together almost up to their waists in bitterly cold water, only separated by one or two hundred yards from a most vigilant enemy. Although every measure which science and medical knowledge could suggest to mitigate these hardships was employed, the sufferings of the men have been very great. In spite of all this they presented, at the inspections to which I have referred, a most soldier-like, splendid, though somewhat war-worn appearance. Their spirit remains high and confident; their general health is excellent, and their condition most satisfactory. I regard it as most unfortunate that circumstances have prevented any account of many splendid instances of courage and endurance, in the face of almost unparalleled hardship and fatigue in war, coming regularly to the knowledge of the public.

Reinforcements have arrived from England with remarkable promptitude and rapidity. They have been speedily drafted into the ranks, and most of the units I inspected were nearly complete when I saw them. In appearance and quality the drafts sent out have exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I consider the army in France is much indebted to the Adjutant-General's Department at the War Office for the efficient manner in which its requirements have been met in this most essential respect. With regard to these inspections, I may mention in particular the fine appearance presented by the 27th and 28th Divisions, composed principally of battalions which had come from India. Included in the former division was the Princess Patricia's Royal Canadian Regiment. They are a

magnificent set of men, and have since done excellent work in the trenches. It was some three weeks after the events recorded in paragraph 4 that I made my inspection of the Indian Corps, under Sir James Willcocks. The appearance they presented was most satisfactory, and fully confirmed my first opinion that the Indian troops only required rest, and a little acclimatising, to bring out all their fine inherent fighting qualities. I saw the whole of the Indian Cavalry Corps, under Lieut.-General Rimington, on a mounted parade soon after their arrival. They are a magnificent body of cavalry, and will, I feel sure, give the best possible account of themselves when called upon. In the meantime, at their own particular request, they have taken their turn in the trenches, and performed most useful and valuable service.

11. The Rt. Rev. Bishop Taylor Smith, C.V.O., D.D., Chaplain-General to the Forces, arrived at my headquarters on January 6th, on a tour of inspection throughout the command. The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster has also visited most of the Irish regiments at the front and the principal centres on the line of communications. In a quiet and unostentatious manner the chaplains of all denominations have worked with devotion and energy in their respective spheres. The number with the forces in the field at the commencement of the war was comparatively small, but towards the end of last year the Rev. J. M. Simms, D.D., K.H.C., Principal Chaplain, assisted by his secretary, the Rev. W. Drury, reorganized the branch, and placed the spiritual welfare of the soldier on a more satisfactory footing. It is hoped that the further increase in personnel may be found possible. I cannot speak too highly of the devoted manner in which all chaplains, whether with the troops in the trenches, or in attendance on the sick and wounded in casualty clearing stations and hospitals on the line of communications, have worked throughout the campaign.

Since the commencement of hostilities the work of the Royal Army Medical Corps has been carried out with untiring zeal, skill, and devotion. Whether at the front under conditions such as obtained during the fighting on the Aisne, when casualties were heavy and accommodation for their reception had to be improvised, or on the line of communications, where an average of some 11,000 patients have been daily under treatment, the organization of the medical services has always been equal to the demands made upon it. The careful system of sanitation introduced into the army has, with the assistance of other measures, kept the troops free from any epidemic, in support of which it is to be noticed that since the commencement of the war some 500 cases only of enteric have occurred. The organization for the first time in war of motor ambulance convoys is due to the initiative and organizing powers of Surgeon-General T. J. O'Donnell, D.S.O., ably assisted by Major P. Evans, Royal Army Medical Corps. Two of these convoys, composed entirely of Red Cross Society personnel, have done excellent work under the superintendence of regular medical officers. Twelve hospital trains ply between the front and the various bases. I have visited several of the trains when halted in stations, and have found them conducted with great comfort and efficiency. During the more recent phase of the campaign the creation of rest depots at the front has materially reduced the wastage of men to the line of communications. Since the latter part of October, 1914, the whole of the medical arrangements have been in the hands of Surgeon-General Sir A. T. Sloggett, C.M.G., K.H.S., under whom Surgeon-General T. P. Woodhouse and Surgeon-General T. J. O'Donnell have been responsible for the organization on the line of communications and at the front respectively.

12. The exceptional and peculiar conditions brought about by the weather have caused large demands to be made upon the resources and skill of the Royal Engineers. Every kind of expedient has had to be thought out and adopted to

keep the lines of trenches and defence work effective. The Royal Engineers have shown themselves as capable of overcoming the ravages caused by violent rain and floods as they have been throughout in neutralizing the effect of the enemy's artillery. In this connection I wish particularly to mention the excellent services performed by my Chief Engineer, Brigadier-General G. H. Fowke, who has been indefatigable in supervising all such work. His ingenuity and skill have been most valuable in the local construction of the various expedients which experience has shown to be necessary in prolonged trench warfare.

13. I have no reason to modify in any material degree my views of the general military situation, as expressed in my despatch of November 20th, 1914.

14. I have once more gratefully to acknowledge the valuable help and support I have received throughout this period from General Foch, General D'Urbal, and General Maud'huy, of the French Army.

APPENDIX VI.

Despatch from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the British Forces, dated April 5th, 1915.

I have the honour to report the operations of the forces under my command since the date of my last despatch, February 2nd, 1915.

1. The event of chief interest and importance which has taken place is the victory achieved over the enemy at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, which was fought on March 10th, 11th and 12th. The main attack was delivered by troops of the First Army under the command of General Sir Douglas Haig, supported by a large force of heavy artillery, a division of cavalry, and some infantry of the general reserve. Secondary and holding attacks and demonstrations were made along the front of the Second Army under the direction of its commander, General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

Whilst the success attained was due to the magnificent bearing and indomitable courage displayed by the troops of the 4th and Indian Corps, I consider that the able and skilful dispositions which were made by the General Officer Commanding First Army contributed largely to the defeat of the enemy and to the capture of his position. The energy and vigour with which General Sir Douglas Haig handled his command show him to be a leader of great ability and power. Another action of considerable importance was brought about by a surprise attack of the Germans made on March 14th against the 27th Division holding the trenches east of St. Eloi. A large force of artillery was concentrated in this area under cover of mist, and a heavy volume of fire was suddenly brought to bear on the trenches at 5 p.m. This artillery attack was accompanied by two mine explosions; and, in the confusion caused by these and the suddenness of the attack, the position of St. Eloi was captured and held for some hours by the enemy. Well directed and vigorous counter-attacks, in which the troops of the Vth Army Corps showed great bravery and determination, restored the situation by the evening of the 15th. A more detailed account of these operations will appear in subsequent pages of this despatch.

2. On February 6th a brilliant action by troops of the 1st Corps materially improved our position in the area south of the La Bassée Canal. During the previous night parties of Irish Guards and of the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards had succeeded in gaining ground whence converging fire could be directed on the flanks and rear of certain "brickstacks" occupied by the Germans, which had been for some time a source of considerable annoyance. At 2 p.m. the affair commenced with a severe bombardment of the "brickstacks" and

the enemy's trenches. A brisk attack by the 3rd Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards from our trenches west of the "brickstacks" followed, and was supported by fire from the flanking positions which had been seized the previous night by the same regiments.

The attack succeeded, the "brickstacks" were occupied without difficulty, and a line established north and south through a point about forty yards east of the "brickstacks." The casualties suffered by the Vth Corps throughout the period under review, and particularly during the month of February, have been heavier than those in other parts of the line. I regret this; but I do not think, taking all the circumstances into consideration, that they were unduly numerous. The position then occupied by the Vth Corps has always been a very vulnerable part of our line; the ground is marshy, and trenches are most difficult to construct and maintain. The 27th and 28th Divisions of the Vth Corps have had no previous experience of European warfare, and a number of the units composing it had only recently returned from service in tropical climates. In consequence, the hardships of a rigorous winter campaign fell with greater weight upon these divisions than upon any other in the command. Chiefly owing to these causes, the Vth Corps, up to the beginning of March, was constantly engaged in counter-attack to retake trenches and ground which had been lost. In their difficult and arduous task, however, the troops displayed the utmost gallantry and devotion; and it is most creditable to the skill and energy of their leaders that I am able to report how well they have surmounted all their difficulties, that the ground first taken over by them is still intact, and held with little greater loss than is incurred by troops in all other parts of the line. On the 14th February the 82nd Brigade of the 27th Division was driven from its trenches east of St. Eloi; but by 7 a.m. on the 15th all these trenches had been recaptured, fifteen prisoners taken, and sixty German dead counted in front of the trenches. Similarly, in the 28th Division, trenches were lost by the 85th Brigade and retaken the following night. During the month of February the enemy made several attempts to get through all along the line, but he was invariably repulsed with loss.

A particularly vigorous attempt was made on February 17th against the trenches held by the Indian Corps, but it was brilliantly repulsed. On February 28th a successful minor attack was made on the enemy's trenches near St. Eloi by small parties of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. The attack was divided into three small groups, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Crabbe: No. 1 Group under Lieutenant Papineau, No. 2 Group under Sergeant Patterson, and No. 3 Group under Co. Sergeant-Major Lloyd. The head of the party got within fifteen or twenty yards of the German trench and charged; it was dark at the time (about 5.15 a.m.). Lieutenant Crabbe, who showed the greatest dash and *élan*, took his party over everything in the trench until they had gone down it about eighty yards, when they were stopped by a barricade of sandbags and timber. This party, as well as the others, then pulled down the front face of the German parapet. A number of Germans were killed and wounded, and a few prisoners were taken. The services performed by this distinguished corps have continued to be very valuable since I had occasion to refer to them in my last despatch. They have been most ably organized, trained, and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Farquhar, D.S.O., who, I deeply regret to say, was killed while superintending some trench work on March 20th. His loss will be deeply felt. A very gallant attack was made by the 4th Battalion of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, of the 80th Brigade, on the enemy's trenches in the early hours of March 2nd. The battalion was led by Major Widdrington, who launched it at 12.30 a.m. (he himself being wounded

during its progress), covered by an extremely accurate and effective artillery fire. About sixty yards of the enemy's trench were cleared, but the attack was brought to a standstill by a very strong barricade, in attempting to storm which several casualties were incurred.

3. During the month of February I arranged with General Foch to render the IXth French Corps, holding the trenches on my left, some much-needed rest by sending the three divisions of the British Cavalry Corps to hold a portion of the French trenches, each division for a period of ten days alternately. It was very gratifying to me to note once again in this campaign the eager readiness which the cavalry displayed to undertake the rôle which does not properly belong to them in order to support and assist their French comrades. In carrying out this work leaders, officers, and men displayed the same skill and energy which I have had reason to comment upon in former despatches. The time passed by the cavalry in the French trenches was, on the whole, quiet and uneventful, but there are one or two incidents calling for remark. At about 1.45 a.m. on February 16th a half-hearted attack was made against the right of the line held by the 2nd Cavalry Division, but it was easily repulsed by rifle fire, and the enemy left several dead in front of the trenches. The attack was delivered against the second and third trenches from the right of the line of this division. At 6 a.m. on the 21st the enemy blew up one of the 2nd Cavalry Division trenches, held by the 16th Lancers, and some adjoining French trenches. The enemy occupied forty yards of our trench and tried to advance, but were stopped. An immediate counter-attack by the supporting squadron was stopped by machine-gun fire. The line was established opposite the gap, and a counter-attack by two squadrons and one company of French reserves was ordered. At 5.30 p.m. the O.C. 2nd Cavalry Division reported that the counter-attack did not succeed in retaking the trench blown in, but that a new line had been established forty yards in rear of it, and that there was no further activity on the part of the enemy. At 10 p.m. the situation was unchanged. The commander of the Indian Cavalry Corps expressed a strong desire that the troops under his command should gain some experience in trench warfare. Arrangements were made, therefore, with the General Officer Commanding the Indian Corps, in pursuance of which the various units of the Indian Cavalry Corps have from time to time taken a turn in the trenches, and have thereby gained some valuable experience.

4. About the end of February many vital considerations induced me to believe that a vigorous offensive movement by the forces under my command should be planned and carried out at the earliest possible moment. Amongst the more important reasons which convinced me of this necessity were: The general aspect of the Allied situation throughout Europe, and particularly the marked success of the Russian Army in repelling the violent onslaughts of Marshal von Hindenburg; the apparent weakening of the enemy in my front, and the necessity for assisting our Russian Allies to the utmost by holding as many hostile troops as possible in the Western Theatre; the efforts to this end which were being made by the French Forces at Arras and Champagne; and, perhaps the most weighty consideration of all, the need of fostering the offensive spirit in the troops under my command after the trying and possibly enervating experiences which they had gone through of a severe winter in the trenches. In a former despatch I commented upon the difficulties and drawbacks which the winter weather in this climate imposes upon a vigorous offensive. Early in March these difficulties became greatly lessened by the drying up of the country and by the spells of brighter weather. I do not propose in this despatch to enter at length into the considerations which actuated me in deciding upon the plan, time, and place of my attack, but Your Lordship is fully aware of these.

As mentioned above, the main attack was carried out by units of the First Army, supported by troops of the Second Army and the general reserve. The object of the main attack was to be the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the enemy's position at that point, and the establishment of our line as far forward as possible to the east of that place. The object, nature, and scope of the attack, and instructions for the conduct of the operation were communicated by me to Sir Douglas Haig in a secret memorandum dated February 19th.

The main topographical feature of this part of the theatre is a marked ridge which runs south-west from a point two miles south-west of Lille to the village of Fournes, whence two spurs run out, one due west to a height known as Haut Pommereau, the other following the line of the main road to Illies. The buildings of the village of Neuve Chapelle run along the Rue du Bois Fauquisart road. There is a triangle of roads just north of the village. This area consists of a few big houses, with walls, gardens, orchards, etc., and here, with the aid of numerous machine-guns, the enemy had established a strong post which flanked the approaches to the village. The Bois du Biez, which lies roughly south-east of the village of Neuve Chapelle, influenced the course of this operation. Full instructions as to assisting and supporting the attack were issued to the Second Army. The battle opened at 7.30 a.m. on March 10th by a powerful artillery bombardment of the enemy's position at Neuve Chapelle. The artillery bombardment had been well prepared and was most effective, except on the extreme northern portion of the front of attack. At 8.5 a.m. the 23rd (left) and 25th (right) Brigades of the 8th Division assaulted the German trenches on the north-west of the village. At the same hour the Garhwal Brigade of the Meerut Division, which occupied the position to the south of Neuve Chapelle, assaulted the German trenches in its front. The Garhwal Brigade and the 25th Brigade carried the enemy's lines of entrenchments where the wire entanglements had been almost entirely swept away by our shrapnel fire. The 23rd Brigade, however, on the north-east, was held up by the wire entanglements, which were not sufficiently cut. At 8.5 a.m. the artillery turned on to Neuve Chapelle, and at 8.35 a.m. the advance of the infantry was continued. The 25th and Garhwal Brigades pushed on eastward and north-eastward respectively, and succeeded in getting a footing in the village.

The 23rd Brigade was still held up in front of the enemy's wire entanglements, and could not progress. Heavy losses were suffered, especially in the Middlesex Regiment and the Scottish Rifles. The progress, however, of the 25th Brigade into Neuve Chapelle immediately to the south of the 23rd Brigade had the effect of turning the southern flank of the enemy's defences in front of the 23rd Brigade. This fact, combined with powerful artillery support, enabled the 23rd Brigade to get forward between 10 and 11 a.m., and by 11 a.m. the whole of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the roads leading northward and south-westward from the eastern end of that village were in our hands. During this time our artillery completely cut off the village and the surrounding country from any German reinforcements which could be thrown into the fight to restore the situation by means of a curtain of shrapnel fire. Prisoners subsequently reported that all attempts at reinforcing the front line were checked. Steps were at once taken to consolidate the position won. Considerable delay occurred after the capture of the Neuve Chapelle position. The infantry was greatly disorganized by the violent nature of the attack and by its passage through the enemy's trenches and the buildings of the village. It was necessary to get units to some extent together before pushing on. The telephonic communication being cut by the enemy's fire rendered communication between front and rear most difficult. The fact of the left of the 23rd Brigade having been held up had kept back the 8th

Division, and had involved a portion of the 25th Brigade in fighting to the north out of its proper direction of advance. All this required adjustment. An orchard held by the enemy north of Neuve Chapelle also threatened the flank of an advance towards the Aubers Ridge. I am of opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the General Officer Commanding First Army been more carefully observed.

The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome at an earlier period of the day if the General Officer Commanding IVth Corps had been able to bring his reserve brigades more speedily into action. As it was, the further advance did not commence before 3.30 p.m. The 21st Brigade was able to form up in the open on the left without a shot being fired at it, thus showing that at the time the enemy's resistance had been paralysed. The brigade pushed forward in the direction of Moulin du Pietre. At first it made good progress, but was subsequently held up by the machine-gun fire from the houses and from a defended work in the line of the German entrenchments opposite the right of the 22nd Brigade. Further to the south the 24th Brigade, which had been directed on Pietre, was similarly held up by machine-guns in the houses and trenches at the road junction six hundred yards north-west of Pietre. The 25th Brigade, on the right of the 24th, was also held up by machine-guns from a bridge held by the Germans, over the River des Layes, which is situated to the north-west of the Bois du Biez. Whilst two brigades of the Meerut Division were establishing themselves on the new line, the Dehra Dun Brigade, supported by the Jullundur Brigade of the Lahore Division, moved to the attack of the Bois du Biez, but were held up on the line of the River des Layes by the German post at the bridge, which enfiladed them and brought them to a standstill. The defended bridge over the River des Layes and its neighbourhood immediately assumed considerable importance. Whilst artillery fire was brought to bear, as far as circumstances would permit, on this point, Sir Douglas Haig directed the 1st Corps to despatch one or more battalions of the 1st Brigade in support of the troops attacking the bridge. Three battalions were thus sent to Richebourg St. Vaast. Darkness coming on, and the enemy having brought up reinforcements, no further progress could be made, and the Indian Corps and IVth Corps proceeded to consolidate the position they had gained.

Whilst the operations which I have thus briefly recorded were going on, the 1st Corps, in accordance with orders, delivered an attack in the morning from Givenchy, simultaneously with that against Neuve Chapelle; but, as the enemy's wire was insufficiently cut, very little progress could be made, and the troops at this point did very little more than hold fast the Germans in front of them. On the following day, March 11th, the attack was renewed by the IVth and Indian Corps, but it was soon seen that a further advance would be impossible until the artillery had dealt effectively with the various houses and defended localities which held up the troops along the entire front. Efforts were made to direct the artillery fire accordingly; but owing to the weather conditions, which did not permit of aerial observation, and the fact that nearly all the telephonic communications between the artillery observers and their batteries had been cut, it was impossible to do so with sufficient accuracy. Even when our troops which were pressing forward occupied a house here and there, it was not possible to stop our artillery fire, and the infantry had to be withdrawn. The two principal points which barred the advance were the same as on the preceding day—namely, the enemy's position about Moulin de Pietre and at the bridge over the River des Layes. On March 12th the same unfavourable conditions as regards weather prevailed, and hampered artillery action. Although the IVth and Indian Corps most gallantly attempted to capture the strongly-fortified positions in their front, they were unable

to maintain themselves, although they succeeded in holding them for some hours. Operations on this day were chiefly remarkable for the violent counter-attacks, supported by artillery, which were delivered by the Germans, and the ease with which they were repulsed. As most of the objects for which the operations had been undertaken had been attained, and as there were reasons why I considered it inadvisable to continue the attack at that time, I directed Sir Douglas Haig on the night of the 12th to hold and consolidate the ground which had been gained by the IVth and Indian Corps, and to suspend further offensive operations for the present.

On the morning of the 12th I informed the General Officer Commanding First Army that he could call on the 2nd Cavalry Division, under General Gough, for immediate support in the event of the successes of the First Army opening up opportunities for its favourable employment. This division and a brigade of the North Midland Division, which was temporarily attached to it, was moved forward for this purpose. The 5th Cavalry Brigade, under Sir Philip Chetwode, reached the Rue Bacquerot at 4 p.m., with a view to rendering immediate support; but he was informed by the General Officer Commanding IVth Corps that the situation was not so favourable as he had hoped it would be, and that no further action by the cavalry was advisable. General Gough's command, therefore, retired to Estaires. The artillery of all kinds was handled with the utmost energy and skill, and rendered invaluable support in the prosecution of the attack.

The losses during these three days' fighting were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering—190 officers and 2,337 other ranks killed; 359 officers and 8,174 other ranks wounded; 23 officers and 1,728 other ranks missing. But the results attained were, in my opinion, wide and far reaching. The enemy left several thousand dead on the battlefield which were seen and counted; and we have positive information that upwards of 12,000 wounded were removed to the north-east and east by train. Thirty officers and 1,657 other ranks of the enemy were captured.

I can best express my estimate of this battle by quoting an extract from a Special Order of the Day which I addressed to Sir Douglas Haig and the First Army at its conclusion:—

"I am anxious to express to you personally my warmest appreciation of the skilful manner in which you have carried out your orders, and my fervent and most heartfelt appreciation of the magnificent gallantry and devoted, tenacious courage displayed by all ranks whom you have ably led to success and victory."

5. Some operations in the nature of holding attacks, carried out by troops of the Second Army, were instrumental in keeping the enemy in front of them occupied, and preventing reinforcements being sent from those portions of the front to the main point of attack. At 12.30 a.m. on March 12th the 17th Infantry Brigade of the 4th Division, IIIrd Corps, engaged in an attack on the enemy which resulted in the capture of the village of L'Épinette and adjacent farms. Supported by a brisk fire from the 18th Infantry Brigade, the 17th Infantry Brigade, detailed for the attack, assaulted in two columns converging, and obtained the first houses of the village without much loss. The remainder of the village was very heavily wired, and the enemy got away by means of communication trenches while our men were cutting through the wire. The enemy suffered considerable loss; our casualties being five officers and thirty other ranks, killed and wounded. The result of this operation was that an advance of three hundred yards was made on a front of half a mile. All attempts to retake this position have been repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. The General Officer Commanding the IInd Corps arranged for an attack on a part of the enemy's position to

the south-west of the village of Wyttschaete which he had timed to commence at 10 a.m. on March 12th. Owing to dense fog, the assault could not be made until four o'clock in the afternoon. It was then commenced by the Wiltshire and Worcestershire Regiments, but was so hampered by the mist and the approach of darkness that nothing more was effected than holding the enemy to his ground. The action of St. Eloi referred to in the first paragraph of this despatch commenced at five p.m. on March 14th by a very heavy cannonade which was directed against our trenches in front of St. Eloi, the village itself and the approaches to it. There is a large mound lying to the south-east of the village. When the artillery attack was at its height a mine was exploded under this mound, and a strong hostile infantry attack was immediately launched against the trenches and the mound.

Our artillery opened fire at once, as well as our infantry, and inflicted considerable losses on the enemy during their advance; but chiefly owing to the explosion of the mine and the surprise of the overwhelming artillery attack, the enemy's infantry had penetrated the first line of trenches at some points. As a consequence the garrisons of other works which had successfully resisted the assault were enfiladed and forced to retire just before it turned dark. A counter-attack was at once organized by the General Officer Commanding 82nd Brigade, under the orders of the General Officer Commanding 27th Division, who brought up a reserve brigade to support it. The attack was launched at two a.m., and the 82nd Brigade succeeded in recapturing the portion of the village of St. Eloi which was in the hands of the enemy and a portion of the trenches east of it. At three a.m. the 80th Brigade in support took more trenches to the east and west of the village. The counter-attack, which was well carried out under difficult conditions, resulted in the recapture of all lost ground of material importance. It is satisfactory to be able to record that, though the troops occupying the first line of trenches were at first overwhelmed, they afterwards behaved very gallantly in the counter-attack for the recovery of the lost ground; and the following units earned and received the special commendation of the Army Commander:—The 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers, the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the 1st Leinster Regiment, the 4th Rifle Brigade, and the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. A vigorous attack made by the enemy on the 17th to recapture these trenches was repulsed with great loss. Throughout the period under review night enterprises by smaller or larger patrols, which were led with consummate skill and daring, have been very active along the whole line. A moral superiority has thus been established, and valuable information has been collected. I cannot speak too highly of the invincible courage and the remarkable resource displayed by these patrols. The troops of the IIIrd Corps have particularly impressed me by their conduct of these operations.

6. The work of the Royal Flying Corps throughout this period, and especially during the operations of March 10th, 11th, and 12th, was of the greatest value. Though the weather on March 10th and on the subsequent days was very unfavourable for aerial work, on account of low-lying clouds and mist, a remarkable number of hours flying of a most valuable character were effected, and continuous and close reconnaissance was maintained over the enemy's front. In addition to the work of reconnaissance and observation of artillery fire, the Royal Flying Corps was charged with the special duty of hampering the enemy's movements by destroying various points on his communications. The railways at Menin, Courtrai, Don, and Douai were attacked, and it is known that very extensive damage was effected at certain of these places. Part of a troop train was hit by a bomb, a wireless installation near Lille is believed to have been effectively destroyed, and a house in which the enemy had installed one of his headquarters

was set on fire. These afford other instances of successful operations of this character. Most of the objectives mentioned were attacked at a height of only 100 to 150 feet. In one case the pilot descended to about 50 feet above the point he was attacking. Certain new and important forms of activity, which it is undesirable to specify, have been initiated and pushed forward with much vigour and success. There have been only eight days during the period under review on which reconnaissances have not been made. A total of approximately 130,000 miles have been flown—almost entirely over the enemy's lines. No great activity has been shown over our troops on the part of the enemy's aircraft, but they have been attacked whenever and wherever met with, and usually forced down or made to seek refuge in their own lines.

7. In my last despatch I referred to the remarkable promptitude and rapidity with which reinforcements arrived in this country from England. In connection with this it is of interest to call attention to the fact that, in spite of the heavy casualties incurred in the fighting between March 10th and 15th, all deficiencies, both in officers and rank and file, were made good within a few days of the conclusion of the battle. The drafts for the Indian Contingents have much improved of late, and are now quite satisfactory.

Since the date of my last report the general health of the army has been excellent; enteric has decreased, and there has been no recurrence on any appreciable scale of the "foot" trouble which appeared so threatening in December and January. These results are due to the skill and energy which have characterized in a marked degree the work of the Royal Army Medical Corps throughout the campaign, under the able supervision of Surgeon-General T. J. O'Donnell, D.S.O., Deputy Director-General, Medical Services. But much credit is also due to divisional, brigade, regimental, and company commanders for the close supervision which has been kept over the health of their men by seeing that the precautions laid down for the troops before entering and after leaving the trenches are duly observed, and by the establishment and efficient maintenance of bathing-places and wash-houses, and by the ingenious means universally employed throughout the forces to maintain the cleanliness of the men, having regard both to their bodies and their clothing. I have inspected most of these houses and establishments, and consider them models of careful organization and supervision. I would particularly comment upon the energy displayed by the Royal Army Medical Corps in the scientific efforts they have made to discover and check disease in its earliest stages by a system of experimental research, which I think has never before been so fully developed in the field. In this work they have been ably assisted by those distinguished members of the medical profession who are now employed as military medical officers, and whose invaluable services I gratefully acknowledge. The actual strength of the force in the field has been increased and the health of the troops improved by a system of "convalescent" hospitals. In these establishments slight wounds and minor ailments are treated, and men requiring attention and rest are received. By these means efficient soldiers, whose services would otherwise be lost for a long time, are kept in the country, whilst a large number of men are given immediate relief and rest when they require it without removing them from the area of operations. This adds materially to the fighting efficiency of the forces.

The principal convalescent hospital is at St. Omer. It was started and organized by Colonel A. F. L. Bate, Army Medical Service, whose zeal, energy, and organizing power have rendered it a model hospital of its kind and this example has materially assisted in the efficient organization of similar smaller establishments at every divisional headquarters.

8. I have already commented upon the number and severity of the casualties in action which have occurred in the period under report. Here once again I have to draw attention to the excellent work done by Surgeon-General O'Donnell and his officers. No organization could excel the efficiency of the arrangements—whether in regard to time, space, care and comfort, or transport—which are made for the speedy evacuation of the wounded. I wish particularly to express my deep sense of the loss incurred by the army in general, and by the forces in France in particular, in the death of Brigadier-General J. E. Gough, V.C., C.M.G., A.D.C., late Brigadier-General, General Staff, First Army, which occurred on February 22nd as a result of a severe wound received on February 20th when inspecting the trenches of the IVth Corps. I always regarded General Gough as one of our most promising military leaders of the future. His services as a staff officer throughout the campaign have been invaluable, and I had already brought his name before your Lordship for immediate promotion. I can well understand how deeply these casualties are felt by the nation at large, but each daily report shows clearly that they are being endured on at least an equal scale by all the combatants engaged throughout Europe, friends and foes alike. In war as it is to-day between civilized nations, armed to the teeth with the present deadly rifle and machine-gun, heavy casualties are absolutely unavoidable. For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest toll is exacted. The power of defence conferred by modern weapons is the main cause of the long duration of the battles of the present day, and it is this fact which mainly accounts for such loss and waste of life.

Both one and the other can, however, be shortened and lessened if attacks can be supported by the most efficient and powerful force of artillery available; but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary and a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to the artillery commanders. I am confident that this is the only means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss.

9. On February 15th the Canadian Division began to arrive in this country. I inspected the division, which was under the command of Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, C.B., on February 20th. They presented a splendid and most soldier-like appearance on parade. The men were of good physique, hard, and fit. I judged by what I saw of them that they were well trained and quite able to take their places in the line of battle. Since then the division has thoroughly justified the good opinion I formed of it. The troops of the Canadian Division were first attached for a few days by brigades for training in the IIIrd Corps trenches under Lieut.-General Sir William Pulteney, who gave me such an excellent report of their efficiency that I was able to employ them in the trenches early in March. During the Battle of Neuve Chapelle they held a part of the line allotted to the First Army, and, although they were not actually engaged in the main attack, they rendered valuable help by keeping the enemy actively employed in front of their trenches. All the soldiers of Canada serving in the army under my command have so far splendidly upheld the traditions of the Empire, and will, I feel sure, prove to be a great source of additional strength to the forces in this country. In former despatches I have been able to comment very favourably upon the conduct and bearing of the Territorial Forces throughout the operations in which they have been engaged. As time goes on, and I see more and more of their work, whether in the trenches or engaged in more active operations, I am still further impressed with their value.

Several battalions were engaged in the most critical moments of the heavy fighting which occurred in the middle of March, and they acquitted themselves with the utmost credit. Up till lately the troops of the Territorial Force in this.

country were only employed by battalions, but for some weeks past I have seen formed divisions working together, and I have every hope that their employment in the larger units will prove as successful as in the smaller. These opinions are fully borne out by the result of the close inspection which I have recently made of the North Midland Division, under Major-General Hon. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, and the 2nd London Division, under Major-General Barter.

10. General Baron von Kaulbars, of the Russian General Staff, arrived at my headquarters on March 18th. He was anxious to study our aviation system, and I gave him every opportunity of doing so. The Bishop of London arrived here with his Chaplain on Saturday, March 27th, and left on Monday, April 5th. During the course of his visit to the army his Lordship was at the front every day, and I think I am right in saying that there was scarcely a unit in the command which was not at one time or another present at his services or addresses. Personal fatigue and even danger were completely ignored by his Lordship. The Bishop held several services virtually under shell fire, and it was with difficulty that he could be prevented from carrying on his ministrations under rifle fire in the trenches. I am anxious to place on record my deep sense of the good effect produced throughout the army by this self-sacrificing devotion on the part of the Bishop of London, to whom I feel personally very deeply indebted. I have once more to remark upon the devotion to duty, courage and contempt of danger which has characterised the work of the chaplains of the army throughout this campaign.

11. The increased strength of the force and the gradual exhaustion of the local resources have necessitated a corresponding increase in our demands on the line of communications, since we are now compelled to import many articles which in the early stages could be obtained by local purchase. The directorates concerned have, however, been carefully watching the situation, and all the administrative services on the line of communications have continued to work with smoothness and regularity, in spite of the increased pressure thrown upon them. In this connection I wish to bring to notice the good service which has been rendered by the staff at the base ports. The work of the Railway Transport Department has been excellently carried out, and I take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the valuable service rendered by the French railway authorities generally, and especially by Colonel Ragueneau, late Directeur des Chemins de Fer, Lieut.-Colonel Le Hénaff, Directeur des Chemins de Fer, Lieut.-Colonel Dumont, Commissaire Militaire, Chemin de Fer du Nord, and Lieut.-Colonel Frid, Commissaire Régulateur, Armée Anglaise. The Army Postal Service has continued to work well, and at the present time a letter posted in London is delivered at General Headquarters or at the headquarters of the Armies and Army Corps on the following evening, and reaches an addressee in the trenches on the second day after posting. The delivery of parcels has also been accelerated, and is carried out with regularity and despatch.

12. His Majesty the King of the Belgians visited the British lines on February 8th and inspected some of the units in reserve behind the trenches. During the last two months I have been much indebted to his Majesty and his gallant army for valuable assistance and co-operation in various ways.

13. His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales is the bearer of this despatch. His Royal Highness continues to make most satisfactory progress. During the Battle of Neuve Chapelle he acted on my General Staff as a liaison officer. Reports from the general officers commanding corps and divisions to which he has been attached agree in commending the thoroughness in which he performs any work entrusted to him. I have myself been very favourably impressed by the quickness with which his Royal Highness has acquired knowledge of the various branches

of the service, and the deep interest he has always displayed in the comfort and welfare of the men. His visits to the troops, both in the field and in hospitals, have been greatly appreciated by all ranks. His Royal Highness did duty for a time in the trenches with the battalion to which he belongs.

14. In connection with the Battle of Neuve Chapelle I desire to bring to Your Lordship's special notice the valuable services of General Sir Douglas Haig, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O., A.D.C., Commanding the First Army. I am also much indebted to the able and devoted assistance I have received from Lieut.-General Sir William Robertson, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., Chief of the General Staff, in the direction of all operations recorded in this despatch. I have many other names to bring to notice for valuable, gallant, and distinguished service during the period under review, and these will form the subject of a separate report at an early date.

APPENDIX VII.

*Despatch from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the British Forces,
dated June 15th, 1915.*

I have the honour to report that since the date of my last despatch (April 5th, 1915) the army in France under my command has been heavily engaged opposite both flanks of the line held by the British forces.

1. In the north the town and district of Ypres have once more in this campaign been successfully defended against vigorous and sustained attacks made by large forces of the enemy, and supported by a mass of heavy and field artillery which, not only in number, but also in weight and calibre, is superior to any concentration of guns which has previously assailed that part of the line.

In the south a vigorous offensive has again been taken by troops of the First Army, in the course of which a large area of entrenched and fortified ground has been captured from the enemy, whilst valuable support has been afforded to the attack which our Allies have carried on with such marked success against the enemy's positions to the east of Arras and Lens.

2. I much regret that during the period under report the fighting has been characterised on the enemy's side by a cynical and barbarous disregard of the well-known usages of civilized war and a flagrant defiance of the Hague Convention. All the scientific resources of Germany have, apparently, been brought into play to produce a gas of so virulent and poisonous a nature that any human being brought into contact with it is first paralysed and then meets with a lingering and agonizing death. The enemy has invariably preceded, prepared, and supported his attacks by a discharge in stupendous volume of these poisonous gas fumes whenever the wind was favourable. Such weather conditions have only prevailed to any extent in the neighbourhood of Ypres, and there can be no doubt that the effect of these poisonous fumes materially influenced the operations in that theatre, until experience suggested effective counter-measures which have since been so perfected as to render them innocuous.

The brain power and thought which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated in its practice shows that the Germans must have harboured these designs for a long time. As a soldier I cannot help expressing the deepest regret and some surprise that an army which hitherto has claimed to be the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant foes.

3. On the night of Saturday, April 17th, a commanding hill which afforded the enemy excellent artillery observation toward the west and north-west was

successfully mined and captured. This hill, known as Hill 60, lies opposite the northern extremity of the line held by the IInd Corps. The operation was planned and the mining commenced by Major-General Bulfin before the ground was handed over to the troops under Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson, under whose supervision the operation was carried out.

The mines were successfully fired at 7 p.m. on the 17th instant, and immediately afterwards the hill was attacked and gained, without difficulty, by the 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment and the 2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers. The attack was well supported by the Divisional Artillery, assisted by French and Belgian batteries. During the night several of the enemy's counter-attacks were repulsed with heavy loss, and fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place; but on the early morning of the 18th the enemy succeeded in forcing back the troops holding the right of the hill to the reverse slope, where, however, they hung on throughout the day. On the evening of the 18th these two battalions were relieved by the 2nd Battalion West Riding Regiment and the 2nd Battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, who again stormed the hill under cover of heavy artillery fire, and the enemy was driven off at the point of the bayonet. In this operation fifty-three prisoners were captured, including four officers.

On the 20th and following days many unsuccessful attacks by the enemy were made on Hill 60, which was continuously shelled by heavy artillery. On May 1st another attempt to recapture Hill 60 was supported by great volumes of asphyxiating gas, which caused nearly all the men along a front of 400 yards to be immediately struck down by its fumes. The splendid courage with which the leaders rallied their men and subdued the natural tendency to panic (which is inevitable on such occasions), combined with the prompt intervention of supports, once more drove the enemy back. A second and more severe "gas" attack, under much more favourable weather conditions, enabled the enemy to recapture this position on May 5th.

The enemy owes his success in this last attack entirely to the use of asphyxiating gas. It was only a few days later that the means, which have since proved so effective, of counteracting this method of making war were put into practice. Had it been otherwise, the enemy's attack on May 5th would most certainly have shared the fate of all the many previous attempts he had made.

4. It was at the commencement of the second battle of Ypres on the evening of April 22nd, referred to in paragraph 1 of this report, that the enemy first made use of asphyxiating gas.

Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre's request to take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the line east of Ypres were posted as follows:—

From Steenstraete to the east of Langemarck, as far as the Poelcappelle Road, a French division. Thence in a south-easterly direction toward the Passchendaele-Becelaere Road, the Canadian division. Thence a division took up the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another division continued the line south-east to the northern limit of the corps on its right.

Of the Vth Corps there were four battalions in divisional reserve about Ypres, the Canadian division had one battalion in divisional reserve and the 1st Canadian brigade in army reserve. An infantry brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting about Vlamer-tinghe.

Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French division at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft reported

that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had been made east of the Ypres-Staden Railway, in which these asphyxiating gases had been employed.

What followed almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for anyone to realize what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about fifty guns.

I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French division for this unfortunate incident. After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign, it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French division would have stood firm.

The left flank of the Canadian division was thus left dangerously exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a prospect of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the Germans to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the east. In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage; and it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most serious consequences. They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the divisions holding the salient and by a brigade which had been resting in billets. Throughout the night the enemy's attacks were repulsed, effective counter-attacks were delivered, and at length touch was gained with the French right, and a new line was formed.

The 2nd London Heavy Battery, which had been attached to the Canadian Division, was posted behind the right of the French Division, and, being involved in their retreat, fell into the enemy's hands. It was recaptured by the Canadians in their counter-attack, but the guns could not be withdrawn before the Canadians were again driven back.

During the night I directed the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian Division, which was then in general reserve, to move to the west of Ypres, and placed these troops at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Second Army. I also directed other reserve troops from the IIIrd Corps and the First Army to be held in readiness to meet eventualities.

In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Germans succeeded in capturing the bridge at Steenstraete and some works south of Lizerne, all of which were in occupation by the French. The enemy having thus established himself to the west of the Ypres Canal, I was somewhat apprehensive of his succeeding in driving a wedge between the French and Belgian troops at this point. I directed, therefore, that some of the reinforcements sent north should be used to support and assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in preventing any further advance of the Germans west of the canal. At about 10 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd connection was finally ensured between the left of the Canadian Division and the French right, about eight hundred yards east of the canal; but as this entailed the maintenance by the British troops of a much longer line than that which they had held before the attack commenced on the

previous night, there were no reserves available for counter-attack until reinforcements, which were ordered up from the Second Army, were able to deploy to the east of Ypres.

Early on the morning of the 23rd I went to see General Foch, and from him I received a detailed account of what had happened, as reported by General Putz. General Foch informed me that it was his intention to make good the original line and regain the trenches which the French Division had lost. He expressed the desire that I should maintain my present line, assuring me that the original position would be re-established in a few days. General Foch further informed me that he had ordered up large French reinforcements, which were now on their way, and that troops from the north had already arrived to reinforce General Putz. I fully concurred in the wisdom of the General's wish to re-establish our old line, and agreed to co-operate in the way he desired, stipulating, however, that if the position was not re-established within a limited time I could not allow the British troops to remain in so exposed a situation as that which the action of the previous twenty-four hours had compelled them to occupy.

During the whole of the 23rd the enemy's artillery was very active, and his attacks all along the front were supported by some heavy guns which had been brought down from the coast in the neighbourhood of Ostend. The loss of the guns on the night of the 22nd prevented this fire from being kept down, and much aggravated the situation. Our positions, however, were well maintained by the vigorous counter-attacks made by the Vth Corps.

During the day I directed two brigades of the IIIrd Corps and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps to be moved up to the Ypres area and placed at the disposal of the Second Army. In the course of these two or three days many circumstances combined to render the situation east of the Ypres Canal very critical and most difficult to deal with. The confusion caused by the sudden retirement of the French Division, and the necessity for closing up the gap and checking the enemy's advance at all costs, led to a mixing up of units and a sudden shifting of the areas of command which was quite unavoidable. Fresh units, as they came up from the south, had to be pushed into the firing line in an area swept by artillery fire, which, owing to the capture of the French guns, we were unable to keep down.

All this led to very heavy casualties, and I wish to place on record the deep admiration which I feel for the resource and presence of mind evinced by the leaders actually on the spot. The parts taken by Major-General Snow and Brigadier-General Hull were reported to me as being particularly marked in this respect.

An instance of this occurred on the afternoon of the 24th, when the enemy succeeded in breaking through the line at St. Julien. Brigadier-General Hull, acting under the orders of Lieutenant-General Alderson, organized a powerful counter-attack with his own brigade and some of the nearest available units. He was called upon to control, with only his Brigade Staff, parts of battalions from six separate divisions which were quite new to the ground. Although the attack did not succeed in retaking St. Julien, it effectually checked the enemy's further advance.

It was only on the morning of the 25th that the enemy were able to force back the left of the Canadian Division from the point where it had originally joined the French line. During the night and the early morning of the 25th the enemy directed a heavy attack against the division at Broodseinde cross-roads, which was supported by a powerful shell fire, but he failed to make any progress.

During the whole of this time the town of Ypres and all the roads to the east and west were uninterruptedly subjected to a violent artillery fire, but in spite of this the supply of both food and ammunition was maintained throughout with order and efficiency.

During the afternoon of the 25th many German prisoners were taken, including some officers. The hand-to-hand fighting was very severe, and the enemy suffered heavy loss. During the 26th the Lahore Division and a cavalry division were pushed up into the fighting line, the former on the right of the French, the latter in support of the Vth Corps. In the afternoon the Lahore Division, in conjunction with the French right, succeeded in pushing the enemy back some little distance toward the north, but their further advance was stopped owing to the continual employment by the enemy of asphyxiating gas.

On the right of the Lahore Division the Northumberland Infantry Brigade advanced against St. Julien and actually succeeded in entering, and for a time occupying, the southern portion of that village. They were, however, eventually driven back, largely owing to gas, and finally occupied a line a short way to the south. This attack was most successfully and gallantly led by Brigadier-General Riddell, who, I regret to say, was killed during the progress of the operation. Although no attack was made on the south-eastern side of the salient, the troops operating to the east of Ypres were subjected to heavy artillery fire from this direction which took some of the battalions, which were advancing north to the attack, in reverse. Some gallant attempts were made by the Lahore Division on the 27th, which, in conjunction with the French, pushed the enemy further north; but they were partially frustrated by the constant fumes of gas to which they were exposed. In spite of this, however, a certain amount of ground was gained.

The French had succeeded in retaking Lizerne, and had made some progress at Steenstraete and Het Sas; but up to the evening of the 28th no further progress had been made toward the recapture of the original line. I sent instructions, therefore, to Sir Herbert Plumer, who was now in charge of the operation, to take preliminary measures for the retirement to the new line which had been fixed upon. On the morning of the 29th I had another interview with General Foch, who informed me that strong reinforcements were hourly arriving to support General Putz, and urged me to postpone issuing orders for any retirement until the result of his attack, which was timed to commence at daybreak on the 30th, should be known. To this I agreed, and instructed Sir Herbert Plumer accordingly.

No substantial advance having been made by the French, I issued orders to Sir Herbert Plumer at one o'clock on May 1st to commence his withdrawal to the new line. The retirement was commenced the following night, and the new line was occupied on the morning of May 4th.

I am of opinion that this retirement, carried out deliberately with scarcely any loss, and in the face of an enemy in position, reflects the greatest possible credit on Sir Herbert Plumer and those who so efficiently carried out his orders. The successful conduct of this operation was the more remarkable from the fact that on the evening of May 2nd, when it was only half completed, the enemy made a heavy attack, with the usual gas accompaniment, on St. Julien and the line to the west of it. An attack on a line to the east of Fortuin was made at the same time under similar conditions. In both cases our troops were at first driven from their trenches by gas fumes, but on the arrival of the supporting battalions and two brigades of a cavalry division, which were sent up in support from about Potijze, all the lost trenches were regained at night.

On May 3rd, while the retirement was still going on, another violent attack was directed on the northern face of the salient. This was also driven back with heavy loss to the enemy. Further attempts of the enemy during the night

of the 3rd to advance from the woods west of St. Julien were frustrated entirely by the fire of our artillery.

During the whole of the 4th the enemy heavily shelled the trenches we had evacuated, quite unaware that they were no longer occupied. So soon as the retirement was discovered the Germans commenced to entrench opposite our new line and to advance their guns to new positions. Our artillery, assisted by aeroplanes, caused him considerable loss in carrying out these operations.

Up to the morning of the 8th the enemy made attacks at short intervals, covered by gas, on all parts of the line to the east of Ypres, but was everywhere driven back with heavy loss. Throughout the whole period since the first break of the line on the night of April 22nd all the troops in this area had been constantly subjected to violent artillery bombardment from a large mass of guns with an unlimited supply of ammunition. It proved impossible whilst under so vastly superior fire of artillery to dig efficient trenches, or to properly reorganize the line, after the confusion and demoralization caused by the first great gas surprise and the subsequent, almost daily, gas attacks. Nor was it until after this date (May 8th) that effective preventatives had been devised and provided.

In these circumstances a violent bombardment of nearly the whole of the Vth Corps' front broke out at 7 a.m. on the morning of the 8th, which gradually concentrated on the front of the division between north and south of Frezenberg. This fire completely obliterated the trenches and caused enormous losses. The artillery bombardment was shortly followed by a heavy infantry attack, before which our line had to give way.

I relate what happened in Sir Herbert Plumer's own words :—

"The right of one brigade was broken about 10.15 a.m.; then its centre, and then part of the left of the brigade in the next section to the south. The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, however, although suffering very heavily, stuck to their fire or support trenches throughout the day. At this time two battalions were moved to General Headquarters' 2nd line astride the Menin road to support and cover the left of their division.

"At 12.25 p.m. the centre of a brigade further to the left also broke; its right battalion, however, the 1st Suffolks, which had been refused to cover a gap, still held on and were apparently surrounded and overwhelmed. Meanwhile, three more battalions had been moved up to reinforce, two other battalions were moved up in support to General Headquarters line, and an infantry brigade came up to the grounds of Vlamertinghe Chateau in corps reserve. At 11.30 a.m. a small party of Germans attempted to advance against the left of the British line, but were destroyed by the 2nd Essex Regiment.

"A counter-attack was launched at 3.30 p.m. by the 1st York and Lancaster Regiment, 3rd Middlesex Regiment, 2nd East Surrey Regiment, 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and the 1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment. The counter-attack reached Frezenberg, but was eventually driven back and held up on a line running about north and south through Verlorenhoek, despite repeated efforts to advance. The 12th London Regiment on the left succeeded at great cost in reaching the original trench line, and did considerable execution with their machine-gun. The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 1st East Lancashire Regiment attacked in a north-easterly direction towards Wieltje, and connected the old trench line with the ground gained by the counter-attack, the line being consolidated during the night. During the night orders were received that two cavalry divisions would be moved up and placed at the disposal of the Vth Corps, and a Territorial division would be moved up to be used if required.

"On the 9th the Germans again repeated their bombardment. Very heavy shell fire was concentrated for two hours on the trenches of the 2nd Gloucestershire

Regiment and 2nd Cameron Highlanders, followed by an infantry attack which was successfully repulsed. The Germans again bombarded the salient, and a further attack in the afternoon succeeded in occupying 150 yards of trench. The Gloucesters counter-attacked, but suffered heavily, and the attack failed. The salient being very exposed to shell fire from both flanks, as well as in front, it was deemed advisable not to attempt to retake the trench at night, and a retrenchment was therefore dug across it. At three p.m. the enemy started to shell the whole front of the centre division, and it was reported that the right brigade of this division was being heavily punished, but continued to maintain its line. The trenches of the brigades on the left centre were also heavily shelled during the day and attacked by infantry. Both attacks were repulsed.

"On the 10th instant the trenches on either side of the Menin-Ypres road were shelled very severely all the morning. The 2nd Cameron Highlanders, 9th Royal Scots, and the 3rd and 4th King's Royal Rifles, however, repulsed an attack made, under cover of gas, with heavy loss. Finally, when the trenches had been practically destroyed and a large number of the garrison buried, the 3rd King's Royal Rifles and 4th Rifle Brigade fell back to the trenches immediately west of Bellewaarde Wood. So heavy had been the shell fire that the proposal to join up the line with a switch through the wood had to be abandoned, the trees broken by the shells forming an impassable entanglement.

"After a comparatively quiet night and morning (10th-11th) the hostile artillery fire was concentrated on the trenches of the 2nd Cameron Highlanders and 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at a slightly more northern point than on the previous day. The Germans attacked in force and gained a footing in part of the trenches, but were promptly ejected by a supporting company of the 9th Royal Scots. After a second short artillery bombardment the Germans again attacked about 4.15 p.m., but were again repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire. A third bombardment followed, and this time the Germans succeeded in gaining a trench—or rather what was left of it—a local counter-attack failing. However, during the night the enemy were again driven out. The trench by this time being practically non-existent, the garrison found it untenable under the very heavy shell fire the enemy brought to bear upon it, and the trench was evacuated. Twice more did the German snipers creep back into it, and twice more they were ejected. Finally, a retrenchment was made, cutting off the salient which had been contested throughout the day. It was won owing solely to the superior weight and number of the enemy's guns, but both our infantry and our artillery took a very heavy toll of the enemy, and the ground lost has proved of little use to the enemy.

"On the remainder of the front the day passed comparatively quietly, though most parts of the line underwent intermittent shelling by guns of various calibres. With the assistance of the Royal Flying Corps the 31st Heavy Battery scored a direct hit on a German gun, and the North Midland Heavy Battery got on to some German howitzers with great success. With the exception of another very heavy burst of shell fire against the right division early in the morning, the 12th passed uneventfully.

"On the night of the 12th-13th the line was reorganized, the centre division retiring into army reserve to rest, and their places being taken in the trenches by the two cavalry divisions, the artillery and engineers of the centre division forming with them what was known as the 'Cavalry Force' under the command of General De Lisle.

"On the 13th, the various reliefs having been completed without incident, the heaviest bombardment yet experienced broke out at 4.30 a.m., and continued with little intermission throughout the day. At about 7.45 a.m. the Cavalry Brigade astride the railway, having suffered very severely, and their trenches

having been obliterated, fell back about 800 yards. The North Somerset Yeomanry on the right of the brigade, although also suffering severely, hung on to their trenches throughout the day, and actually advanced and attacked the enemy with the bayonet. The brigade on its right also maintained its position, as did also the Cavalry Division, except the left squadron, which, when reduced to sixteen men, fell back. The 2nd Essex Regiment, realizing the situation, promptly charged and retook the trench, holding it till relieved by the cavalry. Meanwhile a counter-attack by two cavalry brigades was launched at 2.30 p.m., and succeeded, in spite of very heavy shrapnel and rifle fire, in regaining the original line of trenches, turning out the Germans who had entered it, and in some cases pursuing them for some distance. But a very heavy shell fire was again opened on them, and they were again compelled to retire to an irregular line in rear, principally the craters of shell holes. The enemy in their counter-attack suffered very severe losses.

"The fighting in other parts of the line was little less severe. The 1st East Lancashire Regiment were shelled out of their trenches, but their support company and the 2nd Essex Regiment, again acting on their own initiative, won them back. The enemy penetrated into the farm at the north-east corner of the line, but the 1st Rifle Brigade, after a severe struggle, expelled them. The 1st Hampshire Regiment also repelled an attack, and killed every German who got within fifty yards of their trenches. The 5th London Regiment, despite very heavy casualties, maintained their position unflinching. At the southern end of the line the left brigade was once again heavily shelled, as, indeed, was the whole front. At the end of a very hard day's fighting our line remained in its former position, with the exception of the short distance lost by one cavalry division. Later, the line was pushed forward, and a new line was dug in a less exposed position, slightly in rear of that originally held. The night passed quietly.

"Working parties of from 1,200 to 1,800 men have been found every night by a Territorial division and other units for work on rear lines of defence, in addition to the work performed by the garrison in reconstructing the front line trenches which were daily destroyed by shell fire.

"The work performed by the Royal Flying Corps has been invaluable. Apart from the hostile aeroplanes actually destroyed, our airmen have prevented a great deal of aerial reconnaissance by the enemy, and have registered a large number of targets with our artillery.

"There have been many cases of individual gallantry. As instances may be given the following:—

"During one of the heavy attacks made against our infantry gas was seen rolling forward from the enemy's trenches. Private Lynn, of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, at once rushed to the machine-gun without waiting to adjust his respirator. Single-handed he kept his gun in action the whole time the gas was rolling over, actually hoisting it on the parapet to get a better field of fire. Although nearly suffocated by the gas, he poured a stream of lead into the advancing enemy and checked their attack. He was carried to his dug-out, but, hearing another attack was imminent, he tried to get back to his gun. Twenty-four hours later he died in great agony from the effects of the gas.

"A young subaltern in a cavalry regiment went forward alone one afternoon to reconnoitre. He got into a wood, 1,200 yards in front of our lines, which he found occupied by Germans, and came back with the information that the enemy had evacuated a trench and were digging another—information which proved most valuable to the artillery as well as to his own unit.

"A patrol of two officers and a non-commissioned officer of the 1st Cambridgeshires went out one night to reconnoitre a German trench 350 yards away. Creeping along the parapet of the trench, they heard sounds indicating the

presence of six or seven of the enemy. Further on they heard deep snores, apparently proceeding from a dug-out immediately beneath them. Although they knew that the garrison of the trench outnumbered them, they decided to procure an identification. Unfortunately, in pulling out a clasp knife with which to cut off the sleeper's identity disc one of the officers' revolvers went off. A conversation in agitated whispers broke out in the German trench, but the patrol crept safely away, the garrison being too startled to fire.

"Despite the very severe shelling to which the troops had been subjected, which obliterated trenches and caused very many casualties, the spirit of all ranks remains excellent. The enemy's losses, particularly on the 10th and 13th, have unquestionably been serious. On the latter day they evacuated trenches (in face of the cavalry counter-attack) in which were afterwards found quantities of equipment and some of their own wounded. The enemy have been seen stripping our dead, and on three occasions men in khaki have been seen advancing.

"The fight went on by the exchange of desultory shell and rifle fire, but without any remarkable incident until the morning of May 24th. During this period, however, the French on our left had attained considerable success. On the 15th instant they captured Steenstraete and the trenches in Het Sas, and on the 16th they drove the enemy headlong over the canal, finding two thousand German dead. On the 17th they made a substantial advance on the east side of the canal, and on the 20th they repelled a German counter-attack, making a further advance in the same direction, and taking one hundred prisoners.

"On the early morning of the 24th a violent outburst of gas against nearly the whole front was followed by heavy shell fire, and the most determined attack was delivered against our position east of Ypres. The hour the attack commenced was 2.45 a.m. A large proportion of the men were asleep, and the attack was too sudden to give them time to put on their respirators. The 2nd Royal Irish and the 9th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, overcome by gas fumes, were driven out of a farm held in front of the left division, and this the enemy proceeded to hold and fortify. All attempts to retake this farm during the day failed, and during the night of the 24th-25th the General Officer Commanding the left division decided to take up a new line which, although slightly in rear of the old one, he considered to be a much better position. This was successfully carried out.

"Throughout the day the whole line was subjected to one of the most violent artillery attacks which it had ever undergone, and the Vth Corps and the Cavalry Divisions engaged had to fight hard to maintain their positions. On the following day, however, the line was consolidated, joining the right of the French at the same place as before, and passing through Wieltje (which was strongly fortified) in a southerly direction on to Hooze, where the cavalry have since strongly occupied the château, and pushed our line further east."

5. In pursuance of a promise which I made to the French Commander-in-Chief to support an attack which his troops were making on May 9th between the right of my line and Arras, I directed Sir Douglas Haig to carry out on that date an attack on the German trenches in the neighbourhood of Rougebanc (north-west of Fromelles) by the IVth Corps, and between Neuve Chapelle and Givenchy, by the 1st and Indian Corps. The bombardment of the enemy's positions commenced at 5 a.m. Half an hour later the 8th Division of the IVth Corps captured the first line of German trenches about Rougebanc, and some detachments seized a few localities beyond this line. It was soon found, however, that the position was much stronger than had been anticipated, and that a more extensive artillery preparation was necessary to crush the resistance offered by his numerous fortified posts.

Throughout the 9th and 10th repeated efforts were made to make further progress. Not only was this found to be impossible, but the violence of the enemy's machine-gun fire from his posts on the flanks rendered the captured trenches so difficult to hold that all the units of the IVth Corps had to retire to their original position by the morning of the 10th. The 1st and Indian Divisions south of Neuve Chapelle met with no greater success, and on the evening of the 10th I sanctioned Sir Douglas Haig's proposal to concentrate all our available resources on the southern point of attack. The 7th Division was moved round from the IVth Corps area to support this attack, and I directed the General Officer Commanding the First Army to delay it long enough to ensure a powerful and deliberate artillery preparation.

The operations of the 9th and 10th formed part of a general plan of attack which the Allies were conjointly conducting on a line extending from the north of Arras to the south of Armentières; and, although immediate progress was not made during this time by the British forces, their attack assisted in securing the brilliant successes attained by the French forces on their right, not only by holding the enemy in their front but by drawing off a part of the German reinforcements which were coming up to support their forces east of Arras.

It was decided that the attack should be resumed on the night of the 12th instant, but the weather continued very dull and misty, interfering much with artillery observation. Orders were finally issued, therefore, for the action to commence on the night of the 15th instant. On May 15th I moved the Canadian Division into the Ist Corps area and placed them at the disposal of Sir Douglas Haig. The infantry of the Indian Corps and the 2nd Division of the Ist Corps advanced to the attack of the enemy's trenches, which extended from Richebourg L'Avoué in a south-westerly direction. Before daybreak the 2nd Division had succeeded in capturing two lines of the enemy's trenches, but the Indian Corps were unable to make any progress owing to the strength of the enemy's defences in the neighbourhood of Richebourg L'Avoué.

At daybreak the 7th Division, on the right of the 2nd, advanced to the attack, and by 7 a.m. had entrenched themselves on a line running nearly north and south, half-way between their original trenches and La Quinque Rue, having cleared and captured several lines of the enemy's trenches, including a number of fortified posts. As it was found impossible for the Indian Corps to make any progress in face of the enemy's defences, Sir Douglas Haig directed the attack to be suspended at this point and ordered the Indian Corps to form a defensive flank. The remainder of the day was spent in securing and consolidating positions which had been won, and endeavouring to unite the inner flanks of the 7th and 2nd Divisions, which were separated by trenches and posts strongly held by the enemy. Various attempts which were made throughout the day to secure this object had not succeeded at nightfall in driving the enemy back. The German communications leading to the rear of their positions were systematically shelled throughout the night. About two hundred prisoners were captured on the 16th instant.

Fighting was resumed at daybreak; and by 11 o'clock the 7th Division had made a considerable advance, capturing several more of the enemy's trenches. The task allotted to this Division was to push on in the direction of Rue D'Ouvert, Château St. Roch, and Canteleux. The 2nd Division was directed to push on when the situation permitted towards the Rue de Marais and Violaines. The Indian Division was ordered to extend its front far enough to enable it to keep touch with the left of the 2nd Division when they advanced. On this day I gave orders for the 51st (Highland) Division to move into the neighbourhood of Estaires to be ready to support the operations of the First

Army. At about noon the enemy was driven out of the trenches and posts which he occupied between the two divisions, the inner flanks of which were thus enabled to join hands.

By nightfall the 2nd and 7th Divisions had made good progress, the area of captured ground being considerably extended to the right by the successful operations of the latter. The state of the weather on the morning of the 18th much hindered an effective artillery bombardment, and further attacks had, consequently, to be postponed. Infantry attacks were made throughout the line in the course of the afternoon and evening; but, although not very much progress was made, the line was advanced to the La Quinque Rue—Bethune road before nightfall.

On May 19th the 7th and 2nd Divisions were drawn out of the line to rest. The 7th Division was relieved by the Canadian Division, and the 2nd Division by the 51st (Highland) Division. Sir Douglas Haig placed the Canadian and 51st Divisions, together with the artillery of the 2nd and 7th Divisions, under the command of Lieutenant-General Alderson, whom he directed to conduct the operations which had hitherto been carried on by the General Officer Commanding 1st Corps; and he directed the 7th Division to remain in Army Reserve. During the night of the 19th-20th a small post of the enemy in front of La Quinque Rue was captured.

During the night of the 20th-21st the Canadian Division brilliantly carried on the excellent progress made by the 7th Division by seizing several of the enemy's trenches and pushing forward their whole line several hundred yards. A number of prisoners and some machine-guns were captured. On the 22nd instant the 51st (Highland) Division was attached to the Indian Corps, and the General Officer Commanding the Indian Corps took charge of the operations at La Quinque Rue, Lieutenant-General Alderson with the Canadians conducting the operations to the north of that place. On this day the Canadian Division extended their line slightly to the right and repulsed three very severe hostile counter-attacks. On May 24th and 25th the 47th Division (2nd London Territorial) succeeded in taking some more of the enemy's trenches and making good the ground gained to the east and north.

I had now reason to consider that the battle, which was commenced by the First Army on May 9th and renewed on the 16th, having attained for the moment the immediate object I had in view, should not be further actively proceeded with; and I gave orders to Sir Douglas Haig to curtail his artillery attack and to strengthen and consolidate the ground he had won.

In the battle of Festubert above described the enemy was driven from a position which was strongly entrenched and fortified, and ground was won on a front of four miles to an average depth of 600 yards. The enemy is known to have suffered very heavy losses, and in the course of the battle 785 prisoners and 10 machine-guns were captured. A number of machine-guns were also destroyed by our fire.

During the period under report the army under my command has taken over trenches occupied by some other French Divisions.

I am much indebted to General D'Urbal, commanding the Tenth French Army, for the valuable and efficient support received throughout the battle of Festubert from three groups of French 75 centimetre guns. In spite of very unfavourable weather conditions, rendering observation most difficult, our own artillery did excellent work throughout the battle.

6. During the important operations described above, which were carried on by the First and Second Armies, the IIIrd Corps was particularly active in

making demonstrations with a view to holding the enemy in its front and preventing reinforcements reaching the threatened areas. As an instance of the successful attempts to deceive the enemy in this respect it may be mentioned that on the afternoon of the 24th instant a bombardment of about an hour was carried out by the 6th Division with the object of distracting attention from the Ypres salient. Considerable damage was done to the enemy's parapets and wire; and that the desired impression was produced on the enemy is evident from the German wireless news on that day, which stated: "West of Lille the English attempts to attack were nipped in the bud."

In previous reports I have drawn attention to the enterprise displayed by the troops of the IIIrd Corps in conducting night reconnaissances, and to the courage and resource shown by officers' and other patrols in the conduct of these minor operations. Throughout the period under report this display of activity has been very marked all along the IIIrd Corps' front, and much valuable information and intelligence have been collected.

7. I have much pleasure in again expressing my warm appreciation of the admirable manner in which all branches of the medical services now in the field, under the direction of Surgeon-General Sir Arthur Sloggett, have met and dealt with the many difficult situations resulting from the operations during the last two months. The medical units at the front were frequently exposed to the enemy's fire, and many casualties occurred amongst the officers of the regimental medical service. At all times the officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and nurses carried out their duties with fearless bravery and great devotion to the welfare of the sick and wounded.

The evacuation of casualties from the front to the base and to England was expeditiously accomplished by the Administrative Medical Staffs at the front and on the lines of communication. All ranks employed in units of evacuation and in base hospitals have shown the highest skill and untiring zeal and energy in alleviating the condition of those who passed through their hands. The whole organization of the medical services reflects the highest credit on all concerned.

8. I have once more to call your Lordship's attention to the part taken by the Royal Flying Corps in the general progress of the campaign, and I wish particularly to mention the invaluable assistance they rendered in the operations described in this report, under the able direction of Major-General Sir David Henderson. The Royal Flying Corps is becoming more and more an indispensable factor in combined operations. In co-operation with the artillery, in particular, there has been continuous improvement, both in the methods and in the technical material employed. The ingenuity and technical skill displayed by the officers of the Royal Flying Corps, in effecting this improvement, have been most marked.

Since my last despatch there has been a considerable increase both in the number and in the activity of German aeroplanes in our front. During this period there have been more than sixty combats in the air, in which not one British aeroplane has been lost. As these fights take place almost invariably over or behind the German lines, only one hostile aeroplane has been brought down in our territory. Five more, however, have been definitely wrecked behind their own lines, and many have been chased down and forced to land in most unsuitable ground. In spite of the opposition of hostile aircraft, and the great number of anti-aircraft guns employed by the enemy, air reconnaissance has been carried out with regularity and accuracy.

I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice the assistance given by the French Military Authorities, and in particular by General Hirschauer, Director

of the French Aviation Service, and his assistants, Colonel Bottieaux and Colonel Stammer, in the supply of aeronautical material, without which the efficiency of the Royal Flying Corps would have been seriously impaired.

9. In this despatch I wish again to remark upon the exceptionally good work done throughout this campaign by the Army Service Corps and by the Army Ordnance Department, not only in the field, but also on the lines of communication and at the base ports. To foresee and meet the requirements in the matter of ammunition, stores, equipment, supplies, and transport has entailed on the part of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of these services a sustained effort which has never been relaxed since the beginning of the war, and which has been rewarded by the most conspicuous success. The close co-operation of the Railway Transport Department, whose excellent work, in combination with the French Railway Staff, has ensured the regularity of the maintenance services, has greatly contributed to this success.

The degree of efficiency to which these services have been brought was well demonstrated in the course of the Second Battle of Ypres. The roads between Poperinghe and Ypres over which transport, supply, and ammunition columns had to pass, were continually searched by hostile heavy artillery during the day and night; whilst the passage of the canal through the town of Ypres, and along the roads east of that town, could only be effected under most difficult and dangerous conditions as regards hostile shell fire. Yet, throughout the whole five or six weeks during which these conditions prevailed the work was carried on with perfect order and efficiency.

10. Since the date of my last report some divisions of the "New" Army have arrived in this country. I made a close inspection of one division, formed up on parade, and have at various times seen several units belonging to others. These divisions have as yet had very little experience in actual fighting; but, judging from all I have seen, I am of opinion that they ought to prove a valuable addition to any fighting force.

As regards the infantry, their physique is excellent, whilst their bearing and appearance on parade reflect great credit on the officers and staffs responsible for their training. The units appear to be thoroughly well officered and commanded. The equipment is in good order and efficient. Several units of artillery have been tested in the firing line behind the trenches, and I hear very good reports of them. Their shooting has been extremely good, and they are quite fit to take their places in the line.

The Pioneer Battalions have created a very favourable impression, the officers being keen and ingenious and the men of good physique and good diggers. The equipment is suitable. The training in field works has been good, but, generally speaking, they require the assistance of Regular Royal Engineers as regards laying out of important works. Man for man in digging the battalions should do practically the same amount of work as an equivalent number of sappers, and in riveting, entanglement, etc., a great deal more than ordinary infantry battalions.

11. During the months of April and May several divisions of the Territorial Force joined the army under my command. Experience has shown that these troops have now reached a standard of efficiency which enables them to be usefully employed in complete divisional units. Several divisions have been so employed, some in the trenches, others in the various offensive and defensive operations reported in this despatch.

In whatever kind of work these units have been engaged they have all borne an active and distinguished part, and have proved themselves thoroughly reliable and efficient.

The opinion I have expressed in former despatches as to the use and value of the Territorial Force has been fully justified by recent events.

12. The Prime Minister was kind enough to accept an invitation from me to visit the army in France, and arrived at my headquarters on May 30th. Mr. Asquith made an exhaustive tour of the front, the hospitals and all the administrative arrangements made by corps commanders for the health and comfort of men behind the trenches. It was a great encouragement to all ranks to see the Prime Minister amongst them, and the eloquent words which on several occasions he addressed to the troops had a most powerful and beneficial effect.

As I was desirous that the French Commander-in-Chief should see something of the British troops, I asked General Joffre to be kind enough to inspect a division on parade. The General accepted my invitation, and on May 27th he inspected the 7th Division, under the command of Major-General H. de la P. Gough, C.B., which was resting behind the trenches. General Joffre subsequently expressed to me in a letter the pleasure it gave him to see the British troops, and his appreciation of their appearance on parade. He requested me to make this known to all ranks. The Moderator of the Church of Scotland, the Right Reverend Dr. Wallace Williamson, Dean of the Order of the Thistle, visited the army in France between May 7th and 17th, and made a tour of the Scottish regiments with excellent results.

13. In spite of the constant strain put upon them by the arduous nature of the fighting which they are called upon to carry out daily and almost hourly, the spirit which animates all ranks of the army in France remains high and confident. They meet every demand made upon them with the utmost cheerfulness. This splendid spirit is particularly manifested by the men in hospital, even amongst those who are mortally wounded. The invariable question which comes from lips hardly able to utter a sound is, "How are things going on at the front?"

14. In conclusion, I desire to bring to your Lordship's special notice the valuable services rendered by General Sir Douglas Haig in his successful handling of the troops of the First Army throughout the Battle of Festubert, and Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Plumer for his fine defence of Ypres throughout the arduous and difficult operations during the latter part of April and the month of May.

APPENDIX VIII.

Despatch from the General Officer Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, dated May 20th, 1915.

I have the honour to submit my report on the operations in the Gallipoli Peninsula up to and including May 5th.

In accordance with your Lordship's instructions I left London on March 13th with my General Staff by special train to Marseilles, and thence in his Majesty's ship "Phaeton" to the scene of the naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, reaching Tenedos on March 17th shortly after noon.

Immediately on arrival I conferred with Vice-Admiral de Robeck, Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet; General d'Amade, Commanding the French Corps Expéditionnaire; and Contre-Amiral Guépratte, in command of the French squadron. At this conference past difficulties were explained to me, and the intention to make a fresh attack on the morrow was announced. The amphibious battle between warships and land fortresses took place next day, March 18th. I witnessed these stupendous events, and thereupon cabled your Lordship my reluctant deduction

that the co-operation of the whole of the force under my command would be required to enable the fleet effectively to force the Dardanelles.

By that time I had already carried out a preliminary reconnaissance of the north-western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula, from its isthmus, where it is spanned by the Bulair fortified lines, to Cape Helles, at its extremest point. From Bulair this singular feature runs in a south-westerly direction for fifty-two miles, attaining near its centre a breadth of twelve miles. The northern coast of the northern half of the promontory slopes downwards steeply to the Gulf of Xeros, in a chain of hills, which extend as far as Cape Suvla. The precipitous fall of these hills precludes landing, except at a few narrow gullies, far too restricted for any serious military movements. The southern half of the peninsula is shaped like a badly-worn boot. The ankle lies between Kaba Tepe and Kalkmaz Dag; beneath the heel lie the cluster of forts at Kilid Bahr, whilst the toe is that promontory, five miles in width, stretching from Tekke Burnu to Sedd-el-Bahr.

The three dominating features in this southern section seemed to me to be:—

(1) Saribair Mountain, running up in a succession of almost perpendicular escarpments to 970 ft. The whole mountain seemed to be a network of ravines and covered with thick jungle.

(2) Kilid Bahr plateau, which rises, a natural fortification artificially fortified, to a height of 700 ft. to cover the forts of the Narrows from an attack from the Ægean.

(3) Achi Baba, a hill 600 ft. in height, dominating at long field gun range what I have described as being the toe of the peninsula.

A peculiarity to be noted as regards this last southern sector is that from Achi Baba to Cape Helles the ground is hollowed out like a spoon, presenting only its outer edges to direct fire from the sea. The inside of the spoon appears to be open and undulating, but actually it is full of spurs, nullahs, and confused under features.

Generally speaking the coast is precipitous, and good landing-places are few. Just south of Tekke Burnu is a small sandy bay (W), and half a mile north of it is another small break in the cliffs (X). Two miles further up the coast the mouth of a stream indents these same cliffs (Y 2), and yet another mile and a-half up a scrub-covered gully looked as if active infantry might be able to scramble up it on to heights not altogether dissimilar to those of Abraham by Quebec (Y). Inside Sedd-el-Bahr is a sandy beach (V), about 300 yards across, facing a semi-circle of steeply-rising ground, as the flat bottom of a half-saucer faces the rim, a rim flanked on one side by an old castle, on the other by a modern fort. By Eski Hissarlik, on the east of the Morto Bay (S) was another small beach, which was, however, dominated by the big guns from Asia. Turning northwards again, there are two good landing places on either side of Kaba Tepe. Farther to the north of that promontory the beach was supposed to be dangerous and difficult. In most of these landing-places the trenches and lines of wire entanglements were plainly visible from on board ship. What seemed to be gun emplacements and infantry redoubts could also be made out through a telescope, but of the full extent of these defences and of the forces available to man them there was no possibility of judging except by practical test.

Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to convince me that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success; whereas, on the other hand, a tentative or piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. The landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have described—a theatre strongly garrisoned throughout, and prepared for any such attempt—involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming

in military history except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes. The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns, or else so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration and counter-attack which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt. It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable if awkward contingency—the separation by considerable intervals of the force.

The weather was also bound to play a vital part in my landing. Had it been British weather there would have been no alternative but instantly to give up the adventure. To land two or three thousand men, and then to have to break off and leave them exposed for a week to the attacks of 34,000 Regular troops, with a hundred guns at their back, was not an eventuality to be lightly envisaged. Whatever happened the weather must always remain an incalculable factor, but at least by delay till the end of April we had a fair chance of several days of consecutive calm.

Before doing anything else I had to redistribute the troops on the transports to suit the order of their disembarkation. The bulk of the forces at my disposal had, perforce, been embarked without its having been possible to pay due attention to the operation upon which I now proposed that they should be launched.

Owing to lack of facilities at Mudros redistribution in that harbour was out of the question. With your Lordship's approval, therefore, I ordered all the transports, except those of the Australian Infantry Brigade and the details encamped at Lemnos Island, to the Egyptian ports. On March 24th I myself, together with the General Staff, proceeded to Alexandria, where I remained until April 7th, working out the allocation of troops to transports in minutest detail as a prelude to the forthcoming disembarkation. General d'Amade did likewise.

On April 1st the remainder of the General Headquarters, which had not been mobilized when I left England, arrived at Alexandria.

Apart from the rearrangements of the troops, my visit to Egypt was not without profit, since it afforded me opportunities of conferring with the G.O.C. Egypt and of making myself acquainted with the troops, drawn from all parts of the French Republic and of the British Empire, which it was to be my privilege to command.

By April 7th my preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable me to return with my General Staff to Lemnos, so as to put the finishing touches to my plan in close co-ordination with the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet.

The covering force of the 29th Division left Mudros Harbour on the evening of April 23rd for the five beaches, S, V, W, X, and Y. Of these, V, W, and X were to be main landings, the landings at S and Y being made mainly to protect the flanks, to disseminate the forces of the enemy, and to interrupt the arrival of his reinforcements. The landings at S and Y were to take place at dawn, whilst it was planned that the first troops for V, W, and X beaches should reach the shore simultaneously at 5.30 a.m. after half an hour's bombardment from the fleet.

The transports conveying the covering force arrived off Tenedos on the morning of the 24th, and during the afternoon the troops were transferred to the warships and fleet-sweepers in which they were to approach the shore. About midnight these ships, each towing a number of cutters and other small boats, silently slipped their cables, and, escorted by the 3rd squadron of the fleet, steamed slowly towards their final rendezvous at Cape Helles. The rendezvous was reached just

before dawn on the 25th. The morning was absolutely still; there was no sign of life on the shore; a thin veil of mist hung motionless over the promontory; the surface of the sea was as smooth as glass. The four battleships and four cruisers which formed the 3rd squadron at once took up the positions that had been allotted to them, and at 5 a.m., it being then light enough to fire, a violent bombardment of the enemy's defences was begun. Meanwhile the troops were being rapidly transferred to the small boats in which they were to be towed ashore. Not a move on the part of the enemy; except for shells thrown from the Asiatic side of the Straits the guns of the fleet remained unanswered.

The detachment detailed for S beach (Eski Hissarlik Point) consisted of the 2nd South Wales Borderers (less one company) under Lieut.-Colonel Casson. Their landing was delayed by the current, but at 7.30 a.m. it had been successfully effected at the cost of some 50 casualties, and Lieut.-Colonel Casson was able to establish his small force on the high ground near De Totts Battery. Here he maintained himself until the general advance on the 27th brought him into touch with the main body.

The landing on Y beach was entrusted to the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth (Marine) Battalion, Royal Naval Division, specially attached to the 29th Division for this task, the whole under command of Lieut.-Colonel Koe. The beach at this point consisted merely of a narrow strip of sand at the foot of a crumbling scrub-covered cliff some 200 feet high immediately to the west of Krithia.

A number of small gullies running down the face of the cliff facilitated the climb to the summit, and so impracticable had these precipices appeared to the Turks that no steps had been taken to defend them. Very different would it have been had we, as was at one time intended, taken Y 2 for this landing. There a large force of infantry, entrenched up to their necks, and supported by machine and Hotchkiss guns, were awaiting an attempt which could hardly have made good its footing. But at Y both battalions were able in the first instance to establish themselves on the heights, reserves of food, water, and ammunition were hauled up to the top of the cliff, and, in accordance with the plan of operations, an endeavour was immediately made to gain touch with the troops landing at X beach. Unfortunately, the enemy's strong detachment from Y 2 interposed, our troops landing at X were fully occupied in attacking the Turks immediately to their front, and the attempt to join hands was not persevered with.

Later in the day a large force of Turks were seen to be advancing upon the cliffs above Y beach from the direction of Krithia, and Colonel Koe was obliged to entrench. From this time onward his small force was subjected to strong and repeated attacks, supported by field artillery, and owing to the configuration of the ground, which here drops inland from the edge of the cliff, the guns of the supporting ships could render him little assistance. Throughout the afternoon and all through the night the Turks made assault after assault upon the British line. They threw bombs into the trenches, and favoured by darkness, actually led a pony with a machine-gun on its back over the defences, and were proceeding to come into action in the middle of our position when they were bayoneted. The British repeatedly counter-charged with the bayonet, and always drove off the enemy for the moment, but the Turks were in a vast superiority, and fresh troops took the place of those who temporarily fell back. Colonel Koe (since died of wounds) had become a casualty early in the day, and the number of officers and men killed and wounded during the incessant fighting was very heavy. By 7 a.m. on the 26th only about half of the King's Own Scottish Borderers remained to man the entrenchment made for four times their number. These brave fellows were absolutely worn out with continuous fighting; it was doubtful if reinforcements could reach them in time, and orders were issued for them to be re-embarked.

Thanks to His Majesty's ships "Goliath," "Dublin," "Amethyst," and "Sapphire," thanks also to the devotion of a small rearguard of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, which kept off the enemy from lining the cliff, the re-embarkation of the whole of the troops, together with the wounded, stores, and ammunition, was safely accomplished, and both battalions were brought round the southern end of the peninsula. Deplorable as the heavy losses had been, and unfortunate as was the tactical failure to make good so much ground at the outset, yet, taking the operation as it stood, there can be no doubt it has contributed greatly to the success of the main attack, seeing that the plucky stand made at Y beach had detained heavy columns of the enemy from arriving at the southern end of the peninsula during what it will be seen was a very touch-and-go struggle.

The landing-place known as X beach consists of a strip of sand some 200 yards long by eight yards wide at the foot of a low cliff. The troops to be landed here were the 1st Royal Fusiliers, who were to be towed ashore from His Majesty's ship "Implacable" in two parties, half a battalion at a time, together with a beach working party found by the Anson Battalion, Royal Naval Division. About 6 a.m. His Majesty's ship "Implacable," with a boldness much admired by the army, stood quite close in to the beach, firing very rapidly with every gun she could bring to bear. Thus seconded, the Royal Fusiliers made good their landing with but little loss. The battalion then advanced to attack the Turkish trenches on the Hill 114, situated between V and W beaches, but were heavily counter-attacked and forced to give ground. Two more battalions of the 87th Brigade soon followed them, and by evening the troops had established themselves in an entrenched position extending from half a mile round the landing-place and as far south as Hill 114. Here they were in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers, who had landed on W beach. Brigadier-General Marshall, commanding the 87th Brigade, had been wounded during the day's fighting, but continued in command of the brigade.

The landing on V beach was planned to take place on the following lines:—

As soon as the enemy's defences had been heavily bombarded by the fleet three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were to be towed ashore. They were to be closely followed by the collier "River Clyde" (Commander Unwin, R.N.), carrying between decks the balance of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and other details.

The "River Clyde" had been specially prepared for the rapid disembarkation of her complement, and large openings for the exit of the troops had been cut in her sides, giving on to a wide gang-plank by which the men could pass rapidly into lighters which she had in tow. As soon as the first tows had reached land the "River Clyde" was to run straight ashore. Her lighters were to be placed in position to form a gang-way between the ship and the beach, and by this means it was hoped that 2,000 men could be thrown ashore with the utmost rapidity. Further, to assist in covering the landing, a battery of machine guns, protected by sandbags, had been mounted in her bows.

The remainder of the covering force detailed for this beach was then to follow in tows from the attendant battleships.

V beach is situated immediately to the west of Sedd-el-Bahr. Between the bluff on which stands Sedd-el-Bahr village and that which is crowned by No. 1 Fort the ground forms a very regular amphitheatre of three or four hundred yards radius. The slopes down to the beach are slightly concave, so that the whole area contained within the limits of this natural amphitheatre, whose grassy terraces rise gently to a height of a hundred feet above the shore, can be swept by the

fire of a defender. The beach itself is a sandy strip some ten yards wide and 350 yards long, backed along almost the whole of its extent by a low sandy escarpment about four feet high, where the ground falls nearly sheer down to the beach. The slight shelter afforded by this escarpment played no small part in the operations of the succeeding thirty-two hours.

At the south-eastern extremity of the beach, between the shore and the village, stands the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, a battered ruin, with wide breaches in its walls and mounds of fallen masonry within and around it. On the ridge to the north, overlooking the amphitheatre, stands a ruined barrack. Both of these buildings, as well as No. 1 Fort, had been long bombarded by the fleet, and the guns of the forts had been put out of action; but their crumbled walls and the ruined outskirts of the village afforded cover for riflemen, while from the terraced slopes already described the defenders were able to command the open beach, as a stage is overlooked from the balconies of a theatre. On the very margin of the beach a strong barbed-wire entanglement, made of heavier metal and longer barbs than I have ever seen elsewhere, ran right across from the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr to the foot of the north-western headland. Two-thirds of the way up the ridge a second and even stronger entanglement crossed the amphitheatre, passing in front of the old barrack and ending in the outskirts of the village. A third transverse entanglement, joining these two, ran up the hill near the eastern end of the beach, and almost at right angles to it. Above the upper entanglement the ground was scored with the enemy's trenches, in one of which four pom-poms were emplaced; in others were dummy pom-poms to draw fire, while the debris of the shattered buildings on either flank afforded cover and concealment for a number of machine-guns, which brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground already swept by rifle fire from the ridge.

Needless to say, the difficulties in the way of previous reconnaissance had rendered it impossible to obtain detailed information with regard either to the locality or to the enemy's preparations.

As often happens in war, the actual course of events did not quite correspond with the intentions of the Commander. The "River Clyde" came into position off Sedd-el-Bahr in advance of the tows, and, just as the latter reached the shore, Commander Unwin beached his ship also. Whilst the boats and the collier were approaching the landing-place the Turks made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as if the landing was to be unopposed. But the moment the first boat touched bottom the storm broke. A tornado of fire swept over the beach, the incoming boats, and the collier. The Dublin Fusiliers and the naval boats' crews suffered exceedingly heavy losses while still in the boats. Those who succeeded in landing and in crossing the strip of sand managed to gain some cover when they reached the low escarpment on the further side. None of the boats, however, were able to get off again, and they and their crews were destroyed upon the beach.

Now came the moment for the "River Clyde" to pour forth her living freight; but grievous delay was caused here by the difficulty of placing the lighters in position between the ship and the shore. A strong current hindered the work, and the enemy's fire was so intense that almost every man engaged upon it was immediately shot. Owing, however, to the splendid gallantry of the naval working party, the lighters were eventually placed in position, and then the disembarkation began.

A company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way; but, short as was the distance, few of the men ever reached the farther side of the beach through the hail of bullets which poured down upon them from both flanks and the front. As the second company followed, the extemporized piers of lighters gave way in

the current. The end nearest to the shore drifted into deep water, and many men who had escaped being shot were drowned by the weight of their equipment in trying to swim from the lighter to the beach. Undaunted workers were still forthcoming, the lighters were again brought into position, and the third company of the Munster Fusiliers rushed ashore, suffering heaviest loss this time from shrapnel as well as from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun fire.

For a space the attempt to land was discontinued. When it was resumed the lighters again drifted into deep water, with Brigadier-General Napier, Captain Costeker, his Brigade Major, and a number of men of the Hampshire Regiment on board. There was nothing for them all but to lie down on the lighters, and it was here that General Napier and Captain Costeker were killed. At this time, between 10 and 11 a.m., about 1,000 men had left the collier, and of these nearly half had been killed or wounded before they could reach the little cover afforded by the steep, sandy bank at the top of the beach. Further attempts to disembark were now given up. Had the troops all been in open boats but few of them would have lived to tell the tale. But, most fortunately, the collier was so constructed as to afford fairly efficient protection to the men who were still on board, and, so long as they made no attempt to land, they suffered comparatively little loss.

Throughout the remainder of the day there was practically no change in the position of affairs. The situation was probably saved by the machine-guns on the "River Clyde," which did valuable service in keeping down the enemy's fire, and in preventing any attempt on their part to launch a counter-attack. One half-company of the Dublin Fusiliers, which had been landed at a camber just east of Sedd-el-Bahr village, was unable to work its way across to V beach, and by mid-day had only twenty-five men left. It was proposed to divert to Y beach that part of the main body which had been intended to land on V beach; but this would have involved considerable delay owing to the distance, and the main body was diverted to W beach, where the Lancashire Fusiliers had already effected a landing.

Late in the afternoon part of the Worcestershire Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers worked across the high ground from W beach, and seemed likely to relieve the situation by taking the defenders of V beach in flank. The pressure on their own front, however, and the numerous barbed-wire entanglements which intervened, checked this advance, and at nightfall the Turkish garrison still held their ground. Just before dark some small parties of our men made their way along the shore to the outer walls of the Old Fort, and when night had fallen the remainder of the infantry from the collier were landed. A good force was now available for attack, but our troops were at such a cruel disadvantage as to position, and the fire of the enemy was still so accurate in the bright moonlight that all attempts to clear the fort and the outskirts of the village during the night failed one after the other. The wounded who were able to do so without support returned to the collier under cover of darkness; but otherwise the situation at daybreak on the 26th was the same as it had been on the previous day, except that the troops first landed were becoming very exhausted.

Twenty-four hours after the disembarkation began there were ashore on V beach the survivors of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and of two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. The brigadier and his brigade-major had been killed; Lieut.-Colonel Carrington Smith, commanding the Hampshire Regiment, had been killed and the adjutant had been wounded. The adjutant of the Munster Fusiliers was wounded, and the great majority of the senior officers were either wounded or killed. The remnant of the landing party still crouched on the beach beneath the shelter of the sandy escarpment which had saved so many lives. With them were two officers of my General Staff—Lieut.-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Lieut.-

Colonel Williams. These two officers, who had landed from the "River Clyde," had been striving, with conspicuous contempt for danger, to keep all their comrades in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless imminent peril.

Now that it was daylight once more, Lieut.-Colonels Doughty-Wylie and Williams set to work to organize an attack on the hill above the beach. Any soldier who has endeavoured to pull scattered units together after they have been dominated for many consecutive hours by close and continuous fire will be able to take the measure of their difficulties. Fortunately General Hunter Weston had arranged with Rear-Admiral Wemyss about this time for a heavy bombardment to be opened by the ships upon the Old Fort, Sedd-el-Bahr Village, the Old Castle north of the village, and on the ground leading up from the beach. Under cover of this bombardment, and led by Lieut.-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Captain Walford, brigade-major R.A., the troops gained a footing in the village by 10 a.m. They encountered a most stubborn opposition and suffered heavy losses from the fire of well-concealed riflemen and machine guns. Undeterred by the resistance, and supported by the naval gunfire, they pushed forward, and soon after midday they penetrated to the northern edge of the village, whence they were in a position to attack the Old Castle and Hill 141. During this advance Captain Walford was killed. Lieut.-Colonel Doughty-Wylie had most gallantly led the attack all the way up from the beach through the west side of the village under a galling fire. And now when, owing so largely to his own inspiring example and intrepid courage, the position had almost been gained he was killed while leading the last assault. But the attack was pushed forward without wavering, and, fighting their way across the open with great dash, the troops gained the summit and occupied the Old Castle and Hill 141 before 2 p.m.

W beach consists of a strip of deep, powdery sand some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide, situated immediately south of Tekke Burnu, where a small gully running down to the sea opens out a break in the cliffs. On either flank of the beach the ground rises precipitously but, in the centre, a number of sand dunes afford a more gradual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. Much time and ingenuity had been employed by the Turks in turning this landing-place into a death-trap. Close to the water's edge a broad wire entanglement extended the whole length of the shore, and a supplementary barbed network lay concealed under the surface of the sea in the shallows. Land mines and sea mines had been laid. The high ground overlooking the beach was strongly fortified with trenches, to which the gully afforded a natural covered approach. A number of machine-guns also were cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as to be immune from a naval bombardment whilst they were converging their fire on the wire entanglements. The crest of the hill overlooking the beach was in its turn commanded by high ground to the north-west and south-east, and especially by two strong infantry redoubts near point 138. Both these redoubts were protected by wire entanglements about 20 ft. broad, and could be approached only by a bare glacis-like slope leading up from the high ground above W beach or from the Cape Helles lighthouse. In addition, another separate entanglement ran down from these two redoubts to the edge of the cliff near the lighthouse, making intercommunication between V and W beaches impossible until these redoubts had been captured.

So strong, in fact, were the defences of W beach that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of April 25th.

The landing at W had been entrusted to the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Bishop), and it was to the complete lack of the senses of danger or fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success. As in the case of the landing at X, the disembarkation had been delayed for half an hour, but at 6 a.m. the whole battalion approached the shore together, towed by eight picket boats in line abreast, each picket boat pulling four ships cutters. As soon as shallow water was reached, the tows were cast off and the boats were at once rowed to the shore. Three companies headed for the beach, and a company on the left of the line made for a small ledge of rock immediately under the cliff at Tekke Burnu. Brigadier-General Hare, commanding the 88th Brigade, accompanied this latter party, which escaped the cross fire brought to bear upon the beach, and was also in a better position than the rest of the battalion to turn the wire entanglements.

While the troops were approaching the shore no shot had been fired from the enemy's trenches, but as soon as the first boat touched the ground a hurricane of lead swept over the battalion. Gallantly led by their officers, the Fusiliers literally hurled themselves ashore and, fired at from right, left, and centre, commenced hacking their way through the wire. A long line of men was at once mown down as by a scythe, but the remainder were not to be denied. Covered by the fire of the warships, which had now closed right in to the shore, and helped by the flanking fire of the company on the extreme left, they broke through the entanglements and collected under the cliffs on either side of the beach. Here the companies were rapidly reformed, and set forth to storm the enemy's entrenchments wherever they could find them.

In making these attacks the bulk of the battalion moved up towards Hill 114, whilst a small party worked down towards the trenches on the Cape Helles side of the landing-place.

Several land mines were exploded by the Turks during the advance, but the determination of the troops was in no way affected. By 10 a.m. three lines of hostile trenches were in our hands, and our hold on the beach was assured.

About 9.30 a.m. more infantry had begun to disembark, and two hours later a junction was effected on Hill 114 with the troops who had landed on X beach.

On the right, owing to the strength of the redoubt on Hill 138, little progress could be made. The small party of Lancashire Fusiliers which had advanced in this direction succeeded in reaching the edge of the wire entanglements, but were not strong enough to do more, and it was here that Major Frankland, Brigade-Major of the 86th Infantry Brigade, who had gone forward to make a personal reconnaissance, was unfortunately killed. Brigadier-General Hare had been wounded earlier in the day, and Colonel Wolley-Dod, General Staff 29th Division, was now sent ashore to take command at W beach and organize a further advance.

At 2 p.m., after the ground near Hill 138 had been subjected to a heavy bombardment, the Worcester Regiment advanced to the assault. Several men of this battalion rushed forward with great spirit to cut passages through the entanglement; some were killed, others persevered, and by 4 p.m. the hill and redoubt were captured.

An attempt was now made to join hands with the troops on V beach, who could make no headway at all against the dominating defences of the enemy. To help them out the 86th Brigade pushed forward in an easterly direction along the cliff. There is a limit, however, to the storming of barbed-wire entanglements. More of these barred the way. Again the heroic wire-cutters came out. Through glasses they could be seen quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as if they were pruning a vineyard. Again some of them fell. The fire pouring

out of No. 1 Fort grew hotter and hotter until the troops, now thoroughly exhausted by a sleepless night and by the long day's fighting under a hot sun, had to rest on their laurels for a while.

When night fell the British position in front of W beach extended from just east of Cape Helles lighthouse, through Hill 138, to Hill 114. Practically every man had to be thrown into the trenches to hold this line, and the only available reserves on this part of our front were the 2nd London Field Company, R.E. and a platoon of the Anson Battalion, which had been landed as a beach working party.

During the night several strong and determined counter-attacks were made, all successfully repulsed without loss of ground. Meanwhile the disembarkation of the remainder of the division was proceeding on W and X beaches.

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps sailed out of Mudros Bay on the afternoon of April 24th, escorted by the 2nd Squadron of the Fleet, under Rear-Admiral Thursby. The rendezvous was reached just after half-past one in the morning of the 25th, and there the 1,500 men who had been placed on board H.M. ships before leaving Mudros were transferred to their boats. This operation was carried out with remarkable expedition, and in absolute silence. Simultaneously the remaining 2,500 men of the covering force were transferred from their transports to six destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. H.M. ships, together with the tows and the destroyers, proceeded to within some four miles of the coast, H.M.S. "Queen" (flying Rear-Admiral Thursby's flag) directing on a point about a mile north of Kaba Tepe. At 3.30 a.m. orders to go ahead and land were given to the tows, and at 4.10 a.m. the destroyers were ordered to follow.

All these arrangements worked without a hitch, and were carried out in complete orderliness and silence. No breath of wind ruffled the surface of the sea, and every condition was favourable save for the moon, which, sinking behind the ships, may have silhouetted them against its orb, betraying them thus to watchers on the shore.

A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected for the landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the Turks were not at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the tows having failed to maintain their exact direction the actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a blessing in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of the force of occupation has been much better defiladed from shell fire.

The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow strip of sand, about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and the south by two small promontories. At its southern extremity a deep ravine, with exceedingly steep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a north-easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore. Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is backed by the seaward face of the spur which forms the north-western side of the ravine. From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer, except near the southern limit of the beach, where gentler slopes give access to the mouth of the ravine behind. Further inland lie in a tangled knot the under-features of Saribair, separated by deep ravines, which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered with dense scrub, and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal mass of the mountain, from which they run north-west, west, south-west, and south to the coast.

The boats approached the land in the silence and the darkness, and they were close to the shore before the enemy stirred. Then about one battalion of Turks was seen running along the beach to intercept the lines of boats. At this so critical a moment the conduct of all ranks was most praiseworthy. Not a word was spoken—everyone remained perfectly orderly and quiet awaiting the enemy's fire, which sure enough opened, causing many casualties. The moment the boats touched land the Australians' turn had come. Like lightning they leapt ashore, and each man as he did so went straight as his bayonet at the enemy. So vigorous was the onslaught that the Turks made no attempt to withstand it, and fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry.

This attack was carried out by the 3rd Australian Brigade, under Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair MacLagan, D.S.O. The 1st and 2nd Brigades followed promptly, and were all disembarked by 2 p.m., by which time 12,000 men and two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery had been landed. The disembarkation of further artillery was delayed owing to the fact that the enemy's heavy guns opened on the anchorage and forced the transports, which had been subjected to continuous shelling from his field guns, to stand further out to sea.

The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for sending any formed detachments post haste as they landed to the critical point of the moment, the headlong valour of scattered groups of the men who had pressed far further into the peninsula than had been intended—all these led to confusion and mixing up of units. Eventually the mixed crowd of fighting men, some advancing from the beach, others falling back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified into a semi-circular position with its right about a mile north of Kaba Tepe and its left on the high ground over Fisherman's Hut. During this period parties of the 9th and 10th Battalions charged and put out of action three of the enemy's Krupp guns. During this period also the disembarkation of the Australian Division was being followed by that of the New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades only).

From 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. the enemy, now reinforced to a strength of 20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a specially strong effort against the 3rd Brigade and the left of the 2nd Brigade. This counter-attack was, however, handsomely repulsed with the help of the guns of His Majesty's ships. Between 5 and 6.30 p.m. a third most determined counter-attack was made against the 3rd Brigade, who held their ground with more than equivalent stubbornness. During the night again the Turks made constant attacks, and the 8th Battalion repelled a bayonet charge; but in spite of all the line held firm. The troops had had practically no rest on the night of the 24th-25th; they had been fighting hard all day over most difficult country, and they had been subjected to heavy shrapnel fire in the open. Their casualties had been deplorably heavy. But, despite their losses, and in spite of their fatigue, the morning of the 26th found them still in good heart and as full of fight as ever.

It is a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still more seriously. Several times our machine-guns got on to them in close formation, and the whole surrounding country is still strewn with their dead of this date.

The reorganization of units and formations was impossible during the 26th and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible until a reorganization could be effected, and it only remained to entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for bringing up ammunition, water, and supplies to the ridges—in itself a most difficult undertaking. Four battalions of the Royal Naval Division were sent up to reinforce the Army Corps on April 28th and 29th.

On the night of May 2nd a bold effort was made to seize a commanding knoll in front of the centre of the line. The enemy's enfilading machine-guns were too scientifically posted, and 800 men were lost without advantage beyond the infliction of a corresponding loss to the enemy. On May 4th an attempt to seize Kaba Tepe was also unsuccessful, the barbed-wire here being something beyond belief. But a number of minor operations have been carried out, such as the taking of a Turkish observing station; the strengthening of entrenchments; the reorganization of units; and the perfecting of communication with the landing-place. Also a constant strain has been placed upon some of the best troops of the enemy who, to the number of 24,000, are constantly kept fighting and being killed and wounded freely, as the Turkish sniper is no match for the Kangaroo shooter, even at his own game.

The assistance of the Royal Navy, here as elsewhere, has been invaluable. The whole of the arrangements have been in Admiral Thursby's hands, and I trust I may be permitted to say what a trusty and powerful friend he has proved himself to be to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

Concurrently with the British landings a regiment of the French Corps was successfully disembarked at Kum Kale under the guns of the French Fleet, and remained ashore till the morning of the 26th, when they were re-embarked. Five hundred prisoners were captured by the French on this day.

This operation drew the fire of the Asiatic guns from Morto Bay and V beach on to Kum Kale, and contributed largely to the success of the British landings.

On the evening of the 26th the main disembarkation of the French Corps was begun, V beach being allotted to our Allies for this purpose, and it was arranged that the French should hold the portion of the front between the telegraph wire and the sea.

The following day I ordered a general advance to a line stretching from Hill 236, near Eski Hissarlik Point, to the mouth of the stream two miles north of Tekke Burnu. This advance, which was commenced at midday, was completed without opposition, and the troops at once consolidated their new line. The forward movement relieved the growing congestion on the beaches, and by giving us possession of several new wells afforded a temporary solution to the water problem, which had hitherto been causing me much anxiety.

By the evening of the 27th the Allied forces had established themselves on a line some three miles long, which stretched from the mouth of the nullah, 3,200 yards north-east of Tekke Burnu, to Eski Hissarlik Point, the three brigades of the 29th Division less two battalions on the left and in the centre, with four French battalions on the right, and beyond them again the South Wales Borderers on the extreme right.

Owing to casualties this line was somewhat thinly held. Still it was so vital to make what headway we could before the enemy recovered himself and received fresh reinforcements that it was decided to push on as quickly as possible. Orders were therefore issued for a general advance to commence at 8 a.m. next day.

The 29th Division were to march on Krithia, with their left brigade leading, the French were directed to extend their left in conformity with the British movements and to retain their right on the coast-line south of the Kereves Dere.

The advance commenced at 8 a.m. on the 28th, and was carried out with commendable vigour, despite the fact that from the moment of landing the troops had been unable to obtain any proper rest.

The 87th Brigade, with which had been incorporated the Drake Battalion, Royal Naval Division, in the place of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and

South Wales Borderers, pushed on rapidly, and by 10 a.m. had advanced some two miles. Here the further progress of the Border Regiment was barred by a strong work on the left flank. They halted to concentrate and make dispositions to attack it, and at that moment had to withstand a determined counter-attack by the Turks. Aided by heavy gun fire from H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth," they succeeded in beating off the attack, but they made no further progress that day, and when night fell entrenched themselves on the ground they had gained in the morning.

The Inniskilling Fusiliers, who advanced with their right on the Krithia ravine, reached a point about three-quarters of a mile south-west of Krithia. This was, however, the farthest limit attained, and later on in the day they fell back into line with other corps.

The 88th Brigade on the right of the 87th progressed steadily until about 11.30 a.m., when the stubbornness of the opposition, coupled with a dearth of ammunition, brought their advance to a standstill. The 86th Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Casson, which had been held in reserve, were thereupon ordered to push forward through the 88th Brigade in the direction of Krithia.

The movement commenced at about 1 p.m., but though small reconnoitring parties got within a few hundred yards of Krithia, the main body of the brigade did not get beyond the line held by the 88th Brigade. Meanwhile the French had also pushed on in the face of strong opposition along the spurs on the western bank of the Kereves Dere, and had got to within a mile of Krithia with their right thrown back and their left in touch with the 88th Brigade. Here they were unable to make further progress; gradually the strength of the resistance made itself felt, and our Allies were forced during the afternoon to give ground.

By 2 p.m. the whole of the troops with the exception of the Drake Battalion had been absorbed into the firing line. The men were exhausted, and the few guns landed at the time were unable to afford them adequate artillery support. The small amount of transport available did not suffice to maintain the supply of munitions, and cartridges were running short despite all efforts to push them up from the landing places.

Hopes of getting a footing on Achi Baba had now perforce to be abandoned—at least for this occasion. The best that could be expected was that we should be able to maintain what we had won, and when at 3 p.m. the Turks made a determined counter-attack with the bayonet against the centre and right of our line even this seemed exceedingly doubtful. Actually a partial retirement did take place. The French were also forced back, and at 6 p.m. orders were issued for our troops to entrench themselves as best they could in the positions they then held, with their right flank thrown back so as to maintain connection with our Allies. In this retirement the right flank of the 88th Brigade was temporarily uncovered, and the Worcester Regiment suffered severely.

Had it been possible to push in reinforcements in men, artillery, and munitions during the day Krithia should have fallen, and much subsequent fighting for its capture would have been avoided.

Two days later this would have been feasible, but I had to reckon with the certainty that the enemy would in that same time have received proportionately greater support. I was faced by the usual choice of evils, and although the result was not what I had hoped, I have no reason to believe that hesitation and delay would better have answered my purpose.

For, after all, we had pushed forward quite appreciably on the whole. The line eventually held by our troops on the night of the 28th ran from a point on the coast three miles north-west of Tekke Burnu to a point one mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it was continued by the French south-east to the coast.

Much inevitable mixing of units of the 86th and 88th Brigades had occurred during the day's fighting, and there was a dangerous re-entrant in the line at the junction of the 87th and 88th Brigades near the Krithia nullah. The French had lost heavily, especially in officers, and required time to reorganize.

April 29th was consequently spent in straightening the line and in consolidating and strengthening the positions gained. There was a certain amount of artillery and musketry fire, but nothing serious.

Similarly, on the 30th, no advance was made, nor was any attack delivered by the enemy. The landing of the bulk of the artillery was completed, and a readjustment of the line took place, the portion held by the French being somewhat increased.

Two more battalions of the Royal Naval Division had been disembarked, and these, together with three battalions of the 88th Brigade withdrawn from the line, were formed into a reserve.

This reserve was increased on May 1st by the addition of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, which released the three battalions of the 88th Brigade to return to the trenches. The Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient had disembarked the whole of their infantry and all but two of their batteries by the same evening.

At 10 p.m. the Turks opened a hot shell fire upon our position, and half an hour later, just before the rise of the moon, they delivered a series of desperate attacks. Their formation was in three solid lines, the men in the front rank being deprived of ammunition to make them rely only upon the bayonet. The officers were served out with coloured Bengal lights to fire from their pistols, red indicating to the Turkish gunners that they were to lengthen their range; white that our front trenches had been stormed; green that our main position had been carried. The Turkish attack was to crawl on hands and knees until the time came for the final rush to be made. An eloquent hortative was signed "von Zowenstern" and addressed to the Turkish rank and file, who were called upon, by one mighty effort, to fling us all back into the sea.

"Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy him!"

"We shall not retire one step; for, if we do, our religion, our country, and our nation will perish!"

"Soldiers! The world is looking at you! Your only hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give up your life in the attempt!"

The first momentum of this ponderous onslaught fell upon the right of the 86th Brigade, an unlucky spot, seeing all the officers thereabouts had already been killed or wounded. So when the Turks came right on without firing and charged into the trenches with the bayonet they made an ugly gap in the line. This gap was instantly filled by the 5th Royal Scots (Territorials), who faced to their flank and executed a brilliant bayonet charge against the enemy, and by the Essex Regiment detached for the purpose by the Officer Commanding 88th Brigade. The rest of the British line held its own with comparative ease, and it was not found necessary to employ any portion of the reserve. The storm next broke in fullest violence against the French left, which was held by the Senegalese. Behind them were two British field artillery brigades and a howitzer battery. After several charges and counter-charges the Senegalese began to give ground, and a company of the Worcester Regiment and some gunners were sent forward to hold the gap. Later, a second company of the Worcester Regiment was also sent up, and the position was then maintained for the remainder of the night, although, about 2 a.m., it was found necessary to despatch one battalion Royal Naval Division to strengthen the extreme right of the French.

About 5 a.m. a counter-offensive was ordered, and the whole line began to advance. By 7.30 a.m. the British left had gained some 500 yards, and the centre had pushed the enemy back and inflicted heavy losses. The right also had gained some ground in conjunction with the French left, but the remainder of the French line was unable to progress. As the British centre and left were now subjected to heavy cross fire from concealed machine-guns, it was found impossible to maintain the ground gained, and therefore, about 11 a.m., the whole line withdrew to its former trenches.

The net result of the operations was the repulse of the Turks and the infliction upon them of very heavy losses. At first we had them fairly on the run, and had it not been for those inventions of the devil—machine-guns and barbed wire—which suit the Turkish character and tactics to perfection, we should not have stopped short of the crest of Achi Baba. As it was, all brigades reported great numbers of dead Turks in front of their lines, and 350 prisoners were left in our hands.

On the 2nd, during the day, the enemy remained quiet, burying his dead under a red crescent flag, a work with which we did not interfere. Shortly after 9 p.m., however, they made another attack against the whole Allied line, their chief effort being made against the French front, where the ground favoured their approach. The attack was repulsed with loss.

During the night 3rd-4th the French front was again subjected to a heavy attack, which they were able to repulse without assistance from my general reserve.

The day of the 4th was spent in reorganization, and a portion of the line held by the French, who had lost heavily during the previous night's fighting, was taken over by the 2nd Naval Brigade. The night passed quietly.

During the 5th the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire Division was disembarked and placed in reserve behind the British left.

Orders were issued for an advance to be carried out next day, and these and the three days' battle which ensued, will be dealt with in my next despatch.

The losses, exclusive of the French, during the period covered by this despatch were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering:—

177 officers and 1,990 other ranks killed,
412 officers and 7,807 other ranks wounded,
13 officers and 3,580 other ranks missing.

From a technical point of view it is interesting to note that my Administrative Staff had not reached Mudros by the time when the landings were finally arranged. All the highly elaborate work involved by these landings was put through by my General Staff working in collaboration with Commodore Roger Kayes, C.B., M.V.O., and the Naval Transport officers allotted for the purpose by Vice-Admiral de Robeck. Navy and Army carried out these combined duties with that perfect harmony which was indeed absolutely essential to success.

Throughout the events I have chronicled the Royal Navy has been father and mother to the Army. Not one of us but realizes how much he owes to Vice-Admiral de Robeck; to the warships, French and British; to the destroyers, mine sweepers, picket boats, and to all their dauntless crews, who took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to give their soldier comrades a fair run in at the enemy.

Throughout these preparations and operations Monsieur le Général d'Amade has given me the benefit of his wide experiences of war, and has afforded me always the most loyal and energetic support. The landing at Kum Kale planned by me as a mere diversion to distract the attention of the enemy was transformed

by the Commander of the Corps Expéditionnaire de l'Orient into 'a brilliant operation, which secured some substantial results. During the fighting which followed the landing of the French Division at Sedd-el-Bahr no troops could have acquitted themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances, and under very heavy losses, than those working under the orders of Monsieur de Général d'Amade.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., was in command of the detached landing of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps above Kaba Tepe, as well as during the subsequent fighting. The fact of his having been responsible for the execution of these difficult and hazardous operations—operations which were crowned with a very remarkable success—speaks, I think, for itself.

Major-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C.B., D.S.O., was tried very highly, not only during the landings, but more especially in the day and night attacks and counter-attacks which ensued. Untiring, resourceful and ever more cheerful as the outlook (on occasion) grew darker, he possesses, in my opinion, very special qualifications as a commander of troops in the field.

Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, C.B., is the best Chief of the General Staff it has ever been my fortune to encounter in war. I will not pile epithets upon him. I can say no more than what I have said, and I can certainly say no less.

I have many other names to bring to notice for the period under review, and these will form the subject of a separate report at an early date.

APPENDIX IX.

Despatch from the General Officer Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, dated August 26th, 1915.

The following report from General Sir Ian Hamilton, General Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, dated August 26th, was published in a supplement to the *London Gazette* :—

At the close of the ten days and ten nights described in my first despatch our troops had forced their way forward for some 5,000 yards from the landing-places at the point of the peninsula. Opposite them lay the Turks, who since their last repulse had fallen back about half a mile upon previously prepared redoubts and entrenchments. Both sides had drawn heavily upon their stock of energy and munitions, but it seemed clear that whichever could first summon up spirit to make another push must secure at least several hundreds of yards of the debatable ground between the two fronts. And several hundred yards, whatever it might mean to the enemy, was a matter of life or death to a force crowded together under gun-fire on so narrow a tongue of land. Such was the situation on May 5th, the date last mentioned in my despatch of the 20th of that month.

On that day I determined to continue my advance, feeling certain that even if my tired troops could not carry the formidable opposing lines they would at least secure the use of the intervening ground. Orders were forthwith issued for an attack.

The many urgent calls for reinforcements made during the previous critical fighting had forced me to disorganize and mix together several of the formations in the southern group, to the extent even of the French on our right having a British battalion holding their own extremest right. For the purposes of the impending fight it became therefore necessary to create temporarily a Composite Division, consisting of the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Infantry Brigades

(withdrawn for the purpose from the Northern Section), together with a Naval Brigade formed of the Plymouth and Drake battalions. The 29th Division was reconstituted into four brigades, *i.e.*, the 88th and 87th Brigades, the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade (T.F.), and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. The French Corps Expéditionnaire was reinforced by the 2nd Naval Brigade, and the new Composite Division formed my General Reserve.

The 29th Division, whose left rested on the coast about three miles north-east of Cape Tekke, was ordered to direct its right moving on the south-east edge of Krithia, while the Corps Expéditionnaire, with the 2nd Naval Brigade, had assigned to them for their first point of attack the commanding ridge running from north to south above the Kereves Dere. A foothold upon this ridge was essential, as its capture would ensure a safe pivot on which the 29th Division could swing in making any further advance. Communication between these two sections of the attack was to be maintained by the Plymouth and Drake battalions.

During the three days (6th-8th May) our troops were destined to be very severely tried. They were about to attack a series of positions scientifically selected in advance which, although not yet joined up into one line of entrenchment, were already strengthened by works on their more important tactical features.

The 29th Division led off at 11 a.m., the French Corps followed suit at 11.30 a.m.; every yard was stubbornly contested; some brigades were able to advance, others could do no more than maintain themselves. Positions were carried and held, other positions were carried and lost; but, broadly, our gunners kept lengthening the fuses of their shrapnel, and by 1.30 p.m. the line had been pushed forward two to three hundred yards. Here and there this advance included a Turkish trench, but generally speaking the main enemy position still lay some distance ahead of our leading companies.

By 4.30 p.m. it became clear that we should make no more progress that day. The French Corps were held up by a strong field work. They had made good a point upon the crest line of the lower slope of the Kereves Dere ridge, but there they had come under a fire so galling that they were unable, as it turned out, to entrench until nightfall. The 88th Brigade could not carry a clump of fir trees to their front; company after company made the perilous essay, but the wood, swept by hidden machine-guns, proved a veritable death-trap. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade also were only just barely holding on, and were suffering heavy losses from these same concealed machine-guns. The troops were ordered to entrench themselves in line and link up their flanks on either side.

At night, save for rifle fire, there was quiet along the whole British line. On the right a determined bayonet charge was made upon the French, who gave ground for the moment, but recovered it again at dawn.

Next morning (May 7th) we opened with shrapnel upon the enemy's trenches opposite our extreme left, and at 10 a.m. the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade began the attack. But our artillery had not been able to locate the cleverly sited German machine-gun batteries, whose fire rendered it physically impossible to cross that smooth glacis. Next to the right the 88th Brigade swept forward, and the 1/5th Royal Scots, well supported by artillery fire, carried the fir trees with a rush.

This time it was discovered that not only the enfilading machine-guns had made the wood so difficult to hold. Amongst the branches of the trees Turkish snipers were perched, sometimes upon small wooden platforms. When these were brought down the surroundings became much healthier. The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, of the 87th Brigade, were pushed up to support the left of the 88th, and all seemed well, when, at 1.20 p.m., a strong Turkish counter-attack drove us back out of the fir clump. As an offset to this check the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers captured three Turkish trenches and a second battalion of the 87th Brigade, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, was sent forward on the left to make these good.

At 3 p.m. the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade again reported they were definitely held up by the accurate cross-fire of batteries of machine-guns concealed in the scrub on the ridge between the ravine and the sea, batteries which also enfiladed the left flank of the 88th Brigade as it endeavoured to advance in the centre. Unless we were to acquiesce in a stalemate the moment for our effort had arrived, and a general attack was ordered for 4.45 p.m., the whole of the 87th Brigade to reinforce the 88th Brigade, and the New Zealand Brigade to support it.

Despite their exhaustion and their losses the men responded with a will. The whole force, French and British, rose simultaneously and made a rush forward. All along the front we made good a certain amount of ground, excepting only on our extreme left. For the third time British bayonets carried the fir clump in our centre, and when darkness fell the whole line (excepting always the left) had gained from 200 to 300 yards, and had occupied or passed over the first line of Turkish trenches.

The troops were now worn out; the new lines needed consolidating, and it was certain that fresh reinforcements were reaching the Turks. Balancing the actual state of my own troops against the probable condition of the Turks, I decided to call upon the men to make one more push before the new enemy forces could get into touch with their surroundings.

Orders were therefore issued to dig in at sundown on the line gained; to maintain that line against counter-attack, and to prepare to advance again next morning. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade was withdrawn into reserve, and its place on the left was taken by the brigade of New Zealanders.

General Headquarters were shifted to an entrenchment on a hill in rear of the left of our line. Under my plan for the fresh attack the New Zealand Brigade was to advance through the line held during the night by the 88th Brigade and press on towards Krithia. Simultaneously, the 87th Brigade was to threaten the works on the west of the ravine, whilst endeavouring, by means of parties of scouts and volunteers, to steal patches of ground from the areas dominated by the German machine-guns.

At 10.15 a.m. heavy fire from ships and batteries was opened on the whole front, and at 10.30 a.m. the New Zealand Brigade began to move, meeting with a strenuous opposition from the enemy, who had received his reinforcements. Supported by the fire of the batteries and the machine-guns of the 88th Brigade, they pushed forward on the right and advanced their centre beyond the fir trees, but could make little further progress. By 1.30 p.m. about 200 yards had been gained beyond the previously most advanced trenches of the 88th Brigade.

At this hour the French Corps reported they could not advance up the crest of the spur west of Kereves Dere till further progress was made by the British.

At 4 p.m. I gave orders that the whole line, reinforced by the 2nd Australian Brigade, would fix bayonets, slope arms, and move on Krithia precisely at 5.30 p.m.

At 5.15 p.m. the ships' guns and our heavy artillery bombarded the enemy's position for a quarter of an hour, and at 5.30 p.m. the field guns opened a hot shrapnel fire to cover the infantry advance.

The co-operation of artillery and infantry in this attack was perfect, the timing of the movement being carried out with great precision. Some of the companies of the New Zealand regiments did not get their orders in time, but acting on their own initiative they pushed on as soon as the heavy howitzers ceased firing, thus making the whole advance simultaneous.

The steady advance of the British could be followed by the sparkle of their bayonets until the long lines entered the smoke clouds. The French at first made no move, then, their drums beating and bugles sounding the charge, they suddenly darted forward in a swarm of skirmishers, which seemed in one moment to cover

the whole southern face of the ridge of the Kereves Dere. Against these the Turkish gunners now turned their heaviest pieces, and as the leading groups stormed the first Turkish redoubt the ink-black bursts of high-explosive shells blotted out both assailants and assailed. The trial was too severe for the Senegalese tirailleurs. They recoiled. They were rallied. Another rush forward, another repulse, and then a small supporting column of French soldiers was seen silhouetted against the sky as they charged upwards along the crest of the ridge of the Kereves Dere, whilst elsewhere it grew so dark that the whole of the battlefield became a blank.

Not until next morning did any reliable detail come to hand of what had happened. The New Zealanders' firing line had marched over the cunningly concealed enemy's machine-guns without seeing them, and these, re-opening on our supports as they came up, caused them heavy losses. But the first line pressed on and arrived within a few yards of the Turkish trenches which had been holding up our advance beyond the fir wood. There they dug themselves in.

The Australian Brigade had advanced through the Composite Brigade, and, in spite of heavy losses from shrapnel, machine-gun, and rifle fire, had progressed from 300 to 400 yards.

The determined valour shown by these two brigades, the New Zealand Brigade under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, and the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General the Hon. J. W. McCay, are worthy of particular praise. Their losses were correspondingly heavy, but in spite of fierce counter-attacks by numerous fresh troops they stuck to what they had won with admirable tenacity.

On the extreme left the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, made a final and especially gallant effort to advance across the smooth, bullet-swept area between the ravine and the sea, but once more the enemy machine-guns thinned the ranks of the leading companies of the South Wales Borderers, and again there was nothing for it but to give ground. But when night closed in the men of the 87th Brigade of their own accord asked to be led forward, and achieved progress to the extent of just about 200 yards. During the darkness the British troops everywhere entrenched themselves on the line gained.

On the right, the French column, last seen as it grew dark, had stormed and still held the redoubt round which the fighting had centred until then. Both General d'Amade and General Simonin had been present in person with this detachment and had rallied the Senegalese and encouraged the white troops in their exploit. With their bayonets these brave fellows of the 8th Colonials had inflicted exceedingly heavy losses upon the enemy.

The French troops whose actions have hitherto been followed belonged, all of them, to the 2nd Division. But beyond the crest of the ridge the valley of the Kereves Dere lies dead to anyone occupying my post of command. And in this area the newly-arrived brigade of the French 1st Division had been also fighting hard. Here they had advanced simultaneously with the 2nd Division and achieved a fine success in their first rush, which was jeopardised when a battalion of Zouaves was forced to give way under a heavy bombardment. But, as in the case of the 2nd Division, the other battalions of the 1st Regiment de Marche d'Afrique, under Lieut.-Colonel Nieger, restored the situation, and in the end the Division carried and held two complete lines of Turkish redoubts and trenches.

The net result of the three days' fighting had been a gain of 600 yards on the right of the British line and 400 yards on the left and centre. The French had captured all the ground in front of the Farm Zimmerman, as well as a redoubt, for the possession of which there had been obstinate fighting during the whole of the past three days.

This may not seem very much, but actually more had been won than at first meets the eye. The German leaders of the Turks were quick to realize the fact.

From nightfall till dawn on the 9th-10th efforts were made everywhere to push us back. A specially heavy attack was made upon the French, supported by a hot cannonade and culminating in a violent hand-to-hand conflict in front of the Brigade Simonin. Everywhere the assailants were repulsed, and now for the first time I felt that we had planted a fairly firm foothold upon the point of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Meanwhile in the Northern Zone also the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps had strengthened their grip on Turkish soil. Whilst in the south we had been attacking and advancing they had been defending and digging themselves more and more firmly into those cliffs on which it had seemed at first that their foothold was so precarious.

On May 11th, the first time for eighteen days and nights, it was found possible to withdraw the 29th Division from the actual firing line and to replace it by the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, and by the 42nd Division, which had completed its disembarkation two days previously. The withdrawal gave no respite from shells, but at least the men were, most nights, enabled to sleep.

The moment lent itself to reflection, and during the breathing space I was able to realize we had now nearly reached the limit of what could be attained by mingling initiative with surprise. The enemy was as much in possession of my numbers and dispositions as I was in possession of their first line of defence; the opposing fortified ranks stretched parallel from sea to straits; there was little scope left now, either at Achi Baba or at Kaba Tepe, for tactics which would fling flesh and blood battalions against lines of unbroken barbed wire. Advances must more and more tend to take the shape of concentrated attacks on small sections of the enemy's line after full artillery preparation. Siege warfare was soon bound to supersede manœuvre battles in the open. Consolidation and fortification of our front, improvement of approaches, selection of machine-gun emplacements and scientific grouping of our artillery under a centralized control must ere long form the tactical basis of our plans.

So soon, then, as the troops had enjoyed a day or two of comparative rest I divided my front into four sections. On the left was the 29th Division, to which the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was attached. In the left centre came the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division, on the right centre stood the Royal Naval Division, and at my right was the Corps Expéditionnaire. Thus I secured organization in depth as well as front, enabling each division to arrange for its own reliefs, supports, and reserves, and giving strength for defence as well as attack. Hitherto the piecemeal arrival of reinforcements had forced a hand-to-mouth procedure upon headquarters; now the control became more decentralized.

Already, before the new system of local efforts had come into working order, the 29th Indian Brigade had led the way towards it by a brilliant little affair on the night of May 10th-11th. The Turkish right rested upon the steep cliff north-east of Y beach, where the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion, Royal Naval Division, had made their first landing. Since those days the enemy had converted the bluff into a powerful bastion, from which the fire of machine-guns had held up the left of our attacks. Two gallant attempts by the Royal Munster Fusiliers and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers to establish a footing on this cliff on May 8th and 9th had both of them failed.

During the night of May 10th-11th the 6th Gurkhas started off to seize this bluff. Their scouts descended to the sea, worked their way for some distance through the broken ground along the shore, and crawled hands and knees up the precipitous face of the cliff. On reaching the top they were heavily fired on. As a surprise the enterprise had failed, but as a reconnaissance it proved very useful. On the following day Major-General H. V. Cox, Commanding the 29th

Indian Infantry Brigade, submitted proposals for a concerted attack on this bluff (now called Gurkha Bluff), and arrangements were made with the navy for co-operation. These arrangements were completed on May 12th; they included a demonstration by the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division and by our artillery, and the support of the attack from the sea by the guns of H.M.S. "Dublin" and H.M.S. "Talbot." At 6.30 p.m. on May 12th the Manchester Brigade and the 29th Divisional Artillery opened fire on the Turkish trenches, and under cover of this fire a double company of the 1/6th Gurkhas once more crept along the shore and assembled below the bluff. Then, the attention of the Turks being taken up with the bombardment, they swiftly scaled the cliffs and carried the work with a rush. The machine-gun section of the Gurkhas was hurried forward, and at 4.30 a.m. a second double company was pushed up to join the first.

An hour later these two double companies extended and began to entrench to join up their new advanced left diagonally with the right of the trenches previously held by their battalion.

At 6 a.m. a third double company advanced across the open from their former front line of trenches under a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, and established themselves on this diagonal line between the main ravine on their right and the newly captured redoubt. The fourth double company moved up as a support, and held the former firing line.

Our left flank, which had been firmly held up against all attempts on the 6th-8th was now, by stratagem, advanced nearly 500 yards. Purchased as it was with comparatively slight losses (21 killed, 92 wounded), this success was due to careful preparation and organization by Major-General H. V. Cox, commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. C. G. Bruce, commanding 1/6th Gurkhas, and Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) F. A. Wynter, R.G.A., commanding the artillery group supporting the attack. The co-operation of the two cruisers was excellent, and affords another instance of the admirable support by the navy to our troops.

On May 14th General Gouraud arrived and took over from General d'Amade the command of the Corps Expéditionnaire. As General d'Amade quitted the shores of the peninsula he received a spontaneous ovation from the British soldiers at work upon the beaches.

The second division of the Corps Expéditionnaire, commanded by General Bailloud, had now completed disembarkation.

From the time of the small local push forward made by the 6th Gurkhas on the night of May 10th-11th until June 4th the troops under my command pressed against the enemy continuously by sapping, reconnaissance, and local advances, whilst, to do them justice, they (the enemy) did what they could to repay us in like coin. I have given the escalade of Gurkha Bluff as a sample; no forty-eight hours passed without something of the sort being attempted or achieved either by the French or ourselves.

Turning now to where the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps were perched upon the cliffs of Sari Bair, I must begin by explaining that their rôle at this stage of the operations was—first, to keep open a door leading to the vitals of the Turkish position; secondly, to hold up as large a body as possible of the enemy in front of them, so as to lessen the strain at Cape Helles. Anzac, in fact, was cast to play second fiddle to Cape Helles, a part out of harmony with the dare-devil spirit animating those warriors from the South, and so it has come about that, as your Lordship will now see, the defensive of the Australians and New Zealanders has always tended to take on the character of an attack.

The line held during the period under review by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps formed a rough semi-circle inland from the beach of Anzac

Cove, with a diameter of about 1,100 yards. The firing line is everywhere close to the enemy's trenches, and in all sections of the position sapping, counter-sapping and bomb attacks have been incessant. The shelling both of the trenches and beaches has been impartial and liberal. As many as 1,400 shells have fallen on Anzac within the hour, and these of all calibres, from eleven inches to field shrapnel. Around Quinn's Post, both above and below ground, the contest has been particularly severe. This section of the line is situated on the circumference of the Anzac semi-circle at the furthest point from its diameter. Here our fire trenches are mere ledges on the brink of a sheer precipice falling 200 feet into the valley below. The enemy's trenches are only a few feet distant.

On May 9th a night assault, supported by enfilade fire, was delivered on the enemy's trenches in front of Quinn's Post. The trenches were carried at the point of the bayonet, troops established in them, and reinforcements sent up.

At dawn on May 10th a strong counter-attack forced our troops to evacuate the trenches and fall back on Quinn's Post. In opposing this counter-attack our guns did great execution, as we discovered later from a Turkish officer's diary that two Turkish regiments on this date lost 600 killed and 2,000 wounded.

On the night of May 14th-15th a sortie was made from Quinn's Post with the object of filling in Turkish trenches in which bomb-throwers were active. The sortie, which cost us some seventy casualties, was not successful.

On May 14th Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood was slightly wounded, but, I am glad to say, he was not obliged to relinquish the command of his corps.

On May 15th I deeply regret to say Major-General W. T. Bridges, commanding the Australian Division, received a severe wound, which proved fatal a few days later. Sincere and single-minded in his devotion to Australia and to duty, his loss still stands out even amidst the hundreds of other brave officers who have gone.

On May 18th Anzac was subjected to a heavy bombardment from large-calibre guns and howitzers. At midnight of the 18th-19th the most violent rifle and machine-gun fire yet experienced broke out along the front. Slackening from 3 a.m. to 4 a.m., it then broke out again, and a heavy Turkish column assaulted the left of No. 2 Section. This assault was beaten off with loss. Another attack was delivered before daylight on the centre of this section; it was repeated four times and repulsed each time with very serious losses to the enemy. Simultaneously a heavy attack was delivered on the north-east salient of No. 4 Section, which was repulsed and followed up, but the pressing of the counter-attack was prevented by shrapnel. Attacks were also delivered on Quinn's Post, Courtney's Post, and along the front of our right section. At about 5 a.m. the battle was fairly joined, and a furious cannonade was begun by a large number of enemy guns, including 12-in. and 9.2-in., and other artillery that had not till then opened. By 9.30 a.m. the Turks were pressing hard against the left of Courtney's and the right of Quinn's Post. At 10 a.m. this attack, unable to face fire from the right, swung round to the left, where it was severely handled by our guns and the machine-guns of our left section. By 11 a.m. the enemy, who were crowded together in the trenches beyond Quinn's Post, were giving way under their heavy losses.

According to prisoners' reports, 30,000 troops, including five fresh regiments, were used against us. General Liman von Sanders was himself in command.

The enemy's casualties were heavy, as may be judged from the fact that over 3,000 dead were lying in the open in view of our trenches. A large proportion of these losses were due to our artillery fire. Our casualties amounted to about 100 killed and 500 wounded, including nine officers wounded.

The next four days were chiefly remarkable for the carrying through of the negotiations for the suspension of arms, which actually took place on May 24th.

About 5 p.m. on May 20th white flags and Red Crescents began to appear all along the line. In No. 2 Section a Turkish staff officer, two medical officers, and a company commander came out and were met by Major-General H. B. Walker, commanding the Australian Division, half-way between the trenches.

The staff officer explained that he was instructed to arrange a suspension of arms for the removal of dead and wounded. He had no written credentials, and he was informed that neither he nor the General Officer Commanding Australian Division had the power to arrange such a suspension of arms, but that at 8 p.m. an opportunity would be given of exchanging letters on the subject, and that meanwhile hostilities would recommence after ten minutes' grace. At this time some stretcher parties on both sides were collecting wounded, and the Turkish trenches opposite ours were packed with men standing shoulder to shoulder two deep. Matters were less regular in front of other sections, where men with white flags came out to collect wounded. Meanwhile it was observed that columns were on the march in the valley up which the Turks were accustomed to bring up their reinforcements.

On hearing the report of these movements, General Sir W. R. Birdwood, Commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, ordered his trenches to be manned against possible attack. As the evening drew in the enemy's concentration continued, and everything pointed to their intention of making use of the last of the daylight to get their troops into position without being shelled by our artillery. A message was therefore sent across to say that no clearing of dead or wounded could be allowed during the night, and that any negotiations for such a purpose should be opened through the proper channel and initiated before noon on the following day.

Stretcher and other parties fell back, and immediately fire broke out. In front of our right section masses of men advanced behind lines of unarmed men holding up their hands. Firing became general all along the line, accompanied by a heavy bombardment of the whole position, so that evidently this attack must have been prearranged. Musketry and machine-gun fire continued without interruption till after dark, and from then up to about 4 a.m. next day.

Except for a half-hearted attack in front of Courtney's Post, no assault was made till 1.20 a.m., when the enemy left their trenches and advanced on Quinn's Post. Our guns drove the Turks back to their trenches, and beat back all other attempts to assault. By 4.30 a.m. on May 21st musketry fire had died down to normal dimensions.

As the Turks seemed anxious to bury their dead, and as human sentiment and medical science were both of one accord in favour of such a course, I sent Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, my Chief of the General Staff, on May 22nd to assist Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, commanding the Army Corps, in coming to some suitable arrangements with the representative sent by Essad Pasha. The negotiations resulted in a suspension of arms from 7.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. on May 24th. The procedure laid down for this suspension of arms was, I am glad to inform your Lordship, correctly observed on both sides.

The burial of the dead was finished about 3 p.m. Some 3,000 Turkish dead were removed or buried in the area between the opposing lines. The whole of these were killed on or since 18th of May. Many bodies of men killed earlier were also buried.

On May 25th, with the assistance of two destroyers of the Royal Navy, a raid was carried out on Nibrunesi Point. A fresh telephone line was destroyed and an observing station demolished.

On 28th May, at 9 p.m., a raid was made on a Turkish post overlooking the beach 1,200 yards north of Kaba Tepe, His Majesty's ship "Rattlesnake"

co-operating. A party of fifty rifles rushed the post, killing or capturing the occupants. A similar raid was made against an enemy trench to the left of our line which cost the Turks 200 casualties, as was afterwards ascertained.

From May 28th till June 5th the fighting seemed to concentrate itself around Quinn's Post. Three enemy galleries had been detected there, and work on them stopped by counter-mines, which killed twenty Turks and injured thirty. One gallery had, however, been overlooked, and at 3.30 a.m., on May 29th, a mine was sprung in or near the centre of Quinn's Post. The explosion was followed by a very heavy bomb attack, before which our left centre subsection fell back, letting in a storming party of Turks. This isolated one subsection on the left from the two other subsections on the right.

At 5.30 a.m. our counter-attack was launched, and by 6 a.m. the position had been retaken with the bayonet by the 15th Australian Infantry Battalion, led by Major Quinn, who was unfortunately killed. All the enemy in the trench were killed or captured, and the work of restoration was begun.

At 6.30 a.m. the Turks again attacked, supported by artillery, rifle, and machine-gun fire and by showers of bombs from the trenches. The fine shooting of our guns and the steadiness of the infantry enabled us to inflict upon the enemy a bloody repulse, demoralizing them to such an extent that the bomb throwers of their second line flung the missiles into the middle of their own first line.

At 8.15 a.m. the attack slackened, and by 8.45 a.m. the enemy's attacks had practically ceased.

Our casualties in this affair amounted to two officers and thirty-one other ranks killed, twelve officers and 176 other ranks wounded. The enemy's losses must have been serious, and were probably equal to those sustained on May 9th-10th. Except for the first withdrawal in the confusion of the mine explosion, all ranks fought with the greatest tenacity and courage.

On May 30th preparations were made in Quinn's Post to attack and destroy two enemy's saps, the heads of which had reached within five yards of our fire trench. Two storming parties of thirty-five men went forward at 1 p.m., cleared the sap heads, and penetrated into the trenches beyond, but they were gradually driven back by Turkish counter-attacks, in spite of our heavy supporting fire, our casualties being chiefly caused by bombs, of which the enemy seem to have an unlimited supply.

During May 31st close fighting continued in front of Quinn's Post.

On June 1st, an hour after dark, two sappers of the New Zealand Engineers courageously crept out and laid a charge of guncotton against a timber and sandbag bomb-proof. The structure was completely demolished.

After sunset on June 4th three separate enterprises were carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. These were undertaken in compliance with an order which I had issued that the enemy's attention should be distracted during an attack I was about to deliver in the Southern Zone.

1. A demonstration in the direction of Kaba Tepe, the navy co-operating by bombarding the Turkish trenches.

2. A sortie at 11 p.m. towards a trench 200 yards from Quinn's Post. This failed, but a second sortie by 100 men took place at 2.55 a.m. on June 5th and penetrated to the Turkish trench; demolished a machine-gun emplacement which enfiladed Quinn's Post, and withdrew in good order.

3. At Quinn's Post an assault was delivered at 11 p.m. A party of sixty men, accompanied by a bomb-throwing party on either flank, stormed the enemy's trench. In the assault many Turks were bayoneted and twenty-eight captured. A working party followed up the attack and at once set to work. Meanwhile

the Turkish trenches on the left of the post were heavily assailed with machine-gun fire and grenades, which drew from them a very heavy fire. After day-break a strong bomb attack developed on the captured trench, the enemy using a heavier type of bomb than hitherto.

At 6.30 a.m. the trench had to be abandoned, and it was found necessary to retire to the original fire trench of the post and the bomb-proof in front of its left. Our casualties were eighty; those of the enemy considerably greater.

On June 5th a sortie was made from Quinn's Post by two officers and 100 men of the 1st Australian Infantry, the objective being the destruction of a machine-gun in a trench known as German Officer's Trench. A special party of ten men, with the officer commanding the party (Lieutenant E. E. L. Lloyd, 1st Battalion (New South Wales) Australian Imperial Force), made a dash for the machine-gun; one of the ten men managed to fire three rounds into the gun at a range of five feet and another three at the same range through a loophole. The darkness of the trench and its overhead cover prevented the use of the bayonet, but some damage was done by shooting down over the parapet. As much of the trench as possible was dismantled. The party suffered some casualties from bombs, and was enfiladed all the time by machine-guns from either flank. The aim of this gallant assault being attained, the party withdrew in good order with their wounded. Casualties in all were thirty-six.

I now return to the Southern Zone and to the battle of June 4th.

From May 25th onwards the troops had been trying to work up within rushing distance of the enemy's front trenches. On May 25th the Royal Naval and 42nd Divisions crept 100 yards nearer to the Turks, and on the night of May 28th-29th the whole of the British line made a further small advance. On that same night the French Corps Expéditionnaire was successful in capturing a small redoubt on the extreme Turkish left west of the Kereves Dere.

All Turkish counter-attacks during May 29th were repulsed. On the night of 30th May two of their many assaults effected temporary lodgment. But on both occasions they were driven out again with the bayonet.

On every subsequent night up to that of June 3rd-4th assaults were made upon the redoubt and upon our line, but at the end of that period our position remained intact.

This brings the narrative up to the day of the general attack upon the enemy's front line of trenches which ran from the west to the Kereves Dere in a northerly direction to the sea.

Taking our line of battle from right to left the troops were deployed in the following order: The Corps Expéditionnaire, the Royal Naval Division, the 42nd (East Lancs) Division, and the 29th Division.

The length of the front, so far as the British troops were concerned, was rather over 4,000 yards, and the total infantry available amounted to 24,000 men, which permitted the General Officer Commanding VIIIth Army Corps to form a corps reserve of 7,000 men.

My general headquarters for the day were at the command post on the peninsula.

At 8 a.m. on June 4th our heavy artillery opened with a deliberate bombardment, which continued till 10.30 a.m. At 11 a.m. the bombardment recommenced and continued till 11.20 a.m., when a feint attack was made which successfully drew heavy fire from the enemy's guns and rifles. At 11.30 a.m. all our guns opened fire and continued with increasing intensity till noon.

On the stroke of noon the artillery increased their range, and along the whole line the infantry fixed bayonets and advanced.

The assault was immediately successful. On the extreme right the French 1st Division carried a line of trench, whilst the French 2nd Division, with the greatest dash and gallantry, captured a strong redoubt called the "Haricot," for which they had already had three desperate contests. Only the extreme left of the French was unable to gain any ground, a feature destined to have an unfortunate effect upon the final issue.

The 2nd Naval Brigade of the Royal Naval Division rushed forward with great dash; the "Anson" Battalion captured the southern face of a Turkish redoubt which formed a salient in the enemy's line, the "Howe" and "Hood" Battalions captured trenches fronting them, and by 12.15 p.m. the whole Turkish line forming their first objective was in their hands. Their consolidating party went forward at 12.25 p.m.

The Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division advanced magnificently. In five minutes the first line of Turkish trenches were captured, and by 12.30 p.m. the brigade had carried with a rush the line forming their second objective, having made an advance of 600 yards in all. The working parties got to work without incident, and the position here could not possibly have been better.

On the left the 20th Division met with more difficulty. All along the section of the 88th Brigade the troops jumped out of their trenches at noon and charged across the open at the nearest Turkish trench. In most places the enemy crossed bayonets with our men and inflicted severe loss upon us. But the 88th Brigade was not to be denied. The Worcester Regiment was the first to capture trenches, and the remainder of the 88th Brigade, though at first held up by flanking as well as fronting fire, also pushed on doggedly until they had fairly made good the whole of the Turkish first line.

Only on the extreme left did we sustain a check. Here the Turkish front trench was so sited as to have escaped damage from our artillery bombardment, and the barbed wire obstacle was intact. The result was that, though the 14th Sikhs on the right flank pushed on despite losses amounting to three-fourths of their effectives, the centre of the brigade could make no headway. A company of the 6th Gurkhas on the left, skilfully led along the cliffs by its commander, actually forced its way into a Turkish work, but the failure of the rest of the brigade threatened isolation, and it was as skilfully withdrawn under fire. Reinforcements were therefore sent to the left so that, if possible, a fresh attack might be organized. Meanwhile, on the right of the line, the gains of the morning were being compromised. A very heavy counter-attack had developed against the "Haricot."

The Turks poured in masses of men through prepared communication trenches, and, under cover of accurate shell fire, were able to recapture that redoubt. The French, forced to fall back, uncovered in doing so the right flank of the Royal Naval Division. Shortly before 1 p.m. the right of the 2nd Naval Brigade had to retire with very heavy loss from the redoubt they had captured, thus exposing in their turn the "Howe" and "Hood" Battalions to enfilade, so that they, too, had nothing for it but to retreat across the open under exceedingly heavy machine-gun and musketry fire.

By 1.30 p.m. the whole of the captured trenches in this section had been lost again, and the brigade was back in its original position, the "Collingwood" Battalion, which had gone forward in support, having been practically destroyed.

The question was now whether this rolling up of the newly captured line from the right would continue until the whole of our gains were wiped out. It looked very like it, for now the enfilade fire of the Turks began to fall upon the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division, which was firmly consolidating the furthest distant line of trenches it had so brilliantly won. After 1.30 p.m. it

became increasingly difficult for this gallant brigade to hold its ground. Heavy casualties occurred; the Brigadier and many other officers were wounded or killed; yet it continued to hold out with the greatest tenacity and grit. Every effort was made to sustain the Brigade in its position. Its right flank was thrown back to make face against the enfilade fire and reinforcements were sent to try to fill the diagonal gap between it and the Royal Naval Division. But ere long it became clear that unless the right of our line could advance again it would be impossible for the Manchesters to maintain the very pronounced salient in which they now found themselves.

Orders were issued, therefore, that the Royal Naval Division should co-operate with the French Corps in a fresh attack, and reinforcements were despatched to this end. The attack, timed for 3 p.m., was twice postponed at the request of General Gouraud, who finally reported that he would be unable to advance again that day with any prospect of success.

By 6.30 p.m., therefore, the 42nd Division had to be extricated with loss from the second line Turkish trenches, and had to content themselves with consolidating on the first line which they had captured within five minutes of commencing the attack. Such was the spirit displayed by this brigade that there was great difficulty in persuading the men to fall back. Had their flanks been covered nothing would have made them loosen their grip.

No further progress had been found possible in front of the 88th Brigade and Indian Brigade. Attempts were made by their reserve battalions to advance on the right and left flanks respectively, but in both cases heavy fire drove them back.

At 4 p.m. under support of our artillery the Royal Fusiliers were able to advance beyond the first line of captured trenches, but the fact that the left flank was held back made the attempt to hold any isolated position in advance inadvisable.

As the reserves had been largely depleted by the despatch of reinforcements to various parts of the line, and information was to hand of the approach of strong reinforcements of fresh troops to the enemy, orders were issued for the consolidation of the line then held.

Although we had been forced to abandon so much of the ground gained in the first rush, the net result of the day's operations was considerable—namely, an advance of 200 to 400 yards along the whole of our centre, a front of nearly three miles. That the enemy suffered severely was indicated, not only by subsequent information, but by the fact of his attempting no counter-attack during the night, except upon the trench captured by the French 1st Division on the extreme right. Here two counter-attacks were repulsed with loss.

The prisoners taken during the day amounted to 400, including eleven officers; amongst these were five Germans, the remains of a volunteer machine-gun detachment from the "Goeben." Their commanding officer was killed and the machine-gun destroyed. The majority of these captures were made by the 42nd Division under Major-General W. Douglas.

From the date of this battle to the end of the month of June the incessant attacks and counter-attacks which have so grievously swelled our lists of casualties have been caused by the determination of the Turks to regain ground they had lost, a determination clashing against our firm resolve to continue to increase our holding. Several of these daily encounters would have been the subject of a separate despatch in the campaigns of my youth and middle age, but, with due regard to proportion, they cannot even be so much as mentioned here. Only one example each from the French, British, and Australian and New Zealand spheres of action will be most briefly set down, so that your Lordship may

understand the nature of the demands made upon the energies and fortitude of the troops :

1. At 4.30 a.m. on June 21st the French Corps Expéditionnaire attacked the formidable works that flank the Kereves Dere. By noon their 2nd Division had stormed all the Turkish first and second line trenches to their front, and had captured the Haricot redoubt. On their right the 1st Division took the first line of trenches, but were counter-attacked and driven out. Fresh troops were brought up and launched upon another assault, but the Turks were just as obstinate and drove out the second party before they had time to consolidate. At 2.45 p.m. General Gouraud issued an order that full use must be made of the remaining five hours of daylight, and that before dark these trenches must be taken and held, otherwise the gains of the 2nd Division would be sacrificed. At 6 p.m. the third assault succeeded : 600 yards of trenches remained in our hands, despite all the heavy counter-attacks made throughout the night by the enemy. In this attack the striplings belonging to the latest French drafts especially distinguished themselves by their forwardness and contempt of danger. Fifty prisoners were taken, and the enemy's casualties (mostly incurred during counter-attacks) were estimated at 7,000. The losses of the Corps Expéditionnaire were 2,500.

2. The Turkish right had hitherto rooted itself with special tenacity into the coast. In the scheme of attack submitted by Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter Weston, commanding VIIIth Army Corps, our left, pivoting upon a point in our line about one mile from the sea, was to push forward until its outer flank advanced about 1,000 yards. If the operation was successful then, at its close, we should have driven the enemy back for a thousand yards along the coast, and the trenches of this left section of our line would be facing east instead of, as previously, north-east.

Obviously the ground to be gained lessened as our line drew back from the sea towards its fixed or pivotal right. Five Turkish trenches must be carried in the section nearest the sea : only two Turkish trenches in the section farthest from the sea. At 10.20 a.m. on June 28th our bombardment began. At 10.45 a.m. a small redoubt known as the Boomerang was rushed by the Border Regiment. At 11 a.m. the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, captured three lines of Turkish trenches. On their right the 4th and 7th Royal Scots captured the two Turkish trenches allotted to them, but farther to the east ; near the pivotal point the remainder of the 156th Brigade were unable to get on. Precisely at 11.30 a.m. the second attack took place. The 86th Brigade, led by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, dashed over the trenches already captured by their comrades of the 87th Brigade, and, pushing on with great steadiness, took two more lines of trenches, thus achieving the five successive lines along the coast. This success was further improved upon by the Indian Brigade, who managed to secure, and to place into a state of defence, a spur running from the west of the farthest captured Turkish trench to the sea. Our casualties were small : 1,750 in all. The enemy suffered heavily, especially in the repeated counter-attacks, which for many days and nights afterwards they launched against the trenches they had lost.

3. On the night of June 29th/30th the Turks, acting, as we afterwards ascertained, under the direct personal order of Enver Pasha to drive us all into the sea, made a big attack on the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, principally on that portion of the line which was under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley. From midnight till 1.30 a.m. a fire of musketry and guns of greatest intensity was poured upon our trenches. A heavy column then advanced to the assault, and was completely crumpled up by the musketry and machine-guns of the 7th and 8th Light Horse. An hour later another grand attack took place

against our left and left centre, and was equally cut to pieces by our artillery and rifle fire. The enemy's casualties may be judged by the fact that in areas directly exposed to view between 400 and 500 were actually seen to fall.

On the evening of this day, June 30th, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force suffered grievous loss owing to the wounding of General Gouraud by a shell. This calamity, for I count it nothing less, brings us down to the beginning of the month of July.

The command of the Corps Expéditionnaire Français d'Orient was then taken over by General Bailloud, at which point I shall close my despatch.

During the whole period under review the efforts and expedients whereby a great army has had its wants supplied upon a wilderness have, I believe, been breaking world records.

The country is broken, mountainous, arid, and void of supplies; the water found in the areas occupied by our forces is quite inadequate for their needs; the only practicable beaches are small, cramped breaks in impracticable lines of cliffs; with the wind in certain quarters no sort of landing is possible; the wastage, by bombardment and wreckage, of lighters and small craft has led to crisis after crisis in our carrying capacity, whilst over every single beach plays fitfully throughout each day a devastating shell fire at medium ranges.

Upon such a situation appeared quite suddenly the enemy submarines. On May 22nd all transports had to be despatched to Mudros for safety. Thenceforth men, stores, guns, horses, etc., etc., had to be brought from Mudros—a distance of forty miles—in fleet sweepers and other small and shallow craft less vulnerable to submarine attack. Every danger and every difficulty was doubled.

But the Navy and the Royal Engineers were not to be thwarted in their landing operations either by Nature or by the enemy, whilst the Army Service Corps, under Brigadier-General F. W. B. Koe, and the Army Ordnance Corps, under Brigadier-General R. W. M. Jackson, have made it a point of honour to feed men, animals, guns and rifles in the fighting line as regularly as if they were only out for manoeuvres on Salisbury Plain.

I desire, therefore, to record my admiration for the cool courage and unflinching efficiency with which the Royal Navy, the beach personnel, the engineers, and the administrative services have carried out these arduous duties.

In addition to its normal duties the Signal Service, under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel M. G. E. Bowman-Manifold, Director of Army Signals, has provided the connecting link between the Royal Navy and the Army in their combined operations, and has rapidly readjusted itself to amphibious methods. All demands made upon it by sudden expansion of the fighting forces or by the movements of General Headquarters have been rapidly and effectively met. The working of the telegraphs, telephones, and repair of lines, often under heavy fire, has been beyond praise. Casualties have been unusually high, but the best traditions of the Corps of Royal Engineers have inspired the whole of their work. As an instance, the central telegraph office at Cape Helles (a dug-out) was recently struck by a high-explosive shell. The officer on duty and twelve other ranks were killed or wounded and the office entirely demolished. But No. 72003 Corporal G. A. Walker, Royal Engineers, although much shaken, repaired the damage, collected men, and within thirty-nine minutes reopened communication by apologising for the incident and by saying he required no assistance.

The Royal Army Medical Service have had to face unusual and very trying conditions. There are no roads, and the wounded who are unable to walk must be carried from the firing line to the shore. They and their attendants may be shelled on their way to the beaches, at the beaches, on the jetties, and again, though I believe by inadvertence, on their way out in lighters to the hospital ships.

Under shell fire it is not as easy as some of the critically disposed seem to imagine to keep all arrangements in apple-pie order. Here I can only express my own opinion that efficiency, method, and even a certain quiet heroism have characterized the evacuation of the many thousands of our wounded.

In my three commanders of corps I have indeed been thrice fortunate.

General Gouraud brought a great reputation to our help from the battlefields of the Argonne, and in so doing he has added to its lustre. A happy mixture of daring in danger and of calm in crisis, full of energy and resource, he has worked hand in glove with his British comrades in arms, and has earned their affection and respect.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood has been the soul of Anzac. Not for one single day has he ever quitted his post. Cheery and full of human sympathy, he has spent many hours of each twenty-four inspiring the defenders of the front trenches, and if he does not know every soldier in his force, at least every soldier in the force believes he is known to his Chief.

Lieut.-General A. G. Hunter Weston possesses a genius for war. I know no more resolute commander. Calls for reinforcements, appeals based on exhaustion or upon imminent counter-attack, are powerless to divert him from his aim. And this aim, in so far as he may be responsible for it, is worked out with insight, accuracy, and that wisdom which comes from close study in peace combined with long experience in the field.

In my first despatch I tried to express my indebtedness to Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, and I must now again, however inadequately, place on record the untiring, loyal assistance he has continued to render me ever since.

The thanks of everyone serving in the peninsula are due to Lieut.-General Sir John Maxwell. All the resources of Egypt and all of his own remarkable administrative abilities have been ungrudgingly placed at our disposal.

Finally, if my despatch is in any way to reflect the feelings of the force, I must refer to the shadow cast over the whole of our adventure by the loss of so many of our gallant and true-hearted comrades. Some of them we shall never see again; some have had the mark of the Dardanelles set upon them for life; but others, and, thank God, by far the greater proportion, will be back in due course at the front.

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of the JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

DEAR SIR,—

The Chase, Farnham Royal, Bucks.

In the JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION for August, 1915, is published at p. 177 "Extract from the Journal of Lieut.-Colonel Sir W. M. Gomm, Quartermaster-General of Sir T. Picton's Division at the Battle of Waterloo, June 15th, 1815." In the footnote it is stated that "this diary, which has been contributed by Colonel F. H. Mountstevens, C.M.G., was found by him amongst the papers of his father." It is clear that this diary is a copy of the original, which is in my possession, and which was published by me *in extenso*—pp. 351-388—in my Life and Letters of the Field-Marshal, in the year 1881 (thirty-four years ago). A copy of this work I know you have in your library. Mine is the original diary, and there is a long and interesting note affixed to it in the Field-Marshal's own handwriting in the year 1862, saying: "That this sketchy and sadly rusty-

looking memoir, long lain to rest, was only evoked to disprove the ranting, shameful and false accounts of Victor Hugo and Thiers. The diary was all drawn up and written on the march from the field of battle to Paris in pursuit of Napoleon." No doubt, nearly thirty years after it was written, a copy or copies of it were made, more or less full, and it is one of these copies which fell into the hands of Colonel Mountsteven's father; and not having seen my "Life," published in 1881, Colonel Mountsteven thought he had got hold of an original which had not been published. It adds greatly to the value of the original to know that it was actually penned during that hurried march of two hundred miles in the heat of summer. Curiously enough, the original is all written in the present tense; in the copy all the verbs are in the past tense—otherwise the copy, as far as it goes, is correct *verbatim*.

I am, Sir,

Yours very faithfully,

(Signed) F. C. CARR-GOMM.

The Editor suggested to the writer of the above that perhaps it would be best to publish his letter in the next issue of the JOURNAL, after first submitting it to Colonel Mountsteven. To this Mr. Carr-Gomm at once agreed, saying again that he quite understood that Colonel Mountsteven, finding this diary among his father's papers, thought he had found an original document which it would be of general interest to publish. The correspondence was then passed to Colonel Mountsteven, who wrote in acknowledgment:—

Oddgest, Ston Easton, nr. Bath,

DEAR SIR,—

September 16th, 1915.

I thank you for your letter of the 13th inst., and return herewith the two letters you enclosed. Would you kindly send me a card giving me the correct designation of the writer, who I conclude to be a descendant of the Field-Marshal? I would like to write to him how I came into possession of my copy of the journal. My father joined the 28th Regiment in 1814, and the following year fought in that famous square depicted by Lady Butler in her celebrated painting, "Quatre Bras"; subsequently he was one of the ensigns carrying the Colours of the 28th at Waterloo, where he was severely wounded. The Field-Marshal mentions the 28th Regiment more than once in his journal, at Quatre Bras especially. The regiment formed a portion of the two brigades which bore the brunt of the French attacks: however, all this is doubtless well known to you.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) F. H. MOUNTSTEVEN.

PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY.

September—November, 1915.

THE REGIMENTAL RECORDS OF THE ROYAL SCOTS (THE FIRST, OR THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF FOOT). Compiled by J. C. Leask and Captain H. M. McCance. 4to. (Presented by the Committee of the Royal Scots Regimental Records). Alexander Thom & Co., Ltd.). Dublin, 1915.

THE FRENCH ARMY BEFORE NAPOLEON. By Spenser Wilkinson. 8vo. 5s. (Presented by the Delegates of the Clarendon Press). (Clarendon Press). Oxford, 1915.

- INSTRUCTION IN THE MACHINE-GUN. By Lieutenant D. McG. James. 12mo. 2s. (Presented by the Publishers). (Forster Groom & Co., Ltd.). London, 1915.
- ARTILLERY LINES OF FIRE WITH MAP AND COMPASS. By Lieutenant A. L. Hunt, R.F.A. (T.F.). Crown 8vo. 1s. (Presented by the Publishers). (Forster Groom & Co., Ltd.). London, 1915.
- HANDBOOK ON BATTERY DRILL FOR A FOUR-GUN BATTERY, R.F.A. By the late Lieutenant R. C. Mason, R.F.A. (T.F.). Revised in 1915 by Lieutenant A. L. Hunt, R.F.A. (T.F.). Crown 8vo. 1s. (Presented by the Publishers). (Forster Groom & Co., Ltd.). London, 1915.
- SHIP FORM, RESISTANCE AND SCREW PROPULSION. By G. S. Baker. 8vo. 12s. 6d. (Constable & Co., Ltd.). London, 1915.
- HISTORY OF THE STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA, LTD., 1862—1913. By George Thomas Amphlett. 8vo. (Presented by the Directors of the Standard Bank of South Africa, Ltd.). (Robert MacLehose & Co., Ltd.). Glasgow, 1914.
- IPRA OPULENTA—THE EARLIER HISTORY OF YPRES. By Colonel Sir Reginald Hardy, Bt. Crown 8vo. 1s. (Harrison & Sons). London, 1915.
- THE RAJPUTS: A FIGHTING RACE. By Thakur Shri Jessraj Singhji. Small 4to. £1 1s. (East & West, Ltd.). London, 1915.
- DESPATCHES FROM THE DARDANELLES. By E. Ashmead-Bartlett. Crown 8vo. 1s. (George Newnes, Ltd.). London, 1915.
- LA GUERRE DE 1914—L'ACTION DE L'ARMÉE BELGE POUR LA DÉFENSE DU PAYS ET LE RESPECT DE SA NEUTRALITÉ. Rapport du Commandant de l'Armée (Période du 31 juillet au 31 Décembre, 1914). Oblong 8vo. (Presented by Le Commandant Maton, Belgian Military Attaché). (Librairie Chapelot). Paris, 1915.
- THE WAR OF 1914—MILITARY OPERATIONS OF BELGIUM IN DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY AND TO UPHOLD HER NEUTRALITY. Report compiled by the Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army, for the period July 31st to December 31st, 1914. Oblong 8vo. 1s. (Presented by the Publishers). (W. H. & L. Collingridge). London, 1915.
- THE REVOLUTIONS OF PORTUGAL. Written in French by the Abbot de Vertot. Done into English from the last French Edition. Crown 8vo. (Presented by Mr. G. Sully). (W. Taylor). London, 1724.
- LA GUERRE EUROPEENNE—AVANT-PROPOS STRATÉGIQUES—LA MANŒUVRE MORALE (FRONT D'OCCIDENT, AOÛT 1914—MAI 1915). By Colonel F. Feyler. 8vo. 6s. (Payot & Cie). Paris, 1915.
- WITH THE RUSSIAN ARMY. By Major R. R. McCormick, First Cavalry, Illinois National Guards. Crown 8vo. 6s. (Presented by the Publishers). (Macmillan & Co., Ltd.). London, 1915.
- ETUDES HISTORIQUES ET STRATÉGIQUES—LA SOLUTION DES ENIGMES DE WATERLOO. By E. Lenient. 8vo. 9s. (Librairie Plon). Paris, 1915.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

- The Guilt of Lord Cochrane in 1814. By Edward Downes, 5th Lord Ellenborough: Smith, Elder & Co.

The author tells us in his preface that this book has been written chiefly for the purpose of refuting the attacks made upon his grandfather, the first Lord Ellenborough. It is, of course, a matter of very considerable difficulty to refute an attack without inflicting a certain degree of damage, material or moral, upon

the person attacked, but the writer has not contented himself with mere refutation, he has preferred a wholly damning indictment against Lord Cochrane in connection with the fraud upon the Stock Exchange for which in 1814 Lord Cochrane was tried, convicted and sentenced. Lord Cochrane was a very brilliant naval officer, if not indeed a nautical genius, in an age which had produced many remarkably able seamen; but Lord Ellenborough is probably not far wrong when he says of him that "no man ever blew his own trumpet with greater persistency or with greater success." In all that Lord Cochrane did throughout his remarkable and stormy career he was a law unto himself; and for most men that career would have come to an end when, in 1814, he was found guilty of a fraud of a particularly gross and ignoble kind, and was sentenced to the pillory, to imprisonment and to a heavy fine. He *may* have been innocent of the crime with which he was charged, as indeed he then and thereafter loudly asserted, but the evidence against him was overwhelming, and there can be no doubt he received a hearing the impartiality of which leaves no room for question. When his imprisonment came to an end Lord Cochrane entered the service of Chili, afterwards of Brazil and later of Greece, and we are of opinion that the author of this book is rather inclined to belittle these services, as indeed of those which Lord Cochrane had previously rendered to his own country. The British Admiralty seem, however, to have been under no delusions in regard to these latter, and but small, if any, opposition appears to have been met, when in 1832, or nearly eighteen years after his trial, Lord Dundonald, as he had then become, obtained a free pardon and was restored to the "Navy List." The naval reputation of Lord Cochrane rests, of course, in large measure upon "The Autobiography of a Seaman," written by a Mr. Earp, from statements made by Lord Cochrane, and which contained a very bitter attack upon Lord Ellenborough. It is with the contents of this book, of which a fresh edition was published in 1890 by the present Earl of Dundonald, that Lord Ellenborough's grandson quarrels, and against which he makes his counter-attack; but it is open to question whether the memory of the first Baron Ellenborough needed any defence against one who was, as was under the circumstances not perhaps unnatural, a very bitter enemy. The accusations contained in the "Autobiography" can do the late Lord Ellenborough little or no harm, and most people will perhaps be of opinion that infinitely more worthy of refutation are the opinions expressed in Lord Campbell's "account of the trial" and in his "Lives of the Chief Justices," to which in this book Lord Ellenborough devotes a comparatively small amount of attention.

The Regimental Records of the Royal Scots. Compiled by J. C. Leask and Captain H. M. McCance: Alex. Thom & Co., Ltd.

During the last few years there has been not only a very great increase in the number of regimental records which have been published, but there has been almost an equally great improvement in the historical value of the work which has been produced. For a considerable time regiments were content to entrust the compiling of their histories to any keen officer of the corps who was believed to possess a literary touch, and the records he put together were too often based almost entirely upon canon and upon the meagre manuscript records which had managed to survive the many vicissitudes of regimental wanderings. Quite within recent times a very great change has been apparent in this class of literature; it has been recognized that military history is based upon, and indeed largely made up of, the gleanings of regimental records: the compiling of these has been recognized as being a serious literary effort requiring special qualifications in those entrusted with it; and authors and compilers are learning more and more every day what a rich storehouse is the Record Office, and how much is to be found there and in other such places to reward the seeker after the hidden treasures

contained in old manuscripts and rolls of all kinds, stored away upon the dusty shelves of time. But those who formed the idea of compiling the history of a regiment like the Royal Scots, whose ancestry goes back to 1590 and which was made into a regiment no more than forty years later, may well have been overcome by the difficulty to be experienced in tracing back regimental history to so comparatively remote a period. But they have been extraordinarily successful, and are able to tell us much that is both regimentally and historically interesting of the Scots infantry companies which fought on the Continent in the service of Gustavus Adolphus and of the King of Bohemia, and in establishing their connection with the regiment whose two battalions may be said to have been fighting ever since. It would be quite impossible in the space available even briefly to touch upon the many campaigns in which the regiment has taken part—always with honour and generally with distinction; and even the twenty-nine honours borne upon its Colours give but a comparatively feeble idea of the extent, variety and value of its services in the field. The book is a very bulky volume; the story is not divided into chapters, but the narrative is traced year by year. The illustrations, whether portraits or coloured pictures of types of uniform, are many and good, but there are no maps; and while the several appendices contain many interesting items of information connected with the costumes, badges and trophies of the regiment, there is no roll of those officers who have served in it during the matter of nearly three centuries that it has been in existence. The Record is a truly remarkable one, it has been admirably compiled, illustrated, and turned out, and all ranks of all battalions of the regiment should be proud of the narrative which tells of the honoured life of the Royal Scots from 1633 to 1913.

The French Army Before Napoleon. By Professor Spenser Wilkinson: Oxford, Clarendon Press.

This book contains some half-dozen or so lectures delivered last year before the University of Oxford, and these are now published as a contribution to an attempt to understand the process of war. The author starts by telling us of some of the reasons which led to the triumph of revolutionary France over the armies of the European monarchies, and shows that while the Revolution itself was a transformation, the French Army had so prepared and studied during the last twenty years preceding it, that it was ready for the new organization, a new method of making war, and a new generalship. Two chapters are devoted by Professor Spenser Wilkinson to an examination of tactics and strategy in the French Army in the period between the Seven Years' War and the Revolution; and we are reminded of the close study which in his youth Napoleon had given to the military works published by those Frenchmen who had served in the Seven Years' War under de Broglie and other commanders. We are then told much about the organization of the French Army under Louis the Fifteenth, the reforms carried out by Choiseul and Saint-Germain, and the responsibility of the nobly-born officers for the gradual weakening of discipline in the ranks of their regiments. When the Revolution broke out the army, as then constituted, was practically disarmed by the defection of the Royalist officers, but, as the author reminds us, it led to the acceptance of the principle of promotion by merit and "made possible the rise of that galaxy of generals which, while its members were in the first flush of manhood, led the armies of France to victory." Finally we are told of the creation of these armies and of how, at last, France obtained the army she required, one fitted in every respect for war and an admirable weapon fashioned for the hand of the new young general who was to oppose armies which clung to the ideas and methods of a dead past. Not the least valuable part of this informing work is contained in the appendix, where are given extracts from that rare book, Bourcet's "*Principes de la guerre de Montagnes*."

Regimental War Tales. By Lieut.-Colonel A. F. Mockler-Ferryman: Alden & Co., Ltd.

There can scarcely be a harder task than to tell in brief, in a few small pages, the story of the military lives of two distinguished units of the British Army. Yet this is what Colonel Mockler-Ferryman has successfully accomplished in the little book under the above title, in which he tells for the soldiers of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry the regimental war tales of the regiment known by that name in modern days, and in old times as the 43rd and 52nd. Both regiments were raised in the middle of the eighteenth century, and almost at once commenced upon that series of great campaigns with which their names are inseparably connected—North America, the West Indies, the War of American Independence, the Peninsular War, the Waterloo Campaign, the Indian Mutiny, the War with the Dutch Republics, and many other frays, forays, and expeditions which the author includes under the headings of "Small Wars" or "Minor Expeditions." The list is a very long and a very glorious one, and wherever the 43rd and 52nd have fought there was, in the words of Napier, himself a 43rd man, "much glory." Colonel Mockler-Ferryman tells these regimental tales right well, as stories of events in which ancestors of those now serving have been engaged, which may, and surely will, prove an inspiration for those soldiers of the old regiment who are now engaged in warfare of equal severity, and for the hosts of regimental soldiers yet to come. The book is well illustrated with stirring battle-pictures and drawings in the text and has some good maps.

Military Operations of Belgium. Compiled by the Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army: W. & L. Collingridge.

In August last there was published in this country by the same firm *L'action de l'armée belge pour la défense du pays et le respect de sa neutralité*; we were then told that an edition in English was in the press, and this has now appeared and is issued in the same form and accompanied by the same maps and plans as was the earlier volume. The period covered is that of the first six months only of the war—from July 31st to December 31st—but it is unnecessary to remind readers that it deals with and describes events of the very gravest significance, pregnant with results affecting the whole course of the war. These events, however, important as they were, were to some extent dwarfed or overshadowed by those which followed after them; but the history of them would have been eminently worth publishing if only for the fact that it reveals beyond question that the Belgian Army was not organized or distributed for offence solely against any one of the possible belligerents, and that still less was it so ordered as to afford assistance either to France or to Germany should either, for the purpose of making war upon the other, have decided to advance through Belgium. King Albert's army was then arranged or distributed over the country in such a manner as best, commensurate with its comparatively feeble numbers, to maintain the neutrality of Belgium. The army, on a peace strength, comprised no more than six infantry divisions and one cavalry division, and of these four were so placed as to guard the regions through which danger might threaten Belgium from without; thus the 1st, or Flanders, Division faced England, the 3rd, or Liège, Division faced Germany, while the 4th and 5th Divisions faced France, the one guarding any possible attack on Namur, the other opposing an advance from the direction of Maubeuge and Lille. It is therefore abundantly evident that whatever military precautionary measures Belgium had adopted were solely "to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations; they could not possibly have been inspired by a feeling of defiance towards any of the Powers."

This distribution was actually maintained for more than twenty-four hours following the receipt of Germany's notification that she was about to violate the frontiers of Belgium, and consequently it was only after almost the whole territory was in the hands of the invaders that the field army, still happily intact, was able to effect, on the Yser, a junction with the forces of the guaranteeing Powers. The chapters into which this intensely interesting and dramatic narrative is divided describe the defence of Liège, the operations from August 6th to 20th, the defence of Namur, the operations from August 20th to September 27th, the defence of Antwerp, and the further operations up to the end of the year, including the battle of the Yser. These great operations are admirably described, the spirit of the original has been well maintained, and the book is illustrated by some eleven maps which greatly assist us in following the passing of the great events of those fateful six months in the history of Europe and more particularly of Belgium the Glorious.

La Bataille de Toulouse. By H. Geschwind and F. de Gélis: Edouard Privat, Toulouse.

This work was published last year and claims to have been compiled *d'après les documents les plus récents*, but while it is naturally rather more detailed than are the accounts of the battle as given by the majority of the more modern of the historians of the Peninsular War, most readers will, we think, be of opinion that no fresh light of any real importance is here projected upon the military operations which began with the French defeat at Orthes and which ended with the evacuation of Toulouse and the return of the Bourbons. The authors have consulted many authorities and much contemporary and later literature on the events of this period, but they are not all of them authorities upon which much reliance can be placed for correct views of anything which did not actually occur under their eyes. The diary of Woodberry, for instance, is frequently quoted: Woodberry was a young subaltern of the 18th Hussars, whose journal is exactly what one might expect from a pleasure-loving subaltern with something of the literary gift; he made copious notes and he gives an excellent presentment of the life of the regimental officer of a mounted corps; it is, however, obviously ridiculous seriously to quote Woodberry as an authority as to the extent of the British losses at the battle of Toulouse. The authors do not claim Toulouse as a victory for the French, nor do they admit that it was a defeat, for the reason that the army successfully effected its withdrawal; but it almost seems to be suggested that such success as attended the British was due to the small proportion of *Anglais de race* contained in Wellington's army! It is pleasantly remarked that "*les Anglais de race. . . . étaient déjà avarés de leur propre sang, conformément à une tradition séculaire qui est toujours suivie.*" This book was written no more than a year ago, and the above and the following sentence read strangely to-day when our soldiers and those of France are fighting side by side. Writing of young Fitzroy Somerset, afterwards Lord Raglan, the authors remind us that he commanded the British Army in the Crimea—*dans une des phases de l'entente cordiale, cette étiquette fallacieuse sous laquelle l'égoïsme politique de l'Angleterre a tant de fois dupé le candide français.* The authors tell us that Wellington's Quartermaster-General was a Frenchman, the Duke of Gramont; if this discovery has emerged from a study of *les documents les plus récents*, most students will prefer to trust to the older historians, who state that during that period the office was held by Murray. The estimate of the strength of the Spaniards with Wellington seems to be based upon somewhat unreliable data.

JOURNAL
OF THE
Royal United Service Institution,
WHITEHALL, S.W.

PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL.

Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers

VOL. LX.

AUGUST AND NOVEMBER, 1915.



LONDON:
J. J. KELIHER & CO., LIMITED, CRAVEN HOUSE, KINGSWAY, W.C.
AND MARSHALSEA WORKS, S.E.

1915.

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LONDON :
J. J. KELHER AND CO., LIMITED,
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INDEX.

AUGUST AND NOVEMBER, '1915.

	PAGE
AFGHAN WAR, First, Letters concerning the 44th Regiment during the retreat from Cabul in the	404
AFGHAN WAR, First, Diary of Lieut. C. F. Trower, 33rd B.N.I., during the	442
ANTWERP	56
ARABIA, Turkish, as a Link of Empire (Colonel A. C. Yate)	307
ARMY, The British, on the Continent, translation from <i>Le Temps</i>	361
BOTHA, General (see South Africa).	
CABUL (see Afghan War)	404
DOMINIQUE and Guadeloupe, Proceedings of the British Fleet in an action with the French Fleet off, April, 1782	187
FIGURE-HEADS, Concerning (Lieut.-Colonel C. Field, late R.M.L.I.)	315
FLANDERS, British Armies in (the Hon. J. Fortescue)	1
FORTY-FOURTH REGIMENT, Letters concerning the, during the Retreat from Cabul in the First Afghan War	404
GENOA, British Capture of (Captain C. T. Atkinson)	331
GERMAN UNIVERSITIES, The War and the (F. H. Skrine)	469
GOMM, Lieut.-Colonel Sir William, Extract from the Journal of	177
GUADALOUPE (see Dominique)	
HISTORIES, Regimental, Research Work for (C. R. B. Barrett)	49
LAWS OF NAVAL WAR, The, as Exemplified in the Present Struggle. By G. Laghezza, Royal Italian Navy. Translated from the <i>Rivista Marittima</i> by Assistant-Paymaster P. Smiles, R.N.	103
LOUISBURG, Journal of the Siege of (Lieutenant W. A. Gordon, 40th Regiment)	117
MERCANTILE MARINE, Some War Services of the (Commander W. F. Caborne, C.B., R.N.R.)	27
MINE-SWEEPING, The Development of the Science of, Translated from <i>Nauticus</i>	383
PENINSULAR WAR (see Smith, Journal of Captain William).	
PIRATES, A Brace of British (C. Case-Horton)	89
POWER TRACTION in War (Rt. Hon. Sir John Macdonald)	13
ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, Casual Rambles in the Museum of (Commander W. F. Caborne, C.B., R.N.R.)	344
SMITH, Journal of Captain William Smith, of the 11th Light Dragoons, during the Peninsular War	165
SOUTH AFRICA, With General Botha in (G. D. H.)	323
STANDING ORDERS, Regulations and Instructions (Captain Thomas Graves, R.N.)	153
TROWER, Lieutenant C. F., 33rd Bengal Native Infantry, Diary of, during the Afghan War of 1842	442
UNIFORM, Notes on the Evolution of, 1660—1822 (D. Hastings-Irwin)	63

	PAGE
WATERLOO, Sidelights on (F. H. Skrine)	21
WAR, The, and the German Universities (F. H. Skrine)	469
WAR, Naval, Past and Present (Admiral the Hon. Sir E. R. Fremantle, G.C.B., C.M.G.)	285

AUTHORS AND TRANSLATORS.

ATKINSON, Captain C. T. (The British Capture of Genoa, 1814) ...	331
BARRETT, C. R. B. (Research Work for Regimental Histories) ...	49
CABORNE, Commander, W. F., C.B., R.N.R. (Some War Services of the Mercantile Marine)	27
CABORNE, Commander W. F., C.B., R.N.R. (Casual Rambles in the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution)	344
CASE-HORTON, C. (A Brace of British Pirates)	89
FIELD, Lieut.-Colonel C., late R.M.L.I. (Concerning Figure-heads) ...	315
FORTESCUE, The Hon. J. (British Armies in Flanders)	1
FREMANTLE, Admiral the Hon. Sir E. R., G.C.B., C.M.G. (Naval War Past and Present)	285
G. D. H. (With General Botha in South Africa)	323
GRAVES, Captain Thomas, R.N. (Standing Orders, Regulations and Instructions)	153
HASTINGS-IRWIN, D. (Notes on the Evolution of Uniform, 1660-1822) ...	63
MACDONALD, The Rt. Hon. Sir John, K.C.B. (Power Traction in War) ...	13
SMILES, Assistant Paymaster P. (Translation : The Laws of Naval War) ...	103
SKRINE, Francis H. (The War and the German Universities)	469
SKRINE, Francis H. (Sidelights on Waterloo)	21
YATE, Colonel A. C. (Turkish Arabia as a Link of Empire)	307

FRONTISPIECES.

HIS Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaevitch, Generalissimo Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Russian Armies	<i>facing page</i>	1
THE foot of Too-too and the Range of the Sufed-Koh, from the hill where the last stand was made by the Remnant of the Cabul Force	<i>facing page</i>	285
SKETCH of the hill where the last stand was made by the Remnant of the Cabul Force, from the entrance to the Gundamuck Pass	<i>facing page</i>	285

MISCELLANEOUS.

CORRESPONDENCE	564
SECRETARY'S Notes	i., v.
THE War : its Naval Side	190, 474
THE War : its Military Side	241, 500
PRINCIPAL Additions to Library	276, 565
NOTICES of Books	279, 566

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